Our sample contains 1881 company-year observations for 171 American companies from 2003 to 2013. It is well known fact that RiskMetrics database has missing data for some years. To resolve the problem of missing observations we used the most recent data. This affords to compose the complete balanced panel dataset.

As well as we consider public companies, it is necessary to clarify current choice. There exists a big difference between functioning in public and private companies. The reward of managers mainly depends on success of the business in private companies. They earn more than managers in public companies do, because their work suggests riskiness. Such a system supposes the high level of control from the directors. In the US approximately 57% of the CEO also has a membership in the Board. Josh Lerner, a professor of Harvard Business School, asserts that intervention into work of managers is useful. The company in face of their directors should control managerial decisions to protect shareholder's interests. Public companies do not use this mechanism in spite of their advantages.

Key reason for considering the US public companies consists in findings that there exists expropriation by managers, what triggers to strengthening of agency conflicts and further slackness.

The sample consists of 171 largest public American companies from different industries during the last eleven years (2003 - 2013). The choice of sample consists in the following facts:

1) In the US and UK there is more flexible labor market, so that employees are apt to terminate their contracts at any time. For Germany and Japan, this is not peculiar. Employees usually do not transfer from company to company, because one of the features is concentration on high-quality and specific skills. Another peculiarity is the power of labor unions. For instance, in France, the unions have a significant impact on the decision-making, while in the US and UK only collective agreements make sense.

2) The UK and US managers often have professional degree in finance or management (or MBA); in Germany managers usually are technically oriented. Moreover, due to open labor markets there is a concentration of foreign-born managers in the US and UK in comparison with the European countries. It means that top management team will try to immerse into global operations.

3) Shareholders in the US and UK usually concentrated only on the maximization of their value. In Germany, banks very often play role as lenders and shareholders. Japan shareholders are not neutral; they usually take decisions in cooperation with top management.

4) The most effective boards are in the US and UK, because of the implementation of corporate law. In the UK, it is UK Corporate Governance Code, in the US - the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Japanese boards are very large, with more than 30-40 members. Furthermore, independent directors are almost absent, what restrict the decision-making process. Italian and French boards are medium, but still inefficient, because of small fraction of outsiders. The members of Germany Board are stakeholders (employees, suppliers and banks).

5) The role of government comes to market regulations and protection around takeovers. Due to the weak takeover barriers in the US and UK, the companies are able to work out anti-takeover measures. In most of European countries such as Italy, France, Germany and Japan there is opposite tendency.

All the issues reflect an appropriateness of data set.

Empirical results

This part of the research represents main results from panel regression analysis and interpretation of the obtained outcomes. Our main purpose is to reveal whether there is relationship between corporate governance and company performance variables and what kind of the relationship exists, especially in case of financial crisis to understand how it changes.

As well as we induced dummy variable for crisis the basic implemented approach is “difference in difference” method, which is very powerful approach in the context of testing the time effect. We started from 2003 in order to focus on the financial crisis and excluded data of 2000-2002 because of Sarbanes-Oxley Act rollout in 2002.

We tested four possible models for different company performance proxies: Tobin's q, return on invested capital (ROIC), earning per share (EPS) and growth rate of sales.

Tobin's q model

The table 1 reports the coefficients of the main regression. All variables with prefix “CRI” denote variables that characterize after-crisis corporate governance measures.



Table 1. The coefficients of Tobin's q model

Dependent variable	Tobin's q
Independent variables	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.
CEO_salaryp~c	-0,30838	0,2224042
CEO_bonusperc	0,080759	0,142318
CEO_optionp~c	-0,36784***	0,111276
CEOSharesow~p	0,024294	0,0222939
Boardsize	-0,06177***	0,0204781
Ratioindepe~t	-0,4307	0,3059828
Duality	-0,23172**	0,1122718
ofOtherBoards	0,003737	0,0054532
CRICEO_sala~c	0,172582	0,2955155
CRICEO_bonu~c	0,372236	0,2816585
CRICEO_opti~c	0,321098**	0,1342915
CRICEOShare~w	-0,0032	0,0266373
CRIBoardsize	0,062366***	0,0209011
CRIRatioind~t	0,944352*	0,5579457
CRIDual	0,158203	0,1154073
CRIofOtherB~s	-0,00866	0,0078692
_cons	-5,43756**	2,221461
Number of observations	1873
R-squared (within)	0,2113

***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.

Given outcomes represent appropriate relevance of corporate governance measures. The detailed results are provided in Appendix 5.

