The nature of political orientations

The following indicators of perceptions towards democracy both for Russian and Chinese case were chosen in the process of data reduction:

Political situations in the country;

Interest in politics;

Meaning of democracy;

The level of satisfaction of democracy in the country;

The place of the country on the scale “complete dictatorship - complete democracy”;

What is more preferable, democracy or authoritarian government;

Characteristic/elements essential/non-essential to democracy;

To what extent should democracy develop in the country;

Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy).

Having a democratic political system: a good or a bad thing;

People choose their leaders in free election (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

The state makes people's incomes equal (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

People obey their rulers (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

Women have the same rights as men (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

Democraticness in own country;

Political system: Having a strong leader;

Political system: Having a democratic political system;

These questions were chosen as the major indicators of perceptions towards democracy (or authoritarian syndrome) both for Chinese and Russian case. Each of these indicators can be incorporated towards theoretical structure, provided by Walter Rosenbaum.

As the result, the matrix of comparative data analysis can be formulated in the following way:

Orientations towards governmental institutions

Regime orientations:

What is more preferable, democracy or authoritarian government;

Having a democratic political system: a good or a bad thing;

Political system: Having a strong leader;

Political system: Having a democratic political system;

“Input” orientations:

To what extent should democracy develop in the country;

Democraticness in own country;

“Output” orientations:

Political situations in the country;

The level of satisfaction of democracy in the country;

The place of the country on the scale “complete dictatorship - complete democracy”;

Orientations towards “others”:

Orientations toward “rules of the game”:

Characteristic/elements essential/non-essential to democracy;

Meaning of democracy;

People choose their leaders in free election (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

The state makes people's incomes equal (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

People obey their rulers (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

Women have the same rights as men (essential/non-essential characteristic of democracy);

Orientations toward person himself:

Political competence:

Interest in politics;

The survey includes a wider list of questions which are used to demonstrate political perceptions of citizens, but which cannot be considered as orientations towards democracy (for example, questions about the conditions the citizens are living in, does everyone is treated equally by government or do citizens has basic necessities etc.).

This structure demonstrate the importance of perceptions of democracy on the scale of political orientations of the citizens in transition society. Basically, perceptions towards democracy effects all level of political orientations of a citizen, thus perceptions towards democracy can become a real drivers of the prospects of democratization in the country.

To simplify the comparative qualitative analysis the data can be also organized in following logic:

The meaning of democracy: how people understand democracy;

Democracy as a universal value: do citizens in China and Russian consider democracy as a curse or as rather a blessing of modern era;

Satisfaction with the level of democracy: are Russian and Chinese citizens satisfied with the level of democracy in their own country.

The final matrix of the comparative data analysis includes both structure:

Table 1. The matrix of comparative data analysis

The meaning of democracy	Democracy as a universal value	Satisfaction with the level of democracy
Orientations toward “rules of the game”; Essential characteristic of democracy; Meaning of democracy;	Regime orientations; Democratic or authoritarian regime; Strong leader as a universal value; Democracy vs equality and order; “Input” orientations; How democracy should develop in certain country.	“Output” orientations; Satisfaction with the current situation with democracy in the country; Current political regime in the country: from complete dictatorship to complete democracy; Civil rights and living conditions.

This is the final matrix for comparative analysis. Basically, all indicator towards democracy were marked during this structure. The structure helps to conceptualize the findings of the study.

Limitations

At this stage of data analysis, the main obstacles with data comparison have appeared due to the following problems:

The differences of the meaning of democracy in China and Russia;

The period of radical liberalization in Russia undermined the trust of Russians people towards democratic values. At the beginning of the liberalization, process (early 1990s) mass common sense in Russia had an instrumental view on democracy. Russians were waiting from democracy the improvement of their material welfare. Instead, the economic situation got worse, as the results, first democratic practices didn't meet expectations of Russian citizen. Modern Russians understand democracy as ideology, the main principles of which lies far from satisfaction of material needs. Modern Russians understand the nature of democracy (as a set of freedoms and liberties).

Speaking about Chinese, their orientation towards democracy in some cases can be more comparable with perceptions towards democracy of Russians citizens in the 1990th. Chinese are more likely to expect material benefits from democratization, then real democratic principles.

This problem can become the major issue of uncertainty in the thesis, because different understanding of democracy in China and Russia undermines the main principle of comparative studies: do not compare incomparable.

