Obama Doctrine: did the republican alternative exist?

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OBAMA DOCTRINE: DID THE REPUBLICAN ALTERNATIVE EXIST?

O. S. Kurando

PhD Researcher (Political Science),

Department of International Relations,

Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University,

r. 32, French blvd., 24/26, Odessa, 65058, Ukraine

The article is devoted to the study of the foreign policy views of representatives of the Republican Party in the period 2008-2016. There were three major tendencies in the Republican Party: anti-interventionist, internationalist and nationalist. All three groups were conservative, but they did not agree with the consequences of the American «Grand strategy» under President Barack Obama. The aim of the article is to study the Republican tactic under Obama and to reveal the features of the intellectual contribution of each of the three main groups as an opposition of the party to a democratic president.

Key words: Obama Doctrine, foreign policy, USA, Republican Party.

О. С. Курандо

кафедра міжнародних відносин ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова

к. 32, бул. Французький, 24/26, м. Одеса, 65058, Україна

ДОКТРИНА ОБАМИ: ЧИ ІСНУВАЛА РЕСПУБЛІКАНСЬКА АЛЬТЕРНАТИВА?

Резюме

Стаття присвячена дослідженню зовнішньополітичних поглядів представників Республіканської партії у період 2008-2016 рр. У республіканській партії були три основні школи думки: антиінтервенціоністи, інтернаціоналісти й націоналісти. Всі три групи були консервативні, але вони не були згодні з наслідками американської «великої стратегії» при президенті Бараку Обамі. Метою статті є дослідження тактики республіканців за часів правління Обами й виявлення особливостей інтелектуального внеску кожної з трьох основних груп у спротив партії демократичному президенту. За часів Обами консервативні антиінтервенціоністи являли собою значну політичну силу у рамках Республіканської партії. Американці у переважній більшості були стурбовані внутрішніми й економічними проблемами, а не зовнішніми справами. Консервативні інтернаціоналісти не мали домінуючого впливу, але вони як і раніше були силою, цілком здатною боротися за керівництво Республіканською партією. Незважаючи на тенденції останніх років, консервативні інтернаціоналісти мали більш агресивні погляди з цілого ряду зовнішньополітичних питань, що було укорінено історично, політично, ідеологічно й інституціонально. Консервативні націоналісти переймалися воєнними аспектами зовнішньої політики США: витрати на оборону, приховані дії, стратегічні альянси й превентивні збройні дії за рубежем, якщо це необхідно. У той же час їм украй незручні невоєнні аспекти інтернаціоналізму США, у тому числі іноземна допомога, багатобічна організація, державне будівництво, гуманітарне втручання й дипломатичні поступки іншим державам. Консервативні націоналісти мало цікавилися космополітичними проектами світового порядку й глобального керування. Насправді вони цінували збереження національного суверенітету Америки. Проте вони вірили у необхідність воєнної переваги США над будь-яким супротивником.

Ключові слова: доктрина Обами, зовнішня політика, США, Республіканська партія.

А. С. Курандо

кафедра международных отношений ОНУ имени И. И. Мечникова

к.32, бул. Французский, 24/26, г. Одесса, 65058, Украина

ДОКТРИНА ОБАМЫ: СУЩЕСТВОВАЛА ЛИ РЕСПУБЛИКАНСКАЯ АЛЬТЕРНАТИВА?

