Differences and commonalities between authoritarian and liberal federations

Today there are many different ways how political regimes can be measured. The most widespread opinion in the choosing of better indexes is the choosing of the Freedom House or Polity. As we decided to choose the Schedler's classification as a theoretical framework for the research, we are going to use the Freedom House index because this is the one that suits the most. According to Matthijs Bogaards, these types of political regimes can be measured in a following way: the closed authoritarianism - 7 points, the hegemonic and competitive authoritarianism - 3 - 6 points, the electoral and liberal democracies - 0 - 2. Matthijs Bogaards, "Measures of democratization: From degree to type to war." Political research quarterly 63, no.2 (2010): 475-488. The hegemonic and competitive authoritarianism in that sense differ in a “degree of incumbent or ruling party dominant” Daniela Donno, "Elections and democratization in authoritarian regimes." American Journal of Political Science 57, no.3 (2013): 704. , the hegemonic regimes have a higher level of it what means it should have a higher number in freedom House. However, the Freedom House has changed its methodology in 2019 and now its the total measurement varies from 0 point to 100. Today, there are no research that would test the measurements for the classification of political regimes and regime changes as well, that is why we will suggest our own way of measurement of the regime according to the Freedom House in the empirical part of the work. In the next paragraph, we will discuss on the issue of political regime's existence in federal states.

2.2 Federalism and political regimes

Almost every political scientists who study the federalism and federations refer to the question of the federalism and democracy coexistence. Daniel Elazar even used the term of democratic federalism to explain this theoretical phenomenon Elazar, Daniel Judah. Exploring federalism. University of Alabama Press, 1987.. This idea actually has deep roots; it developed from the beginning of the modern federal theory that appeared with Hamilton, Jay and Madison and their work “The federalist paper”. The main argument that scholars uses to prove the fact that federalism does not exist without democracy is the fact that it was created as a democratic tool. This statement, for example, can be found in a really famous work of Alexis de Tocqueville “Democracy in America”. He claimed that federalism in a state helps to achieve some conditions that are necessary for democracy, such as the liberties of minorities, for example. De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Vol. 10. (Regnery Publishing, 2003):86-87. Perhaps, partly because of the initial development of the federal idea, it is still accepted as being directly related to democracy. However, we all know that any social phenomenon always change or in other way social science would have ceased to exist long ago.

Theoretically, federalism is often connected by scientists with democratic regime because it creates the stability for democracy, its institutions and liberal representation of people. At the same time, they claim that federalism work only in democracies, because authoritarianism made it a simple formality weather lead to the territorial instability. Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova. "Federalism, democracy, and democratization." Federal Dynamics (2013): 167. It means that federalism is a good helper for democracy to make it stronger, but it is not able to exist in authoritarian context. From the one hand, we agree, that sometimes the federal system in authoritarian states becomes just a formality, like it can be seen in the Somalia or Nepal cases, for example. Both of these states are federal and have federal constitutions that does not work. However, some states, like Russia, for example, that is often compared as de jure but not de facto federal actually works as federal. It has all federal structural features that really works. The question is whether they work effectively or not and how they really work and controlled.

Today federalism is also often studied in the case of correlation of it with the democratic success. Such studies seem to indicate that federalism is taking root in an already democratic community in order to strengthen existing democracy and either contribute to success or does not work in any way. For example, it can be seen in this kind of works where the factors of successful federalism for democracy distinguished Myerson, Roger. "Federalism and incentives for success in democracy." (2006).. There are two possible reasons why it happens: 1) political scholars use too idealistic approaches to the federalism and limit their research by such a theoretical frame; 2) they have not tried to investigate the nature of federalism in political regimes. The first reason is more likely today as the second one is not actually true. There were some scientists that tried to discuss the possibility of authoritarian federalism existence and we will look at them a little bit later. However, the first reason for that should be resolved. We all understand that there is no anything ideal. Even if we are talking about the civil society: it can be weak or strong, it can exist in democracies and autocracies. Why is federalism still located in the democratic frames?