Chronological divergence:

Data collection required to determine exactly which period of time should be chosen to define modern orientations of Russian and Chinese citizens.

Different samples of data

There are number of important differences between Russian and Chinese questionnaires. Despite the fact that the questions can be formulated in different terms, also answers are not totally the same. This problem have appeared because of the fact, that primary sources for this research contains data results from different data centers. This surveys were conducted by different organization, which were using different style of research.

For example, even if the question in the survey for Russians citizens totally corresponds with the Chinese one (“Interests in politic” and “How much are you interested in politics”), the meaning of the formulations in answers can be different. For example on the question “how much are you interested in politics?” Russians are offered the following answers to reply: “not very interested in politics”, “somewhat interested”, “very interested”. Chinese at the same question (“interest in politics”) are offered different options than Russians. Some variants on answers are same as the Russian one (“somewhat interested” or “very interested”, but options for the negative answer (which should show the amount of respondents with low interests in politics varies in two different options: “not at all interested” and “somewhat interested”.

Chapter 3. Perceptions of democracy in China and Russia

This part of my course work is concerned with traditional features of Russian and Chinese political cultures. This chapter includes academic's view on some aspects of mass common sense in both countries and their potential to construct and develop real democratic values and norms. Then the tendencies provided by scholars I am trying to prove or disprove with data about modern perceptions of Russian and Chinese citizens.

3.1 Cultural requisites for democracy in China

Among main obstacles for democratization in China scientists usually name the following features of Chinese political culture: political passivity of the citizens, intolerance, authoritarian attitudes, ignorance and even fear of being involved in political sphere [Nathan A.J., Tianjian Shi., 1993].

Chinese relations with power is considered by Lucian Pye as a strong belief of Chinese people that China has a historic sense of greatness, which should be shared and will be shared with the rest of the world [Pye L.W., 1985, P. 182.].

Another interesting feature of Chinese political culture - is their ability to focus on country's future without complaining about past disasters. Pye claims that Chinese people are ready to forget all the broken promises and crimes of past leaders when they take-for-granted and unquestioningly believe into a vision of successful future provided by new their leader [Pye L.W., 1985, P. 183.]. Their system of political orientations can unlikely be characterized as an ability to consider constructive criticism of contemporary state of affairs as an effective mechanism for preventing future fail.

Coming back to “authoritarian syndrome”, with the desire for strong power, it's also important to mention here Chinese attitudes towards power and authority. Chinese mass common sense during the whole process of Chinese history have had a special set of orientation toward authority and power. Chinese have been ready to find the magical features in power and authority. They had a strong faith that power and authority is given from above and can be used only by supreme leader towards whom “mandate of heaven” is delivered. The myth about legitimacy of power which is given from above had been attractive for mass common sense in China. Besides, Confucian ideology had dominated Chinese mass common sense for almost two millennium. This ideology provided an idea that it's possible to look on politics and government in terms of only moralistic ideology [Pye L.W., 1985, P. 186]. When the whole system fall down and the new search for ideas was satisfied with new ideology of Marxism-Leninism- Mao Zedong ideas, the mixed orientations towards power and authority have been constructed as a part of Chinese political culture. And there is a big question that this kind of orientations might be suitable with democracy.

Traditional common senses that were indicated by Lucian Pye in the 1980s are still supported by modern Chinese people. The book of Lucian Pye was published in 1985, so it is interesting to look at the data, which represents perceptions of modern Chinese. The data shows the following tendency: the majority or respondents looks very optimistic towards nearest future. They believe, the government will be able to resolve all important problems in the nearest future. And what is more important the majority of Chinese respondents believe that is important to support the government even if it is following the wrong direction.

The Asian Barometer Survey East Asia Barometer 2005-2008 // The Asian Barometer Survey, Mainland China, 2008, URL: http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=503.presents the following data about perceptions of mainland Chinese respondents in 2008 (more than 5000 respondents):

The majority of respondents access the probability that the most important problems the government will be able to solve in the nearest future as “likely” (41,1%) and “very likely” (10,1%). Only 8% of respondents think that the government will not be able to resolve these issues. Speaking about data distribution for the position “not at all likely” - less than 2% of Chinese respondents have chosen this position.

