Modernity and the Failure to Maintain the Peace (1918–1938): Comparing the Cases of the Soviet Union and the German Reich

I intentionally do not go into further detail in order to make my argument. There is little doubt that peace was not yet lost in the 1920s. Even though the establishment of the Soviet Union and the radical societal restructuring it brought were more turbulent than the reforms in Germany, the politics in both countries were committed to the peaceful pattern of change. There was also an intense intellectual exchange between social scientists in the Soviet Union and the West. Even those in exile were part of this on-going communication [Bruisch 2014].

The creation of a new collective identity at the turn of the 1930s

In order to develop and maintain a new collective identity under dictatorships, people must have lived through a period of chaos, violence and political instability which emphasize their concerns about their own survival. It was only in this context that radicalization, naturally leading towards the new war, was possible. Such conditions made people susceptible to the propagandistic claims promising solutions to their problems, and the promises of a «paradise» bringing peace and prosperity to everyone.

This existential insecurity hit societies at a time when their social fabric had already been torn by war and revolution. Although economic recovery took off in both countries around the 1920s, the damages that were dealt to the social structure of both societies proved enduring. In Russia, the revolution fostered the emigration of the nobility and the remainder of its still weak bourgeoisie. The resulting weakness of its elites and the lack of clear structures allowed the Communist Party to take over easily.

Even though revolution and civil war had almost wiped out the existing classes, the party paradoxically continued to make use of traditional class distinctions for pragmatic and ideological reasons. The living conditions of the great masses of people were miserable. This was a «quicksand society» (Moshe Lewin) with an inability to organize, and the fluidity of its social structures. In Germany, on the other hand, the structure of the society remained largely intact. However, many people lost their previous political orientation and commitment. The national consciousness quickly came up with a comforting legend explaining the defeat in WW1. The Versailles Treaty, which put all the blame on the Germans and obliged them to make all the reparations, was widely rejected. It was therefore difficult for the Weimar Republic to come to terms with the conditions and to accept this as its own burden. Both right - and left-wing politicians openly attacked its democratic structures. While national identity united Germans, they were divided by class cleavages and political attitudes. In the Weimar period, previously stable identities waned, with the exception of the Catholic identity, which overwhelmed that of class. The moderate liberal parties of the political center lost their integrating power. Coupled with increasing street terror, such political fragmentation also turned Germany into a quicksand political society. Against this background, it is therefore no longer surprising that the National Socialist German Workers' Party succeeded in uniting a heterogeneous mass movement even including the social democratic electorate. It largely represented German society [Browning, Siegelbaum 2009, pp. 231-238].

The shaking of the social structure was a necessary condition for the rise of dictatorships. A sufficient condition was the severe economic and political crisis that hit both Germany and the Soviet Union in the late 1920s. In the Soviet Union, the crisis was largely homemade. Its «revolution from above» combined with accelerated industrialization and the compulsory collectivization of the peasants once again increased social dislocation. The world economic crisis reached the Weimar Republic late in 1929. The sense of lost hope that overwhelmed people in both countries was quickly recognized by the Nazis and the Communists.

In order to gain widespread acceptance, the new collective identity was linked to the attractive promise of a glorious new future. Communism was portrayed as a society without exploitation, fostering self-fulfillment and material well-being. Similar sentiments, albeit with a specific emphasis on homogeneity and equality, were voiced in the vision of the national community (Volksgemeinschaft) that was sold to the German people by the Nazis. However, the attainment of this glorious future could not be achieved instantaneously and required certain effort, including the elimination of those who stood in the way of achieving it. In order to facilitate inclusion, the sense of belonging to the majority that shared such visions was sold as a privilege [Merl (1) 2012]. Stalinism and National Socialism also coupled their ideal futures with the ideal of the «new man» [Halfin 2002, p. 7; Browning, Siegelbaum 2009]. This created a powerful narrative, which in the eyes of a single individual legitimized the use of physical violence against the regimes' enemies. This model of legitimation was not that much different from that of which is often found in most religions.

