Cyber warfare as part of information warfare of Russia against Ukraine since the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion

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Mykhailo Dragomanov State University of Ukraine

CYBER WARFARE AS PART OF INFORMATION WARFARE OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 2022 RUSSIAN INVASION

Kateryna Fedotenko

Postgraduate student

Kyiv

Abstract

cyber dimension malware information

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine showcased the evolving nature of modern warfare, where cyber and information confrontations play a pivotal role alongside traditional kinetic engagements. This article provides a comprehensive examination of the cyber dimension of the conflict, highlighting several key findings. Historical analysis reveals a trajectory of escalating cyber engagements between Russia and Ukraine, setting the stage for the sophisticated cyber operations witnessed in 2022. Technical assessments underscore the advanced nature of malware deployed, with specific tools aimed at espionage, disruption, and information manipulation. A notable aspect of the conflict was the democratization of cyber warfare, where beyond state-led initiatives, grassroots movements and hacktivist groups emerged as significant players, contesting narratives and launching counter-offensives. The global implications of the Russia-Ukraine cyber dimension are vast, suggesting the need for international cyber norms, cooperative defense mechanisms, and a reevaluation of the role of non-state actors in geopolitical confrontations. This research offers a holistic lens into the cyber facet of the RussiaUkraine war, serving as a beacon for understanding the intricacies of digital warfare in contemporary conflicts.

Keywords: Cyber warfare, information warfare, Russia-Ukraine War, digital confrontations, grassroots resistance, advanced malware, technical analysis, global cyber implications, hacktivism, international cyber norms.

Statement of the problem and its significance

The digitization of the modern world has ushered in an era where state actors employ cyber tactics as a means of warfare. This shift in the nature of warfare, moving from traditional kinetic methods to the cyber realm, presents a multitude of challenges both in terms of defense and understanding. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine serves as a contemporary case study of this evolution in warfare. Beyond the visible confrontations on the ground, an invisible war raged in the cyber domain, with both nations deploying various tactics to further their strategic objectives [1; 2; 3].

This cyber dimension of warfare is not merely an auxiliary or supportive facet but stands as a critical component in the modern warfare matrix. With the increasing dependence on digital infrastructure, from communication to logistics, a successful cyberattack can cripple a nation's defense capabilities, disrupt its economy, and manipulate the narrative. Recognizing the importance of cyber warfare, especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, is essential for policymakers, military strategists, and academics. It is a pressing task to understand the intricacies of these cyber engagements, their implications, and the broader impact they have on the future of global conflict and security [1].

Analysis of the latest research and publications

The cyber dimension of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not a novel phenomenon but builds upon a history of cyber engagements between the two nations. The digital confrontations date back to the earlier stages of their geopolitical tensions, with notable incidents such as the 2015 blackout in Ukraine, which was attributed to Russian-affiliated actors [2; 6]. Since then, the methods, tools, and tactics have evolved, mirroring the advancements in cyber capabilities globally.

A critical analysis by N. Kostyuk and E. Gartzke [1] outlines the strategic rationale behind cyber operations. They emphasize that while cyber operations can serve as force multipliers, they are not standalone tools for achieving victory. Instead, they function optimally when integrated with traditional methods of warfare, a strategy evident in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. This integration manifests in various forms, from espionage and intelligence gathering to the disruption of critical infrastructure and information warfare.

Another pivotal study, the one by I. Kouper, delves into the information practices of resistance during the conflict [3]. This research underscores the importance of cyber capabilities not just for state actors but also for non-state entities and the general populace. With the proliferation of digital tools and platforms, information dissemination and resistance have been democratized. This means that ordinary citizens can engage in cyber resistance, challenging the narratives pushed by state actors and even sometimes countering cyber offensives.

The technological advancements in cyber capabilities were evident in the conflict. A detailed technical analysis by M. Willett reveals the sophistication of malware used, the precision of attacks targeting specific infrastructure, and the rapid evolution of tactics in response to defenses [4]. This dynamic nature of cyber warfare necessitates continuous research and adaptation.

Lastly, the broader implications of the Russia-Ukraine cyber conflict extend beyond the two nations. The war serves as a precedent, setting the stage for future conflicts where cyber operations play a pivotal role. This sentiment is echoed in various publications, emphasizing the global implications of the lessons learned from this conflict and the need for international cooperation and norm-setting in the cyber domain [see, e.g., 5; 6].

Purpose of the article (Statement of the aim)

The ongoing cyber dimension of the Russia-Ukraine conflict serves as an illustrative example of the evolving nature of warfare in the digital age. While there exists a wealth of research and analysis on various facets of this digital confrontation, there remains a need for a consolidated and comprehensive overview. This article aims to bridge that gap.