We can see the CEO option remains significant after the crisis and even changes the direction of the coefficient sign, what is more interesting for our consideration. Option reward was very popular compensation last decade, therefore negative sign for the data before 2008 reflects the desire of managers to overvalue the stock price. The sign of option reward coefficient before crisis confirms the proposed hypothesis #7. In case of stock drop, option-holders do not lose anything. In reality, this overprice leads to reduction in Tobin's q, as a reaction on artificial extent. Positive sign implies the necessity of the company to motivate managers to care about the shareholders' value. The option reward becomes more efficient instrument as an indicator of the managers' motivation.

The board size remains strictly significant over the period under review. The crisis had impact on the coefficient sign for the board size variable. Before-crisis the larger board makes operation worse and this confirms our hypothesis #1. Our result coincides with widespread statement that better Board operation ought to be managed by small group of directors. After the beginning of the crisis, the situation totally changes. The board size becomes negatively affected Tobin's q. This could be interpreted as follows: the most of companies suffered after the crisis and needed in more diversified operational institute. The larger board provides good experience, advices and talent of new directors who are able to bring the benefits for the company.

The share of independent directors in the board has very similar behavior to the board size variable. The only exception is insignificance on the before crisis period. However, here we consider opposite motivation. The widespread view shows that the independent directors are very important element of the board, who guarantees the absence of agreements inside the board and ensures the outside view about the company operation. The after-crisis result affords to accept the proposed hypothesis #2.

CEO duality stays significant only before crisis. The empowerment of CEO and chairman concentrated in the hand of one person negatively affects Tobin's q. This coincides with proposed hypothesis #3 and means the duality was inefficient characteristic in decision-making process. The empowerment should be separated in order to both CEO and chairman were accountable for their own responsibilities. The only powerful and well-informed CEO enable to do job for both and brings the value for the company. After the crisis, the duality does not make sense in case of company performance measures.

The rest variables have proven to be insignificant over the period under review. They have no impact on Tobin's q. Moreover, we can accept the hypothesis #5 about executive's salary.

In order to reveal the separate effect of corporate governance measures we also run the regressions for each explanatory variable. Table 2 reports the obtained results.

Table 2. The results of separated effect for Tobin's q model

Dependent variable	Tobin's q
Independent variables	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.
CEO_salaryp~c	-0,18838	0,1996568
CRICEO_sala~c	-0,02048	0,2580423
CEO_bonusperc	0,152067	0,1295348
CRICEO_bonu~c	0,297062	0,2886312
CEO_optionp~c	-0,36103***	0,0991942
CRICEO_opti~c	0,301728**	0,1251713
CEOSharesow~p	0,018793	0,0222664
CRICEOShare~w	-0,01574	0,0187194
Boardsize	-0,05419***	0,0199142
CRIBoardsize	0,053053***	0,0180667
Ratioindepe~t	-0,33994	0,2985537
CRIRatioind~t	0,887601	0,5610955
Duality	-0,22928*	0,1245054
CRIDual	0,210316	0,1411377
ofOtherBoards	-0,00687	0,0060369
CRIofOtherB~s	0,006197	0,0077419

***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.

The regressions' results look very similar to the previous one. The only difference is insignificance of independent directors' ratio after the financial crisis. However, this is not relevant because of significance level Details of regression results are in Appendix 5..

As we pointed out above the based approach is “difference in difference” method to account for time effect. By combining time-series of cross-section observations, panel data gives “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” Some advantages of panel data from Balgati, op. cit., 3-6. Our model mainly consists of the corporate governance measures that are not correlated. The table with correlation matrix is attached below.

Table 3. Correlation matrix of corporate governance proxies

	CEO_sal	CEO_bon	CEO_opt	CEOShar	Boardsiz	Ratioind	Duality	ofOtherB
CEO_sal	1,0000
CEO_bon	0,0660	1,0000
CEO_opt	0,0018	-0,1374	1,0000
CEOShar	0,1112	0,0199	0,0012	1,0000
Boardsiz	-0,0899	0,0247	-0,0191	-0,1907	1,0000
Ratioind	-0,1969	-0,2138	0,1038	-0,1072	0,0315	1,0000
Duality	-0,0161	0,1264	-0,0280	0,0015	0,1212	0,1419	1,0000
ofOtherB	-0,1731	0,0232	0,0081	-0,1294	0,4601	0,2494	0,1801	1,0000

Therefore, there is no problem with multicollinearity in the model. We considered clustered errors in our fixed effect regression to have correct estimators that take into account heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation if its exist. For our specification these problems does not make sense.

