Chapter 5. Conclusion

In the study, we tried to explore the effects of corporate governance, leverage and institutional factors on the company's performance during the Global crisis. We also used interactions of these factors to investigate complex influence on the key performance indicators.

We used cross-sectional regression method and tested four hypotheses, one of which was statistically confirmed. We used data for 751 non-financial companies from 24 developed countries for 2007-2009 years.

The main result of the research was that leverage decrease the effect of corporate governance and institutions on the ROA and Stock returns. We showed that solely leverage had negative influence on ROA and Stock returns and positive on profit volatility.

We conducted research, which stand out among other papers by including into analysis interactions between institutions and leverage. Additionally, we tested the interactions between corporate governance and institutions, but results were insignificant. Despite the fact, that we did not obtain significant results concerning interaction terms, for further studies it would be interesting to use other metrics for corporate governance and institutions. Moreover, it would be great to use wider time-period for investigation to detect continuous effect of factors.

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Appendix A. Countries Indices

Country	FTSI	MSCI	S&P	World Bank	IMF	OECD
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+
Austria	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cyprus	+	+	+	X	+	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	+
Finland	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+	+
Germany	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hong Kong SAR, China	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+	+
Italy	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	+	X	+	X	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+	+
Korea	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+	+
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	+	+	+	+	+
Portugal	+	+	+	+	+	+
Singapore	+	+	+	+	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+	+
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+

Appendix B. Dates for stock returns

Country	Index	Start	Bottom
Australia	ASX 200	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
Austria	FWAO	01.06.2007	01.02.2009
Belgium	BEL20	01.06.2007	01.02.2009
United Kingdom	FTSE 100	01.11.2007	01.02.2009
Germany	DAX 30	01.08.2007	01.03.2009
Hong Kong	HSI	01.10.2007	01.11.2008
Denmark	OMX COPENHAGEN	01.06.2007	01.02.2009
Israel	TA-125	01.10.2007	01.12.2008
Ireland	ISEQ	01.05.2007	01.02.2009
Spain	IBEX 35	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
Italy	FTSE MIB	01.04.2007	01.02.2009
Canada	TSX	01.05.2008	01.02.2009
Luxembourg	LUXX	01.05.2008	01.03.2009
Netherlands	AEX	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
New Zealand	NZDOW	01.05.2007	01.03.2009
Norway	OSEAX	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
Portugal	PSI20	01.06.2007	01.02.2009
Singapore	MSCISG	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
USA	S&P 500	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
Finland	HEX25	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
France	CAC 40	01.05.2007	01.02.2009
Switzerland	SMI	01.05.2007	01.02.2009
Sweden	OMX 30	01.07.2007	01.01.2009
South Korea	KOSPI	01.10.2007	01.02.2009
Japan	Nikkei 225	01.06.2007	01.03.2009

Appendix C. Dependent variable - ROA For ROA 2009 the results were qualitatively the same, we decided not to overburden the study with identical information

In the table the results for ROA 2008 as dependent variable are presented. In the brackets, p-values are demonstrated. We run regressions with interaction between corporate governance indicators and institutions, but we did not report them as they were mostly insignificant and to save the space.

*- 5% significance level, ** - 10% significance level.