In order to protect their (artificial) collective identities from becoming the subject of critical debate, the dictatorships had to sell them as a belief or axiomatic basis of social order that could not be subjected to rationalization [Giesen 2004, pp. 73-75; Merl

(1) 2012]. While formally free, the decision to associate oneself with such a collective identity was, nevertheless, forced by the surrounding context, since everyday people were confronted by the unenviable fate of those who did not embrace it. In Germany, particularly Communists and Jews were persecuted and marginalized, whereas in the Soviet Union similar fate awaited kulaks, bourgeoisie and the clergy. This was further enforced by propaganda which pictured the enemy such that most people could easily recognize them and in a language which they could understand. The promise of a glorious future had to be formulated with sufficient vagueness in order not to provoke opposition. Thereby anyone could decorate the new identity with more or less any aspects he or she wanted [Klemperer 1966; Hanisch-Wolfram 2010].

No dictatorship would have lasted long if the majority actively opposed the elimination of the enemies. Thus, the willingness of people to turn a blind eye to arrests and repressions was what made the dictatorships possible [Wildt 2007; Gellately 2001]. While this does not mean that people actively supported such physical violence (after all, active opposition was connected with an unpredictable, potentially fatal risk for individuals), everyone who did not actively resist subordination to the regime was considered included [Wildt 2007]. In fact, this was considered no less binding than active support of the slogans of the new regime. Such passive inclusion was widespread in Germany, but also in the Soviet Union after the late 1930s.

However, dictatorial rule also relied on some pre-modern ideas both in Germany and in the Soviet Union. The paternalistic understanding of power remained familiar and acceptable to many people. In both countries, the majority saw nothing negative in committing to a strong leader [Wildt 2007, pp. 51-53; Merl (1) 2012]. Incidentally, paternalism also served as means of solving the paradox of the failure of dictatorships to deliver on their promises. Confidence in the leader coupled with the belief in the existence of enemies made it easy to attribute the blame for such failures to anyone but the dictatorship itself. Stalin perfected this technique by making whipping boys out of his functionaries, when necessary, whom he accused of incompetence, standing in the way of fulfilling his promises to the people. The readiness of the population to accept, without question, such blame - which was completely arbitrary as viewed from the outside - remained unbroken [Merl (1) 2012].

The organization of society according to the concept of community

The large-scale projects of societal reorganization in line with the spirit of Modernity, which were pursued by Stalinism and National Socialism in the 1930s, were also designed to facilitate warfare. They aimed to reduce class antagonism and substitute it with a clear structure consisting of the leader and his followers. For this purpose, the polarizing concepts of capital and labor had to be eliminated.

The first measure to establish dictatorships (in 1930 in the Soviet Union and in 1933 in Germany) was the elimination of independent workers' movements. In Germany, the trade unions were disbanded, whereas in the Soviet Union they were simply deprived of the function of an autonomous representation of workers' interests. Nevertheless, both dictatorships sought for alternative ways to buy the loyalty of the workers. For instance, the Nazi founded the German Labor Front (DAF) uniting employers as the «leaders» of the enterprises and employees as their «followers». DAF was the biggest and the most powerful association in the Nazi regime. It served to eliminate the class struggle in factories and integrate the workers into the new regime, both of which it achieved with great success.

In factories, DAF was given the power and responsibility to organize almost every aspect of work which did not involve politics. This included work ethics, the organization and modernization of catering, the construction of sports facilities, improvements related to worker hygiene. In the Soviet Union, similar concerns were reflected in the promotion of a culturally rich life among workers [Petrone 2000], their on-the-job training and further education.

Both dictatorships maintained community through competitions. From 1934 national professional job competitions (Reichsberufswettkдmpfe) were held in Germany, in which millions of mostly young workers took part. German enterprises also competed with each other and a handful of exemplary companies were given awards annually. This resembled a similar practice in the Soviet Union, where top performers and enterprises were also rewarded for their contributions the fulfilment of economic plans. Both regimes also tried to influence the leisure activities of their workers [Wildt 2008, pp. 93-94; Petrone 2000]. For instance, in Germany, an organization called «Kraft durch Freude» (KdF) was created, which in 1935 alone organized short trips for almost 6 million workers. 336,000 workers made annual contributions to eventually receive one of the cars promised by the KdF. Through such services, the Nazis aimed to convince the workers that maintaining a strong national community was also what benefited their real working and living conditions. In Stalinism, upward social mobility was also intentionally manipulated to break with previously existing barriers. To satisfy the demand for entertainment, both regimes relied in particular on film production. In the Soviet Union, some elements of Hollywood musicals were borrowed in order to develop a specific film genre. It effectively conveyed ideological messages to the audience in way that could escape critical judgment [Hдnsgen 2005].