Therefore, there are some scholars, who start to talk about this theoretical phenomenon. Jenna Bednar in her book “The Robust Federation” mentioned a really important thing. Some federal features can work in federations in an authoritarian way. She said so about the independence, the feature of federation that assumes the opportunity of centre and federal sub-units to act independently from each other establishing the regional political elections and mutual control of decision-making. Bednar, The robust federation, 18 - 19. She did not say how it could work but we can guess that it is possible through the centralization processes in fiscal and political fields what increases the power of authorities and decreases the significance of independence for regions despite the fact that it is de jure and de facto works.

The authoritarianism in federal states today is also studied as a case-study research. Sabine Kropp for example, presented the research about Russia investigating the authoritarian federalism in that state and claiming that this concept is actually not oxymoron. She made a conclusion that federalism in authoritarian states really can help it to strengthen the authoritarianism through different mechanisms, which are mostly concentrates on a way of usage of federal system in a controlled way. Kropp, "The Ambivalence of Federalism and Democracy: The Challenging Case of Authoritarianism--With Evidence from the Russian Case.", 213-229. For example, she claimed, “federalism may establish informal relations between regional and federal elites at the cost of formally democratic institutions” Ibid. 226. . However, she noticed that it asks the in-depth analysis of more cases than one to make a conclusion on that issue Ibid. 225. . Unfortunately, such studies today does not exist so there are possible way to make a clear theoretical conclusion on the issue of authoritarian political regime existence in the federations.

Therefore, we think that the problem with the political regimes in federal states is the problem of federalism conceptualization. Should we include the actual work of federal institutions into the federal theory or not? We think that we should not because of two reasons. Firstly, democracy and federalism are different concepts. The first concept explains the real work of institutions, while federalism shows the real structure of governance within the state that can work as in authoritarian as in a democratic way. Secondly, thinking that federalism works democratically, we exclude the authoritarian federalism out of analysis and claim that authoritarian federations are actually unitary. It can lead to the factual mistake in studying the phenomena of such states, since they can be federations in their institutional structure, but such a structure can be controlled in authoritarian way. That is why it is really important to study this phenomenon and understand how the authoritarian federations really differ from the liberal once to avoid such mistakes in learning the phenomenon of federalism in federal states. The next part of this research is dedicated to this problem solution and present the qualitative comparative analysis of the commonalities and differences between authoritarian and democratic federations.

federalism liberal democratic political

3. Authoritarian and liberal federations

3.1 Methodology

Method description

The qualitative comparative analysis (the QCA) is an unusual method. From the one hand, it is oriented on the in-depth case study on the stages of the research beginning. From the other hand, it consists of a numerical data analysis on the stages of data calibration, its analysis and logical minimization. The main advantage of this method is the ability to analyse a small number of cases with the opportunity to build complex causal relations in a set of conditions. Charles C., Ragin "Using qualitative comparative analysis to study causal complexity." Health services research 34, no. 5 (1999): 1225. In a broader sense, it means that the outcome is explained through the modelling of configurations of different conditions Schneider, Carsten Q., and Bernard Grofman. "It might look like a regression equation… but its not! An intuitive approach to the presentation of QCA and fs/QCA results." Conference on “Comparative Politics: Empirical Applications of Methodological Innovations”, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan, (2006): 10.. There are neither dependent nor independent variables in this method. There are only sufficient and necessary conditions that in some combinations can lead to positive or negative outcomes that should be analysed separately. Schneider, Carsten Q., and Claudius Wagemann. "Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets." Comparative Sociology 9, no.3 (2010): 407.

The QCA can be implemented in three strategies: fuzzy-set QCA, crisp-set QCA and mvQCA. All of them differ in a way in which the data calibration process happens. In the QCA, calibration process is a process of membership score conferment to the concrete outcome or condition from 0 to 1. Crisp-set QCA in that sense has only two possible points 1 - full membership (the availability of something) and 0 - non-membership (the absence of something). Ragin, Charles C. "Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA)." Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques 51 (2009): 87-121. However, this strategy does not fit our study for two reasons: 1) it will not help us reflect the full possible variation of various political regimes as well as 2) it will not help to more specifically describe cases using conditions. That is why we are going to use fuzzy-set QCA strategy because it suggests the solving of all these obstacles.