Presentation of the main research material and justification of the obtained scientific results

As previously mentioned, one of the most significant early incidents was the 2015 blackout in Ukraine's power grid. This cyberattack, attributed to Russian-affiliated actors, disrupted power to over 230,000 Ukrainians, marking one of the first instances of cyber operations with direct, tangible effects on civilian infrastructure [2]. In June 2017, a devastating ransomware attack named NotPetya spread globally, causing billions of dollars in damages. While it affected organizations worldwide, its epicenter was in Ukraine. This malware, which was later linked to the Russian military, disrupted operations in banks, media outlets, and transportation in Ukraine. While it masqueraded as ransomware, the primary intent was seemingly disruption rather than financial gain [7; 8].

Apart from the power grid attacks, Ukraine's critical infrastructure, including its railway system, airport operations, and governmental websites, faced several cyberattacks between 2015 and 2017. These attacks, often linked to Russian statesponsored groups, aimed to disrupt services, sow chaos, and undermine trust in Ukrainian institutions [9; 10]. Parallel to these disruptive attacks, cyber espionage campaigns were consistently observed. Tools like the BlackEnergy malware suite were deployed to infiltrate Ukrainian networks, gather intelligence, and lay the groundwork for potential future operations. These espionage efforts provided Russian actors with valuable insights into Ukraine's defense mechanisms, strategic plans, and vulnerabilities [10; 11].

The intricate web of digital confrontations between Russia and Ukraine before 2022 paints a picture of a persistent, evolving, and multi-faceted cyber conflict. These engagements, shaped by both global technological advancements and regional geopolitical dynamics, set the stage for the heightened cyber operations witnessed during the 2022 invasion [2].

The 2022 invasion saw the deployment of sophisticated malware, targeting specific infrastructure elements in Ukraine. One of the notable malware families was “X”, which had multifaceted capabilities, from espionage to direct disruption. Analysis of this malware revealed its potential origins, with code similarities pointing towards previously known Russian-affiliated cyber tools [4]. Nevertheless, Ukraine's defenses, bolstered by international cooperation and assistance, showcased the power of collaborative cyber defense. The years leading up to the 2022 invasion saw Ukraine enhancing its cybersecurity posture, recognizing the imminent threats it faced from its larger neighbor. Established by Ukrainian hacktivist groups, the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance played a significant role in not only defending against Russian cyber offensives but also launching counter-attacks. Their operations ranged from exposing Russian disinformation campaigns to unveiling intelligence about Russian operatives [12]. At the same time, recognizing the significance of the cyber threats faced by Ukraine, several Western countries, including the United States and member nations of the European Union, provided cybersecurity training to Ukrainian officials. This training aimed to enhance Ukraine's capacity to detect, mitigate, and respond to cyber threats effectively [13]. In so doing, Ukraine adopted an integrated approach to cyber defense, bringing together civilian experts, hacktivist groups, and military personnel. This collaborative strategy ensured a comprehensive defense mechanism, pooling resources, expertise, and intelligence to counter sophisticated cyber threats [2; 13; 14].

Beyond state-led cyber operations, the digital realm saw a surge in grassroots resistance. Platforms like social media became battlegrounds where narratives were contested. While Russia aimed to control the narrative through disinformation campaigns, Ukrainian citizens and global netizens countered these narratives, often leveraging digital tools to verify information in real-time [15]. As the war raged, numerous platforms and initiatives emerged, driven by ordinary citizens, to verify and debunk false information. These efforts often relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) methodologies, where publicly available data, such as satellite images, social media posts, and geolocation techniques, were used to corroborate or refute claims [15; 16]. Platforms like social media became active arenas for real-time factchecking. Whenever a dubious claim or piece of information surfaced, it was rapidly scrutinized, dissected, and verified by a decentralized network of vigilant netizens. This crowdsourced approach to fact-checking played a pivotal role in countering disinformation campaigns [17].

Moreover, non-state actors played a pivotal role. Groups like Anonymous openly declared support for Ukraine, launching cyber offensives against Russian governmental websites, media outlets, and other digital assets [16]. Beyond direct cyberattacks, hacktivists played a crucial role in exposing disinformation campaigns. By infiltrating communication channels, chat groups, and forums, they unveiled orchestrated efforts to spread false narratives, subsequently sharing these findings with the global community [17]. Some hacktivist groups engaged in cyber reconnaissance, infiltrating networks to gather intelligence, which was then shared with Ukrainian defense forces or published online to expose adversarial strategies and intentions [17]. Finally, hacktivists utilized their platforms to raise awareness about the ground realities of the conflict, advocating for support and solidarity for Ukraine. They played a pivotal role in mobilizing global digital communities, fostering a sense of shared responsibility and action [16].

The involvement of these non-state entities underscores the evolving nature of digital warfare. The line between state and non-state actors blurs as cyber capabilities become more accessible, and decentralized groups can exert significant influence on the digital battlefield. This democratization of cyber capabilities presents both challenges and opportunities, reshaping the contours of modern warfare and highlighting the need for adaptive strategies and frameworks [16, 17].

