State symbol of Russia and Albania: comparative aspect

Размещено на http://www.allbest.ru/

State symbol of Russia and Albania: comparative aspect

Romanenko Y.

Key words: Russia, Albania, the national flag of Russia, the national flag of Albania, geopolitical isolationism, autarky, diffusion of macroidentity.

Метою дослідження є порівняльний опис візуальних особливостей національних прапорів Росії та Албанії як символів дифузії макроідентичності, що виражається в суперечливих векторах їх зовнішньої політики та зосередженості як на європейській, так і на азіатській макроідентичності. У статті на основі колористичної семантики проаналізовано державні прапори Росії і Албанії, в яких, як у державних символах, розкриваються особливості геополітичного позиціонування держав. Показано зв 'язок між осьовим символом ідентичності - двоголовим орлом - і роздвоєністю (дифузністю) політичної макроідентичності. Показано спільні для двох держав особливості: схильність до геополітичного ізоляціонізму, авторитарність державної влади, залежність інституту церкви від держави і етатистський атеїзм, розповсюдженість корупційних практик, ставка на форсовану модернізацію і технології екстраординарного виходу з ситуацій зовнішньо-політичних викликів. Констатовано, що в обох країнах має місце корупція влади, ознакою чого є запекла боротьба за владу протягом більшої частини візантійської історії. Визначено, що ця боротьба велася не політичними методами, а силою - військовим переворотом, повстанням або вбивством чинного глави держави. В геополітичному положенні Албанії це було пов 'язано зі спробою Скандерберга об 'єднати два в одному: ісламську і православну ідентичність, а також ситуативну адаптацію політичної еліти країни до наступного окупанта: з 1443 року, тобто роки боротьби з Турецьким пануванням, і до 1944 року герби набували поперемінно турецьких, австрійських, грецьких, італійських та радянсько-російських деталей. В гербі РФ також присутні візантійські елементи, що вказує на духовне правонаступництво з Візантійською імперією, проте, з меншою кількістю запозичень.

Ключові слова: Росія, Албанія, державний прапор Росії, державний прапор Албанії, геополітичний ізоляціонізм, автаркія, дифузія макроідентичності.

Ключевые слова: Россия, Албания, государственный флаг России, государственный флаг Албании, геополитический изоляционизм, автаркия, диффузия макроидентичности.

Recent literature review. The state symbolism and macroidentity of Russia and Albania was studied in monographs and scientific articles on heraldry, political history, coloristic semantics. G. Arsh and I. Senkevich, N. Smirnova, V. Pantin, Yu. Romanenko devoted their work to this subject. The works of the presented authors contain empirical material concerning the political genesis of Albania and Russia, the features of state modernization, the analysis of permanent crisis, and the problems of diffusion of macroidentity typical for two states [Albanian crisis, 2002; Arsh, 1965; Pantin 1997; Romanenko 2017].

For the author, the top-down structuralist opposition and the use of color semantics by M. Lusher, which, in this case, acts as the starting point of the analysis, are important, and the crosscutting trends in the history of the community, that is, the patterns of transition from the period of historical ruin to the period of the next occupation, find their isomorphic expression / reflection in color values. The explanatory color-semantic model allows one to analyze the choice of symbols based on the conventionalist conventions of the founders of statehood. These symbols express, in fact, the implicit logic of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, represented in the language of colors and geometric shapes. K.-G. pointed to this circumstance in his works. Jung and a number of other representatives of Jungianism [Heydt 1976: 22-88].

Of course, such conclusions have their basis in the theories of structuralism and symbolic interactionism, whose representatives are K. Levy-Strauss, J.-G. Mead, H. Blumer [Blumer 1935; Blumer 1937; Blumer 1939; Blumer 1969; Levi-Strauss 2005; Levi-Strauss 1963: 51-75; Moore 2009: 237-262].

The first group of these theories postulates the possibility of imagining any system as a language based on implicit grammar, so that "... matrimonial rules and systems of kinship taken together can be interpreted as a kind of language and a set of operations guaranteeing a certain type of communication within a group ..." (Levy-Strauss). The author in this case is not just talking about the parallelism of grammars, but about the ability to convert characters from one language to another, i.e. make a transfer. It turns out that a structuralist interpretation of the flag's color symbolism will be correct only if it is not based on the conventions of ideologists and propagandists, but on balanced analytical explications implemented in line with structuralist color semantics.

The second direction, symbolic interactionism, also contains postulates that allow translation and relay of symbols in symbolic interactions, which in itself does not contradict structuralism. After all, if there are various languages, then there are translations of texts from one language to another. In this case, the flag text is a kind of abbreviated "translation" from the language of historical performative to the language of color combinations and combinations of images / symbols (J.-G. Mead, G. Blumer) [Joas 13, 23-69].