Although Hitler and Stalin regarded peasants as a powerful anti-communist force and therefore treated them respectively either as pillars or enemies of their regimes, there are striking similarities in how both approached agricultural policy as far as maintaining economic self-sufficiency and preparation for war were concerned. Both regimes pursued the goal of organizing peasants. However, in the Soviet Union, their inclusion in the collective farms (kolkhoz) also served the purpose of their political neutralization. In Germany, the peasants were united on the basis of previous forms of cooperation and association into a compulsory cartel of the Reichsnдhrstand. «Peasant leaders» were expected to lead the peasants organized at the local and central level into the battle for increasing agricultural production. Just as Stalinism placed its peasants on the «Grain Front», so too did National Socialism prepare its peasants for the provision of the German population in the case of war [Merl 1996; Merl (2) 2002].

Both regimes also relied heavily on cartels and other collective forms in organizing their industry and manufacture. By the second half of the 1930s each had more or less established an economic system which was tailored for war, a system through which the state could easily allocate resources and control foreign trade. Nazi Germany also adopted a four-year plan [Petzina 1968]. The economic upturn in the 1930s in both countries was largely based on investment in the defense industry, which was justified by the need to prepare for possible outside aggression. With the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Nazism and Stalinism also defined their spheres of interest and influence in Europe, in which they claimed back the territories that were lost during WW1.

The images of the enemies: alien threat scenarios

Both regimes also maintained the fear of external threats and portrayed their enemies as being controlled by foreign powers (including the Jewish world conspiracy). These images of the enemy were effective, not least due to the fact that they were framed in the mythical world of ideas that was implanted into the popular conscience.

The enemies were almost always portrayed as supporters or even agents of hostile ideologies, e.g. as spies and saboteurs. Their stigmatization was sweeping, such that, for instance, in Germany, it reached out even to assimilated Jews. In the Soviet Union, the enemy image of the mythical kulak transformed successful peasants into bourgeois counterrevolutionaries. It affected even those peasants who had previously proven their loyalty to the Communists [Merl 1990, pp. 61-103; Wildt 2007]. Moreover, anyone who showed solidarity with the accused was put under suspicion [Gellately 2001; Wildt 2007]. In all of the cases, the external enemies were also constructed as social entities, which reinforced the inclusiveness of the numerous underprivileged. The world Jewry, the capitalists, the imperialists, the exploiters, and the kulaks were all designated as undeservingly privileged, against whom it was easy to incite the common people. Such framing also made the population surprisingly immune to foreign radio stations [Merl (1) 2012].

The extent to which these enemy images were internalized reflects itself well in the enthusiasm with which some people were involved in detecting enemies. In the Soviet Union, for instance, a lot of people were convinced that kulaks existed. They were also convinced that the enemies could most easily be found at work - a likely site of sabotage - and that they were responsible for all the failures [Schlцgel 2008, pp. 119-135]. In Germany, popular masses endorsed the idea of extraditing Jews, Communists, foreign workers and prisoners of war seeing them as criminals threatening the national community [Gellately 2001; Fitzpatrick, Lьtke 2009, pp. 275-281, 298-301]. The Nazis even managed to blame the Jews for the war, and the conviction that it was a Jewish war was shared by many [Klemperer 1966, pp. 189-198; Gellately 2001]. Wildt has traced the extent to which actions against Jews were initiated by common people from 1933 onwards. He argues that it did not matter whether one approved of these actions openly or secretly opposed them. Passive observation was akin to giving consent and this was the basis of the support on which the dictatorship rested. Even though spectators, strictly speaking, cannot be equated with perpetrators, the former provide legitimacy to the actions of the latter. Their silent presence alone made them accomplices of anti-Semitic politics. With only a few exceptions most people did not show any sign of opposition at all to what was happening [Wildt 2007, pp. 68, 214-217, 351-374; Gellately 2001; Johnson 1999]. Propaganda and the policy of violence thus achieved their goals at even at the very local level. In Germany, people lost their neutrality with respect to Jews. Many said to themselves: «Actually, the Nazis are right!» [Wildt 2007, p. 215]. Similar things were taking place in the Soviet Union, where the people by resolutions at closed assemblies welcomed the condemnation of certain groups of people or the executions following show trials [Merl (1) 2012].

