Causes of Ideological Polarization in the US

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Government of the Russian Federation

FEDERAL STATE AUTONOMOUS EDUCATIONAL

INSTITUTION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

“HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS”

Faculty of Social Sciences

Causes of Ideological Polarization in the US

Field of Study 41.04.04 Political Science

Master's Program “Politics. Economics.Philosophy”

Nikita Fedotov

Reviewer

Israel Marques II

Moscow,2020

Introduction

In the recent years, we have observed a significant shift of political agenda in the established democracies. Both academic researchers and journalists, as well as politicians and the general public have been preoccupied with the issues of political polarization, radical movements and political populism in the democratic countries. This shift was mainly triggered by the events of Brexit and the migration crisis in the European Union, which led to rise of The National Front in France, AfD in Germany, The Five Star movement in Italy and other populist organizations (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2012).

These events sparked a fierce debate over the causes, nature and possible implications of populism for the contemporary democratic politics. The main scenario that alarms all those, concerned with this topic is a possible wave of authoritarian backsliding in consolidated democracies of the west.

In this regard, there is one case that, in our opinion, stands out the most. Current President of the United States Donald J. Trump receives by far the most criticism for creating divide in the civil society, pursuing extremist policies and undermining one of the oldest liberal democracies in existence. (Mounk 2016)

Yet, it is widely agreed in the academic community that populism in the established democracies emerges as a symptom of deep political polarization and does not itself create this trend. Moreover, in our regard, populism is a double-edged sword that both results from internal polarization and drives it forward multiplying political fragmentation and creating a wider social polarization.

Derived from this logic, the essential point of this thesis deals with the qualitative dimension of political polarization. In specific, I argue that the process of polarization in the US started long before the emergence of the populist agenda in the country, but Trump's campaign and his subsequent presidency resulted in the polarization of views and party sorting among median, centrist voters, as opposed to polarization during Obama's administration that mostly affected core supporters of both parties.

Since examination of this topic entails coverage of the two aspects of the larger phenomenon, it is necessary to formulate a research question in a way that will encompass both of them. That is why, my research question is a double one: Does the populist policy boost political polarization? Does populism change the character of political polarization among voters?

The subject of this paper is the popular political polarization in the United States of America. The object of this paper is the influence of the populist movement on the popular political polarization in the US.

In order to examine this topic we choose the case of the United States of America from 2009 to 2019. At first glance, this time period seems insufficiently long, since the rise of populism in the US is believed to have started much later. However, we study the stated topic starting with the premise that populism has a dual nature and originates from polarization that already exists in the political system. That is why we choose to examine the period that precedes the rise of populism in the US: in this case the period of Barack Obama's administration.

Methodology polarization populism electorate

I conduct a case study, based on qualitative research methods that are aimed at assessing internal changes in the given political institutions and phenomena, namely, political polarization and populism. In order to back the hypothesis, I use the quantitative statistical data, measuring the discussed phenomena. The general problem of the research design is the absence of the ways to make a robust connection between dependent and independent variables, meaning the connection between the theory and the empirical data. In addition, this paper partly deals with the stages and deepness of political polarization. Nevertheless, there is no concrete threshold that defines the frames and the stages of political polarization. All assessments on this matter are made, in comparison with the previous periods.

In terms of theory, my paper will examine the issue of political populism through the Cass Mudde's ideational approach to the phenomenon. This theory studies populism, as an “incomplete” political ideology that reshapes to a given political system and a “host ideology”. We deliberately chose the minimalist approach to the matter that encompasses multiple different aspects of the larger phenomenon, since political polarization takes place on the different levels in society and is influenced by multiple factors that tend to be overlooked by more concrete theories. Since we discuss political polarization in the wide context, in this paper we are going to utilize different theories to discuss certain aspects of this concept. The degree and levels of polarization will be summarized, based on Hill and Rausanovitch's paper. The causes and trajectory of polarization will be discussed, based on works of Ura and Ellis 2012 and Frymer 2011.

Composition

The study is composed of three chapters. The first chapter is devoted to defining the phenomena, used in the subsequent research, including populism and polarization, and providing their components and logic of interaction. In general, this chapter serves as a basis for further analysis.

The second chapter deals with the political polarization before the Trump's administration. It discusses the presidential influence on the process, the connection between political divergence and the larger social polarization. In addition, it examines the polarizing policies of Barack Obama and discusses the additional reasons that undermined popular belief in liberal democracy and resulted in the populist emergence.