The purpose of research. The purpose of this research is a comparative description of the visual features of the national flags of Russia and Albania as symbols of diffusion of macroidentity, which is expressed in the contradictory vectors of their foreign policy and focus on both European and Asian macroidentity.

The important research results. It is worth noting that the two-headed eagle is a common state symbol of both countries.

Now the double-headed eagle is considered the emblem of the Byzantine Empire. In fact, this is not true. The coat of arms is still a Western European phenomenon that arose around the time of the Crusades. In Byzantium there was no coat of arms as such. But there was a place to have its own original system of symbols of state power (such as the Constantine Cross). But the double-headed eagle, as a sign of the Emperor's power, dates back precisely after the 4th Crusade, when Constantinople was conquered by the Catholic armies, and the lands of the Empire were divided between the conquerors. And first, he appears in the role of the Byzantine symbol precisely in the Western arms and only then accepted by Byzantium itself [Vilinbakhov 1998: 28-31].

The last Byzantine dynasty of the Paleologists, which managed to return Constantinople and restore the Empire for a short time, already used the image of double-headed eagles as its own dynastic symbol. And this continued until the fall of Byzantium as a state - until 1453, when Constantinople fell under the blows of the Ottoman conquerors, and the last Emperor Constantine XI died, defending his legacy.

From that moment, the double-headed eagle as a symbol began to exist simultaneously in two planes - secular and church.

On the one hand, the two-headed eagle, as the coat of arms began to use the monarchs, one way or another claiming to be the legacy of the Roman or Byzantine Empire. So, the double-headed eagle became the emblem of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation (and after its liquidation - the Austrian Empire). At different times, the double-headed eagle was also included in the arms of the Balkan states that arose in the former Byzantine territories: Serbia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia, Albania.

Also, the double-headed eagle continued to be used by members of the House of Paleologists, who managed to escape to Italy. It was this Paleologian variant of the double-headed eagle that came to Moscow with the bride of Grand Duke John III - Sofia Paleologine, the niece of the last Byzantine Vasileus Constantine XI, and eventually became the Russian coat of arms.

On the other hand, in the territories conquered by the Turks, the double-headed eagle has become a symbol of church authority. It happened, paradoxically, by the will of the conquerors. The first, elected with the permission of the Sultan after the fall of Byzantium, the Patriarch of Constantinople - Gennady II Scholarius - became not only the Primate of the Church, but also the head of the Christian community in the Ottoman Empire - an ethnarch. In this regard, the First Hierarchs of Constantinople adopted some elements of the former imperial symbolism.

The patriarch's vestment became more magnificent, it looked more and more like ceremonial imperial clothes: once a simple white omophorion began to resemble the imperial belt - lor, miter - the crown-stemma of the last Paleologists. The same thing happened with the imperial doubleheaded eagle. Only now did he mean not royal, but bishop authority. And as a reminder of such, he began to adorn the bishop's thrones, orlets, high places, placed on the Royal Doors of temples, etc [Weyss 1991, 78].

The national flag of Russia is a hierarchical tricolor, consisting of white, blue and red stripes. The vertical arrangement of stripes on any flag reflects the hierarchy of ethnic values, in this case, the Russian one.

Based on the semantics of white, it can be assumed that the hierarchically highest value of Russians is identification with the Highest reality (God, Spirit), that is, everything that has no image and is associated with spiritual perfection - read: high intellectual and moral qualities (white color corresponds to identification with God as an ugly (achromatic) color, that is, the one from which all other colors flow).

The predominance of blue marks the state of socio-historical stabilization, which corresponds to the force-regime of the formation of society constantly present in Russian history and the scenario of catch-up modernization. Blue acts as an indicator of inertia, sensitivity, concentricity, desire for peace with the simultaneous dominance of sensitivity (sensitivity), dependence, conformity and anxiety.

The self-direction of blue is fully consistent with the tendency to self-isolation (cultural and political isolationism), the desire to form a closed political system (political autarky), manifestations of latent xenophobia, which, sometimes, are refracted in the rigid forms of ethnic apartheid and the authoritarian ethnopolitical segregation of ethnic minorities.

According to the author, the blue color in the political color semantics of Russian macroidentity corresponds to the Finnish-Finnish sub-ethnic sub-identity, which, in its purest form, expresses itself primarily in internally-introverted programs of political activity. Blue acts as a semantic relic of the Finno-Baltic-German monarchical dynasties, the last of which was the Romanov dynasty. All of them, against the background of the dominance of the Turkic-Mongolian political and cultural models among the masses (we are talking primarily about the eastern type of the Russian monarchy and the peasant community) showed a tendency to political reaction and conservation of obsolete political institutions. The reaction of the last Russian monarch to the revolutionary upheavals of 1905-1917 was also, figuratively speaking, ethnically specific "blue" (introvert).

In Nicholas II, the very provincial Dane appeared, who did not want and could not (due to known ethnic peculiarities) react to the growth of the criminal-Bolshevik underground and the decomposition of the army other than by repressive measures. The self-directedness of blue accompanies the popularity of authoritarianism as a model of rational-volitional governance based on the elimination of opposition pluralism and minimization of the institutions of democratic participation in favor of bureaucratic autocracy.

At the same time, a cyclical fluctuation scenario is common for Russia: situations of political stagnation and reaction, "tightening the screws in the blue" are replaced by chaotic freemen, riots, riots and rampant crime in the "red", which semantically correlates not only with state attributes, but also Russian social everyday life.Extroversion, passivity, combined with cultural and political fatalism complement the second disposition of the state's macroidentity.Of interest in the context of the foregoing is the cyclical-wave approach to the review of reforms and modernization of Russia.

So, V.I. Pantin identifies 5 cycles of reforms and counter-reforms: 1) reforms of Alexander I - the counter-reforms of Nicholas I; 2) the reforms of Alexander II - the counter-reforms of Alexander III; 3) S.Yu. reform Witte and P.A. Stolypin - counter-reforms after October 1917; 4) reform N.S. Khrushchev and A.N. Kosygin - the counter-reform of the "stagnant" period; 5) reforms of our days (second half of the 80s - 90s of the twentieth century).

Among the internal reasons for the cyclical nature of reforms in Russia, V. Pantin identifies the following: the predominance of attempts to transform "from above" with the unpreparedness of the lower classes, immaturity and lack of form of civil society; undocking between different groups of the political elite and the bureaucratic apparatus; elements of pressure and violence in the policy of reformers that provoke a response from society; centrifugal tendencies arising every time during the reforms, which forces to strengthen political centralization.

In his review of the book V.I. Pantin "Cycles and waves of modernization as a phenomenon of social development", V.G. Khoros supplements this list with the following factors of imperial modernization of Russia: selective borrowing, mainly for military purposes, technical and organizational achievements of more developed countries in exchange for raw materials and raw materials; the exploitation of the population, which is being tightened with reforms, in archaic, prebourgeois ways; the need to maintain a high degree of centralization and bureaucratization of management.The imperial model of modernization contained an unavoidable contradiction between the techno-economic and socio-political sides of the reforms. Hence the periodic imbalances and failures in the mechanism of Russian modernization, hence the need to correct it with reforms and counter-reforms [Pavlova-Sylvan 1999, 212].

On the one hand, Russian culture expresses interest in other cultures and societies, clearly dominating interest in its own culture. The production of meanings on a Russian basis in most cases was fraught with excess difficulties, which was partly due to expansionist projects, and partly to the factors in which the state got into extraordinary situations that required human extra costs.

The pole of these extra costs corresponds to the red color, which, in combination with blue, involves the alternation of cycles of autopoietic stagnation and mobilization overvoltage using administrative-power technologies. In general, we are talking about, including, material, energy, and human costs of most technological projects related to industrial production, the construction of infrastructure, and the provision of basic vital needs of the population.

Given the partial relevance of organismic and medical analogies and the corresponding models of sociological theorizing, a comparison of Russian society with the body of an athlete- bodybuilder, the muscular system of which is hypertrophied through the use of anabolic catalysts for muscle growth, suggests itself.

The colossal dimensions of the territorial periphery require extreme efforts to pump "blood", which is analogous to money and other life-supporting resources, including food and basic necessities. Both the size of the regions and their inaccessibility, as well as the archaic way of life, turn everyday life and everyday life into an agonal extreme. The latter is enhanced by significant corruption and criminality, forming symbiotic alliances with state bureaucracy.

Y. Gilinsky, analyzing the historical origin of corruption, notes that, following the example of Byzantium, the institution of "feeding" was formed, which represents the provision by the head of state (prince) of positions to his representatives (governor, governors) in the provinces without monetary compensation. "It was assumed that the population of the region would" feed "the governor," since the administrative resources available to the latter assumed unlimited conversion of power into any other material goods. The latter possessed enormous powers, and it is clear that the population did not skimp on offerings ... "Fattened" governors, returning to the capital - Moscow, brought with them accumulated good, "gifts", the "surpluses" of which were withdrawn even upon entering the "golden-domed" in favor of the treasury ...

So there was the mutual responsibility of bribe-takers provincial and metropolitan. Feeding was officially abolished in 1556, but the tradition of living and becoming wealthy at the expense of subjects actually remained for a long time, perhaps still. How else can one explain the size of wages - often below the subsistence level established in modern Russia by police, customs, state sanitary and epidemiological service, etc.? There was no shortage of moral and sovereign condemnation of bribery (in the 13 th century, Metropolitan Cyril, then Tsars Ivan III, