Postcolonial theory and its application to the post-soviet states

Imperial views regarding the indigenous populations of former colonies of Imperial Russia did not contradict, but rather reinforced the Marxists' ideas of nationalism and nationality, which posited that nationalism was regressive while small national states were archaic. Stephen Velychenko suggested that Bolsheviks «nationalised their communism» much like other Marxist movements in their respective countries while Lenin's principle of «the right of self-determination» was used as a pretext for the «imperial reunion» under the guise of improved conditions. He argues that most Bolsheviks, who had been educated in lines with the values and beliefs of the Russian Empire, did not consider Ukrainians foreign, but rather as a non-Russian minority, that had settled in Russian lands [26, p. 95]. Consequently, ethnic Ukrainians were officially permitted to join the Communist Party of Ukraine, work in Soviet institutions or hold high positions in the factories. However, they had to conform to the «Soviet Man» standard, which required complete adherence to Soviet (Russian Bolshevik) ideology and rejection of any aspect of national identity deemed undesirable or inferior by the Party. This unwritten rule was not ex- elusive to Ukraine but was also applied in other «Soviet republics», such as Georgia and Kazakhstan. Consequently, in the Soviet Republics, it was possible for individuals of different ethnic backgrounds, including Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and Georgians, to hold influential positions alongside ethnic Russians. In fact, due to their non-Russian nationality, they often had stronger incentives to remain loyal to the Central Government in order to avoid being labelled as «enemies» of the people.

Similarly, Mark von Hagen argues that the Soviet political order did not resolve the colonial question or «national question», as it was called in the Russian Empire, but rather transformed it in a way that could satisfy the needs of the new political organisation in Russia [28, p. 159]. Von Hagen also notes in another article, «From Imperial Russia to Colonial Ukraine», that when the Bolshevik regime came to power, they criticised Wilson's program as a mere mask for continued imperialism and colonial slavery [27, p. 182]. However, similarly to the Entente leaders who chose not to apply the infamous Fourteen Points to their own colonies, the Bolsheviks retained complete political and economic control over non-Russian imperial lands, which were called «republics».

Despite this, many scholars who acknowledge the restoration of the Russian empire under Bolshevik rule tend to omit the continuity of colonial practices in Russia, that leads to misinterpretation of colonialism and its consequences in the post-Soviet space. For example, Paul Robinson suggests that the mechanism of revival of Russian empire under Soviet rule was a gradual divergence from international tensions and external threats [20, pp. 244-247]. According to Robinson, early Soviet ideology was strongly against Russian nationalism and had an internationalist flavour. However, later on, the emphasis gradually shifted towards building a nation within the Soviet Union, that involved a return to «narrative history» that glorified figures from Russia's imperial past. This shift was brought about by political tensions in Europe in the 1930s, and was further intensified by the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Russian nationalism, thus, became the basis for rallying population against the external threat, as it was seen as a safer option compared to the nationalism of minorities who could potentially be viewed as fifth columns during the war.

While recognising the potential influence of external threats and tensions on the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, we hold a differing view that these factors alone can account for the regime's imperialistic actions. As previously discussed, the Bolsheviks' ideology inherently viewed Russia as a multinational state and the indigenous populations of its former colonies as minorities within that state. This suggests that colonial impulses were present from the outset of Soviet rule and persisted even after Stalin's death, which marked the end of the era of «Great Terror».

Following the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union underwent significant transformations both domestically and internationally, referred to as the «thaw» period in literature. This era was marked by a relaxation of propaganda, censorship, and ideology, as well as a desire for peaceful coexistence with other nations. Moreover, the USSR surprisingly became a vocal proponent of human rights on the international arena, particularly in regards to decolonisation, self- determination, and social rights, playing a crucial role in the establishment of the post-1945 human rights system. The Soviet government vigorously advocated for the inclusion of decolonisation, national liberation, and self-determination in the founding documents of the UN, while liberal Western powers held to the notion that only «mature» populations had the capability to exercise self- determination. In 1957, when Ghana joined the UN, Soviet leadership viewed it as their own achievement and presented the Soviet Union as a model for the rest of the world. Similar to the Soviet policies implemented since 1917, Khrushchev claimed that the nationalities who had endured oppression and poverty during the tsarist era were now experiencing freedom within the Soviet Union. He argued that through the principles of communist self-determination, these nationalities had the opportunity to cultivate their distinct cultures and make substantial advancements in their living standards [30, pp. 247-259].