The collective stigmatization of marginalized groups, such as vagabonds, prostitutes, and homosexuals, as antisocial or alien also took place under both Stalinism and National Socialism [Browning, Siegelbaum 2009, pp. 249-258]. The population perceived them as criminals, just as it valued the regime's successful struggle against crime in general as one of its most important achievements [Gellately 2001].

Political communication for the preservation of the belief in the legitimacy of rule

In order to preserve the belief in the legitimacy of their rule among the people, it was crucial for the dictatorships to exercise effective control over public communication. This was greatly facilitated by the clear structuring of virtually the entire population by different places of work or places of living. That way the state could easily reach out to its people through regularly organized meetings and events, all of which required compulsory attendance.

Through the public of closed assemblies the dictatorships gained an effective means of social integration. It ensured everybody's participation. During such meetings, the participants had to express their individual position in the politically correct language. The actors and spectators were identical, and there were no bystanders. The meetings were organized such that the participants always supervised each other. Through the performative function of the ritual, mere participation was enough to provide a sense of integration into the community. While closed assemblies suggested political participation, it was only superficially aligned with the principles of democratic decision-making. Deviating views could be expressed, but it was crucial that they were framed in the language supported and internalized by the regime. Those who raised criticism without sticking to the commonly accepted rules risked being overrun by the state security organs. The participants knew that a dissenting vote would have consequences. In fact, the assemblies almost always willingly and unanimously supported any resolution prepared by the regime. This was reinforced by the vicious circle of passivity and the fear of speaking out publicly with a dissenting opinion. The meetings also became increasingly ritualized. The participants used the language of the regime in their speeches with formulas internalized from the propaganda. All of this instilled a sense of obligation without the need to actually convince anyone. Thus, by means of the public of closed assemblies the dictatorships could control the will of their subjects and direct it anywhere they wished [Merl (1) 2012; Erren 2010].

Both regimes used rituals, symbols, and rhetorical means to engage the masses [Browning, Siegelbaum 2009, p. 247]. To openly display integration people were also obliged to participate in major festivities and similar events. To prevent people from avoiding them, the dictatorships tried to make participation more attractive by introducing different rewards. In the Soviet Union, a significant improvement in the supply of food and alcoholic beverages to the public in the days preceding the holidays was obligatory [Petrone 2000; Merl (1) 2012].

In the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the new constitution of 1936, «general, equal, free and secret» elections to the Supreme Soviets were introduced. Obligatory participation in the elections served as yet another means of the performative integration into the community. Stalin also used the Soviet election at the end of1937 to demonstrate to the world that the entire Soviet population was behind him. He spared no effort. Prior to the election, several hundred thousand priests and former kulaks were shot in a secret mass action so that they could not influence the election by spreading opposition [Merl 2011]. The Nazis carried out referendums with similar purposes in mind. Both dictatorships attached great importance to demonstrating the joint support of the entire population for their policies, both internally and externally. It was therefore a patriotic obligation for each eligible voter to vote [Gellately 2001; Merl 2011].

The national community and the evolution of Stalin «s concept of inclusion

In order to promote a sense of community, the new collective identity also had to maintain integration as one of its core founding ideas. For National Socialism this was successfully resolved in the idea of the national community. However, this also implied that in order to stay in power and maintain their dictatorship, the Nazis were not allowed to do anything that would have set this idea under threat by public communication, depriving them of the status of harbingers of the glorious future and of the legitimate right to destroy their enemies. Stalin, on the other hand, faced the challenge of improving inclusion to lead the Soviet people into the «harmonious unity of socialist nations», which in many respects resembled that of the national community.

