Defense and foreign policies of the global and regional actors in middle east and north Africa and its impact on the Eu’s turbulence: the cases of Syria and Yemen in 2011-2017

Actual task of the state military building and defence in this context is all-round development of “soft power” that in military area finds reflection in hybrid methods of warfare. Special value in the present conditions is acquired by so-called “currency wars” which occur in stock market, application of measures of restriction of interbank payments. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to search for the reason of occurrence of new threats in the economic basis, a changing method of production, structural changes of world economy. Hybrid methods of warfare, possibly, constitute a transitive stage to following generation of wars. It is rather difficult to tell that hybrid threats in itself are capable to make separate generation. Anyway, adequate reaction to new calls sees in an anticipation, advancing reflection of new threats and their immediate legal adjustment. In one of the latest works “World order” Kissinger has quite right noted that if it is not possible to provide an order with the consent or to impose force, it will be shaped by catastrophic crash, chaos - and by uncountable victims. Danger of hybrid methods of war is their structural uncertainty. Namely, the world or war can be the decision of any conflict. Hybrid mechanisms as if coil between them, forming chaos space. As during Thirty-year's war any state could not gain a resolute victory because of all of them were approximately at one level of development, and now active use of a hybrid antagonism can quite lead to catastrophic consequences. A unique exit from such situation is legal determination of threats, the fresh wording of the phenomenon of war taking into account its overflowing in a hybrid channel.

1.8 The concept of “air power” in the military conflicts of the XXI century

Detailed examination of modern conflicts in the area from Europe to the Middle East and North Africa, South East Asia, allows us to test the well-known thesis of Clausewitz about the continuation of policy by military means. Despite significant humanistic progress after the World wars, military strength is still a decisive factor in the development of the international situation, and the improvement of the means and methods of warfare have a significant impact on the formation of international relations in general. As history shows, the fleet played a decisive role in many conflicts of the past. It is the presence of a strong and efficient naval fleet contributed to the Union of Athens and Corfu in the Peloponnesian war, which significantly affected the development of the international situation in the MediterraneanФукидид. История: Пер. с греч. - М.: Академический Проект, 2012. С. 23-24.. Today, the air force power affects the architecture of world order. There are some interesting moments in the theory of “aggressive realism” of John Mearsheimer about developing strengthening national security and achievement of hegemony at a given time John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. P. 35, based on the aggressive behavior of states in an anarchic international system and shaped by the need to increase military power to prevent other actors.

The founder of the doctrine of air warfareItalian general Giulio Douhet, who in his work “Supremacy in the Air” outlined the prospects for the use of the air force, formulated the idea of a massive strike at the vital centers of the enemy. This approach will form the basis of the Russian air force combat during the II World war as Nazi Germany and anti-Hitler coalition countries. In the modern view of the concept of “air power” we can find normative documents in the United States in the Charter of AFM 1-2 “The Basic Doctrine of the Air Force” and replaced his AFM 1-1 “Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the US Air Force”. For half a century (from the mid-40s to the 90s of the XX century), American military thought, based on geopolitical and Maritime strategy of A. Mahan, tolerated the idea of the domination of the sea in the airspace. Only now it was not just about “domination”, and about the concept of “global reach - global power”, the core of which is the thesis of the possibility of a strike at any point of the planet during the day. Moreover, the air force must play a crucial role in regional military conflicts. Experience in the application of the Israeli air force during Six day and Lebanon wars, the US air force and its allies in Iraq and Yugoslavia shows how the reduced time ground phase of operation, if it was preceded by a massive bombardment. At the same time, such use of force has much in common with the “carpet bombing” of the II World War and could carry significant political risks associated with possible unjustified victims among the local population. The latest cases demonstrate air power may relate to the establishment of no-fly zone (as in Libya) or with the application of precision strikes (Russia's actions in Syria). It has a tendency to twofold manifestation of the concept of air power in modern conflicts. On the one hand, the United States are based on historical experience of hosting the naval and air force bases around the world and continue to build their presence, we are talking about a predominantly quantitative approach is associated with significant difficulties in the deployment of military infrastructure. A similar plan is valid in China, expanding the area of responsibility of its air force to the American bases in the Western Pacific ocean through the introduction in 2013 of the zone of identification of air defense in the South China sea and construction of aircraft carrier “Liaoning”. On the other hand, policy documents have put forward a course on the concept of “global impact” to strengthen the space component and coherence in the information space, which largely involves focusing on the quality characteristics. Pursuant to the PGS - Prompt Global Strike is produced by active development of air and space attack and defense, as well as hypersonic aircraft and missiles. The defense projects of DARPA in the US (AASC, HAWK, TBD, XS-1, NAI Wave Rider, CAV, FALCON), SHEFEX in Germany, Skylon in the UK, IXV, in France has long history of exploration of space by military means and for military purposes. Significant scientific and technological progress in the aerospace sphere, the improvement of high-precision means of destruction, integration processes in the political and economic field, that is, changes in the socio - economic basis and political superstructure give rise to substantial changes in military strategy and the armed forces. The concept of air power today is the plane of the contemporary military outlook, at the forefront of a new generation of wars, combining traditional conventional means of warfare, and the hybrid methods of warfare. Itself combat use of air and space forces is undergoing significant changes in the context of development of information and communication systems.