Finally, the third chapter deals with the essence of the Trump phenomenon, statistically assesses the polarizing trends during the Trump's presidency and before him to derive conclusions about the qualitative changes in this process.

Chapter I. Theoretical Framework

In order to establish a connection, stated in the research question and find out, whether the Trump phenomenon caused qualitative difference in political polarization amongst the American electorate, first we need to establish a set of terms that describe this part of political reality and pick those that will help us conduct further analysis. As this paper deals with the two large fields, this chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first one, we will briefly outline the characteristics of political polarization, provide their analysis in the existing literature and discuss how they are applied to our research. In the second part, we are going to summarize the state-of-the-art approach towards populism, discuss, why we picked it and how it explains the populist phenomenon. At the end of this chapter, we will provide our own explanation of the cause and effect relations between political polarization and political populism to finalize our theoretical approach that will be applied to the chosen case in the later chapters.

1.1 Political polarization

In our paper, political polarization is a key notion that is a subject to both quantitative and qualitative measurement. This term signifies a process of opinion divergence over time about one, or several issues, relative to some theoretical maximum As a state, polarization is an extent to which the opinions are opposed to one another at a given time (DiMaggio; Evans; Bryson 1996). Political polarization differs in its causes, nature, level and consequences relative to a given political system. In order to make an assessment about history and current state of political polarization in the US, we should identify the features of this phenomenon, pick those of them, relevant for our topic, establish a connection between them and determine ways of their measurement.

1.1.1 Levels of Polarization

First and foremost, in terms of levels of analysis, scholars of the field usually distinguish between elite and mass polarization. In this dichotomy, elite polarization refers to divergence of opinions among democratic representatives of the people that form the political establishment of a country. (Layman, Carsey, Horowitz 1996)

Elite

There are several traits that are specific to elite polarization in the two party systems, such as the US. First, there are very few intersections in ideology between the representatives of the two parties. Second, it results in almost any political conflict, being entrenched in the larger ideological struggle. These pronounced differences encourage more conflicts and diminish the room for consensus. Consequently, it becomes more complicated for the elites to do moderate politics and voters have lower chances to vote centrist candidates into the office.

Mass

In turn, mass polarization refers to differentiation among the electorate. It occurs, when large numbers of people take a position over one or several political issues that coincides with the ideological, or party lines. (Fiorina, Abrams 2008) When popular divide is exacerbated, partisans question morality and acceptability of opposing camp. At its extreme, the divide can transform into “we” versus “them” standoff.

1.1.2 Degrees of Polarization

Secondly, we need to specify the degree of political polarization in the given case. In this context, the degree of polarization defines internal structure of the phenomenon and the consequences it will have for the political system in general. Academics widely agree that the nature of political polarization is directly related to its scale. The researchers utilize two main concepts to ascertain the degree of political polarization.

Benign Polarization

One of them is “benign” polarization. As the name implies, this type of political differentiation is mild and does not pose a threat of political destabilization and violence. This type of polarization is characterized by moderate distancing between political elites and the general public. Some scholars make an argument that this type of polarization that is most frequent in consolidated democracies does not undermine civil society and political system, but also helps with democratization. In specific, elite polarization in democracy, as shown by Douglas R. Piercea and Richard R. Laub 2019 and James E. Campbell 2016, may result in clearer distinction between opposing ideologies and platforms, which leads to better quality of representation, since it facilitates rational voter behavior. Moreover, differentiation amongst population can show dissatisfaction with the existing injustice in the society and create demand for shifting the status quo, which will result in political response from the establishment. Consequently, acknowledgement of such a systemic problem and its comprehensive solution can help overcome internal conflict and build more solid and homogenous identity. Finally, clear line between opposing camps in political life may mobilize both voters and politicians (Noam Lupu 2015) and contribute to higher political partisanship that is fruitful for resilience of civil society and political system. Though, there are many positive aspects of benign political polarization, scientists frequently perceive it as a problem, since it can transform into a different type of differentiation.

Pernicious Polarization

The second type is “pernicious” polarization. Normally, the political agenda is comprised of multiple major issues. There can be a common consensus over some of them and fierce debate about the others. Pernicious polarization emerges when one issue overrides the rest in its importance and a single political cleavage starts to play the key role. In this situation, it is highly likely that people will align within two different camps. This clear-cut distinction in society results in two sets of mutually exclusive identities and interests (Lozada 2014; Somer, 2001). “At the extreme, each camp comes to perceive the “Other” in such negative terms that a normal political adversary with whom to engage in a competition for power is transformed into an enemy posing an existential threat to be vanquished.” (Pew Research Center, 2016; Garcia, 2016). At this point, the split extends to all spheres of life beyond politics and both the population and the establishment start to perceive peaceful coexistence in the current political system as impossible. Deep polarization disrupts normal governance and communication, which leads to instability. In the long run, one camp may become dominant, which will result in authoritarian backsliding, or unresolved tension may spark violent conflict.