Operationalization

Today we know about 32 states that can be de jure considered as federal. These states are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iraq, Mexico, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States, Venezuela and South Africa. However, we decided to exclude five of them out of the list of studied cases. These excluded states are:

1) Myanmar: in modern time this state is hardly can be named as federal even de jure. Myanmar's Constitution of 2008 does not say that this state is federal but the Union. In a case of South Africa we recognize that the Constitution guarantee main federal principles, at least the administrative autonomy Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (Act 200 of 1993). However, the Myanmar's Constitution does not guarantee them Myanmar's Constitution of 2008, (29 May 2008) so it is unitary for obvious reasons;

2) Nepal, Sudan: these states currently are on the stage of transition to democratic federalism according to their Constitutions The Constitution Of Nepal, as Amended by the First, Second, and Third Amendments of the Constitution. (Kathmandu, Nepal :His Majesty's Govt. of Nepal, Ministry of Law and Justice, Law Books Management Committee, 1981) Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan (Amendment) (2015). They have not reached the real federalism and still work in accordance to their temporary transitional documents;

3) Saint Kitts and Nevis: this federation is a unique case; it has two territories and a unicameral system. Constitution establishes federal relations only with Nevis territory what makes it not a federation but a federacy Constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, (10 September 1983);

4) Somalia: political situation in this state until the current time is not good enough to guarantee not only the work of main federal principles but also the work of the Constitution at all Freedom House. “Countries and territories.” 2019;

Therefore, this research is focused on the 24 cases of federal states studying. They are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Sudan, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States, Venezuela and South Africa. All these states are recognized as de jure federations and all have federal constitutions. According to the Freedom House, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Micronesia, Switzerland, United States and South Africa are classified as free once. All of them have the high level of political rights and civil liberties. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan are partly free. According to the reports, these federations mostly have problems with liberties, corruptions, poverty, security and independence of electoral system. The last group of federal states that Freedom House investigate as not free consists of Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar, Russia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. These states have problems in many spheres of economic, political and social development because of different reasons, and federalism in these states is the most interesting object for study to the recent time. “Countries and territories,” Freedom House, 2019

Studying this list of federal states has its own limitations and difficulties. Firstly, it is difficult to really understand what is happening in accordance to the central-regional relations in many federal states. Especially it is relevant for authoritarian once. The open resources with the available information on the federalism in the chosen federations are their Constitutions, Forum of Federations website that collects information, reports, and academic articles on the federalism development in federations. Secondly, the absence of the index of decentralization required the additional approach to measure different types of it. The calculations will be described later in this part of the research. It is also important to notice that data collection as well as case selection are also limited by the current time. Of course, most federations were established and existed until today while the theory on the possible conceptualization of some states as authoritarian federations is a recent development. Moreover, the large part of the data was collected with the help of the federal Constitutions that usually are not being changed for a long time.

As we are going to compare the availability of different federal features within democratic and non-democratic states, the outcome of the research is the political regime. To operationalize the political regime, we are going to use Andreas Schedler's conceptualization that has been already described in the previous part (see Table 1). We will use the simplest classification of political regimes with five types which are closed and hegemonic autocracies, competitive autocracies and electoral and liberal democracies. Schedler, Andreas, The politics of uncertainty: Sustaining and subverting electoral authoritarianism. (OUP Oxford. 2013): 79. We have chosen this approach because of two reasons: 1) in accordance to the chosen calibration strategy that will be described later; 2) to avoid contradictory configurations because the qualitative comparative analysis is sensitive to the outcome because of the small number of cases and its calculation processes.