Another data have also proven the traditional desire of Chinese citizens to accept any decision the ruler make: in 2008 the majority of respondents (almost 70%) said “somewhat agreed” with the statement that “People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with it”; this can be compared with only 10% percent of respondents, who “somewhat disagreed” with the statement.

Speaking about “authoritarian syndrome', and it's main feature as “a willingness to accept the holders of power as father figures or “elder brothers”, as those possessing unconditional authority and “more” equal than the rest” [Urnov M.Y: 2012. P. 67], the data proves this tendency for Chinese case. The majority of respondents (63,5%) East Asia Barometer 2005-2008 // The Asian Barometer Survey, Mainland China, 2008, URL: http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=503. “somewhat agree” with the statement that citizens of the country should follow the rule and decisions of the government leaders, because they can be considered as the head of family. Only relatively low amount of respondents “somewhat disagree” with such role of governmental leaders. The modern Chinese citizens do not sacrifice the power as if it was given from above as mandate of heaven. However, at the same time they are more willing to see the country as the model of family, where political leader is playing the role of the father.

Another important point which can characterize Chinese political orientations - the concept of the revolution. In many political cultures revolution is associated with the ability to share liberty and provide a great freedom. As liberty and freedom are important parts of the concept of democracy, Chinese way of interpretation of this values can be relatively important in terms of analyzing cultural prerequisites towards democracy. Lucian Pye claims that the idea of revolution for Chinese has always been connected with the process of “creating a stronger, more enveloping authority” [Pye L.W., 1985, P. 190]. This interpretation of revolution can be defined as another example of special relations of Chinese mass common sense with the concept of strong power.

Figure 1. Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent

The data provided by World Values Survey World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 // World Values Survey Database, URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp. (Figure 1.) demonstrate the same tendency in Chinese mass common sense. The majority of respondents in 2012 didn't know how to answer the question whether the situation, when army should takes over the incompetent government, is essential characteristic of democracy (27,2%). However, comparing with the data redistribution on these questions in other countries (for example, Russia and United States) it seems like that Chinese are more likely to consider this statement as an essential characteristic of democracy. The larger amount or respondents in Chinа (then in other countries) think that the army can take the power in case of government failure (8% of respondents, comparing to 5% in United States).

Right consciousness among other democratic norms and institutions is another indicator of Chinese perceptions towards democracy. Belief in importance of individual rights and individual freedom is extremely sensible and fundamental indicator of democratic values. Traditional Chinese political culture put group interests over individual rights, thus government authority should be conscious about the Collective rather than the Individual (like in western democracies) [Chen J., Lu C., 2011, P. 707].

Not only collective interest are emphasized by Chinese common sense over individual rights and liberty, there is also special valuation of political liberty and order. Here theorist find one distinguish feature between Russian perceptions of democracy and Chinese one [Chen J., Lu C., 2011, P. 708]. Russians can accept the idea that in the process of transition towards democracy mass support for democracy is highly important even though there might be some disorder on any phase of transition. While Chinese people conceptualize and understand certain democratic norms in alternative way: for Chinese political culture, democracy is associated with social harmony and social order [Chen J., Lu C., 2011, P. 708].

The date also demonstrate that Chinese citizens are ready to sacrifice individual happiness and individual rights for the sake of having a better and harmonized society. The absolute majority of the respondents in 2008, “somewhat agree” with the statement that a citizen should be ready to sacrifice his personal interest for the sake of the interest of nation, community or society. Only 12,3% of respondents “somewhat disagree” with the statement and less than 1% strongly disagree with this issue.

Same data redistribution for another question: the absolute majority of respondents in 2008 (65,6%) “somewhat agree” with the statement that “A citizen should always remain loyal only to his country, no matter how imperfect”, while less than 5% and 1% “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree” with the statement World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 // World Values Survey Database, URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp..

3.2 Cultural requisites for democracy in Russia

Political orientations and values can be transmitted from generation to generation. Thus the study perceptions of modern Russian youth can be highly relevant in case of future prospects for democratization. The first young generation of the Russian Federation was not normal, it was almost “lost generation”. The society that gave rise to the "lost generation", at least, is not healthy. The issue has grown of the importance in light of comparison with the “lost generation” of Germany in the 1930s. It seems that Germany at that time had some similar features with the situation of Russia in the 1990s. The collapse of the empire, of political, economic, cultural and social principles, economic difficulties, also the lack of hopes and breach of expectations, the lack of sustainable orientations, moral values - all these phenomena pulls together the crisis situation in Germany and Russia. Moreover the existing situation in the Russian Federation can be also identified with tightening of political regime, a rising tide of nationalism and xenophobia. All these tendencies show that our society is sick, and the disease is similar with the disease of German society in the 1930s. According to some research, [Yrnov M.Y, 2005, P.45; Zamoglnii, 2005, p.20-36] our society is inclined to radical forms of authoritarianism.