1.1.3 Causes

Thirdly, we should identify the causes of political polarization. It is a complicated task, since we find ourselves in the cause and effect trap. It happens, because political polarization is well known for reinforcing and multiplying itself, which results in dragging a given polity into a downward spiral of confrontation, where the original cause is hard to find. Still, there are instances in which political actors deliberately provoke polarization, or exacerbate the existing state of division to pursue their political goals.

To begin with, as it was mentioned above, intentional platform distancing can be used by the opposing sides to mobilize voters and increase partisanship. In this scenario of polarization, political parties play the major role. Those scholars, who conduct party polarization research, tend to conclude that the process of polarization goes in the top-down manner: from elite distancing to the popular rise of partisanship. (Ura; Ellis; 2012). The classical example of this case is the Republican - Democrat divergence that started after the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. When Democrats initiated this law, their southern supporters started shifting to the Republican Party, since vague ideological distinction between the parties turned into the clearer one and allowed voters to make a better informed choice (Frymer 2011).

Secondly, political polarization can emerge as a reflection of public ideological preferences and voting behavior. In turn, public ideological divide can be caused by several reasons. One of them is disenfranchisement of certain groups of people within a society. In this case, large shifts in societal structure, mostly economic inequality, give some of its representatives a feeling of exclusion and injustice. This factor encourages such groups to perceive the rest of the society as hegemonic groups, who aim to steal their rights and get rid of them. (Saeki 2019) At its extreme, this tendency may lead to full scale class based political violence, which results in emergence of radical parties, such as Bolsheviks in Russia, or National Socialists in Germany, as dominant ones. Another possible cause of polarization is party alignment over ethnic, religious, or cultural distinctions. This cause is mostly spread in postcolonial countries, where native peoples and ex-colonialists align with different parties. Still, this factor has an effect in developed democracies, such as the US.

Finally, over the last century the media has grown a significantly stronger institution that highly influences public political choices. The media market shifted from the dominance of politically moderate and even-toned outlets, to much more polarized, partisan, lopsided ones. Some scholars argue that media divergence provoked public differentiation. (Baum, Groeling 2008) It happens through the partisan sorting. Viewers, who used to watch some channels to find out what is happening around them, now more frequently, watch their favorite channels and seek justification of their ideological beliefs (Hollander 2008).

1.1.4 Electorate Coverage of Polarization

When we speak about public polarization, it is important to remember the two understandings of this phenomenon that were summarized in Hill and Rausanovitch's (2015) paper “A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in Congressional and Public Polarization”. The first one is “divergence”. Apart from the general meaning, synonymous to political polarization in general, it refers to “the degree to which the distribution of opinion is spreading apart...” The second one is “party sorting”. It describes the extent to which political stances of the public correlate with party affiliation. In other words, “divergence” deals with the existing poles moving in opposite directions, whereas “party sorting” (or simply “sorting”) addresses the rising level of partisanship and ideological identity.

This distinction is crucial for answering the stated question, as the populist influence on the electorate is expected to have shifted the trajectory of polarization to “party sorting” of previously politically indifferent voters and voters with mixed ideological views.

1.1.5 Implications for Further Analysis

In the section above, we summarized key parameters of political polarization and discussed possible causes and consequences of this phenomenon for democratic politics. Though, we have already mentioned the examples from the United States politics in this part, we need to assess the chosen object of the paper from the standpoint of these criteria.

First, as we have determined, there are two major levels of political polarization and there is no consensus among the researchers on whether it emerges among the elites and spreads on the public agenda, or goes from the electorate upwards, influencing polarization among professional politicians. However, it is important for us that the two tracks of polarization can develop simultaneously, reinforcing one another. Since we are preoccupied with both “primary” and “secondary” polarization, answering the first research question, we will conduct analysis on both levels, utilizing corresponding theories. Nevertheless, the essence of the second one presupposes that the process of public polarization followed the top down trajectory and was initiated by Donald Trump's rhetoric and policies. That is why, answering the second part of the question, we will utilize the elite polarization approach.

Second, we need to discuss the degree of polarization. It needs to be mentioned, because it is important to explain, why this topic and the stated question are relevant to the existing problems and challenges.