Hitler made use of the concept of national community, which already existed and had a positive connotation. The concept posited the reunification of the whole German nation in order to face the external enemies at the beginning of WW1. The national community was also considered a «German alternative» to democracy. Community (or Gemeinschaft in Tцnnies' terms) was directed against Western individualism: the unity of the state and the people subordinated private interests for the sake of the common good. What the Allies saw as a lack of freedom was in fact the specific German understanding of it. Comradeship was juxtaposed with the Western term equality. The concept of the national community as of 1914 included all the social groups of German society. Even socialist ideas about the people's state, the state for the whole people, were based on it [Brьndel 2003, pp. 238-243; Wildt 2007; Wildt 2008]. However, in the years of political fragmentation in 1916-1917, the concept became increasingly refined to exclude certain groups, such as, for instance, Jews and Poles. Later the Nazis took these exclusionary ideas to their extremes. They also fused the notion of the national community with an ethno-biological and anti-Semitic meaning, while emphasizing the continuity with the ideas of 1914. (According to Brьndel [Brьndel 2003, pp. 301-313], neither the concept of the people's state nor the ideal of the national community was anti-modernist, rather it was an expression of a specific understanding of Modernity in the interpretation of the German elites.)

Intended as a dictatorship of the working class, Stalinism first pursued the class principle. The first concept of Soviet nationality politics (korenizatsiya), which sought to promote nation-building among different ethnic groups (before they were later reunited through the working class), accepted ethnic differences as given and tolerable for the time being. Paradoxically this implied that Stalininsm was oriented more towards division than a comprehensive inclusion of its peoples [Martin 2001; Browning, Siegelbaum 2009, p. 247]. In 1926, Stalin introduced some changes to this doctrine, which improved the promise of Communism: by drawing on the slogan of «building socialism in one country» he distanced himself from the internationalist claims of world revolution and thus became more aligned with the nation-state building trend of the interwar period. However, it still had the disadvantage of class rhetoric, which did not allow the inclusion of the whole population and thus endangered the belief in the legitimacy of his rule. It i s therefore not surprising that in the mid-193 0s, Stalin retreated to his earlier agenda. In his speech before economists in June 1931, he turned back to the «bourgeois specialists» whom he previously declared as enemies of the regime and allowed them to take sides with the working class. The Stakhanov movement renounced the class criterion altogether [Merl 2017].

The mass terror against peasants during the collectivization was also directed against specific ethnic groups and effectively ruined the idea of nation building. Stalin desperately needed a concept that would glue his multiethnic dictatorship together with an appropriate sense of belonging. In the mid-1930s, he moved away from the dividing class concept. As a «diligent dictator» (Ian Kershaw), he apparently closely observed National Socialism and recognized that he lacked an ideology that could effectively integrate all Soviet citizens, i.e. ideology similar to that of the national community. With the introduction of the Socialist constitution in 1936, he presented his people with the idea of the «harmonious community of socialist nations». This redefined Soviet people into a new entity during WW2 [Martin 2001]. The notion of the people S enemy replaced that of the class enemy.

For the formerly independent peasants, who were forced into collective farms, the integration offer was limited, even though they had to participate in the elections in order to express their affiliation with the collective whole. Otherwise, Stalin pursued only their political neutralization, not their equal integration. The collective farmers were deprived of crucial civil and social rights, such as the right to free movement (they were not entitled to internal passports), and the 1936 constitution explicitly excluded them from state social security [Merl 1990; Getty 1991].

Thus, by carefully constructing the history, culture and constitution of the Soviet people, Stalin placed his dictatorship on a firm footing that lasted beyond his death in 1953. The central importance of this process of unification becomes fully apparent only from the point of view of the communicative strategy of the dictatorship.

Concluding remarks

After the WW1, many people believed the promises of Modernity that a brighter and better future could soon be attained because the constraints of the previous political systems could be overcome through rational planning. Drawing on the incredible success of modern medicine, they willingly believed the promises of social scientists who claimed to possess the recipes to change their societies. Dictatorships also embraced such advice and the restructuring of societies in the 1930s effectively pushed the world towards the brink of a new war. By drawing on the «scientificity» of the advice of social science and its promise of delivering a glorious future to their nations, dictators won the belief in the legitimacy for their rule. On this basis, they molded new societies like gardeners by weeding (often physically) the undesirable elements from their social structures. Through the implementation of the concepts like «national community» or «Soviet people», National Socialism and Stalinism shaped the communities that could secure their claim to power. I argue that in this way the expectations of Modernity and the scientization of the social eventually contributed to the renewed military conflict in Europe after the WW1. It is in this respect all the more concerning that the international organizations created after the WW2, which were designed to avoid the repetition of similar scenarios in the future and which have achieved certain success in this respect, are becoming increasingly attacked by populists and resurgent nationalism.

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