Резюме

Статья посвящена исследованию внешнеполитических взглядов представителей Республиканской партии в период 2008-2016 гг. В республиканской партии были три основные школы мысли: антиинтервенционисты, интернационалисты и националисты. Все три группы были консервативными, но они не были согласны между собой относительно последствий американской «большой стратегии» при президенте Бараке Обаме. Целью статьи является исследование тактики республиканцев в годы правления Обамы и выявление особенностей интеллектуального вклада каждой из трех основных групп в сопротивление партии демократического президента. При Обаме консервативные антиинтервенционисты представляли собой значительную политическую силу в рамках Республиканской партии. Американцы в абсолютном большинстве были озабочены внутренними и экономическими проблемами, а не внешними делами. Консервативные интернационалисты не имели доминирующего влияния, однако они, как и раньше, были силой, целиком способной бороться за руководство Республиканской партией. Невзирая на тенденции последних лет, консервативные интернационалисты имели более агрессивные взгляды по целому ряду внешнеполитических вопросов, что объясняется историческими, политическими, идеологическими и институциональными корнями. Консервативные националисты волновались по поводу военных аспектов внешней политики США: затраты на оборону, скрытые действия, стратегические альянсы и превентивные вооруженные действия за рубежом, если это необходимо. В то же время им были совершенно несвойственные невоенные аспекты интернационализма США, в том числе иностранная помощь, многосторонние организации, государственное строительство, гуманитарное вмешательство и дипломатические уступки другим державам. Консервативные националисты мало интересовались космополитическими проектами мирового порядка и глобального управления. На самом деле они ценили сохранение национального суверенитета Америки. Однако они верили в необходимость военного превосходства США над любым противником.

Ключевые слова: доктрина Обамы, внешняя политика, США, Республиканская партия.

Basement of the Study. Over the last half century Democrats and Republicans have differed not only on economic, but also on cultural and social issues, such as crime, abortion and civil rights. The liberals gradually withdrew from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party, while the conservatives did the opposite. Both the electoral base and, to a large extent, representatives of the congress from two major parties are polarized along ideological lines now. It means that leaders of the Democratic Party resort to liberal political proposals, while leaders of the Republican Party tend to conservative. Within the Republican Party, conservatives of different types play dominant role among party activists, elected officials, donors, which support foundations, loyal media and, above all, voters of the Republican Party. About two-thirds of Republicans call themselves conservative in the United States. There were three major factions or schools of thought in the Republican Party each of them has approximately equal importance: anti-interventionists, internationalists and nationalists. All three groups were conservative, but they didn't agree with the consequences of the American «Grand strategy» under President Barack Obama.

Analysis of Recent Researches. A lot of scientific works have appeared in the last decade, devoted to the research of reasons for the failure of Barack Obama's presidency which began with such great hopes. Among them the monographs of Ole Holsti, Henry Nau, and Colin Dueck need to be highlighted. For better understanding of this specific context the monographs and articles of the most important political scientists were studied: from Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski to Janusz Bugajski, George Friedman, Robert Gilpin,

Richard Haas, Samuel Huntington, John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. At the heart of Barack Obama's foreign policy strategy were scientific achievements more of political idealists than realists, notably works of Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Obama did not believe that conflict was the essence of world politics; he believed that genuine and comprehensive international cooperation would be possible if the opponents could learn to listen and adapt to each other. According to Nye, «soft power» is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payment. An important principle of this method is that an object should not feel explicit pressure, since the impact should be indirect, so that it gives the impression that the object came to such conclusions on its own. The international actor is strong when it is able to influence others more than others can influence it. Building on the ideas outlined by Nye in his works, the Obama administration has been trying to offer its own, qualitatively new approach, called smart power. No less interest present scientific articles by Nicol Rae, Justin Logan, Bernardo Alvarez Herrera, Gian Carlo Delgado Ramos, and Silvina Maria Romano. In addition, the given article is based on officials' memoirs such as William Brown, Jean Kirkpatrick, Robert Gates, as well as different types of materials from the American media (reports of journalists, reviews, sociological polls etc).

But the issue of the Republican alternatives is covered only tangibly, so it seems to be an important aim to study the tactic of the Republicans during Obama's time and to identify the peculiarities of the intellectual contribution of each of the three main groups - anti-interventionists, internationalists and nationalists - as a party's opposition to the Democratic president.