Currently, the United States is in the state of benign divide. Although, it is natural for an established democracy to be in such a state, lately we have witnessed several signs that the situation is going beyond natural divisions.

Despite the fact that the American politics is still defined by a long list of ideological clashes, the issue of immigration policy has become a dominant question in the recent years. In our view, this problem currently has by far the highest potential of overriding other issues and boosting ideological regroupment in the United States.

Moreover, entrenchment of ideological differentiation in the representative bodies of the US is so persistent that it frequently results in legislative gridlock and disruption of governance. In specific, under Trump's administration, government shutdown due to inability to pass funding legislation happened twice within one year. The first one in January 2018 (BBC 21 January 2018), the second one in December - January 2018-2019 (Congressional Budget Office 2019). Although, shutdowns happened several times before Trump, these ones were more frequent and much more costly. In addition, previous shutdowns caused mainly by the local problems with money allocation, whereas the last two were directly related to the major issues of political struggle, including spending on immigration policies.

Finally, in the recent years we have observed a significant increase of interparty antagonism among ordinary voters. In 2019, “Pew Research Center” conducted a partisan antipathy survey. It says that ordinary voters not only became more polarized and ideologically distinct, but also grew more hostile of the opposing party. For instance, the growing share of people in both parties gives “cold” rating to those in the opposing party on the “feeling thermometer”. Since 2016, this number rose by 14% for Republicans and 16% for Democrats, up to the total of 79% among Democrats and 83% among Republicans. Representatives of both parties claim that the opposing side is immoral. This statement was supported by 55% of Republicans and 47% of Democrats. However, the most important finding of this research is that both parties view another one as closed-minded, unpatriotic and immoral. When asked about the distinguishing feature of those in the other party, 64% of Republicans said, Democrats were more closed-minded that other Americans, whereas 75% of Democrats said the same about Republicans. The majority of Republicans also claimed that Democrats were more unpatriotic (63%) and immoral (55%) than others. A large number of Democrats (47%) also claimed that the other party was more immoral than others.

These figures reflect the significant negative trend in mutual perception that coincides with the necessary presuppositions of “pernicious” polarization. Both parties outline closed-mindedness of the other, which can indicate the inability to compromise, as perceived by the respondents. Additionally, the two camps question morality and patriotism of one another. This point brings us back to the issue of moral legitimacy and unacceptability of the other camp in the case of pernicious polarization. If this trend keeps deepening and the existing ideological cleavage spreads to other spheres of life, as it does now, it might result in direct confrontation and political instability that undermines the democracy. The latent menace of extreme polarization that might originate from the phenomenon of party sorting is the main practical concern that, in our view, makes the stated topic worth examining.

1.2 Populism

The second crucial term that will help us define the theoretical frame of this thesis is political populism. Although, it is safe to assume that populism is one of the key notions that define contemporary political reality in the established democracies, there is an intense contest over the essence of the concept. As Cas Mudde, one of the prominent modern scholars of populism, points out: “While no important concept is beyond debate, the discussion about populism concerns not just what it is, but whether it even exists.” (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017)

In order to assess the given case from the viewpoint of populism, we need to choose the most comprehensive approach and pick its measurements that best describe the chosen case, including the political system in which it takes place, a level at which it is initiated, its components and possible implication for politics.

Different scholars provide a diverse range of understandings of this phenomenon, claiming that populism is a tactic, a rhetoric, an ideology, a movement and so forth. (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2013) One of the most popular criticisms of this term points out that the notion of populism is too vague to have a substantial meaning, since it is applied mainly to undermine one's political rivals.

In order to identify the substance of this phenomenon and provide its assessment through the given measurements we should take a look at the most popular options. We intentionally deal only with those concepts of populism that are related to liberal democracy, since the essence of this phenomenon in non-democratic regimes may be drastically different. (Makarenko 2018)

1.2.1 Concepts of Populism

First, the popular agency approach states that populism is a democratic way of life that is achieved through direct mass involvement in political affairs (Goodwyn, 1976). It is mainly applied to analysis of the history of populism and attributes a positive mobilizing role to this phenomenon.

Second, the Laclauan post-Marxist approach considers populism to be the essence of politics, the emancipative force that helps to overcome the problems of liberal democracy and achieve radical (true) democracy through reestablishing conflict in the society. (Laclau, 2005)

Third, the economic approach claims that populism is a reckless economic policy of massive public spending and redistribution of wealth that encourages public support of the regime in the short run and results in macroeconomic breakdown in the long run.