As an index for the counting of political regimes, we will use Freedom House measurements. There is an obvious limitation in the sense of usage of this system of measurement. It is hidden in the lack of the new Freedom House methodology assessments in accordance to the political regimes' classification. For this reason, we offer a simple mathematical grading system. Those states that are less than 25 point will be considered as closed and hegemonic authoritarianism, 25 - 49 points - electoral authoritarianism, 50 - 75 point - electoral democracy and 76 - 100 points - liberal democracy. Of course, this type of political regime operationalization and measurement is not the best in a sense of explanation of the phenomenon of political regimes. However we are limited here by the fuzzy-set QCA opportunities as the method is still underdeveloped and the lack of testing of the new Freedom House' methodology as it was previously mentioned.

Table 1. Schedler's operationalization of political regimes

Closed Authoritarianism	Electoral Authoritarianism	Electoral Democracy	Liberal Democracy
Non-democratic regimes	Democratic regimes

The conditions that represents main federal features are divided into two groups. The first group of conditions is structural and presents the main features of federal structure in federations (see Table 2). These conditions are geopolitical division (code: geo_div_s), written contract (code: wr_contract_s), direct governance (code: dir_gov_s), administrative autonomy (code: adm_aut_s), political autonomy (code: pol_aut_s), shared-rule (code: shared_rule_s). All of these conditions were chosen in accordance to the theoretical framework of the research and will be used to test the main Hypothesis as well as the Hypothesis 1. To collect the data for these conditions, each of them has a question that should be answered in a following way: Yes or No. The political autonomy has two optional answers: more No than Yes and more Yes than No. It is done in advance to the selected type of data calibration strategy, which will be described in the next paragraph. Answers to all questions were found in the Constitutions and in the project website of the Forum of Federations, references to which are given in the Bibliography under the “Empirical base” part.

Table 2. Operationalization of structural conditions for the analysis

Abbr.	Full name	Operationalization	Source
geo_ div_s	Geopolitical Division	The division of country on federal sub-units (Is there a political division of country for potential federal sub-units?)	Bednar, Jenna, The robust federation. Principles of Design, 2009.
wr_contract _s	Written Contract	The written legislature where federal relations are guaranteed (Is there a written federal contract in a country?)	Schmitt, Carl, Constitutional theory. Duke University Press, 2008.
dir_ gov_s	Direct Governence	Regional and national centres have direct power over people under them what also means that these people are under the power of at least two governments (Do regional and national centres have direct power over people at the same time in at least two levels?)	Bednar, Jenna, The robust federation. Principles of Design, 2009.
adm_ aut_s	Administrative Autonomy	Each level of power has at least one autonomy in which it can make a final decision (Is there at least one responsibility of centre and regions in which they can make a final decision?)	Riker, William Нarrison. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964.
pol_ aut_s	Political Autonomy	The election of federal subunits' officials (Do the chiefs of regions are elected by citizens of the region?)	Filippov, Michail, Ordeshook Peter Carl and Shvetsova Olga. Designing federalism: A theory of self-sustainable federal institutions. Cambridge University Press., 2004.
shared_ rule_s	Shared Rule	The opportunity to make the common policy of federal community through the constitutionally established federal structure (Is there a bicameral system in a state?)	Elazar, Daniel Judah. Exploring federalism. University of Alabama Press, 1987.

The second group of conditions is much more complex as it is concerned to the descriptive characteristics of federal structure in federations (see Table 3). First of all, independence (code: indep_w) presents one of the federal features that was describe by Jenna Bednar. It is, as well as equality of representation (code: eq_repr_w) and asymmetry (asy_w) were collected as the structural conditions answering the question with Yes, more Yes than No, more No than Yes, No. All of them, despite the asymmetry, the information to which was found in the reports of Forum of Federations, were also collected with the usage of the Constitutions as well as the next three conditions. Fiscal (code: fiscal_centr_w), administrative (code: adm_centr_w) and political (code: pol_centr_w) centralizations were counted in accordance to main fields that can be divided among federal centre and federal sub-units. (see Appendix 1, 2 and 3 to look at the measurements of all types of centralization). These conditions are necessary in testing the main Hypothesis and Hypotheses 1 and 2. As a result, the data was collected in the common dataset that is attached to the Appendix 4 of this paper.