As the result of the demonstration of air power in contemporary conflicts would be change in the military and political characteristics of the world order. Another important consequence of the concept of air power in the context of forming a new generation of wars can be considered its inclusion in the overall hybrid strategy of using the armed forces. Namely, we can observe a significant reorientation in the combat use of the air force. The predominantly air power today requires coordination with other non-conventional methods in the framework of the information and financial - economic confrontation. During the military operation in Syria, the Russian air force went hand in hand not only with groups of special forces, but with military resources, space exploration, Federal financial monitoring service, Russia's FSB, which identified and provided army with information about the financial centers of the enemy. Thus, aerospace power also needs in the information power in the broadest terms, and all characteristic features of hybrid threats and characterize the modern aspects of combat application of air force. Air power, like the hybrid strategy in general, aims to pinpoint the use of force, minimizing human losses. In other words, hybrid methods of resistance associated with the use of military force, carrying a sort of injection of “soft power”.

2. The battle of Yemen and Syria

2.1 Introduction

Figure 1

Nonviolent, "velvet" revolution in Yemen has begun in February, 2011. According to the orientalist Sergey Serebrov, in 2011 thirst of changes has brought millions of people to streets of the cities. Protesters with an amazing clearness formulated the slogans of fight, demanded dismantling of the existing mode and transition to the state founded on the modern civil forms of government and the principle of division of the authorities. The largest cities of the North (Sana'a and Taiz) and the South (Aden and Mukalla) became the main centers of events.

However two months of the requirement of protesters later have undergone adjustment. In the south of separatist sentiments began to dominate. In the north a part of leaders has relied on Islamic rhetoric.

In November with mediation of monarchy of the Persian Gulf the president Saleh has signed the contract on transfer of power with opposition. In February, 2012 Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi has been elected to a transition period the president of the country. The new authorities have approved the project of creation of the federal state as a part of six provinces.

This initiative was opposed by housita - the Shiite Muslims living in the north of Yemen (make about a third of the population of the country). The discontent of housit has provoked a new round of armed conflict - in January, 2015 they have occupied the capital of the country Sana'a.

The president of Yemen has been forced to appeal to monarchy of the Persian Gulf to interfere with a situation. On March 26, 2015 the coalition of the Arab states led by Saudi Arabia has begun military and air operation against rebels. Now the conflict in the country isn't settled. According to the UN, since March, 2015 5,7 thousand people became his victims.

The situation is complicated also that else since the time of the president Saleh in the territory of Yemen the "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" terrorist group works. Till 2011 attacks on positions of terrorists were struck by the USA with the consent of the Yemen authorities, after change of the power to Al-Qaeda (it is forbidden in the territory of the Russian Federation) and also the cells of IS which have appeared in the country were resisted by housita.

Who will combat terrorists further - it is unknown, not casually international community is interested in the fastest success of national dialogue in Yemen which goes over with variable success under the auspices of the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Yemen has long history of wars and conflicts, there is no peaceful time in last years since the revolution of 1962. Current situation at the country are becoming worse after abortive attempts to reestablish imamate as it was before 1962, and unsuccessful events of Arab Spring. Nowadays, we can see escalation of the conflict because of growing influence of external actors on the situation inside country. Yemen is a battleground in proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which use conventional and irregular tools of hybrid warfare for establishing hegemony on the Middle East, where Yemen has a very important strategical position. In the situation of proxy war between two regional powers Yemeni population is the weakest element of this “game of powers”. In according to the UN's estimations, more than 10,000 people were killed during the conflict and more than 80% of 26 million population is in need of humanitarian assistance. In this case, it is very important for international and local policy-makers understand modern security policies of key actors that to prevent mass killings and possible famine in future.

The period from 2011-2016 was chosen that to have broader perspective for analysis and policy-making process in global context. For this case there are two main selection criteria:

1. Both regional actors (Iran and KSA) lead coalitions of other states from the Arabian Peninsula (for KSA) or non-state actors (for Iran) and use similar strategies of coalition-building for providing its public interests by means of violent and non-violent tools.