The Republicans participated in a sound internal debate on some of the alternate foreign policy approaches, which is expected from the party that does not have power. But the alternatives of the Republican Party's foreign policy were not limited to simple neo-conservatism, on the one hand, and isolationism on the other. Also, most of Tea Party supporters were not isolationists. The truth was actually more complicated. Republicans under Obama were divided on foreign policy issues. The most devoted anti-interventionists of the Republican Party had an impact on the Obama era, but they were a minority in their own party. Most of the conservatives and Republicans, as Alex Altman wrote, actually did not support any comprehensive separation or deep reduction of US military force abroad [1]. In fact, two of the three leading factions of the Republican Party - conservative nationalists and conservative internationalists - agreed on aggressive counterterrorism, reasonable military spending, a solid line against such adversaries like Iran, support for major alliances of the United States and more solid foreign policy approach than President Obama had. The Republican conservatives remained the most captious to national security issues from all American political groups.

According Nicol Rae, conservative anti-interventionists preferred a strategy of deep retrenchment, including strict prevention of foreign wars, reduced defence spending, reduced foreign assistance and reduced military presence of America, the bases and commitments of the alliance abroad. Conservative internationalists adhered to the opposite point of view, supporting the US foreign policy activity and global leadership in both military and non-military aspects. Conservative nationalists were sceptical of foreign aid, state building, and multilateral humanitarian intervention, especially when President Obama was concerned, but continued to maintain strong national defence and a firm position about US adversaries abroad [2, p. 174-176].

Conservative anti-interventionists, like Senator Rand Paul, tended to avoid foreign wars, reduce military spending, reduce US commitments in the alliance and reduce spending for a «Grand strategy» to a minimum. It was an overwhelming opinion in the Obama era, which coinciding with a massive loss of interest in getting involved in foreign affairs. In selected issues, such as American airstrikes in Syria, anti-interventionists were in the majority. They had a growing network of analytical centres, journals, and elected officials to present their views in which adherents, of the doctrine of freewill, played a special and important role. Senator Paul, a serious contender for a Republican candidature in 2016, considered that under President Obama the United States did not reduce military interventions sufficiently far abroad, defence spending, strategic commitments, drone attacks, «War on Terror», or internal spending in general. Therefore, anti-interventionists of the Republican Party advocated a new big strategy of deep retrenchment [3].

In the days of George W. Bush, conservative Republicans, as a rule, were convinced supporters of US military operations abroad. Anti-interventionists of the Republican Party gathered momentum under Obama, and this was important itself. Inauguration of Barack Obama as a president demanded from the conservatives of the Republican Party to become against the military actions of the United States as a whole. New interventions in Libya (2011) and in Syria (2013) have been considered now by many conservatives as poorly managed, overly expensive and unconstitutional. Even the American war in Afghanistan, which was strongly supported by the majority of Republicans, lost support in 2009-2010, as conservatives from the people and their representatives in Congress considered Hamid Karzai's Afghan government to be wasteful, corrupt, and ungrateful for US support [1].

Justin Logan, the director of foreign policy studies at the Kato, added in 2012 that «the time had come to declare the alliance a relic of the past and send NATO to rest» [4, p. 293].

Conservative internationalists are at the other end of the foreign policy spectrum. Obama's years as president have led to the fact that an increasing number of conservatives of the Republican Party doubted in the internationalist policy of any kind [5, p. 51]. Among them there were Henry Kissinger, John McCain, Lindsay Graham, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Mitt Romney, Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, Bobby Jindal, Marco Rubio, Phil Ryan, and Rick Santorum.

Even famous figures as Charles Krauthammer and Robert Kagan support military methods along with diplomatic and economic implements of US foreign policy. They stand for US leadership at the international level, support the leading strategic US presence abroad and accept modern and historic institutes of American national security policy. Conservative internationalists believe that the interests of the United States overseas should be large and expect multiple threats to these interests from numerous autocratic states, as well as from violent non-state subjects. They consider Russia and China to be rivals; support the policy of struggle with jihadists; are sceptical about diplomacy in Iran and North Korea [6].