Table 3. Operationalization of descriptive institutional conditions for the analysis

Abbr.	Full name	Operationalization	Source
indep_w	Independence	Regional and central authorities control each other through the electoral system or the right of veto on the decision of other level of power (Do centers control each other through the electoral system or the right of veto on the decision of other level of power?)	Bednar, Jenna, The robust federation. Principles of Design, 2009.
eq_repr_w	Equality of representation	The problem of overrepresentation of smaller federal subunits is solved (Are regions represented equally in the legislature institutions?)	Parameswaran, Giri. "Bargaining and bicameralism". Legislative Studies Quarterly 43, no.1 (2018): 101 - 139.
fiscal_ centr_w	Fiscal Decentralization	Taxes, revenues (trade), property control, pensions and other social payments (The level of centralization: the level of control of central authorities over the main state economic systems)	Faletti, Tulia G. "A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin America cases in comparative perspective". America Political Science Review99, no. 3 (2005): 327 - 346.
adm_ centr_w	Administrative Decentralization	Police, foreign policy, defence, execution of punishment, healthcare, science, natural resources, ecology, industry, education, sport, agriculture, transport (The level of centralization: the level of central authorities over the implementation of main policy field)
pol_ centr_w	Political Decentralization	Legislature officials of regions, executive officials of regions, regional judges (The level of centralization: the level of control of central authorities over the main regional officials appointment)
asy_w	Asymmetry	Non-central subjects of federal relations can be unequal in what they can do and in which way they can do it (Do some regions have privilege in fiscal, administrative or political spheres?)	Burgess Michael. Comparative federalism: theory and practice. Routledge, 2006.

Calibration strategy

Calibration is the most important step in the qualitative comparative analysis. This process involves turning the collected data into points from zero to one depending on the chosen strategy. The four-value fuzzy set strategy of calibration will be implemented in this research. This strategy assumes that all data collected for this study will be determined using the following membership scores: full in - 1; more in than out - 0.67; more out than in - 0.33; fully out - 0. Charles C., Ragin, "Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA)." Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques 51 (2009): 89-91. The calibration process can be made in two ways: by the software for the qualitative comparative analysis whether in accordance to conceptualization and operationalization by hands. We have chosen the second way of calibration to be sure that established thresholds correspond to the research theoretical framework and chosen calibration strategy.

The outcome, the political regime, will be calibrated in accordance with the Schedler's classification: the closed and hegemonic authoritarianism - 0; the electoral authoritarianism - 0.33; the electoral democracy - 0.67; the liberal democracy - 1. Conditions will be also calibrated in accordance to such system. Here is the calibration list for the conditions (see also Table 4):

1) Geopolitical division (code: geo_div_s), direct governance (code: dir_gov_s), written contract (wr_contract_s), administrative autonomy (code: adm_aut_s), shared-rule (code: shared_rule_s), asymmetry (code: asy_w): (No 0); (Yes 1);

2) Political autonomy (code: pol_aut_s), equality of representation (eq_repr_w), independence (code: indep_w): (No 0); (No>Yes 0.33); (Yes>No 0,67); (Yes 1);

3) Fiscal centralization (code: fiscal_centr_w): (1 0); (1.5; 2 0.33); (2.5; 3 0.67); (2.5 1);

4) Administrative centralization (code: adm_centr_w): (4.5; 5 0); (5.5; 6; 6.5 0.33); (7; 7.5; 8 0.67); (8.5; 9 1)

5) Political centralization (code: pol_aut_s): (0 0); (0.5; 1 0.33); (1.5; 2 0.67); (2.5; 3 1)