Fourth, strategic approach (Weyland, 2001) considers populism to be a strategy for seeking the office and ruling, based on direct support of the population. This approach implies that populism is always centered around a strong charismatic leader, who sustains a direct connection with the population. Consequently, it means that populism disappears when such a leader leaves the political scene.

Fifth, the rhetorical approach (Kazin, M. 1995) claims that populism is a style and language of politics that strives to maximize public and media attention. By utilizing unorthodox language and behavior, populist politicians try to stand out and appear more attractive to the voters.

Sixth, ideational approach describes populism as a special type of political ideology that exists only in conjugation with a more traditional ideology, such as liberalism, socialism, or conservatism. It means that populism, being attached to a “host” ideology can transform to fit the existing popular demands in a given polity. (Mudde 2017)

To sum up, there are several traits in all the listed concepts that prove the existence of the substantial meaning in the discussed phenomenon. All forms of populism emphasize the dichotomy between “the people” (an overwhelming majority of the society that makes a country what it is and possesses all the good ethical qualities) and “the elite” (a tiny corrupt group of people, who steal from the people their sovereignty over the country and undermine democracy). Therefore, it is safe to assume that populism inevitably involves some form of criticism of the elite and adulation of the electorate. Moreover, the populist leader/movement/party usually claims to reinstate democracy, as the rule of the people, hindered by the elite.

Nevertheless, despite several core resemblances most of the given definitions are irrelevant for our research. The popular agency approach is mostly a historical concept that lacks necessary aspects for political analysis. The Laclauan approach is highly ideological. It treats liberal democracy as a problem to solve, whereas we are concerned with the issue of democratic sustainability that can be undermined through populism. The economic approach is too narrow, as its stated criteria allow only radically left (socialist) populist leaders/movements to fit into the definition. The strategic approach is much closer to the essence of our topic. However, seeing populism as a strategy, or method, it overlooks ideological content of this phenomenon, thus lacking flexibility. Finally, a rhetorical approach concentrates on a single aspect of populism, in particular on attracting attention to the political cause through special language, excluding intellectual essence of the phenomenon and possible implications for the political system.

That is why we use the ideational approach to discuss the essence and possible implications of populism. The main advantages of this minimalist theory are its inclusiveness, as it deals with ideological, rhetorical and strategical sides of populism and its non-normative character that allows to assess a wider array of cases and avoid ideological biases as much as possible. (Urbinati, 2019)

Ideational Approach

Now, we need to break down the ideational approach to populism, in order to get the apparatus and criteria for assessing the chosen case in the subsequent chapters.

First, Cas Mudde, whose version of ideational approach we rely on, identifies populism as “…a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017) In order to understand the definition, we need to provide clarification for the dichotomy of “thick-centered” and “thin-centered” ideologies. A “thick-centered” ideology is the one that provides a view of the best way to organize people's life. Ideologies of this type usually provide a comprehensive set of values and institutions to achieve the aspired way of life. Thus, they are also referred to as “full ideologies”, for example: socialism, conservatism, liberalism, etc. Meanwhile, thin-centered ideologies, such as populism, have vague end flexible structure that requires attachment to a different, usually thick-centered, ideology, also referred to as “host ideology”. “…populism can take very different shapes, which are contingent on the ways in which the core concepts of populism appear to be related to other concepts, forming interpretative frames that might be more or less appealing to different societies.” (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017) This distinction is a crucial part of analysis, as it explains malleability of the concept and provides rationale, as to why populism is drastically changing from case to case. Consequently, it solves the problem of populism's existence as a subject for academic analysis and gives us a reason to utilize this concept in this thesis.

In order to reinforce the credibility of this definition and proceed with its properties and criteria we need to set more precise boundaries by excluding the opposites of this ideology.

There are two main thin-centered ideologies, contrary to populism.

The first one is elitism. It establishes the same Manichaean distinction between “the elite” and “the people”, while reversing their respective ethical characteristics and subsequent implications for politics. In this view, “the elite” is morally and intellectually superior, while “the people” is ignorant and dangerous, which means that the former should have full power in the state.

The second one is pluralism. It holds that the society is comprised of multiple heterogeneous and sometimes overlapping interest groups, with none possessing absolute virtue. For this reason, the political system should have multiple centers of power, while the decision-making should be a result of compromise and consensus. This ideology is directly opposed to elitism and populism in regard of the dualist understanding of reality. Among the ideologies in this list pluralism is the closest to the conventional understanding of what liberal democracy should look like.