The only problem that could exist is endogeneity of CEO pay package elements. The company performance efficiency could affect the compensation of management. If the performance were good enough the Board and the compensation committee would reward the managers for their good job. To exclude this problem in all considered models we calculated the ratios for salary, bonus and value of option reward as the percentage of the total compensation. As well as the percentages of the total compensation are not correlated with the quantitative performance measures, we supposed these variables are not endogenous.

As regards with the share ownership in hand of CEO, the issue remains, but this is not so relevant question in case of consideration the proposed set of dependent variable. The reason is in fact that all performance proxies are relative measures.



ROIC model

The table 3 below contains the results of all regressions.

Table 4. The coefficients of ROIC models

Model	Return on invested capital	Return on invested capital with separated effects
Independent variables	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.
CEO_salaryp~c	-1,73626	2,007822	-1,303885	2,02713
CRICEO_sala~c	-4,80464	5,387668	-4,701849	4,59594
CEO_bonusperc	2,818331**	1,358524	2,409492*	1,416178
CRICEO_bonu~c	2,150483	4,020719	3,126353	4,457476
CEO_optionp~c	-1,53548	1,238025	-1,494555	1,0152
CRICEO_opti~c	-0,56597	1,39936	-0,6961144	1,585243
CEOSharesow~p	-0,05851	0,1274567	-0,0877077	0,1171075
CRICEOShare~w	-0,16213	0,1520295	-0,1200017	0,1399684
Boardsize	-0,04722	0,2661377	-0,2783148	0,1772136
CRIBoardsize	0,14107	0,2152094	0,2252751	0,1929833
Ratioindepe~t	3,309783	3,811701	2,270766	3,440529
CRIRatioind~t	-8,31226	8,201288	-3,413313	5,73989
Duality	-2,66931*	1,597234	-2,272415	1,428057
CRIDual	4,048493	2,525872	3,173458	2,016443
ofOtherBoards	-0,121	0,100384	-0,1373793	0,0861621
CRIofOtherB~s	-0,01743	0,0685555	0,0171845	0,0666111
_cons	-73,014***	18,09084
Number of observations	1873
R-squared (within)	0,0402

***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.

The share of CEO bonus is significant only before-crisis. Positive sign provides the motivation of executives to work better and receive the larger reward. The value of bonus depends on the company performance, and this could be the indicator of managerial efforts. We can confirm the proposed hypothesis #6.

Similar to the previous model CEO duality makes sense only before crisis. When CEO acts for the chairman, this leads to inefficiency in decision-making process. Negative impact on the return on invested capital coincides with the hypothesis #3.

EPS model

The results obtained under testing of earning per share as a dependent variable are very exiguous. The full regression does not implement significance of the corporate governance indicators. Thus, the table 4 reports only results of separate regressions.

Table 5. The results of separated effect for EPS model

Dependent variable	Earning per share
Independent variables	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.
CEO_salaryp~c	-5,500264*	3,240366
CRICEO_sala~c	7,938523	12,61406
CEO_bonusperc	7,621075	5,56075
CRICEO_bonu~c	-3,43042	3,047385
CEO_optionp~c	-0,556989	0,8281699
CRICEO_opti~c	1,315939	1,821415
CEOSharesow~p	0,1838977	0,1769575
CRICEOShare~w	0,0072625	0,1751674
Boardsize	1,055766	0,8154971
CRIBoardsize	-0,90587	0,6813637
Ratioindepe~t	0,3862623	1,571853
CRIRatioind~t	2,764515	2,200345
Duality	-0,440946	0,6479483
CRIDual	1,795108	2,625091
ofOtherBoards	0,1819711	0,1447963
CRIofOtherB~s	-0,125898	0,0877924

***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.

The only implication we can formulate is the relevance of the CEO salary for before-crisis data. Negative sign means this part of compensation offers demotivation for managers. This contradicts with the proposed hypothesis #5.

This model does not provide important implication because of dependent variable reflects balance sheet ratios and does not include market value. Appendix 7 contains details of regression analysis.

Sales growth rate model

Similar to the previous model we report only results of separate regressions in the table 5.