Nonetheless, in reality, despite the Soviet Union's sincere endorsement of oppressed nations globally, it did not make any effort to grant autonomy to its own dependent populations. Instead, it used its image as a leader of the global socialist and anticolonial movement to justify military invasions of independent states such as the Baltic States, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. These double standards raise legitimate doubts about the genuine motives of the Soviet authorities when it comes to promoting human rights on the international stage. Indeed, after World War II, the so-called «Third World» became the battlefield in the Cold War between the USSR and the Western Block.

The internal changes that took place in the Soviet Union after the Stalin's death followed the similar pattern. Khrushchev initiated the constitution-making, which was intended to signal a new era in the USSR. However, despite the new constitution's emphasis on the democratic foundations of the Soviet system and a significantly extended chapter on citizens' basic rights, it did not bring any significant changes to Soviet law. As Christopher Osakwe commented, in spite of the official declarations, the new constitution did not introduce any innovative ideas to Soviet law. Furthermore, it does not generate any significant hopes among the general public, and fails to establish a new developmental policy for Soviet society [16].

Certainly, most of the Soviet citizens, especially the marginalised minorities, could not expect any significant changes from the soviet law. As Krawchenko pointed out, the official stance of the Soviet Union on national relationships was no different from Marx and Engels' perspective that ideology serves to hide the interests of dominant socio-political groups [8, pp. 175-182]. Although the relative easing of censorship allowed for the emergence of a strong dissident movement in the Soviet republics, the Russian Bolshevik regime used a range of repressive tactics, including bureaucratic harassment, psychiatric abuse, forced exile, and judicial persecution, to suppress the dissidents [22]. It is worth to note that some Russian dissidents were also subjected to repression, however they did not encounter the specific issue of the «national question» that was carried over from the Russian Empire to the Soviet regime. The social prejudice against indigenous nationalities and the russification policy persisted under the guise of the «merge» project (Russian - «sli- ianie»), which aimed to further assimilate these groups into Russian culture. Krawchenko contends that the notion of Georgians, with their Ibero-Caucasian language, joining forces with the Finno-Ugric Estonians or the Turkic Uzbeks to create a unified nation with a common language was illogical. Instead, the practical application of «sliianie» aimed to assimilate these distinct groups entirely into Russian culture [8, pp. 175-182].

The new Fundamental Law of the USSR provided a more detailed outline of power distribution between the Union and Soviet Republics, but it did not alter the legal and institutional framework of the Soviet Union. For example, while Article 72 of the Constitution granted Union Republics the right to secede from the USSR [3, Art. 72], the absence of any legal procedures to exercise this right meant that it was effectively meaningless. This was evident when the Baltic states attempted to gain independence through parliamentary votes and referendums, only to be met with a response from the Supreme Soviet claiming that their actions were invalid due to discrepancies with Articles 74 and 75 of the constitution. These articles asserted the supremacy of USSR law and the sovereignty of the USSR over its territory, creating a legal gap that many lawyers refer to as a «lacuna». The Soviet Union's overwhelming military power combined with the dependence of the judiciary from the Party effectively ensured that the right to secede was never truly granted.

Concerning the economic component of Soviet colonial policy, it is worth considering the main macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine. Figure 4 demonstrates the actual constant decrease in most of them, which is a sign of ineffective economic policy and exhausting extensive economic development. Stepan Zlupko emphasized an essential factor that is not to be omitted when talking about the dynamics and efficiency of the national economy in the 1960s-1980s. All the economic decisions, starting from setting prices, distributing capital investments, directing production, approving transport tariffs, taxes and so on, were made based on imperial, not Ukrainian interests [33, p. 342].

Figure 4. Average annual rates of growth of the main macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine (1961-1990), % Source: Own preparation based on [33, p. 337].

Another side of the coin was that Ukraine had limited capacity to provide itself with the final product. The integration of Ukrainian industry in the final product production amounted to 15-20%, while more than 70% in Russia [33, p. 361].