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Leverage	-0.014 (0.023)*	-0.022 (0.016)*	-0.034 (0.019)*	-0.01 (0.013)	-0.028 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.03)*	-0.012 (0.019)*	-0.0028 (0.029)*	-0.009 (0.013)*	-0.008 (0.011)*	-0.012 (0.011)*	-0.014 (0.015)*	-0.01 (0.013)*	-0.012 (0.011)*	-0.01 (0.01)*	-0.009 (0.014)*	-0.019 (0.016)*	-0.011 (0.018)*
EBIT/total assets	0.0001 (0.01)*	0.000 (0.013)*	0.000 (0.01)*	0.021 (0.02)	0.027 (0.021)*	0.029 (0.027)*	0.027 (0.024)*	0.027 (0.02)*	0.023 (0.02)*	0.022 (0.02)*	0.023 (0.03)*	0.021 (0.032)*	0.021 (0.02)*	0.021 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.02)*	0.025 (0.03)*	0.02 (0.02)*	0.028 (0.023)*
Ln_Revenue	-0.0032 (0.15)	-0.0033 (0.13)	-0.002 (0.13)	-0.001 (0.12)	-0.001 (0.12)	-0.001 (0.11)	-0.012 (0.15)	-0.001 (0.12)	-0.001 (0.14)	-0.002 (0.14)	-0.000 (0.18)	-0.003 (0.11)	-0.001 (0.12)	-0.0008 (0.13)	-0.019 (0.2)	-0.002 (0.11)	-0.001 (0.12)	-0.009 (0.19)
Dummy_industrials	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
ESG_score	0.02 (0.001)*			0.034 (0.001)*			0.08 (0.024)*			0.1 (0.045)*			0.1 (0.045)*			0.089 (0.01)*
ESG_score*Leverage	-0.012 (0.012)*			-0.03 (0.01)*			-0.31 (0.06)**			0.041 (0.036)*			0.041 (0.036)*			0.038 (0.03)*
Shareholders_score		0.0189 (0.012)*			0.021 (0.014)*			0.03 (0.035)*			0.078 (0.007)*			0.078 (0.027)*			0.034 (0.021)*
Shareholders_Score*leverage		-0.023 (0.042)*			-0.019 (0.021)*			-0.035 (0.027)*			-0.029 (0.03)*			-0.029 (0.03)*			0.0001 (0.12)
Management_Score			0.017 (0.02)*			0.021 (0.049)*			0.022 (0.039)*			0.034 (0.026)*			0.034 (0.026)*			0.046 (0.03)*
Management_Score*Leverage			-0.018 (0.04)*			-0.020 (0.05)*			-0.029 (0.045)*			-0.027 (0.04)*			-0.027 (0.04)*			-0.046 (0.002)*
VoiceansAccountability	0.0004 (0.4)	0.018 (0.14)	0.017 (0.14)
VoiceansAccountability*Leverage	0.0123 (0.58)	0.0123 (0.58)	0.013 (0.42)
Political_StabilityNoViolence				0.000 (0.31)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.021 (0.11)
Political_StabilityNoViolence*Leverage				0.043 (0.38)	0.015 (0.6)	0.013 (0.34)
GovernmentEffectiveness							-0.023 (0.02)*	0.009 (0.04)*	-0.021 (0.11)
GovernmentEffectiveness*Leverage							0.05 (0.29)	0.037 (0.09)**	0.013 (0.34)
RegulatoryQuality										0.4 (0.27)	0.14 (0.34)	0.063 (0.17)
RegulatoryQuality*Leverage										0.098 (0.41)	0.078 (0.19)	0.027 (0.31)
RuleofLaw													0.21 (0.02)*	0.094 (0.043)*	0.06 (0.07)**
RuleofLaw*Leverage													0.01 (0.016)*	0.021 (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)
ControlofCorruption																0.01 (0.19)	0.04 (0.37)	0.09 (0.07)**
ControlofCorruption*Leverage																0.1 (0.06)**	0.025 (0.15)	0.017 (0.18)
Aggregate effect of leverage	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.11 (0.03)*	-0.12 (0.03)*	-0.08 (0.05)*	-0.1 (0.04)*	-0.11 (0.03)*	-0.09 (0.03)*	-0.14 (0.04)*	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.12 (0.03)*	-0.09 (0.05)*	-0.1 (0.06)**	-0.14 (0.04)*	-0.09 (0.03)*	-0.07 (0.03)*	-0.1 (0.04)*	-0.11 (0.03)*	-0.06 (0.05)*
Aggregate effect of corporate governance	0.1 (0.05)*	0.02 (0.04)*	0.07 (0.03)*	0.12 (0.05)*	0.04 (0.02)*	0.1 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.06)**	0.11 (0.05)*	0.06 (0.04)*	0.08 (0.04)*	0.11 (0.07)**	0.1 (0.05)*	0.05 (0.04)*	0.03 (0.04)*	0.1 (0.03)*	0.08 (0.05)*	0.12 (0.04)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Aggregate effect of institutes	0.05 (0.12)	0.01 (0.17)	0.009 (0.15)	0.03 (0.1)**	0.008 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	0.008 (0.16)	0.04 (0.13)	0.006 (0.19)	0.03 (0.12)	0.004 (0.17)	0.05 (0.18)	0.005 (0.14)	0.009 (0.12)	0.09 (0.19)	0.09 (0.18)	0.05 (0.2)	0.009 (0.11)
R2	22.30%	24.60%	21.65%	22.41%	23.96%	24.65%	22.30%	21.86%	22.15%	23.76%	21.81%	23.64%	22.59%	24.40%	21.70%	22.15%	24.76%	21.43%
F-value
N	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751	751

Appendix D. Dependent variable - Profit Volatility

In the table the results for Profit volatility as dependent variable are presented. In the brackets, p-values are demonstrated. For each specification R-square and F-value are shown.. We run regressions with interaction between corporate governance indicators and institutions, but we did not report them as they were mostly insignificant and to save the space.