Finally, it is important to draw a distinction between populism and clientelism as the two of them are frequently confused both in the literature. Clientelism is a certain “give and take” pattern of doing politics, in which politicians provide some groups of the electorate with access for certain resources and services in exchange for their electoral support. While clientelism is a technique, widely employed by populists, there is no concrete connection between the two, especially given that clientelism exists outside populist regimes. (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017)

1.2.2 Properties of Populism

In the previous part of the chapter, we drew clear distinction between populism and other political techniques/ideologies/ languages, etc; in order to later apply these frames to the US case. In this part, we will describe the three core concepts of the populist philosophy.

The People

One of the crucial stumbling blocks that undermines the scientific debate over populism is the concept of “the people”. Its vagueness is widely recognized. The existing academic paradigm presupposes that “the people” is a construct, dealing with an oversimplified part of the reality. This concept is intentionally used by the populists as a key term to create and back their agenda. This notion is so important for the populist politics, as it has shallow meaning and thus can be conveniently attributed to any given situation. (Laclau, 2005)

There are three main meanings that the populists attach to “the people”: the common people, the sovereign and the nation. These meanings are rarely used separately and usually refer to the different properties of the same group.

“The common people” stands for the bulk of the population, deprived of the socio-economic privileges in possession of the elite. In the populist narrative, this part of the society is believed to adhere to the true country's (for example, American) values that are seen with suspicion by the elite. In turn, the populist electorate rejects “the elitist values” and sees a populist candidate as a means of reinstating these true popular values as the dominant ones and returning direct control of the country to the socially disenfranchised “true citizens”.

“The sovereign” refers to the key principal of democracy that the people is the source of power. Since representative democracy presupposes indirect participation in the political life, ordinary voters feel the gap between them and the political establishment. In certain cases, they might feel that the gap is too large and their interests are no longer properly represented. Thus, inclusion of this meaning in the understanding of the people justifies the populist claim for power as it emphasizes direct connection between the voters and the representative.

“The nation” stands for the country's community that involves all those, perceived as its part. This term is usually defined from either civic or ethnic point of view. Depending on the ideological standpoint of the populist movement, it may involve either “the native” people of the country, or all its citizens in general. In case of the right wing populists with the nationalist agenda, all “non-native” people in the population are seen as external (alien) elements that pose a threat to the nation. (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017)

The Elite

Although, the definition of “the people” is very ambiguous and causes a lot of public and academic debate, the essence of “the elite” is an even more contested issue. Just like the notion of “the people”, this term is hard to define. Aside from the “empty signifier” problem, there are two more issues that make it harder for the academics to draw the boundaries of “the elite”. Both of them originate from the strategic issues of the populist policy.

First, they cannot claim that “the elite” is limited to the political establishment (meaning all democratically elected officials); simply because their electoral success would mean that they became part of it.

In addition, due to democratic constraints or their own inability, populists frequently fail to deliver the promised policies to their voters. These two factors combined encourage the populists to claim that the elite consists of all those, who hold leading positions in politics, the economy, the media, the show business, etc. (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017) Consequently, it means that occupying the office does not give the populist leader enough power, since unofficial centers of power undermine his, or her effort. On top of that, the narrative of the “shadow forces” that secretly rule the country and impede popular interests gives way to the paranoid politics and different conspiracy theories that serve as an excuse for populist failures. (Hofstadter, 1955)

Under the influence of the stated factors, populists redefine “the elite” to sustain their anti-establishment agenda and retain legitimacy. Although, populists generally believe in post-class world and claim that social strata were deliberately created to discourage the popular discontent, they frequently concentrate their interpretation of “the elite” on economic factors.

The General Will

The two core concepts, discussed above, mainly serve as parts of the populist philosophy and rhetoric, convincing the voters in their relevancy and legitimacy. However, the third one not only expands on the populist ideology, but also provides a rationale for certain strategy of populist mobilization and political behavior. The discussed notion comes from the distinction between “the general will” (volonté générale) and “the will of all” (volonté de tous), made by the famous political thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In this dichotomy, the will of all is an aggregated sum of interests of all citizens, while the general will is the sum of all interests, expressed and enforced through join effort of the whole community. From Rousseau's point of view, representative democracy is a form of aristocracy that creates a certain illusion of popular political participation, while mobilizing the voters only for elections and ignoring them the rest of the time. (Sreenivasan, 2000)

In this regard, modern populists can be seen as the successors of Rousseau's logic. The Manichean distinction between the elite and the people strengthens the idea of the general will. In this line of thought, populist leader is a person, who assumes the task of formulating the general will, reuniting the population in “the people” with shared thinking about the politics and overcoming institutional obstacles to make their will an official policy. “…one of the practical consequences of populism is the strategic promotion of institutions that enable the construction of the presumed general will.” (Mudde, Kaltwasser 2017)

1.2.3 Political Implications of Populism

The influence of populism on democracy is another highly contested topic. The circumstances, such as the populist movement type and the regime type make it even harder to answer this question. Although it is conventionally agreed that populism poses a danger and challenge to democracy, there is no consensus over possible positive implications of populism on democratic politics. In the final part of the chapter, we will summarize positive and negative effects of populism from the standpoint of ideational approach.