Table 4. Data calibration

Federation	pol_reg	geo_div_s	dir_gov_s	wr_contract_s	adm_aut_s	pol_aut_s	shared_rule_s	eq_repr_w	indep_w	fiscal_centr_w	adm_centr_w	pol_centr_w	asy_w
Argentina	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0,67	0,33	0,33	0
Australia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	0,33	0	0	1
Austria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	0,33	0
Belgium	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	0,67	0,33	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0,67	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0,33	1
Brazil	0,67	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0,67	0,67	0,33	0
Canada	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0,33	0,67	0,33	0,67	1
Comoros	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0,33	0,33	0
Ethiopia	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,33	0	1
Germany	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	0,33	0,33	0
India	0,67	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,67	0	0,67	1
Iraq	0,33	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	0	0	1	0	0,67	1
Malaysia	0,67	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0,67	0,33	0,33	1
Mexico	0,67	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,67	0	1
Micronesia	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,67	0,33	0,67	0
Nigeria	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0,67	1	0	1
Pakistan	0,33	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0,67	0,67	0,67	1
Russia	0	1	1	1	1	0,67	1	0	0	1	0,67	0,67	1
South Sudan	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0,33	0,33	0,33	0
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	1	0,33	0,33	0	0
United Arab Emirates	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,67	1	1
United States	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	0,33	0
Venezuela	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,67	1	0,67	1
South Africa	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0,67	0,67	0,33	0

3.2 Qualitative comparative analysis: findings

The Qualitative Comparative Analysis usually starts from testing conditions for the necessity. It should be done in two ways: the tests for the availability of conditions and for absence of them. Then the sufficient conditions should be tested by completing the truth table and making logical minimization. These steps will be implemented for each hypothesis in this research.

Main Hypothesis: structural conditions

Testing main Hypothesis for the necessary structural conditions: Authoritarian and liberal federations have the same federal structure (administrative and political autonomy, bicameralism, written federal contract, geopolitical division and direct governance)

Testing for the necessary conditions will allow us to investigate, which of them are necessary lead to the positive and negative outcomes. To be a necessary the consistency for the conditions should be higher than 0.9, while the coverage should be higher than 0.6 Charles C. Ragin, "Set relations in social research: Evaluating their consistency and coverage." Political analysis 14, no.3 (2006): 291-310.. The tables (see Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8) below shows the tests for the necessity analysis of the structural conditions. They are administrative (code: adm_aut_s) and political autonomy (code: pol_aut_s), bicameralism (code: shared_rule_s), written federal contract (code: wr_contract_s), geopolitical division (code: geo_div_s) and direct governance (code: dir_gov_s).

Table 5. Testing main H's necessary structural conditions for the positive outcome in the presence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
geo_div_s	1.000000	0.611250
dir_gov_s	1.000000	0.611250
wr_contract_s	1.000000	0.611250
adm_aut_s	1.000000	0.611250
pol_aut_s	0.863667	0.666842
shared_rule_s	0.909339	0.667000

Table 6. Testing main H's necessary structural conditions for the positive outcome in the absence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
~geo_div_s	0.000000	0.000000
~dir_gov_s	0.000000	0.000000
~wr_contract_s	0.000000	0.000000
~adm_aut_s	0.000000	0.000000
~pol_aut_s	0.158828	0.466000
~shared_rule_s	0.090661	0.332500

Table 7. Testing main H's necessary structural conditions for the negative outcome in the presence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
geo_div_s	1.000000	0.388750
dir_gov_s	1.000000	0.388750
wr_contract_s	1.000000	0.388750
adm_aut_s	1.000000	0.388750
pol_aut_s	0.713826	0.350526
shared_rule_s	0.713826	0.333000

Table 8. Testing main H's necessary structural conditions for the negative outcome in the absence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
~geo_div_s	0.000000	0.000000
~dir_gov_s	0.000000	0.000000
~wr_contract_s	0.000000	0.000000
~adm_aut_s	0.000000	0.000000
~pol_aut_s	0.321543	0.600000
~shared_rule_s	0.286174	0.667500

As a result, only four conditions and only for the positive outcome, which are the democratic federations, can be called as necessary. These conditions are geopolitical division (code: geo_div_s), direct governance (code: dir_gov_s), written contract (code: wr_contract_s), administrative autonomy (code: adm_aut_s) and shared-rule (code: shared_rule_s). However, we can say that the same conditions are necessary for the negative outcome as well as the consistency for them are equal to one. The coverage number in that sense is law because the overall number of authoritarian federations is a little bit lower then democratic ones. Now we are going to test the sufficient structural conditions for the positive and negative outcome.