According Henry Nau, conservative internationalists of the Republican Party differ from liberal internationalists with important features, for example, the allocation of cooperation between sovereign democracies rather than institutions of global governance. The format of internationalism, approved by the American conservatives, is differed a lot from the version approved by modern liberals. Conservative internationalists are inclined to pay more attention to defence spending, military support for foreign allies and credible counterterrorism, while liberal internationalists tend to emphasize the desirability of guns' control agreements, diplomacy with rogue states, UN support and multilateral actions on climate change [7, p. 51-52].

Conservative internationalists are not monolithic: it's a group that includes Henry Kissinger and John McCain. They are often divided by considerable range of philosophical inclinations and political positions, including the possibility of diplomacy with American opponents, the relative importance of promoting democracy and human rights as foreign policy priorities, the use of force abroad, the desirability of multilateral agreement on specific issues and the need for military foresight against deterrence [8].

Neo-conservatives can be defined as a subspecies of conservative internationalists who contribute to power idealism in external affairs. First-generation non-conservatives, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, warned that promotion of human rights issues with American partners could destabilize allied governments and ensure the growth of even worse regimes [9, p. 35-45].

Some current authors, usually described as neo-conservatives, such as columnist Charles Krauthammer, have been sceptical of the fact that the Arab Spring revolutions would lead to creation of democratic governments, friendly US, while others, like Robert Kagan, were much more optimistic. During Bush's second term neoconservatives have lost their arguments on foreign policy.

When it comes to foreign policy of the Republican Party, conservative internationalists have the majority of political, intellectual and organizational forces. Each presidential candidate from the Republican Party after the end of the Cold War has been in favour of some form of conservative internationalism. It was in 2012 when the party supported the candidacy of Mitt Romney the governor of Massachusetts. The majority of presidential candidates for the Republican Party in 2016 also retreated from a conservative internationalist approach. For example, it was Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Governor of New Jersey Chris Christie, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, Senator Marco Rubio, Representative Phil Ryan, and former Senator Rick Santorum. Most former officials of the executive power in the Republican Party are inclined to some version of conservative internationalism, as well as most of the leadership of the congress. Republican Senate representatives are still a stronghold for conservative internationalists such as John McCain and Lindsay Graham [10].

Conservative internationalists are influencing and maintaining a significant network of journals, funds, analytical centres and multimedia. A number of important interest groups on political and centre-right issues share the positions with internationalists. For example, in the years of Bush, there was an impulse to solve problems of external assistance and human rights in Africa and beyond. In addition, a large number of Republicans in all regions of the country understand that America's current economic prosperity is increasingly linked to external conditions, and this prevent any strict isolation from world affairs. In general, internationalist sentiment is still substantially stronger among American conservatives and Republicans than often perceived. This is especially right on issues related to the use of force abroad.

Assistance to foreign countries has not been widely popular among the population, partly because the level of assistance was considered to be overestimated, but most Republicans actually supported the highest level of US assistance to Africa and Israel. Indeed, a large majority of Republicans tend to be very warm towards Israel, considering it as the key ally of the United States and supporting its defence in the case of attack. On the main issue of whether the United States should dismantle its traditional multilateral commitments abroad, most of the Republican voters said «no». Indeed, voters of the Republican Party maintained preservation of these commitments more than Democrats. Most Republicans supported the use of US troops to protect US traditional allies, such as South Korea, Israel, and Taiwan, if they were subjected to attacks. As for South Korea, for example, more than two-thirds of Republicans said they would defend United States military assistance to South Korea in the case of attack. Most Republicans also advocated a broad extension of US strategic presence in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East [11, p. 176].

The third foreign political group within the Republican Party is conservative nationalists, the group that can go in various directions on issues of the American big strategy, depending on the circumstances. Conservative nationalists, for ex., Tea Party, have special support from the South, the interior inhabitants of the West, white voters of the working class. During the Obama period conservative nationalists like Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry, Ted Cruz, formed the main tendencies that were spread in the USA House of Representatives and at the top of the Republican Party. They supported the mighty American military, did not object to the use of force against security threats. As Bernardo Alvarez Herrera underlined, conservative nationalists considered multiple aspects of a liberal internationalist tradition, including foreign economic assistance, as naive, wasteful, threatening for US sovereignty [12]. They regarded President Obama as weak and indecisive on national security issues.