There are two polar assessments of populist influence on politics. The first one claims that populism misinterprets and intentionally distorts the democratic principles, thus inevitably eroding representative democracy. (Rosanvallon, 2008) The second one emphasizes that populism, being a democratization of democracy, leads to a truly democratic society, where the elite does not hinder the popular rule and the institutions do not distance the people from the power. (Laclau, 2005)

Cas Mudde, as the key representative of the ideational approach to populism, claims that, to a certain extent, both approaches are relevant, and populism can be both “a threat and a corrective for democracy”. (Mudde, Kaltwasser, 2012).

Further discussion of relationship between populism and democracy requires clarification of the essence of democracy. Just like any other political term, democracy can be defined in multiple dimensions. In this paper, we are interested in the approaches that can help us understand the difference between the conventional usage of the term and the populist one. For this reason, we need to describe the differences between the two types of democracy.

Democracy without adjectives is a form of governance that is based on the understanding that the country's population is the sole source of power and the will of the majority is essential to express its power.

In turn, liberal democracy is a form of governance that adheres to the principles of democracy without adjectives, while guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and minority rights to avoid the tyranny of the majority.

If we project what we already know about populism on these two definitions, we will clearly understand that democracy per se (without adjectives) completely falls into the populist understanding of what a just rule of people should look like. In the meantime, the features that distinguish liberal democracy from the former one is what constrains the populist movements to achieve direct people's rule. In other words, populists claim that minority rights protection undermines the popular sovereignty. This statement is also found on the assumption of the existence of the general will that makes “the people” a homogenous community, without minority groups with differing interests. “In essence, populism raises the question of who controls the controllers. As it tends to distrust any unelected institution that limits the power of the demos, populism can develop into a form of democratic extremism or, better said, of illiberal democracy.” (Mudde, Kaltwasser, 2012)

On the one hand, it means that populism has a positive effect on politics. It stimulates political engagement of previously unrepresented groups of people, changes the agenda by politicizing new issues. In addition, as a reaction to the rise of the populist movements, mainstream political forces adjust their political behavior and program to fit in the newly emerged demands and lure the voters from the populist camp. On top of that, populism enhances democratic accountability by raising the issue of people-elite gap.

On the other hand, populism leads to the erosion of the institutions that guarantee the fundamental freedoms and minority rights. Moreover, the Manichean approach to political life fosters the “friend-foe” distinction that tends to antagonize the fragmented society and provokes confrontation. In the long run, it may result in political crisis, or even in the violent conflict.

In order to identify, which of these effects take place in a given case, the researches split them over a range of stages that a country goes through during a process of democratization. However, it does not mean that the established, consolidated democracies are not vulnerable to populism. Under the influence of this ideology, they may follow the opposite direction, which is known as a process of de-democratization.

It is split into three stages: democratic erosion, democratic breakdown, and repressiveness. Democratic erosion includes the reforms to undermine the autonomy of non-elected institutions that guarantee the fundamental freedoms and minority rights. Democratic breakdown denotes the political transformation of democracy into competitive authoritarianism with the rules rigged in favor of the populist movement. The final stage is repressiveness, in which a populist government applies political harassment and violence to sustain its rule, undermined by the regime crisis.

Chapter II. Polarizing Processes Prior to the Populist Emergence

In the first part of the first chapter, we discussed the essence of political polarization, its properties and possible implications to the political system. Our initial hypothesis presupposes that the success of the populist movement in the US (Trump's 2016 electoral campaign) resulted in significant increase in the degree of popular polarization in the country. However, we also claim that the populist mobilization conducted by Trump could not be possible without prior differentiation that served as a basis for launching the movement. For this reason, we need to examine the process of political divergence under the Trump's predecessor: President Barack Obama.