Testing main Hypothesis for the sufficient structural conditions: Authoritarian and liberal federations have the same federal structure (administrative and political autonomy, bicameralism, written federal contract, geopolitical division and direct governance)

To check this hypothesis, firstly, we are going to use the truth table as a representation of the conditions that potentially can lead to the positive and negative outcomes; democratic and authoritarian regimes in our case (see Table 9). The frequency and consistency norms for the truth table outcome are 1 and 0.8 respectively which are automatically being used in the fsQCA software. Analysing this table, we see that there is no any satisfying configuration of structural conditions that lead to the positive or negative outcome because there is no any set of conditions with the raw consistency higher than 0.8. It has already excluded the possibilities of connection between the concrete set of structural conditions with the political regimes as the conditions are classified by this number as insufficient for the outcome. However, the raw consistency of the first configurations equal to 0.70875 shows that the availability of all federal structural features likely leads to the democratic regime, but this number is not high enough to make a conclusion on the necessity of this configuration for democracy.

Logical minimization of the truth table with the checking of the negative and positive outcomes (see Table 10) and the raw coverage equal to 1 shows that all positive and negative outcomes within studied cases have the following conditions that can be classified as sufficient conditions for any type of outcome: geopolitical division, direct governance, written federal contract and administrative autonomy. These cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term of geo_div_s*dir_gov_s*wr_contract_s*adm_aut are Argentina (1,1), Australia (1,1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1,0.67), Canada (1,1), Comoros (1,0.33), Germany (1,1), Micronesia (1,1), Switzerland (1,1), United Arab Emirates (1,0), Venezuela (1,0), Austria (1,1), Belgium (1,1), Brazil (1,0.67), Ethiopia (1,0), India (1,0.67), Iraq (1,0.33), Malaysia (1,0.67), Mexico (1,0.67), Nigeria (1,0.33), Pakistan (1,0.33)

Table 9. Main Hypothesis: truth table for the positive outcome in structural conditions

geo_div_s	dir_gov_s	wr_contract_s	adm_aut_s	pol_aut_s	shared_rule_s	number of cases	pol_reg	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
1	1	1	1	1	0	16	0	0.70875	0.667618	0.756669	Argentina (1.00,1.00) Australia (1.00,1.00) Austria (1.00,1.00) Belgium (1.00,1.00) Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.00,0.67) Brazil (1.00,0.67) Ethiopia (1.00,0.00) Germany (1.00,1.00) Malaysia (1.00,0.67) Mexico (1.00,0.67) Nigeria (1.00,0.33) Russia (0.67,0.00) South Sudan (1.00,0.00) Switzerland (1.00,1.00) United States (1.00,1.00) South Africa (1.00,0.67)
1	1	1	1	0	1	4	0	0.5825	0.445183	0.570213	Canada (1.00,1.00) India (1.00,0.67) Iraq (0.67,0.33) Pakistan (1.00,0.33)
1	1	1	1	1	0	3	0	0.443333	0.374532	0.42735	Comoros (1.00,0.33) Micronesia (1.00,1.00) Venezuela (1.00,0.00)
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	United Arab Emirates (1.00, 0.00)

Table 10. Main Hypothesis: intermediate solution formula for the positive and negative outcome in structural conditions

Political autonomy and shared rule conditions are not necessary and not sufficient conditions for studied cases. 8 cases of different political regimes in a truth table show it with the presented raw consistency in a truth table and the results of the logical minimization. Canada (liberal democracy), India (electoral democracy), Iraq (electoral authoritarianism), Pakistan (electoral authoritarianism) do not have the political autonomy. Comoros (electoral authoritarianism), Micronesia (liberal democracy) and Venezuela (closed authoritarianism) do not have the bicameral legislature. The United Arab Emirates (closed authoritarianism) does not have both and it is actually the reason to rise a question of belonging of this country to the list of federal, as it does not give an opportunity to regions to be sovereign in some spheres because of the total control on the regional and national levels.