In general, evidence about Soviet colonialism covers a wide range of issues and spheres of life. In particular, such an issue as Soviet ecocide when almost a third of the ecological dirt of the empire was concentrated on 3% of the USSR's territory, i.e. Ukraine [33, p. 353]. Or the state of Ukrainian science and language as well. To demonstrate a colonial-periphery position of Ukrainian economic science, for instance, Zlupko noted, that «during the entire period of existence of the Ukrainian SSR, not a single work of the world economic classics was published in the Ukrainian language, if we do not count «Capital» and other works of Marx. All other classics were supposed to be replaced by the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev, etc. But the Ukrainian-speaking reader does not have Aristotle, Plato, Petty, Smith, Keene, Ricardo, Keynes, Samuelson, etc., etc.» which is important to keep pace with the achievement of the civilized world [34, p. 70].

Building upon the previous points, the Western perception of the Soviet regime as both anti-imperialistic and anticolonial was shaped by the role of socialist movements in the Western World and the USSR's involvement in the global decolonisation movement. However, this view fails to account for the domination-oriented attitude towards former colonies, ingrained in the Bolsheviks' ideology inherited from the Russian Empire, which persisted throughout the Soviet Union's existence until its dissolution. Many postcolonial scholars find it contradictory to believe that a country that championed the rights of the most underprivileged and subjugated peoples would also take a diametrically opposed stance towards other nations. Consequently, most of the atrocities committed by Russian Bolsheviks are often solely attributed to Stalin's «great terror», thereby overlooking the continuous oppression of nations within the USSR by the Bolshevik regime, which was carried out through quasi-colonial institutions that operated within the mainly declaratory in nature legal system. This continuity of colonialism experienced had a lasting impact on the development of ex-dependant states after the collapse of the USSR, exacerbated by the reluctance of the ex-colonial metropole, the present-day Russian Federation, to embrace its colonial past.

It is crucial to point out that not all former colonies of Russian Empire perfectly fit into the category of what Mark von Hagen referred to as «failed decolonization». Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were able to maintain their sovereignty for several decades before the Soviet invasion. As Andres Kasekamp points out, the newly autonomous states encountered numerous obstacles in constructing their government and establishing their national identity [6]. Nevertheless, they experienced a process of state-building, formed the required institutions, and fundamentally reorganised their economies, becoming notable exporters of food to Western Europe by the late 1930s. So, despite the interruption of the decolonisation process by the new invasion, the years of independence provided significant advantages to the Baltic States in restoring their independence in 1991. This sets them apart from former colonies of Russian empire, where the Bolshevik regime quickly replaced the old imperial regime.

Conclusion

Throughout this article, we focused on the applicability of postcolonial theory to the post-Soviet states and the untapped potential within this context. By scrutinising the intersections of theory and reality, we have sought to shed light on the unexplored avenues within the realm of postcolonial studies in this specific geopolitical landscape.

Analysis of the limitations of traditional postcolonial theory highlighted how it often overlooks the complex dynamics of the so-called «Second World». It was evident that the exploitation of indigenous populations was rationalised through their perceived «backwardness», creating a sense of inferiority based on any distinguishing characteristic. Colonialism's impact extended beyond mere racial or geographical boundaries. Drawing from this understanding, we delved into the colonial practices of both the Russian imperial and Bolshevik regimes. Despite variations in implementation, these practices exhibited striking similarities with Western colonialism, including economic exploitation, cultural imposition, and the perpetuation of an inferiority complex among the colonised.

Our analysis unveiled that exclusion of former colonies of Russian Empire from postcolonial studies primarily stemmed from a misperception of Bolshevik ideology, often considered anti-imperialist and anti-colonial. Our research revealed that the Bolsheviks monopolised the anti-imperialist communist movement, denying colonies the chance for independence. We also underscored the persistence of colonial practices, such as genocide and forced deportations, which have often been overlooked due to the Soviet Union's anti-colonial stance and the underrepresentation of post-Soviet states in global knowledge production.

Enriching our comprehension of global colonialism's multifaceted nature, this article underscores the urgent need to view the postimperial post-Soviet space through a postcolonial lens. By doing so, it advocates for a more inclusive examination of marginalised societies. Our approach supplements the prevailing discourse on Western colonialism, offering fresh perspectives and deepening our understanding of global colonial legacies. After all, a context-specific approach is indispensable to grasp the intricate trajectories of post- Soviet states. Such an approach informs enlightened policy decisions and transformative reforms, ensuring that these nations evolve in ways that resonate with their unique historical contexts. Furthermore, adopting a postcolonial framework facilitates the participation of scholars from diverse backgrounds in global knowledge production. This inclusive approach guarantees representation for various post-Soviet states, fostering a more comprehensive analysis of the colonial legacy and its global ramifications.

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