As stated in the first chapter, political polarization can take place on both elite and mass levels. In this chapter, we choose to apply the “elite polarization” approach that assumes the “top-down” trajectory of this process. This chapter will be devoted to answering three questions: How presidents influence polarization of the electorate in the US political system? How ideological differences spread to the larger social polarization? How did polarization of the electorate happen under Barack Obama, and how did it set the stage for the emergence of the populist movement, known as the Trump phenomenon? What additional factors encouraged the Trump phenomenon?

2.1 Presidential Influence on Popular Polarization

In this section, we are going to examine the influence that the presidential behavior has on public divergence. We partly covered this issue in the section, devoted to populism. However, the patterns of political behavior differ between regular and populist leaders. That is why we need to describe this topic again, since both the conventional wisdom and the academic community identify Barack Obama as the former one and Donald Trump as the latter one.

First, we should point out that most of the literature that analyses political polarization on the elite level deals with the parties and their ideologies, overlooking the figure of president. (Wood, Jordan 2018) Although, this allocation of attention is partly justified, since the consensus among researchers implies that in most cases, political differentiation is ideology based and political parties in democracy are mostly responsible for forming the ideological agenda, presidents, as political figures, also play their role in public polarization.

Another important consideration is that limited literature does not allow us to make far-fetched conclusions about the particular instruments of presidents' influence on political divergence, but we still can describe the general trends, captured in the surveys, and speculate about this phenomenon in detail.

“Presidents and Polarization of the American Electorate” by Dan Woods and Soren Jordan presents the assessment and interpretation of the statistical data about the American presidency. In order to make their sample representative and trace a long-lasting tendency, Woods and Jordan picked a timespan from Reagan's presidency to Obama's one. First, they assessed the job approval ratings of all presidents in the given period. The results clearly show that the gap of approval between in-party respondents and out-party respondents has drastically increased over 26 years. This tendency existed even before the given period, but intensified since 1980s. To put it simple, the supporters of the president remained loyal, but the opposition intensified. It is also evident that the public support increases during the presidential campaigns, even before the winner assumes the office, which suggests that there is a strong connection between the mobilizing policies of the leaders and their approval.

When examining the data, concerning popular electoral polarization, the researchers found out that the increases happened with high frequency over the whole period, but reached their peak under Obama's presidency. However, outside the electoral mobilization periods, public polarization was relatively stable (floating near its peak) for both groups of partisans. Thus, contrary to the intuitive belief, Obama did not drastically polarize the electorate, but rather followed a longtime divergence trend that reached its climax during his term. (Wood, Jordan 2018) Nevertheless, the spikes of polarization during the periods of electoral mobilization under his rule are notable. They will be further discussed in the section, devoted to Obama's polarizing politics.

2.2 The Connection between Political Polarization and Social Issues

Although in this paper we are mostly focused on the political aspects of polarization and populism, there is a crucial factor (indirectly connected with the partisanship) that both enhances popular divergence and prepares a stage for the emergence of the populist movements. In order to identify it, we should first establish a distinction between the two aspects of the general phenomenon that is under discussion in this section. Simply put, in this part we will give two additional definitions of polarization to clarify the arguments that will follow.

The first notion is political polarization. We extensively discussed it in the previous parts, but we need to introduce a different understanding for this phenomenon here to build a solid connection between populism and polarization as a larger social conflict. By political polarization in this context, we mean the form of political engagement of the population that presupposes holding certain political stances that highly diverge among the society. In turn, social polarization is a state, or a process, in which the cleavage of political stances in the society overrides other conflicts and defines the boundaries for social interaction and relationship. Simply put, social polarization is a process of political identity becoming a crucial, intrinsic part of someone's personality that fosters inner conflicts within the community.

Just like populism, this phenomenon is both a cause and an effect of political polarization that plays its part both in the stage of benign and pernicious polarization. During the stage of benign polarization, diverging society goes through the process of party sorting that consists of clearly aligning different social groups (religious, gender, age, educational, income) with an existing political ideology, or camp. (Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, Westwood 2019) The more different groups align with an ideology, the higher is the level of social polarization.

For a long time, the scholars in the political science recognized the phenomenon of “cross-cutting cleavages”. (Mason, 2018) It signifies the differences, which are not commonly found in the party and a person identifies himself with. On the one hand, if a voter, identifying himself with one party, is a part of the social group, commonly associated with another party, the effects of “partisanship bias” (a tendency of a partisan to take a stance, or make decisions, based on ideological, or party affiliation) are reduced. In other words, voters that identify with an ideology, perceived as not representative of their social group, tend to be more critical to their political views. On the other hand, if a voter shares the same set of political beliefs as the bulk of his social groups, the partisan bias effects, consequent polarization and hostility towards other social groups tends to multiply.