2. Iran and KSA use different conventional and irregular tactics.

Thus, Republic of Yemen today is a battlefield between Saudi Arabia that has wide support from the Western countries and arising Iran that has strong ambitions in the region and would like to be the most important regional power.

2.2 Short description of the conflict

The Houthi movement was initially formed by Hussein al-Houthi in the 1990s to revive and defend Zaydism (or Twelver Shiism), a branch of Shia Islam, against Saudi-imported Wahhabism and Salafism. Despite starting as a sectarian initiative, the Houthi movement draws most of its power and support from tribal politics, rather than exclusively religious alliances. The Houthis opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s and attacked President Ali Abdullah Saleh, for his support of the invasion. The group was able to create a strong coalition in the northern governorate of Saada by regrouping tribal factions that wanted to challenge the President's authoritarian rule.

The Houthis took part in the National Dialogue Conference in 2012. In 2014 the Houthis allied with former President Saleh and led a new attack, reaching the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. President Hadi initially fled to Aden in February 2015, then fled the country entirely in March. Saudi Arabia and allies started a bombing campaign to reinstate President Hadi's government, who has now established a temporary capital in Aden. During the Arab spring in 2011, the Houthis expanded their influence and drew support from other groups across the country that also rejected President Saleh's regime. During the transition of power from President Saleh to President Hadi, the Houthis took part in the “National Dialogue Conference” (NDC). One of the outcomes of the NDC was the proposal for a federal division of Yemen into six regions. Although well-received by the majority of political factions, the Houthis and elements of the Southern Movement, objected to the way some of the regional lines were drawn. Peaceful dialogue was short-lived as the Houthis, fed up with the lack of progress and President Hadi's perceived cozying up to Islamist leaders, took advantage of instability in the interim government in early 2014 to launch a new attack from the north, reaching as far as the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. Paradoxically, to achieve this the Houthis formed an alliance with their previous enemy, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, with the aim of overthrowing the government of President Hadi and push the Islamists further south. This move on the capital created a great breach in the country between the northern regions controlled by the Houthi/Saleh alliance and the southern and oil-rich eastern regions nominally controlled by President Hadi. In early 2015 the Houthis reinforced their control over the capital Sanaa and surrounded the presidential palace. President Hadi escaped to the southern port city of Aden in February. He fled to Saudi Arabia in March 2015 when the Houthis pushed to take control of the whole country, with the backing of security forces loyal to former President Saleh. The push south and the exile of President Hadi raised alarm in Saudi Arabia and a number of other Arab States, who began a bombing campaign to push back the Houthis and reinstate President Hadi's government. The US, the UK and France provided logistical and intelligence support. President Hadi returned from his exile in Saudi Arabia after six months and established a temporary capital in the city of Aden.

Some analysts have called the Yemen conflict a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although the Houthi movement was originally created to revitalise Zaydism, its platform is more tribal and political than sectarian. Yemen has traditionally not been divided along sectarian lines and intermarriage between different sects of Muslims was common and widely accepted. Nevertheless, external sectarian pressures have seeped in to Yemen and kindled tensions. Iran is thought to be one of the principal foreign backers of the Houthis, although the true extent of Iran's support and involvement is disputed. Iran and the Houthis share ideological goals, but Iran follows a different branch of Shia Islam to the Houthis. Saudi Arabia's official reason for entering the fray was to support the legitimate government of Yemen against the insurgents. However, Saudi Arabia's motivations come, at least in part, from a fear of the interference of Iran in its back garden and Iran's rise as a political and military power in the region. Some have gone as far as to call the conflict a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. When outside countries became involved militarily, Yemen was wedged into the pressure cooker of Middle East geopolitics, making it even harder to reach a modicum of peace.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is one of Al Qaeda's most successful franchises. The group has taken advantage of unrest to take control at various times of cities and areas across the south of the country. The US continues to lead a campaign of drone strikes against the group. The Islamic State is also active in the conflict, but is not as influential as AQAP. The group took advantage of the chaos and instability during the Arab Spring in 2011 and the transition of power from Saleh to Hadi to take control of key cities in Abyan province in southern Yemen. They were driven out and into the mountains further east in 2013. Taking advantage of the distraction caused by the Houthi invasion of the capital Sanaa in 2014, AQAP took control of the city of Al Mukalla and surrounding areas in early 2015, but were driven out by Yemeni and Emirati troops in April 2016. The US continues to lead a campaign of drone strikes against AQAP. AQAP competes for recruits against the Islamic State, which started active operations in Yemen in March 2015 with suicide attacks on mosques in Sanaa killing 140 people. The group, which is seen as a foreign entity by many Yemeni, has not been as successful as AQAP, which has strong links to local tribal factions.

2.3 Current policies of the major actors

Nowadays, international community can observe highly controversial security policies of the main actors and third parties as well as supranational authorities. There are eight resolutions of the UN Security Council that were adopted: 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015), 2216 (2015), 2266 (2016), 2342 (2017), but these acts do not prevent key participants of the conflict from escalation and violation of human rights. Iran and KSA lead opposing coalitions of other actors and formulate security policies for the whole region. KSA use both conventional and hybrid strategies of warfare in its policy, Iran support rebels financially and materially and do not use its armed forces in Yemen.

I. “State - centric” security policy of Saudi Arabia

The main factor of KSA's dominance in the “battle of Yemen” is air power: aerial blockade and bombing as well as sea control. The first test of the aerial blockade occurred in late April 2015, when Iranian civil aircraft negotiated permission from Oman and the Houthis to deliver Red Crescent aid packages to Sana. Upon detecting the inbound flights and denying them permission to land, the coalition bombed the runways at Sana airport, forcing the planes to turn back. This measure was presumably based on fears that the supposed “aid packages” would also contain munitions and other materiel - a legitimate concern given Tehran's other efforts to rearm the Houthis. Russia has tested the air embargo twice: in July and November 2015, when single flights arrived carrying what Moscow described as “humanitarian supplies”, then departed carrying Russian nationals. On both occasions, the coalition opened specific windows in the no-fly zone to accommodate the requests.

The air operations undertaken by the Gulf coalition over the past year have been complex and controversial. What began as a single-front operation to liberate Aden has evolved into a sprawling war where coalition forces are in contact with enemy forces on as many as seven major battlefronts each day. Operations have become more refined over time, starting out with around 90 combat sorties per day, peaking at up to 300 last fall, and now settling at 20-70 sorties per day, many of which return to base without releasing their weapons. The campaign's key failing has been its inability to address the widespread perception that airstrikes are killing far too many noncombatants, a factor that may ultimately overshadow the coalition's achievements.

Table 2. Human toll in 2015-2017 among civilians in the capital during air operations of the coalition

Table 2 and Figure 1 show us chaotic and ongoing deaths among civilians in the capital. It means that military forces of the coalition lead by Saudi Arabia chose ineffective military component of the security policy in the conflict. The Houthis in Yemen are not only combatants, there are many civilians who live on the same territory.

Figure 2

One of the air campaign's most problematic elements has been the stream of “strategic targets” struck with the intention of coercing the Houthi leadership and population to weaken or prompting Saleh loyalists to defect. Since May 2015, the Houthi home province of Saada has been singled out for special coercive treatment, resulting in numerous strikes on what are typically viewed as civilian targets - mosques, houses, and water wells. Practically every major state institution has been struck multiple times, as have most properties belonging to Saleh loyalist leaders, leaving the country's government in shambles. Last fall, as the fixed target list was exhausted and multiple ground axes of attack began to open, the focus of the air campaign shifted toward dynamic short-notice targeting of suddenly emerging Houthi and Saleh forces. Since then, many strikes have been aimed at military units, SSM teams, or commanders who betray their location through movement patterns or intercepted communications. At any given time, the coalition is now operating stacks of close-support strike aircraft over four or five active frontlines. These circling aircraft are guided to emerging targets by airborne controllers with specialized sensors and links to special forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. This has resulted in a huge variety of target locations being hit on short notice: bridges, gas stations, camps, occupied commercial and residential buildings, and even schools, hospitals, and mosques.

Thus, KSA adhere to the security policy that involves states and its regular armies as main actors of influence on the conflict. There was an abortive attempt to use irregular tactics and Colombian mercenaries but not so successfully.

The Iranian regime's regional security policy is not purely sectarian. In his address to the attendees of the January 2015 Islamic Unity Conference in Tehran, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “the Islamic Republic's assistance to its Muslim brothers has mostly been given to Sunnis. We have stood beside the Palestinians. We have helped Hamas and Islamic Jihad and will continue to help”. In general this seems to be true- Iran tends to conduct its foreign and security policies based on ideology, not theology. But this does not prevent the regime from using Shiism as a soft-power tool or mobilizing Shiites in the Middle East to threaten the West's interests and allies. The receptiveness that many Zaydi leaders have shown toward Iran's security policy and its practice of Twelver Shiism gives Tehran a ready means to expand its influence in Yemen.

Iran has been caught transferring weapons to the Houthis before - notably on January 23, 2013, when the USS Farragut intercepted the ship Jihan 1 off Yemen's coast carrying 122-millimeter Katyusha rockets, radar systems, Chinese QW-1M antiaircraft missiles, and 2.6 tons of RDX high explosive. This action violated UN Security Council Resolution 1747 of 2007, which mandated that “Iran shall not supply, sell, or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel” (When Iran and the P5+1 reached their nuclear deal in July 2015, UNSCR 1747 was replaced by the much weaker UNSCR 2231, which put the onus on other states “to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Security Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer of arms from Iran by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran”).

On November 2015, the EU-funded group Conflict Armament Research (CAR) released a “Dispatch” paper titled “Maritime Interdictions of Weapon Supplies to Somalia and Yemen: Deciphering a Link to Iran”. CAR used serial numbers and weapon types to draw several important conclusions about their origin, including the following:

1. New sniper rifles may have been drawn from Iranian national stocks. According to CAR, such a large cache of new, sequentially numbered weapons “suggests that the rifles derived from a national stockpile, rather than disparate non-state sources”.

2. Tehran may have supplied Russian and Iranian antitank guided missiles. CAR found nine Russian-made 9M133-1 Kornet ATGMs manufactured in two production lots in 2008; the Kornet is a common weapon in Iran's arsenal. The UAE showed CAR a similar Russian-made Kornet reportedly captured from the Houthis in Taizz on November 29, 2015. The serial number on the latter weapon placed it in the same production batch (Lot 02-08) as the Kornets, providing a potential “smoking gun” linking Iranian smuggling vessels with frontline Houthi fighters. In addition, the UAE's Taizz cache included a 2015 Iranian-made Dehlavieh ATGM (an Iranian copy of the Kornet), while the Oman cache included an Iranian-made Tosan ATGM (Iran's copy of the 9M113 Konkurs).

It means Iran prefers do not support the Houthis openly but provide them with weapons and other material support as forms of unconventional security policy.

2.4 Pragmatic approach for policy Cycle in Yemen

The war in Yemen has left at least 10,000 dead, including almost 4,000 civilians, according to the United Nations, and has displaced 3.2 million Yemenis, out of a population of 27 million. It has decimated the economy of what was already the poorest country in the Arab world and sparked a deadly famine. Yemen's infrastructure is in ruins. Saudi Arabia's official reason for continuing its assault on its impoverished southern neighbor is to restore the legitimate president of the country, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi fled the capital, Sanaa, in February 2015 and now stays in Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of backing the Houthis, and the war in Yemen is often cast as a proxy battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Houthis and Iranians are both Shiites, though the Houthis are Zaydis, a different branch of Shiite Islam than is practiced by Iranian leadership. Indeed, the Iranian government did work to increase its influence in Yemen after the change in Yemeni leadership in 2012 by supporting activists who were against Hadi's government. Saudi Arabia was keenly aware of such developments, and the monarchy, fearful of Shiite Islam as it is, did not want Iran to gain any more allies in the region, especially not on its southern border.

After general identification of the problem we should detail it and then we will find two crucial challenges:

1. Problem of macrolevel - the battle of power where regional powers use conventional and irregular forces for reshaping economic and security architecture in Middle East that costs more than 10,000 lives.

2. Problem of microlevel - state fragility and economic collapse of Yemen as a result of the revolution, civil war and foreign intervention.

What is the similarity of these problems? For Yemeni case we can say that state fragility of the country has clear connection with fiasco of democracy transition when global powers use it for the contestation of reshaping regional economic and security order. In other words, we can describe hybrid warfare here as a tool of dominance in the context of Realpolitik's paradigm or pragmatic approach of Philippe Zittoun, if we will analyze security policies and decision process of major actorsin the context of “cognitive bricolage”. On the one hand, we have policy cycle of state transition with its steps, on the other hand, there is hybrid warfare as the most efficient source of war.

Figure 3

On the scheme there are key regional actors for Middle East and North Africa that show us global context for Yemeni proxy war between KSA and Iran. For local level of the country we have two opposing blocks:

· Yemeni government with support of coalition lead by Saudi Arabia (Sunni group)

· Insurgents (the Houthis) with support of Iran (Shia group).

In terms of proxy warfare, Iran and KSA are benefactors, the Houthis and Yemeni government are conduits. Tensions are high between Huthis and their various opponents - the Ahmar family, Major General AliMohsen al-Ahmar (no relation to the Ahmar family) and his military allies, Salafifighters, and the Sunni Islamist party, Islah, and their affiliated tribes.

Huthis claim that their expansion is locally driven. Yemenis, they say, welcomethem because they are frustrated with old regime forces, including the Salehs, AliMohsen, Islah and the Ahmars.Opponents contrast the Huthis' inclusive rhetoric with their often repressive tactics. Critics routinely accuse the group of wanting to reinstate, by force, a theocracysimilar to the Zaydi imamate of Yemen's past. Some go further, claiming that theHuthis have turned away from their Zaydi roots toward Twelver Shiism - to whichIran's Shiites adhere - and are serving Tehran's agenda.

Thus, for external actors - Iran and KSA - there are another interests:

Table 3

Methodologically, there is collaboration between tri-partite counter insurgency model of Andrew Mumford and actors-centered approach of Dmitry Zaytsev. Mumford gives three interactive and interdependent factors in the model: the counter-insurgent, the insurgent and the international political context. Particularly, Mumford does not associate here the insurgent/counter-insurgent with actors that are specific implications of rebels' groups and can occur spontaneously. Zaytsev have the same idea about nature of actor. “Spontaneous groups of citizens to political change, except giving a signal about their necessity, are not affected. On the contrary, agents, actors, and especially strategic actors influence the political changes (agents for the benefit of their patrons, the actors themselves in their own interests). Rare cases when spontaneous not institutionalized groups of citizens are transformed strategic actors (such as the "Solidarity" movement in Poland or "S№jыdis" in Lithuania). The most common when mass protest remain spontaneous expression of discontent of citizens, which is suppressed by the old or take dictation of a new political elite (e.g. case of “Arab Spring” show us). In theory, there are several strategies of action of spontaneous not institutionalized groups of citizens transformed into strategic actors - growing “out of itself” the new political elite or the creation of policy coalitions to develop and promote alternative policies”Zaytsev, Dmitry. Positioning Actors Centered Approach Within and Vis-а-Vis Paradigms, Methodological Frameworks and Methods of Social Sciences, 7-th ECPR General Conference Science Po Bordeaux, 4-7 September 2013 (Bordeaux)..

2.5 Policy recommendations

Nowadays, we see ongoing war in Yemen and the main alternative to this bloody conflict is “political solution”, in according to UNSCR 2342 (2017). The situation is combustible. Emboldened by recent victories, the Huthis mayoverplay their hand and miss a chance to consolidate gains through compromise.Their opponents, who show no sign of giving in, are pushing state intervention to rollback Huthi advances. President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi's government is at risk ofbeing pulled into a conflict that it cannot win militarily, especially while it fights anemboldened al-Qaeda branch. Southern separatists also are watching developmentsin the north closely; should the military become embroiled there, they could seizethe opportunity to advance an independence bid.They did not fashion a clear consensus around the issues driving the fighting,such as power sharing and the division of the country into six federal regions. Someelements, like disarmament of non-state actors, are dangerously vague, lacking timetablesand enforcement mechanisms.In April 2014, President Hadi initiated talks with Huthi leader Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi about ending the recent fighting and implementing the NDC. But Hadi andUN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar must go further and transform the NDC conclusionsinto an implementable peace deal. The talks must include, at least informally,additional stakeholders: high-level representatives of the General People's Congress(GPC, former President Saleh's party), Islah, the Ahmars, Ali Mohsen and Salafis.

Any realistic peace plan will need to satisfy the core concerns of belligerents and guarantee them with enforcement mechanisms. Three elements are critical:

1.National and local power sharing until elections can be held. This should include a consensus government that would ideally comprise Huthi representatives, with ministers chosen on the basis of professional skill and political affiliation.

2. Disarmament. The Huthis should agree to a detailed, sequenced program for transferringweapons to the state in exchange for government steps to improve its neutrality, especially of the security services. Disarmament, first of heavy andthen medium weaponry, must apply to all non-state actors. To promote transparencyand implementation, all sides could agree to a monitoring framework.

3. Guarantees of freedom of religious belief and peaceful political activities. As a first step, the Ahmars, Islah, Salafis and Ali Mohsen should explicitly accept the Huthis' right to propagate their religious views and pursue peaceful political activities. The Huthis should do the same for others and form a political party. Negotiating the details and sequencing of implementation are far from easy. The parties were unable to do so during the NDC, which succeeded in no small part because difficult decisions were delayed. Yemen no longer has this luxury. At stake is not only a relapse into violence, but the country's fragile transition.

Figure 4

Figure 5

On scales of the victims and destructions, catastrophic social, economic and political consequences such conflicts of new type are comparable with consequences of the most real war.

And «rules of war» significantly have changed. The role of not military ways has increased in achievement of political and strategic objectives which in some cases have considerably surpassed weapon force in the efficiency.

The focus of the used methods of confrontation is shifted towards broad application of the political, economic, information, humanitarian and other not military measures realized with involvement of protest potential of the population. All this is complemented with military measures of the hidden character, including realization of actions of information confrontation and actions of forces of special operations. Often under the guise of peacekeeping activity and crisis settlement pass to open use of force only at some stage, generally for achievement of final success in the conflict.

From here natural questions follow: what is modern war, what it is necessary to prepare army for, than she has to be armed? Only having answered them, we will be able to define the directions of construction and development of Armed Forces for a long-term outlook. For this purpose it is necessary to represent accurately what forms and ways of their application we will use?

Now along with traditional non-standard receptions take root. The role of mobile trans-species groups of the troops acting in uniform prospecting information space due to use of new opportunities of control systems and providing raises. Military operations become more dynamic, active and productive. Tactical and operational pauses which the opponent could use disappear. New information technologies have allowed to reduce considerably a spatial, time and information gap between troops and governing bodies. Frontal collisions of large groups of troops (forces) at the strategic and operational level gradually consign to the past. Remote contactless impact on the opponent becomes the main way of achievement of the goals of fight and operation. Defeat of his objects is carried out on all depth of the territory. Differences between strategic, operational and tactical level, offensive and defensive actions are erased. Use of precision weapons gains mass character. Actively take root arms on the new physical principles into military science and robotic systems.

The asymmetric actions allowing to level superiority of the opponent in armed struggle were widely adopted. Treat them use of forces of special operations and internal opposition for creation of the permanent front in all territory of the resisting state and also information influence which forms and ways are constantly improved. The happening changes find reflection in doctrinal views of the leading countries of the world and are approved by different global and regional actors.

For example, by the end of April 2018 two agreements on accession to the mode of cessation of hostilities of settlements of ANHUL of the province Derja and NABA AL FAVOR of the Province of El-Cuneytrawere signed.

The number of the settlements which have joined reconciliation process has increased till 1475.Negotiations on accession to the mode of cessation of hostilities with groups of the armed opposition in the provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and El-Cuneytra are continued.

The number of the paramilitary groups which have declared the commitment to acceptance and performance of conditions of cessation of hostilities according to the armistice agreement of February 27, 2016 hasn't changed - 143.The number of the settlements freed since January 1, 2017 by the Syrian government troops from paramilitary groups of the international terrorist organization "Islamic State" hasn't changed - 236.Per day under control of government troops has passed 16 sq.km of the territory. 4629 sq.km. are in total released. Observance of the mode of cessation of hostilities

From 00:00 on December 30, 2016 according to the Uniform Agreement on complex permission of the Syrian crisis the regime of cessation of hostilities is introduced. The number of the paramilitary groups of the Syrian opposition which have joined the mode of cessation of hostilities hasn't changed - 65.The Russian part of representative office of the joint Russian-Turkish commission on consideration of the questions connected with violations of the Uniform Agreement has recorded per day 15 violations in provinces Damascuses (9), Latakia (3), Hama (2) and Derja (1).Turkish part of representation has recorded 12 violations of the Uniform Agreement in the provinces of Aleppo (5), Damascus (2), by Derja (2), Hama (2), Homs (1).

During trial on these facts of violations it is established that all 12 cases of violations aren't confirmed by the Russian side

3. Migration risks and turbulence of the European Union: the role of borders management, third country nationals and legal implications

The international migration turned into a universal problem long years ago, and the EU is not an exception. There were more than 16,2 million citizens from the third countries before the refugee crisis in the EU who lived on the legal basis, i.e. about 4% of population of the member-statesD. von Hoffmann (ed.). Towards a Common European Immigration Policy. Frankfurt am Main, 2003. Р. 11-32. Also, see more about the phenomenon of international migration in KoserKh. International migration. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, 2007. Also, some issues of the EU border control were mentioned by Steve Peers in the Chapter 25 in International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges / edited by Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud, Euan MacDonald, The Hague: TMC Asser, 2007..

The problem of cross-border migration has many sides. Along with positive moments (for example, inflow of necessary cheap labour force), it contains also a row negative elements (in particular, connected with organised crime and terrorism). It puts the EU before dificult problem of development of an adequate legal mechanism of regulation for migration flows. Not accidentally this mechanism is non-uniform and represents a difficult interlacing of elements of the common international law, the EU law and national law of the member-states.

Moreover, current migration flows and processes have a very strong impact on the idea and foundations of the European Union and its policies. We can see evolution of different concepts of state, stateness and statehood and interpenetration of foreign and internal policy. The global crisis of sovereignty and legitimacy need in rethink of traditional views on the problems of state.

3.1 Legal mechanismsof the migration policy

Originally the basis of this mechanism was made by the Schengen agreements - The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders of June 19, 1985 EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01) (Schengen I) and Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders of June 19, 1990 EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(02) (Schengen II). In the same period - June 15, 1990 was signed the Dublin Convention that contained the system of criteria according to which the member-states admit for consideration of petitions from asylum seekers. Along with the Schengen agreements it was the tool for more close cooperation by implementation of joint actions of police officers, judicial, customs and other competent authorities of the EU member-states. The area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) is an important link between the Schengen law and the law of the European Union.

Further development of legal infrastructure of AFSJ on a basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam was concretised at a meeting of the European Council in Tampere, Finland in October, 1999 (Tampere I): «This freedom should not, however, be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union's own citizens. Its very existence acts as a draw to many others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for granted. It would be in contradiction with Europe's traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes. These common policies must be based on principles which are both clear to our own citizens and also offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to the European Union» Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#union.. The meeting was devoted to development of the general immigrant policy and granting asylum in the EU for five-year term. In December, 2004 the EU adopted the second five-year programme (The Hague Programme, or Tampere II). This programmeactually developed provisions of previous conclusions. Particularly, the need of improvement of cooperation between judicial and law-enforcement bodies of the member-states, creation of common asylum system, regulation of legal immigration, distributions of a financial burden between the member-states and the EU protecting external borders, fighting against illegal immigration, international terrrorism and cross-border organised crime.

All these measures for development of a legal mechanism of AFSJ did not affect the special status of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, when carrying out the common migration policy of the EU. According to the special protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam these countries stipulated for themselves a possibility of non-participation in Schengen processesSo called «opt-in» and «opt-out» - Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen Acquis Integrated into the Framework

of the European Union:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E%2FPRO%2F19. There is a case С-77/05 UK & Ireland v. Council (2007) where we can find a legal position of the Court of Justice that non-participation of a member-state in any coverage of the EU law is deprived by this member-state of the right to take part in development of the acts of the secondary law concerning this sphere, even if this state is interested in development of the similar act.. The United Kingdom and Ireland agreed to support measures for protection of external borders of the EU and to participate in cooperation of law-enforcement bodies and judicial authorities of the member-states, but refused to open the internal borders. Denmark limited the participation only to international legal obligations within the Schengen agreements. In practice it meant that approved by this country in 6 months measures of the European Council, taken on a basis of the Schengen acquis, obliged only member-states which participated in this measure. The same legal regime concerning the Schengen acquis extends to other countries of the Nordic Council: for the EU member-states (Sweden, Finland) and non member-states (Iceland, Norway).

The Treaty of Lisbon which came into force on December 1, 2009 did not bring something cardinally new to the mechanism of regulation of freedom of movement for citizens of the third countries in the territory of the EU, especially as its basis draw up by statements of the secondary law of the EU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Title V “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. The provisions of this title often reproduce (if not literally, but in fact) provisions of the acts of the secondary law of the EU, regulating position of citizens of the third countries in the EU, in particular the concerning lawful stay and stay of citizens of the third countries in the EU, fighting against illegal migration, terrorism and cross-border crimes, protection of basic rights and personal freedoms.. In this regard in the Protocol 36 to the Treaty of Lisbon on transitional provision it is emphasized that the acts of bodies and institutes of the EU adopted before entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon will continue to work until they are not cancelled, cancelled or changed in the course of application of agreements (Art. 9 of the Protocol).

3.2 Regulations for the third country nationals

There are three main spheres of regulation, concerning citizens of the third countries, within the legal mechanism of regulation of migration flows in the EU:

1. visacontrol;

2. protection of refugees and asylum seekers;

3. formation of the common migration and asylum policy for migrants from the third countries.

Visa control. The principle of uniform control on external borders of the EU is the basis for visa control. According to this principle, bilateral visa agreements of the member-states with the third countries are excluded. On a basis of the Schengen II was established the Schengen visa for free visit of the EU. Respectively, there were defined countries for the visa regime and countries which citizens are exempted from receiving visaCouncil Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R0539.. The EU Council regularly instructs consulates of the member-states concerning rules of carrying out the common visa policy for the third countries. That is why was created a system of information exchange for visaCouncil Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS) - 2004/512/EC:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2004/512/oj..

One of the basic provisions of this system is that the refusal of one of the member-states to provide the visa to the citizen from the third country works also for other member-states through which this citizen will seek to drive in the EU Nevertheless, there are some limitations for this approach defined in case С-503/03 Commission v. Spain (2006).. It is also necessary to mention the Visa Code adopted in the form of Regulations No. 810/2009 of the Council and the European Parliament on 13 July, 2009 and came into force at the beginning of April, 2010Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code):