Overall, the Russia-Ukraine War's cyber dimension serves as a harbinger for future conflicts. Several key takeaways thus emerge:

1. Integration of kinetic and cyber operations: The seamless integration of cyber strategies with on-ground warfare strategies, as seen in the 2022 invasion, is likely to be emulated in future conflicts [1].

2. Role of non-state actors: The prominence of hacktivists and independent cyber groups in the conflict highlights the potential for such entities to play significant roles in future geopolitical confrontations [15; 17].

3. Needfor international cyber norms: The conflict underscored the absence of clear international norms in the cyber domain. As cyber operations become central to warfare, there is an urgent need for the global community to establish norms, ensuring a stable and predictable cyber environment [5]. Conclusions. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with its significant cyber dimension, has illuminated the intricacies and complexities of modern warfare in the digital age. Through a rigorous examination of the conflict's cyber aspects, several pivotal conclusions emerge:

1. Holistic warfare strategy: Modern conflicts no longer segregate between kinetic and digital. The Russia-Ukraine War exemplified how cyber operations are integrated seamlessly with traditional warfare strategies, enhancing their effectiveness.

2. Democratization of cyber warfare: The digital age has blurred the lines between state and non-state actors. With the right tools and knowledge, even non-state entities can significantly influence the cyber dimension of conflicts, as evident from the grassroots resistance and hacktivist interventions during the Russia-Ukraine War.

3. Global ramifications: The cyber strategies deployed in the Russia-Ukraine conflict aren't confined to these two nations. They serve as precedents, offering insights, lessons, and potential strategies for future confrontations globally. The conflict has accentuated the urgency for international cooperation and the establishment of cyber norms to ensure stability and predictability in the digital domain.

The Russia-Ukraine War, while immensely tragic for Ukraine and Europe, provides an invaluable case study for researchers, policymakers, and military strategists. As the nature of warfare continues to evolve, it is imperative to continuously adapt, innovate, and learn. This study underscores the need for further research, especially in areas like the psychological impact of information warfare, the economic ramifications of cyber operations, and the technical evolution of malware and defense mechanisms.

References

1. Kostyuk, N., Gartzke, E. (2022). Why cyber dogs have yet to bark loudly in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Texas National Security Review, 5(3), 113-126.

2. Kouper, I. (2022). Information practices of resistance during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Paper published in the proceedings of the 85th Annual Meeting of the Association for Information Science & Technology (October 29 - November 1, 2022) (pp. 157-168). Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

3. Park, C.Y., Mendelsohn, J., Field, A., Tsvetkov, Y (2022). Challenges and opportunities in information manipulation detection: An examination of wartime Russian media. Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2022, 5209-5235.

4. Willett, M. (2022). The cyber dimension of the Russia-Ukraine War. Survival, 64(5), 7-26.

5. Grossman, T. (2022). Norms vs. realities: Cyber at the UN. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 313. Retrieved from https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/577969.

6. Harnisch, S., Zettl-Schabath, K. (2023). Secrecy and norm emergence in cyber-space. The US, China and Russia interaction and the governance of cyber-espionage. Democracy and Security, 19(1), 82-110.

7. McQuade, M. (2018). The untold story of NotPetya, the most devastating cyberattack in history. Wired.com. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukrainerussia-code-crashed-the-world/

8. Nakashima, E. (2018). Russian military was behind `NotPetya'cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA concludes. Washington Post, January 12.

9. Dubov, D.V. (2018). Problemni pytannia komunikuvannia kiberatak v Ukraini: bozhlyvi shliakhy vyrishennia [Problematic issues of communicating cyberattacks in Ukraine: possible ways to solve the problem]. Retrieved from http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/ CyberCommunication-e06b5.pdf [in Ukrainian].

10. Kovacs, E. (2016). BlackEnergy malware used in Ukraine power grid attacks. Retrieved from https://www.securityweek.com/blackenergy-group-uses-destructive-plugin-ukraine-attacks/

11. Kalashnyk, P. (2018). V SBU zaiavyly, shcho otrymaly dokazy orhanizatsii Rosiieiu kiberatak proty Ukrainy [The Security Service of Ukraine announced that it had received evidence of Russia's organization of cyberattacks against Ukraine]. Hromadske.ua. Retrieved from https://hromadske.ua/posts/v-sbu-zayavili-sho-otrimali-dokazi-organizaciyi-rosiyeyu-kiberatakproti-ukrayini [in Ukrainian].

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13. Spivpratsia Ukrainy ta SShA u sferi kiberbezpeky dopomozhe protystoiaty vyklykam z boku krain-ahresoriv [Cooperation between Ukraine and the USA in the field of cyber security will help to resist challenges from aggressor countries]. (2018). Interfax.com.ua. Retrieved from https://interfax.com.ua/news/political/485603.html.

14. Valjataga, A. (2022). Cyber vigilantism in support of Ukraine: A legal analysis. Retrieved from https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2022/04/Cyber-vigilantism-in-support-of-Ukraine-alegal-analysis.pdf.

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