The Rise and Establishment of Oligarchs as Party Substitutes in Ukraine: an Assessment of the Post-Revolutionary (Orange) Years

Conclusions and Discussion

This article has advanced the position that the transitional nature of the political system in Ukraine around the time of the 2004 Orange Revolution formed a specific environment of political uncertainty, where elected officials were more prone to seek accommodation of their interests beyond the traditional voter base, in order to have continued political relevance, maintain or enhance their reputation, and ensure a safe exit and/or political immunity, rather than merely obtain electoral votes. At the same time Ukrainian oligarchs - who had navigated a precarious balancing scheme for years during Kuchma's presidency and accumulated a wealth of material and organizational resources - became logical providers of such “political goods” to transitional Ukrainian leaders. Furthermore, during the post-Orange years, Ukrainian economic elites tipped the institutional balance from depending on the government for krysha protection and immunity firmly toward utilizing diverse government resources in their augmented role as party substitutes for personal economic gain.

Furthermore, despite the public Orange promises to impose order and justice, Ukrainian oligarchs received assurances of personal and business security from the Orange camp very early on after the revolution. After the oligarchs' major concerns for security and continued profit-making were satisfied, they waited for “arbitration” from the top executive office. However, instead they were allowed to vie for economic influence and advantage vis-а-vis the government and between themselves. On the other hand, regarding engagement with the political system, the oligarchs were encouraged to come out of the shadow. This explains their growing numbers in lists of the extremely wealthy both in Ukraine and abroad. In addition, these business elites were given a new role of “socially responsible actors” that provided them a direct connection to President Yushchenko and his family.

As the dynamic of the relationship between the oligarchs and the Orange leaders became more solidified (i.e., no prosecution, no arbitration, more publicity, more “social responsibility” and tacit support from the Orange camp), the oligarchs switched more of their efforts toward party formation and management. Their role as party substitutes able to offer, barter for, and deliver significant votes through a variety of media, financial, and administrative resources became dominant in the Ukrainian political system. In this research, I have shown that oligarchic involvement in post-Orange Ukrainian party politics was critical to the political fortunes of the Party of Regions and Nasha Ukraina, positioned on either side of the political divide.

One theoretical aspect merits discussion at this point, as it could also serve as a fruitful future extension of the current paper. As mentioned above, Henry Hale's concept of party substitutes takes its analytical roots from an economic model. However, if we analytically transpose the concept of party substitutes from its economic theoretical background to more mainstream research on political parties and political behaviour, then oligarchic actors as substitutes can be shown to fulfill other functions that parties normally carry out in democratic or democratizing political systems. In juxtaposition to Hale's model of what candidates receive from their sponsors (party substitutes), the focus could be shifted to what voters receive from parties, or their substitutes, in such a relationship. The functions of parties vis-а-vis voters are varied, and could be summarized as campaign linkages (parties recruits candidates and set parameters of electoral process), participatory linkages (parties activate citizens during elections and mobilize them to vote), ideological linkages (parties inform and shape voting preferences on policy alternatives), representative linkages (parties represented in parliament achieve congruence with citizen policy preferences), and policy linkages (parties deliver on electoral policy promises). Russell J. Dalton, David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister, “Parties and Representative Government,” in Political Parties and Democratic Linkage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6. All of these could be examined in the post-Orange and/or post-Euro- maidan years to determine the specific processes by which oligarchs influence the political landscape of party politics in Ukraine.

Finally, connected with the above point, the propositions in this paper leave an interesting open door for the analysis of the current processes that are underway in today's Ukraine. If we consider that the Euromaidan movement ushered in a new transitional period for Ukraine, and that the armed conflict in the east of the country is still threatening political stability, it signals that the current (post-Euro- maidan) revolution in Ukraine is far from over. This is especially the case because reforms to the political system in accordance with the values of the Revolution of Dignity have not yet been firmly put in place. Thus, according to the propositions elaborated in this research, it is logical to conclude that oligarchic actors still maintain the ability to function as party substitutes in the current political context. Further possible research could therefore more broadly encompass the period from the Orange Revolution to present, as Ukraine's attempts continue to fashion its political future in the globalizing world of the 21st century.

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