Some scholars define situation with Russian political culture as a contradiction between mass common sense who are rejecting democratic market capitalism and ruling elite who are willing to implement a neoliberal project into Russian political agenda [Hopf, T., 2013, P. 317]. While Russian neoliberal elite is trying to find a place under the Western hegemony mass common sense doesn't consider neoliberalism as a part of their normal daily life. From the one hand, Russia has denied western ideology due to the lack of communication with western world. Hopf here speaks about the lack of international meetings provided at the territory of Russia, the relatively low number of foreign students and Russian students who are studying abroad, also western social and political institutions are far from Russian traditional governmental principles. But apart from these objective reasons there can be another factor - on other hand the lack Russian integration into western hegemony can be caused by special features of Russian common sense [Hopf, T., 2013, P. 332].

No more than 24 years have passed since the Soviet Past. That time was not enough for successful democratic transition. It's highly possible to say that neoliberal discourse with value of liberal democracy and neo-liberal principles of economics [Hopf, T., 2013, P. 332]. have appeared in Russia. 71% of Russians do not consider themselves Europeans. Only 20% of Russians consider themselves as a part or European culture Восприятие россиянами европейских ценностей. Левада-центр // Пресс-выпуск от 15.02.2007, URL: http://www.levada.ru/press/2007021501.html..

History of the XX century for both China and Russia can be characterized as a period of rapid changes in all spheres of society such as economic, political, social and cultural life. Speaking about Russia the collapse of the USSR is considered to be the point since which the new era of Russian history has begun. It is seems such a long time have passed since the creation of the Russian Federation, but in reality it is only twenty years. But this short period of time means nothing in the sense of the global historical process, but the number of radical changes for one person's life is too high. These transformations are the normal reactions to the changes in the political system. However, these rapid transformations are seriously affecting the existing system of value orientations. Changes took place too quickly to be perceived and admitted by people. As a result the first period of the history of the Russian Federation can be considered as the time of values crisis and the lack of political traditions. A new process of resocialisation has emerged in order to refund this lack of political traditions and values. But people in the early 90s after the collapse of USSR had only vague notions about life in the democracy society and the market economy. After twenty years of new Russian history soviet vales has lost their importance. However, one question that needs to be asked, is whether in mind of Russian people the new stable system of values and political orientations has been formed.

3.3 Perceptions towards democracy of Russian citizens in the 1990s

The collapse of USSR have caused a new era of citizen's identity. For the first time after Soviet period, political orientations and perceptions were forming without total care and ideological control. The state was also not ready to provide a new direction of political orientations the citizens are supposed to follow. As the result, the beginning of transition period was characterized with a different variety of identities of Russian citizens. The beginning of transition period considered by researches as the period with maximum differentiation of mass common sense [Omelchenko, 2004].

The process of market formation in Russia was followed with a growing amount of economic, political, social, international obstacles and contradictions [The sociology of youth, 1996]. Rapid form of transformation was accompanied by decline of material welfare among the majority of population. These challenges have caused breaking of moral orientations. In new market conditions honesty very often was replaced with utilitarianism and extreme desire for acquiring money or material things. Because only acquisitiveness and utilitarianism could make people more adapted for the new forms of reality.

The majority of people were dissatisfied with their material welfare. Besides criminalization of society, the increase of unemployment, uncertainty about future, threat of loosing material values, health and even life - all these factors have increased social tension in mass common sense of Russian citizens. As the result the beginning of transition period can be characterized with the formation of special criminalized social and psychological climate in the society. Especially young generation of Russian citizens was highly influenced by these social transitions [Lisovskoi, 1996]. The survey, which were conducted in the beginning of 1998, shows the following results: 9,1% of young people consider criminal activity as a normal way of earning money [Karpuhin, 2000].

The rise of favorable perceptions towards democracy have influenced only the minority of Russian citizens. Besides these perceptions didn't have a chance to be implemented into political agenda.