Overall, the first part of the main Hypothesis is confirmed. We see that, firstly, there is no any sufficient differences between liberal and authoritarian federations. Secondly, without exception, all federal states are endowed with the most important features of a federal structure and the most majority of them has all set of federal features. Thirdly, federal states that have fallen out of the total number of cases due to the lack of political autonomy or a bicameral parliament nevertheless prove the lack of sufficiency for any outcome. It means that federations are structurally similar. Now, we are going to test the second part of the main Hypothesis that is dedicated to analysis of descriptive conditions.

Main Hypothesis: descriptive conditions

Testing main Hypothesis for the necessary descriptive conditions: Authoritarian and liberal federations have different characteristics of the federal structure (administrative, fiscal and political centralization, independence, equality of representation and asymmetry)

The tables below shows the tests for the necessity analysis of the descriptive conditions (see Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14). They are administrative (code: adm_centr_w), fiscal (code fiscal_centr_w) and political (code: pol_centr_w) centralization, independence (code: indep_w), equality of representation (code: eq_repr_w) and asymmetry (code: asy_w).

Table 11. Testing main H's necessary descriptive conditions for the positive outcome in the presence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
eq_repr_w	0.546012	0.828335
indep_w	0.728016	0.781273
fiscal_centr_w	0.659168	0.673868
adm_centr_w	0.453306	0.623827
pol_centr_w	0.406953	0.640558
asy_w	0.454669	0.476429

Table 12. Testing main H's necessary descriptive conditions for the positive outcome in the absence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
~eq_repr_w	0.453988	0.464759
~indep_w	0.271984	0.386254
~fiscal_centr_w	0.475801	0.723316
~adm_centr_w	0.659168	0.724888
~pol_centr_w	0.750511	0.750000
~asy_w	0.545331	0.800000

Table 13. Testing main H's necessary descriptive conditions for the negative outcome in the presence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
eq_repr_w	0.177921	0.171665
indep_w	0.320472	0.218727
fiscal_centr_w	0.713826	0.464111
adm_centr_w	0.606645	0.530957
pol_centr_w	0.606645	0.607296
asy_w	0.785638	0.523571

Table 14. Testing main H's necessary descriptive conditions for the negative outcome in the absence of conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
~eq_repr_w	0.822079	0.535241
~indep_w	0.679528	0.613746
~fiscal_centr_w	0.498392	0.481865
~adm_centr_w	0.570204	0.398801
~pol_centr_w	0.640943	0.407357
~asy_w	0.214362	0.200000

As a result, the analysis for necessary descriptive conditions showed that there are no necessary descriptive conditions for positive wether negative outcomes. Now, we are going to test descriptive conditions for the sufficiency.

Testing main Hypothesis for the sufficient descriptive conditions: Authoritarian and liberal federations have different characteristics of the federal structure (administrative, fiscal and political centralization, independence, equality of representation and asymmetry)

The truth table below presents ten configurations that lead to the positive outcome with the raw consistency higher than 0.8 (see Table 15) as well as four configurations leading to the negative outcome with the raw consistency higher than 0.8 in a case when the truth table is made for the negative outcome. We have decided not to put it into the research as this table actually have already presented sufficient sets for both outcomes.

Table 15. Main Hypothesis: truth table for the positive outcome in descriptive conditions

eq_repr_w	indep_w	fiscal_centr_w	adm_centr_w	pol_centr_w	asy_w	number	pol_reg	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
1	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	Switzerland (0.67,1.00) United States (0.67,1.00)
0	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	Brazil (0.67,0.67) South Africa (0.67,1.00)
1	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	Canada (0.67,1.00) India (0.67,0.67)
1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Germany (0.67,1.00)
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Austria (0.67,1.00)
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.67,0.67)
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Malaysia (0.67,0.67)
0	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	0.854077	0.796407	0.796407	Argentina (0.67,1.00) Comoros (0.67,0.33)
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.801205	0.75188	0.75188	Mexico (0.67,0.67)
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.801205	0.75188	0.75188	Belgium (0.67,1.00)
1	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0.712446	0.655	0.665	Australia (0.67,1.00) Ethiopia (0.67,0.00)
0	0	1

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