During 2009-2010 Sarah Palin and Tea Party supported the US military effort in Afghanistan, providing significant bipartisan support to Obama's troops in that country. In 2011 they felt immediately to the ungrateful ally of the United States, Afghanistan. It has made even wider controversy about US economic support for such allies. In general, the good intentions of US interventions in the Muslim world were sour. Nationalists suspected that American military intervention was helping Islamist radicalism rather than fighting it - and they announced this suspicion in the new debate over Libya and Syria. Fearing that Obama would intervene in Libya in 2011, most nationalists of the Republican Party opposed it. The same situation was repeated in August and September 2013 in relation to Syria [13, p. 557].

Republican nationalists, like Senator Ted Cruz, openly disdained the style of Obama's leadership. Indeed, the biggest trick for the Jacksonists was the opposition to President Obama, through the conviction that his domestic political agenda is a serious threat to American traditions of a limited government. The intensity of this belief has had side effects in foreign policy and US national security. Such presidential candidates in 2002 as Michele Bachmann and Rick Perry supported conservative nationalism in external affairs just like Ted Cruz, presidential candidate in 2016, and former governor of Alaska Sarah Palin. Left-wing elites disregard them as «very conservative» [12]. However, this is their force in the Republican Party.

Particular attention deserves the connection of Tea Party with conservative nationalism. External observers often assume that the Tea Party should be an isolationist or anti-interventionist in foreign affairs. Most, however, do not do this. According to a series of public opinion polls, the set of foreign policy views expressed by supporters of the Tea Party from 2009 to 2010 was a hawk American nationalism, sceptical about new interventions in Syria and Libya, but undoubtedly supporting reliable counterterrorism campaigns, strong national defence and firm position against numerous opponents of the United States abroad. Most of the confusion on this topic is explained by the fact that for supporters of Tea Party foreign policy is not their main task. The Tea Party movement has evolved as a reaction to President Obama's domestic policy in 2009; the main problems were limited government, excessive federal spending and constitutional conservatism. This, apparently, had some incidental impact on US foreign policy. However, the main emphasis on internal problems is not the same as the clear adherence to isolationism. In fact, the majority of Tea party supporters are not isolationists at all. They just focus on internal issues and pay particular attention to preserving US national sovereignty [12]. The most dramatic symbol of the Tea Party (the historic Gadsden flag with a coiled snake on a yellow background, which states: «Do not tread on me») clearly expresses these different directions. The snake's statement can be considered as an advantage to non-intervention, if possible. It can also be considered as a rejection of retreat and warning of a battle. This very combination of instincts characterizes conservative American nationalists to this day.

Conclusions. In the days of Obama, conservative anti-interventionists (for ex., Senator Rand Paul) represented a significant political force within the Republican Party. The Americans in the overwhelming majority were concerned about internal and economic problems, not external affairs. The ongoing weak recovery after the 2008-2009 recessions only strengthened this tendency. The public was sceptical about new military interventions or national projects abroad. This tiredness from foreign wars and international spending has spread widely to the Republican Party. An important priority was to reduce public spending of all types. International spending had fewer defenders. A lot of conservatives complained that Obama's appeal to the US military current commitments and fight against terrorism is incompetent and unconstitutional, and neglects the authority of Congress.