The crash of the Soviet system didn't affected much perceptions and orientations of mass common sense. In other words, despite of the states in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia didn't experience “the revolution of values”. Soviet political institutions was destroyed while soviet values and beliefs remained in the values orientation system of the majority of Russians [Gorshkov, 2010, P. 13].

At the beginning of 1990s the majority of Russians had only vague notions about life under the condition of market economy and democracy. Citizens were more likely to share the following image of democracy: the society with maximum individual rights and freedoms and at the same time with guarantee of social rights. Basically, the majority of citizens were sharing instrumental approach towards democracy: only small part of Russians considered democratic institutions and practices as values and principles for normal state functioning under the conditions of freedom and competition.

Data proves that Russian citizens were still waiting social guarantees from the state instead of democratic values. In 1994 the majority of respondents (60%) were sharing the idea that the state should provide working places for its citizens, while only 28% agreed with the idea that citizens are responsible with their places by themselves «Курьер - 1994-2» //Joint Economic and Social Data Archive, URL: http://sophist.hse.ru/arch_about.shtml..

First economic obstacles, which are natural for the process of transition from planned economy towards market economy, have destroyed interest and trust in democratic values of the majority of population. People were expecting the rise in material welfare, instead soviet political and economic institutions were destroyed. Primary interest towards democracy was replaced with distrust and disappointment.

The results of survey in 1994 proves this tendency: almost 43% (42,2%) of respondents were sharing the idea that there were more freedom in society before 1985, it is interesting but same amount of respondents (43,9%) considered 1990s as the period with more freedom, then before «Курьер - 1994-2» //Joint Economic and Social Data Archive, URL: http://sophist.hse.ru/arch_about.shtml.. This results carried out the idea that Russian citizens at the beginning of the transition period did not share a stable system of orientations. People was confused about their Soviet past, about current situations ad more over about benefits they were close to get from the process of democratization. Only 40% of citizens had thought that freedom of speech that have appeared with the crush of Soviet era, had brought more benefits towards the country «Курьер - 1994-2» //Joint Economic and Social Data Archive, URL: http://sophist.hse.ru/arch_about.shtml.. Almost 34% considered that freedom of speech have caused more damage, and a relatively large amount of respondents (almost 26%) were confused with the answer and haven't decided yet.

The majority of the respondent at the beginning of transition period were pessimistic about the process of transition in the country: 54% of respondents in 1994 claimed that recent events are forcing the country towards a blind alley «Курьер - 1994-2» //Joint Economic and Social Data Archive, URL: http://sophist.hse.ru/arch_about.shtml..

The situation got worse in 1998, when four different government were not able to resolve the financial and economic and financial crisis [Levada U., 1999]. The economic troubles have caused even more distrust among Russian citizens.

Traditional orientations towards state have become more popular and stable. Among such orientations the most influential one was attitude towards state which were considered to be responsible for the stability and main driver for the changes [Gorshkov M., Dinkin B., Makarenko B.: 2010].

Default was considered by the majority of the citizens as the major indicator that the process of liberalization of economy has failed. The default have force for more consolidation the traditional for Russian paternalism (a desire for strong government). As the result after 1998 antiliberal, antidemocratic antiwestern orientations had become more popular among mass common sense (changes [Gorshkov M., Dinkin B., Makarenko B.: 2010]. European identity neither were incorporated into the perceptions of European elite nor mass common sense.

3.4 Cross-country comparisons: perceptions of democracy in China and Russia

In this part of the thesis the finding of the study will be demonstrated. The structure of comparison of Chinese and Russian perceptions of was provided in Chapter 2. This part will demonstrate the shift in data redistribution.

3.5 Satisfaction with the level of democracy

Satisfaction of the citizens with the level of democracy the country has is the part of political orientations, which are concerned with “output” orientations (the level of satisfaction of the governmental policy, orientations towards main political decisions (to approve them or not).

Political situation in general: Speaking about general “output” orientations, Chinese citizens are more likely to consider political situations in the country as the good one East Asia Barometer 2005-2008 // The Asian Barometer Survey, Mainland China, 2008, URL: http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=503.. The absolute majority of the country (59,4%) consider present political situation in the country as the good one, while almost 30% of respondents think that political situation in China can be considered as “very good”.

Russian are not so optimistic about the direction the country is moving towards. Although the majority of respondents (55,2%) thinks that Russia is moving towards right direction, still the amount of pessimistic respondents is relatively high (almost 31%). It is important to mention that such political perceptions Russians had in 2007. Even though the time before 2008 economic crisis can be considered as the most stable period in modern Russian history, still people had rather pessimistic (than Chinese citizens) orientations. The majority of Russian citizens in 2007 were not fully satisfied with the current situation in the country (41,2%), while 34,2% were almost satisfied and less than 8% totally satisfied Курьер - 2007-12 //Joint Economic and Social Data Archive, URL: http://sophist.hse.ru/dbp/S=1580/Q=5/..

Democracy in the country: The majority of Chinese are fairly satisfied (70,4%) or not very satisfied (11,3%) with the way democracy works in China. The majority of RussiansВсероссийский опрос ВЦИОМ, 2011 // Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM), URL: http://wciom.ru/zh/print_q.php?s_id=727&q_id=52620&date=12.06.2011. also doesn't consider the level of democracy as satisfactory one (41% is fairly satisfied, 21% not at all satisfied). Although the percentage of respondents who is satisfied with democracy (totally and almost satisfied) is higher in Russia, then in China East Asia Barometer 2005-2008 // The Asian Barometer Survey, Mainland China, 2008, URL: http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=503..

Interest in politics: The majority of Chinese (42,4%) are not very interested in politics. Almost the same amount of citizens (30,7 %) are somewhat interested in politics. The perception of Russian citizens towards politics has similar distribution: the absolute majority of the citizens are not very interested or somewhat interested in politics.

It is interesting to compare Chinese and Russian views with answers of respondents from democratic countries. The amount of Chinese, who consider their own country as a complete democracy, can be comparable with respondents from US (9,1% and 9,0%). Only 2,2% of respondents in Russia consider their own country as a complete democracy, (comparable to 2,4% in Great Britain) East Asia Barometer 2005-2008 // The Asian Barometer Survey, Mainland China, 2008, URL: http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=503..

Figure 2. Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent

3.5 Democracy as universal value

Orientations toward regime (perceptions towards legitimacy of governmental institutions, beliefs in official symbols, opinion about governors and important official figures in the country) “input” orientations (opinion about a range of demands an individuum can ask from the government. and “input” orientation) are focus on democracy as the value.

Even though the majority of Chinese doesn't satisfied with the level of democracy in the country, in the scale (from 1 to 10, where 1 is complete dictatorship and 10 - complete democracy) the majority of respondents (almost 30%) wants to see China as a complete democracy. The same amount of respondents (30,7%) choose democracy is perfectly suitable (the point 10, at the scale from 1 to 10, where is 1 - democracy is completely unsuitable) Zheng Ming Shu. What Democracy Does Chinese Want: China “Political Man”, 2012.

Figure 3. Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent

Russians are more likely to consider democratic political regime as a bad thing, than Chinese. Although the majority of respondents in both countries like the idea of having a democratic political regime (26,7% in China and 20,8% in Russia have chosen “very good”; 43,8% and 46,5% - “fairly good”), still the amount of negative opinions is higher in Russia, then in China: 12,6% and 5,7% for “fairly bad” and 4,6% and 1,4% for “very bad” World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 // World Values Survey Database, URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp..

“Authoritarian syndrome” can be indicated in the society with the lack of citizens who considers democracy as a value. Besides that the society is captured by “authoritarian syndrome”, when the majority of citizens has a desire for strong power, authority or a strong political leader.

Although the majority of Chinese prefer to identify the head of the government the father of the family, it seems like Chinese are less affected by “authoritarian syndrome”. The following data World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 // World Values Survey Database, URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp., gathered by World Values Survey prove this statement:

The majority the Russians respondents (41%) in 2011 think that it is a “fairly good” idea to have a strong leader “who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”. Only 16% of Russian respondents consider it as a bad idea.

Chinese respondents (2012) have a different opinion on this issue: the majority of respondents (36,3%) think that it is a bad situation, when a strong leader doesn't care about parliament and elections. It is although interesting to look at distribution of answers of American citizens. The equal amount respondents both for US and China (almost 6%) consider this statement as a “very good idea”. But perceptions of American citizens are different in the way, that the majority of respondents are actually very negative about this idea (37,2% comparing to 6% both for China and Russia).



Figure 4. Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent

Another important indicator is perceptions of society about the importance of democracy in general. Redistribution of the data for this case is almost similar for China and Russia: the majority of respondents for both countries (26% and 30% accordingly) consider democracy as important thing. However, if we look at the data of American respondents, we can see that citizens in the United States are more likely to value the importance of democracy (then Russian and Chinese are actually do) World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 // World Values Survey Database, URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp..

Figure 5. WVS: Importance of democracy

3.6 The meaning of democracy

The finding of two previous part have shown the following tendency: it seems like, Chinese has more democratic values than Russians actually do. Chinese citizens are more likely to consider democracy as important thing, than Russians are. However the main limitation of the study was a concern about the idea that Chinese citizens enjoy democracy because they have a rather specific understanding of democracy.

This part of analysis is focused on the meaning of democracy and orientations toward “rules of the game”.

Usually in different questionnaires questions about the meaning of democracy contains a variety of possible answers: from freedom of speech towards anarchy and lack of power. Chinese citizens gives the first place to the following answer: meaning of democracy- people as their own master. Then the second place is given to the freedom of speech, press or expression, and at the third place: election popular vote or electoral choice. Variants in the questionnaire for Russian citizens differs from Chinese one. Still it is possible to mention some tendencies. The majority of Russians associate democracy with the freedom of speech, press or religion (44%). The second place Russian give to economic prosperity of the country (28%). It is interesting though that only a few Chinese respondents (less than 3%) associate democracy with provision of happy and prosperous life East Asia Barometer 2005-2008 // The Asian Barometer Survey, Mainland China, 2008, URL: http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=503..

The following range of graphs World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 // World Values Survey Database, URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp. are proving the tendency that Russians are actually sharing liberal principles of democracy while Chinese has a very specific understanding of democracy, which doesn't corresponds much with meaning of democracy in liberal tradition:

The majority of Russian respondents (45%) consider free elections, where people can choose their leaders as an essential characteristic of democracy. While the amount of Chinese respondents who are sharing the same idea as rather low (only 45%);

Figure 6. WVS: Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections

Russians are also more intent to consider civil rights as an obstacle to state oppression as an essential characteristic of democracy (40%) (from 1 to 10 on the scale, 40% of Russians have choose “10”, the amount of Chinese who choose the same maximum point is less - only 40%).

Figure 7. WVS: Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression

Speaking about the last graph it is interesting to see, that here Russian are more into “authoritarian syndrome” then Chinese actually are. 19% of Russians and only 12% and 8% of Chinese and American respondents have chosen the maximum point (“10”) for the statement “people obey their rulers” as essential characterics of democracy.



Figure 8. Democracy: People obey their rulers

Conclusion

Having examined the major theoretical theories and approaches concerning with perceptions of democracy, which is resulted as first chapter of the master thesis, I would like to conclude with the following points:

Political behavior of a person is influenced by the individual system of value orientations, which include orientations, perceptions, attitudes and beliefs toward basic elements of political system.

Political orientation due to selection of alternative help actor to choose among wide variety forms of political behavior or political participation.

Political culture which includes perceptions and political orientations of the whole society or mass common sense in other words, may influence the political process the same way as certain perception is influencing the choice of one person. Thus cultural factors (with the similar extend as economic or political and social factor) may influence the prospects of democratization in non-democratic society.

On the transition to democracy some societies face obstacles which can totally turn the whole process of democratization. Among such obstacles - “authoritarian syndrome” of society, which can be defined as a set of non-democratic values of the majority people in the country.

Russia and China have special relations with democratic values. Perceptions of democracy in both countries may be influenced by “authoritarian syndrome”.

That's why the comparative analysis of political values in both countries may help to construct possible threads and prerequisites for democratization.

Another important part of the finding the study is actually an answer on the questions who has a stronger “authoritarian syndrome”. The data analysis have proved the following statement of hypothesis:

Mass common sense in Russia has a better understanding of democracy, then Chinese mass common sense while Chinese citizens are more likely to consider democracy as a value, than Russian citizens.

In that case, Russia has a stronger indication for “authoritarian syndrome”, with the desire for strong power and approval of non-democratic regime. Russians understand what is actually democracy is and at the same time reject this value. That's why Chinese have more prospective towards forming a stable democratic values, because for them democracy is rather a value.

The reason for that can be actually found in the mode of transition the country were following. The mode of transition among other factors can actually effect the stability and quality of democratization in the country.

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