*- 5% significance level, ** - 10% significance level.

Factor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Leverage

0.01 (0.025)*

0.03 (0.01)*

0.05 (0.04)*

0.012 (0.04)*

0.019 (0.01)*

0.02 (0.02)*

0.03 (0.019)*

0.032 (0.021)*

0.011 (0.01)*

0.11 (0.021)*

0.11 (0.02)*

0.02 (0.04)*

0.011 (0.021)*

0.03 (0.02)*

0.01 (0.02)*

0.038 (0.05)*

0.033 (0.023)*

0.061 (0.021)*

EBIT/total assets

0.0001 (0.02)*

0.000 (0.07)**

0.000 (0.06)**

0.002 (0.04)*

0.004 (0.07)**

0.001 (0.04)*

0.000 (0.04)*

0.003 (0.02)*

0.000 (0.05)*

0.001 (0.05)*

0.008 (0.03)*

0.0001 (0.032)*

0.000 (0.041)*

0.003 (0.05)*

0.001 (0.062)**

0.002 (0.02)*

0.001 (0.034)*

0.009 (0.049)*

Ln_Revenue

0.02 (0.08)**

0.003 (0.11)

0.009 (0.1)**

0.001 (0.09)**

0.00 (0.14)

0.003 (0.13)

0.006 (0.11)

0.00 (0.17)

0.002 (0.07)**

0.001 (0.06)**

0.00 (0.1)

-0.003 (0.08)**

0.00 (0.07)**

-0.002 (0.15)

-0.00 (0.12)

-0.003 (0.09)**

-0.001 (0.09)**

0.00 (0.15)

Dummy_Industrials

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

ESG_score

-0.002 (0.03)*

-0.003 (0.01)*

-0.006 (0.03)*

-0.01 (0.04)*

-0.01 (0.038)*

-0.05 (0.04)*

ESG_score*Leverage

0.002 (0.03)*

0.03 (0.03)*

0.04 (0.05)*

0.06 (0.031)*

0.04 (0.037)*

0.05 (0.037)*

Shareholders_score

0.004 (0.03)*

0.01 (0.044)*

0.02 (0.035)*

0.027 (0.036)*

0.09 (0.037)*

0.11 (0.039)*

Shareholders_Score*leverage

-0.017 (0.038)*

-0.02 (0.04)*

-0.015 (0.04)*

-0.03 (0.03)*

-0.019 (0.04)*

-0.011 (0.046)*

Management_Score

-0.007 (0.12)

-0.01 (0.11)

-0.031 (0.12)

-0.15 (0.025)*

-0.02 (0.039)*

-0.01 (0.03)*

Management_Score*Leverage

-0.02 (0.06)**

-0.02 (0.05)*

-0.05 (0.05)*

-0.008 (0.048)*

-0.15 (0.05)*

-0.11 (0.029)*

VoiceansAccountability

-1.21 (0.19)

-1.42 (0.21)

-1.24 (0.24)

VoiceansAccountability*Leverage

-0.76 (0.23)

-0.11 (0.25)

-0.66 (0.22)

Political_StabilityNoViolence

-0.16 (0.2)

-0.22 (0.28)

-0.21 (0.27)

Political_StabilityNoViolence*Leverage

2.11 (0.12)

1.14 (0.19)

1.75 (0.19)

GovernmentEffectiveness

-0.5 (0.04)*

-0.7 (0.038)*

-1.09 (0.07)**

GovernmentEffectiveness*Leverage

0.33 (0.14)

0.37 (0.1)**

0.35 (0.14)

RegulatoryQuality

-1.35 (0.19)

-1.1 (0.21)

-1.12 (0.07)**

RegulatoryQuality*Leverage

0.43 (0.19)

0.35 (0.13)

0.27 (0.19)

RuleofLaw

-0.39 (0.041)*

-0.87 (0.06)**

-0.19 (0.09)**

RuleofLaw*Leverage

0.003 (0.039)*

0.031 (0.041)*

0.045 (0.05)*

ControlofCorruption

-0.21 (0.09)**

-0.029 (0.14)

-0.074 (0.15)

ControlofCorruption*Leverage

0.021 (0.07)**

0.01 (0.07)**

0.009 (0.08)**

Aggregate effect of leverage

0.07 (0.03)*

0.09 (0.04)*

0.1 (0.03)*

0.009 (0.04)*

0.08 (0.03)*

0.16 (0.02)*

0.1 (0.02)*

0.09 (0.05)*

0. 08 (0.03)*

0.05 (0.04)*

0.06 (0.04)*

0.1 (0.06)**

0.14 (0.04)*

0.08 (0.02)*

0.09 (0.04)*

0.12 (0.05)*

0.07 (0.04)*

0.07 (0.06)**

Aggregate effect of corporate governance

-0.08 (0.04)*

-0.06 (0.05)*

-0.09 (0.04)*

-0.16 (0.05)*

-0.07 (0.04)*

-0.09 (0.04)*

-0.1 (0.04)*

-0.1 (0.06)**

-0.08 (0.03)*

-0.09 (0.05)*

-0.13 (0.06)**

-0.1 (0.05)*

-0.05 (0.04)*

-0.08 (0.05)*

-0.14 (0.05)*

-0.09 (0.04)*

-0.1 (0.05)*

-0.11 (0.05)*

Aggregate effect of institutes

-0.09 (0.14)

-0.1 (0.2)

-0.02 (0.19)

-0.02 (0.14)

-0.01 (0.17)

-0.08 (0.1)**

-0.012 (0.12)

-0.13 (0.18)

-0.009 (0.13)

-0.08 (0.18)

-0.009 (0.15)

-0.05 (0.18)

-0.008 (0.16)

-0.01 (0.19)

-0.12 (0.11)

-0.1 (0.17)

-0.1 (0.16)

-0.01 (0.14)

R2

24.7%

32.1%

26.5%

28.5%

26.4%

29.5%

22.1%

23.4%

24.8%

25.6%

24.7%

21.4%

21.9%

24.6%

25.1%

23.9%

23.5%

21.7%

F-value

N

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

Appendix E. Dependent variable - Stock Return

In the table the results for Stock return as dependent variable are presented. In the brackets, p-values are demonstrated. For each specification R-square and F-value are shown.. We run regressions with interaction between corporate governance indicators and institutions, but we did not report them as they were mostly insignificant and to save the space.

*- 5% significance level, ** - 10% significance level.

Factor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

35

36

Market Leverage

-0.119 (0.032)*

-0.23 (0.01)*

-0.123 (0.03)*

-0.204 (0.03)*

-0.213 (0.04)*

-0.116 (0.021)*

-0.215 (0.032)*

-0.114 (0.031)*

-0.21 (0.01)*

-0.12 (0.042)*

-0.172 (0.047)*

-0.257 (0.037)*

-0.146 (0.023)*

-0.161 (0.037)*

-0.093 (0.034)*

-0.122 (0.033)*

-0.233 (0.015)*

-0.241 (0.033)*

-0.198 (0.049)*

-0.208 (0.02)*

-0.149 (0.026)*

-0.152 (0.028)*

Ln_Revenue

0.02 (0.002)*

0.02 (0.003)*

0.04 (0.01)*

0.04 (0.03)*

0.001 (0.02)*

0.000 (0.05)*

0.001 (0.04)*

0.000 (0.09)**

0.003 (0.04)*

0.001 (0.04)*

0.001 (0.051)**

0.002 (0.012)*

0.000 (0.06)**

0.000 (0.01)*

0.004 (0.027)*

0.011 (0.032)*

0.002 (0.042)*

0.001 (0.048)*

0.002 (0.019)*

0.000 (0.014)*

-0.002 (0.039)*

0.000 (0.015)*

Dummy_Industrials

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

ESG_score

0.014 (0.023)*

0.001 (0.03)*

0.012 (0.048)*

0.007 (0.07)**

0.02 (0.017)*

0.08 (0.06)**

0.01 (0.038)*

0.1 (0.063)**

ESG_score*Leverage

-0.003 (0.157)

-0.008 (0.02)*

-0.001 (0.043)*

-0.061 (0.06)**

Shareholders_score

0.001 (0.024)*

0.005 (0.033)*

0.01 (0.029)*

0.09 (0.031)*

0.11 (0.012)*

0.09 (0.055)**

Shareholders_Score*leverage

-0.003 (0.12)

0.009 (0.09)**

-0.005 (0.07)**

Management_Score

0.003 (0.04)*

0.005 (0.05)*

0.01 (0.02)*

0.12 (0.09)**

0.07 (0.041)*

0.017 (0.11)

0.16 (0.048)*

0.21 (0.071)**

Management_Score*Leverage

-0.02 (0.06)**

-0.03 (0.04)*

-0.14 (0.06)**

-0.21 (0.032)*

VoiceandAccountability

-0.04 (0.11)

-0.08 (0.14)

-0.11 (0.21)

-0.32 (0.2)

-0.39 (0.14)

-0.44 (0.11)

VoiceandAccountability *Leverage

-0.76 (0.057)**

-0.89 (0.11)

-0.45 (0.09)**

-0.42 (0.07)**

-0.46 (0.09)**

-0.76 (0.19)

Political_StabilityNoViolence

-0.001 (0.19)

-0.06 (0.15)

-0.02 (0.18)

-0.03 (0.17)

-0.08 (0.18)

-0.08 (0.12)

Political_StabilityNoViolence* Leverage

-1.02 (0.14)

-1.003 (0.1)**

-1.2 (0.11)

-1.04 (0.09)**

-1.33 (0.12)

-0.89 (0.09)**

GovernmentEffectiveness

0.07 (0.1)**

0.11 (0.09)**

0.09 (0.053)**

0.15 (0.031)*

0.08 (0.052)**

0.1 (0.052)**

GovernmentEffectiveness *Leverage

-0.82 (0.14)

-0.72 (0.1)**

-0.57 (0.08)**

-0.71 (0.13)

-0.44 (0.13)

-1.02 (0.09)**

RegulatoryQuality

0.41 (0.17)

0.21 (0.22)

RegulatoryQuality*Leverage

0.088 (0.19)

0.093 (0.13)

RuleofLaw

0.091 (0.06)**

0.078 (0.11)

RuleofLaw*Leverage

0.016 (0.11)

0.016 (0.26)

ControlofCorruption

0.006 (0.24)

0.011 (0.19)

ControlofCorruption*Leverage

0.015 (0.18)

-0.003 (0.22)

Aggregate effect of leverage

-0.1 (0.05)*

-0.09 (0.04)*

-0.07 (0.04)*

-0.08 (0.05)*

-0.1 (0.04)*

-0.11 (0.03)*

-0.07 (0.04)*

-0.09 (0.05)*

-0.11 (0.05)*

-0.06 (0.04)*

-0.07 (0.05)*

-0.09 (0.05)*

-0.11 (0.05)*

-0.14 (0.05)*

-0.09 (0.05)*

-0.14 (0.05)*

-0.11 (0.04)*

-0.08 (0.04)*

-0.12 (0.05)*

-0.08 (0.04)*

-0.16 (0.05)*

-0.09 (0.05)*

Aggregate effect of corporate governance

0.08 (0.04)*

0.07 (0.05)*

0.1 (0.04)*

0.12 (0.05)*

0.04 (0.02)*

0.1 (0.04)*

0.07 (0.07)**

0.12 (0.04)*

0.09 (0.03)*

0.09 (0.04)*

0.14 (0.09)**

0.11 (0.06)**

0.09 (0.05)*

0.09 (0.03)*

0.08 (0.04)*

0.09 (0.05)*

0.15 (0.05)*

0.11 (0.04)*

0.11 (0.06)**

0.1 (0.06)*

0.11 (0.05)*

0.09 (0.05)*

Aggregate effect of institutes

0.09 (0.13)

0.1 (0.14)

0.007 (0.11)

0.03 (0.1)**

0.008 (0.12)

0.01 (0.11)

0.01 (0.11)

0.05 (0.09)**

0.01 (0.12)

0.07 (0.13)

0.009 (0.11)

0.06 (0.11)

0.009 (0.13)

0.01 (0.11)

0.12 (0.12)

0.11 (0.13)

0.09 (0.18)

0.01 (0.15)

0.11 (0.16)

0.16 (0.11)

0.03 (0.1)**

0.09 (0.12)

R2

23.5%

24.4%

22.3%

23.7%

21.5%

21.9%

21.8%

23.5%

22.3%

23.7%

23.2%

22.4%

21.8%

23.5%

23.3%

21.3%

24.1%

25.3%

22.6%

24.2%

20.1%

21.5%

F value

N

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

751

Factor	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
Market Leverage	-0.2 (0.019)*	-0.212 (0.015)*	-0.114 (0.021)*	-0.134 (0.012)*	-0.201 (0.024)*	-0.211 (0.043)*	-0.112 (0.011)*	-0.126 (0.02)*	-0.236 (0.042)*	-0.241 (0.01)*	-0.109 (0.034)*	-0.116 (0.019)*
Ln_Revenue	0.007 (0.02)*

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