Conservative internationalists - from Henry Kissinger, John McCain, Lindsay Graham, Jeane Kirkpatrick to Mitt Romney, Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, Bobby Jindal, Marco Rubio, Phil Ryan, and Rick Santorum, preferred a strong presidential leadership when it was going about national security policy. They were mostly optimistic about the latent capabilities of the United States in relation to their opponents. They advocated a reasonable level of defence spending, support for American military preferences and were convinced that US military might establish a lasting international order. From the point of view of the main strategic options for the United States, internationalists have opposed any deep reduction and preferred strategies of interaction, containment, and sometimes regime change. They, as a rule, advocated the support of traditional US allies abroad. Internationalists supported a sufficient level of US foreign assistance as necessary for America's influence and role as a world power. They supported participating in international economic institutions as a prerequisite for encouraging public economic order abroad. Internationalists have been enthusiastic about free trade, which is beneficial to the American economy. Equally important, they believed that the promotion of trade leads to more free international system, more prosperous and friendly to US strategic interests. They often preferred the promotion of democracy abroad for the same reasons. Internationalists often supported the use of persistent diplomacy against American opponents abroad if it relied on solid government. They advocated an electoral multilateral approach, which, if possible, worked through international institutions without considering such institutions as the veto power of the US national interests. Internationalists were not a dominant influence, but they were still a force that was quite capable of fighting for the leadership of the Republican Party. Despite the tendencies of recent years, conservative internationalists had more aggressive views on a range of foreign policy issues that was rooted historically, politically, ideologically and institutionally.

Conservative nationalists (Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry, Ted Cruz, and Sarah Palin) were concerned with military aspects of US foreign policy: defence spending, latent actions, strategic alliances and preventive armed actions abroad, if needed. At the same time, they are extremely uncomfortable with non-military aspects of US internationalism, including foreign assistance, multilateral organization, state-building, humanitarian intervention and diplomatic actions to other states. Historically, nationalists have opened up various strategic options: from non-interference to regime change, but did not have interest in classical liberal integration or placement strategies. Nationalists were little interested in cosmopolitan projects of world order and global governance. In fact, they valued the preservation of the national sovereignty of America. However, they believed in the necessity for US military superiority over any opponent. In a word, they preferred the use of foreign sticks, but not the carrots. This particular mixture of qualities left them somewhat unclear, since they were neither internationalists nor isolationists.

Consequently, all three factions of the Republican Party at one time put forward interesting and theoretically effective alternatives to the Obama doctrine. But their inability to reconcile their thoughts and, even more, actions actually provided Obama with two terms in the White House.

References

obama republican party policy

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2. Rae, Nicol. «Be careful what you wish for: The rise of responsible parties in American national politics.» Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 169-191.

3. Drezner, D. «Five thoughts on the Obama Doctrine». Washingtonpost. March 11, 2016. Accessed August 20, 2018. http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/03/11/ five-thoughts-on-the-obama-doctrine

4. Logan, Justin. «Should the NATO alliance continue?» Congressional Quarterly Researcher. March 23, 2012. 293.

5. Holsti, Ole. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2004. Accessed August 20, 2018. https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/9780472030118-ch1.pdf

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8. Delgado-Ramos, Gian Carlo and Silvina MarHa Romano. «Political-Economic Factors in U. S. Foreign Policy: The Colombia Plan, the Mnrida Initiative, and the Obama Administration.» Latin American Perspectives 38 (4) (2011): 93-108.

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Список використаної літератури

1. Altman A. The rebel. Time. 15 april 2013. P. 2.

2. Rae N. Be careful what you wish for: The rise of responsible parties in American national politics. Annual Review of Political Science. 2007. № 10. Р. 169-191.

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4. Logan J. Should the NATO alliance continue? Congressional Quarterly Researcher. 23 march 2012. 293 p.

5. Holsti O. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004. URL : https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/9780472030118-ch1.pdf (дата звернення 20.08.2018).

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7. Nau H. Conservative Internationalism. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2013. 352 p.

8. Delgado-Ramos G. C., Romano S. M. Political-Economic Factors in U. S. Foreign Policy: The Colombia Plan, the M^ida Initiative, and the Obama Administration. Latin American Perspectives. 2011. № 38 (4). Р. 93-108.

9. Kirkpatrick J. Dictatorships and double standards. Commentary. November, 1979. Р. 35-45.

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