Table 6. The results of separated effect for Sales growth model

Dependent variable	Sales growth
Independent variables	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.
CEO_salaryp~c	-4,14961	7,693254
CRICEO_sala~c	-30,0446**	15,10648
CEO_bonusperc	13,6983*	7,441642
CRICEO_bonu~c	41,54872	53,23737
CEO_optionp~c	-8,77749**	3,887229
CRICEO_opti~c	0,839541	4,389159
CEOSharesow~p	-1,70599	1,255848
CRICEOShare~w	0,331377	0,541105
Boardsize	-0,39329	1,100706
CRIBoardsize	-0,60505	0,6969345
Ratioindepe~t	-8,25221	10,37004
CRIRatioind~t	11,00373	8,784578
Duality	6,159495*	3,560972
CRIDual	3,16911	3,877682
ofOtherBoards	0,237756	0,2528485
CRIofOtherB~s	0,342119	0,3728222

***, **, * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.

The directions of significant coefficients except duality coincide with the Tobin's q and ROIC implications. CEO salary becomes significant only after the crisis and gathers very strong negative sign. That confirms the hypothesis #5 for the before-crisis period. Salary represents fixed part of the executives' total compensation, therefore does not serve the instrument of motivations for them. They exactly know that receive this amount of reward. The induction of crisis enhances the operation in management team as some additional parts of remuneration such as bonuses decreases. Typically, the value of executive's bonus corresponds to the company performance and brings to managers benefits for their executed work. We can observe from the table above that the CEO bonus variable is significant only on the before-crisis base. Thus, after the crisis the only benefit for managers is the salary, which serve as inefficient measure.

These coefficient directions help to take a decision about the proposed hypotheses. The hypothesis #5 about salary are not accepted for after-crisis. We do not reject the hypothesis #6 only for after-crisis data.

Before the financial crisis, the option reward was well-known measure of executive compensation and negatively affected the sales growth rate, because of expropriation of shareholders. Thus, we accept the hypothesis #7.

Duality variable sign totally differs from the Tobin' q results. We can interpret that very powerful CEO who is well informed and has considerable experience enable to do decision-making process better. This contradicts with the hypothesis #3 and very widespread statement.

Final remarks

The table below contributes the results of all models.

Table 7. The combined results of modeling

	Before-crisis	After-crisis
Dependent variable	Tobin's q	ROIC	EPS	Sales growth	Tobin's q	ROIC	EPS	Sales growth
CEO salary percantage			-					-
CEO bonus percentage		+		+
CEO option percentage	-			-	+
CEO share ownership
Board size	-				+
Ratio of independent					+
Duality	-	-		+
Attendance in other boards

The signs `+' and `-' reflect the directions of the parameters' estimated coefficients. The empty boxes show insignificant variables.

Firstly, we can highlight that in our research we have the only one contradictive result about the variable Duality. Tobin's q and ROIC models show that CEO duality negatively affect them. That explains widespread statement about separation of CEO and chairman roles. Sales growth model demonstrates the opposite sign. We suppose the powerful CEO could do decision-making process more efficient, when the management has a primary goal to increase sales.

All other results for each separate periods are close. The induction of crisis deteriorates corporate governance functioning. The parameters that were significant either become irrelevant or change the sign on the opposite after the crisis. The value of option reward coefficient becomes positive and serves the motivation for management to work better as well as bonuses' amount decreases. Moreover, after the crisis the board size has strictly positive effect on the performance, as the companies need in new directors' experience, advices and knowledge.

Two variables - CEO share ownership and attendance in other boards - are insignificant for all models and do not have impact on the company performance.

Our settings suggest that corporate governance variables examine the collapses of company performance during the crisis of 2008-2009 because of changes in coefficient directions and insignificance of `crisis' corporate governance variables (Johnson et al., 2000).

Furthermore, our outcomes coincide with several previous settings:

§ After the crisis, the corporate governance does not affect the company performance (Gupta et al., 2011)

§ The board size negatively affects the performance (Wang et al., 2013)

§ The share of independent directors has positive influence on the company performance (Francis et al., 2010; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Core et al., 1999)

§ CEO option reward enhances expropriation of shareholders from management and decreases the performance (Bender, 2005)

§ CEO salary negatively affects the performance (Core et al., 1999)

Conclusion

The aspects related to the corporate governance systems do not lose their relevance, as many of the questions connected to the financial crisis and its determinants have not been studied yet. The correspondence between executive's compensation package elements and the company performance under the financial crisis has not been studied previously. Furthermore, shareholders are interested in these issues, because of their direct effect on future investment decisions.

The main goal of this paper is to define the boundaries for existing works devoted to the importance of the quality of corporate governance under uncertainty and high risks in the current environment that are respectively the object and the subject of this study.

After the review of the research papers about the corresponding topic we revealed that few studies address the related problems and the existing hypotheses should be tested on supplementary data with alternative mathematical approaches. The detailed methodology has been presented applying pros and cons of different approaches to the selection of independent and dependent variables. As well as we are interested in testing the time effect, the basic implemented approach is “difference in difference” method, which is very a powerful econometric tool. We study the time period starting in 2003 in order to focus on the financial crisis and excluded data for 2000-2002 because of Sarbanes-Oxley Act rollout in 2002. Thus, our data covers financial performance and corporate governance indicators for the sample of 171 public companies from S&P 500 listed on New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. The data is provided by Bloomberg (company financials, especially performance proxies and balance sheet ratios), Execucomp (CEO total compensation elements and executives' ownership in share capital) and RiskMetrics (board structure).

We tested the nature of relationship between corporate governance and company performance before and after the crisis using the regression analysis with panel data. Our settings represent the results of four models with different company performance proxies: Tobin's q, return on invested capital (ROIC), earning per share (EPS) and growth rate of sales.

The primary setting is that the corporate governance does not affect the company performance after the financial crisis of 2008-2009, as the majority of variables become irrelevant. This coincides with the outcomes of Gupta et al (2011). We can even state the corporate governance enhances the performance (Johnson et al., 2000). The board size becomes positively significant after the crisis, pointing out to the companies' need in larger board with talented and smart directors who can bring the benefits to the company over the post-crisis period. Moreover, for the Tobin's q model the share of independent directors in the board also becomes positively significant. It also confirms the statement about suffering after the recession and necessity in the outside view about the company operation.

The executives' bonus stops to be significant after the crisis, and deteriorates motivation of managers to work better. The coefficient of CEO salary remains negative and reflects the same idea, this fixed part of remuneration also does not serve as the impetus for executives. After the crisis the company pursues the cut of its costs, therefore, the executives lose the most inconstant part of the compensation. Substantively, they lose the primary source of motivation. Instead of the bonus the company tries to compensate them with the option grant. However, this remuneration plan does not account for the interests of shareholders and leads to expropriation of shareholders. Hence, the compensation committee has to use counterproductive tools. The share ownership does not influence the company performance.

Considering the pre-crisis data, we also accepted most of the proposed hypotheses that correspond to the settings obtained in previous researches. The companies operate better with small boards (Wang et al., 2013). CEO salary negatively affects the company performance, as we explained above. CEO bonus motivates managers to do decision-making process better and positively corresponds to the performance. The option-holders expropriates the shareholders' interests to increase future stock price, thus, the option reward has negative impact on the performance (mainly, Tobin's q and Sales growth).

Concerning the CEO duality, we obtained contradictive results. Tobin's q and ROIC models confirmed the hypothesis about adverse correspondence with the performance. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient for Sales growth model was positive. The reason could be the following: very powerful and well-informed CEO enable to do decision-making process better by coordinating both roles. Despite this mismatch, we adhere to the result of Tobin's q and ROIC models.

Regarding the future research, we can recommend concentrating on the comparison of the corporate governance parameters and macroeconomics variables to reveal what could better examine the collapse of financial institutions.



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Appendix 1

Main characteristics of corporate governance players in six countries Ruth Aguilera, George Yip / Global structure faces local constraints / FT Mastering Corporate Governance, 2005

	United States	United Kingdom	Germany	France	Italy	Japan
Employees	Flexible labour, low unionization, employment at will	Flexible labour markets	Work council, co-determination, high skills, non-flexible labour market	Work council, low unionization, short-term contracts	Long-term contracts, rigid labour market, medium skills	Enterprise union, life-time employment, medium skills
Shareholders	Institutional investors and individuals, dispersed	Institutional investors, dispersed	Other non-financial companies, banks	Foreign investors, state	State, families	Other non-financial companies, banks
Government	Liberal policies, arms-length, weak takeover barriers	Liberal policies, arms-length, weak takeover	Protectionist policies, medium takeover barriers	Protectionist policies, interventionist, medium takeover barriers	Protectionist policies, interventionist, strong takeover barriers	Protectionist policies, strong takeover barriers
Boards of directors	High activism, high % of outsiders due to investor pressure	High activism, high % of outsiders determined by law	Moderate activism, stakeholders as a significant minority, medium size	Moderate activism, minority outsiders, medium size	Low activism, large % of insiders, medium size	Low activism, large % of insiders, large size
Top management team	Professional (Finance/MBA) background, some foreign-born management, open labour markets	Semi-professional background, some foreign-born management, open labour markets	Technical background, few foreing-born managers, closed labour markets (long term)	Common educational background, state links, few foreign-born managers, closed labour markets (long term)	Non-professional, no foreign-born management, closed labour markets (long term)	Common educational background, no foreign-born management, closed labour markets (long term)



Appendix 2

Alleged incidents of stealing in the Asian financial crisis

Company	Country	Date	Alleged incident
Bangkok Bank of Commerce	Thailand	1996-1997	Bank managers moved money to offshore companies under their control.
United Ingineers (Malaysia) Bhd	Malaysia	1997-1998	United Engineers bailed out its financially troubled parent, Renong Bhd, by acquiring a 33% stake at an artificially high price.
Malaysia Air System Bhd	Malaysia	1998	The chairman used company funds to retire personal debts.
PT Bank Bali	Indonesia	1997-1998	Managers diverted funds in order to finance a political party.
Sinar Mas Group	Indonesia	1997-1998	Group managers transferred foreign exchange losses from a manufacturing company to a group-controlled bank, effectively expropriating the bank's creditors and minority shareholders.
Guangdong International Trust&Investment Co	Hong Kong/China	1998-1999	Assets that had been pledged as collateral disappeared from the company when it went bankrupt.
Siu-Fung Ceramics Co	Hong Kong/China	1998-1999	Assets that had been pledged as collateral disappeared from the company when it went bankrupt.
Tokobank	Russia	1998-1999	Creditors who may have been linked to bank managers took control of the bank and its remaining assets following default. Foreign creditors got nothing.
Menatep	Russia	1998	Following Menatep's bankruptcy, managers transferred a large number of regional branches to another bank they controlled.
AO Yukos	Russia	1998-1999	Managers transferred Yukos's most valuable petroleum-producing properties to offshore companies they controlled.
Uneximbank	Russia	1999	Following Uneximbank's bankruptcy, managers moved profitable credit-card processing and custodial operations to another bank.
Samsung Electronics Co	Korea	1997-1998	Managers used cash from Samsung Electronics to support other members of the Samsung group (notably Samsung Motors) that were losing money.
Hyundai	Korea	1998-1999	Managers of a Hyundai-controlled investment fund channeled money from retail investors to loss-making firms in the Hyundai group.

Appendix 3

Descriptive statistics of variables' list

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Company performance
Tobinq	1881	1,90	1,08	0,75	11,29
ROIC	1881	10,73	13,81	-413,44	67,61
EPS	1881	2,02	18,39	-756,85	107,8
Sales growth rate	1881	9,64	39,04	-93,73	992,69
CEO compensation package
CEO salary percentage	1875	0,17	0,15	0	1
CEO bonus percentage	1875	0,09	0,15	0	0,95
CEO option reward percentage	1875	0,17	0,33	0	10,46
CEO shares ownership	1881	0,72	2,69	0	25,72
Board structure
Board size	1881	10,98	2,35	0	22
Ratio of independent	1875	0,79	0,13	0,22	1
Duality	1881	0,72	0,45	0	1
Attendance in other boards	1881	12,24	6,22	0	45
Control variables
log(Sales)	1881	23,16	1,09	18,42	27,05
Gearing	1881	4,86	16,81	1,12	369,61



Appendix 4

Applied companies' details

Company name	Frequency	Percent
ABBOTT LABORATORIES	11	0.58	0.58
ADOBE SYSTEMS INC	11	0.58	1.17
AFLAC	11	0.58	1.75
AGL RESOURCES INC	11	0.58	2.34
ALCOA INC	11	0.58	2.92
AMAZON.COM INC	11	0.58	3.51
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO	11	0.58	4.09
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO	11	0.58	4.68
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP	11	0.58	5.26
AMETEK INC	11	0.58	5.85
AMGEN INC	11	0.58	6.43
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP	11	0.58	7.02
ANALOG DEVICES	11	0.58	7.60
AON PLC	11	0.58	8.19
APACHE CORP	11	0.58	8.77
APPLE INC	11	0.58	9.36
APPLIED MATERIALS INC	11	0.58	9.94
ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO	11	0.58	10.53
AUTODESK INC	11	0.58	11.11
AUTONATION INC	11	0.58	11.70
BANK OF AMERICA CORP	11	0.58	12.28
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC	11	0.58	12.87
BB&T CORP	11	0.58	13.45
BEST BUY CO INC ...

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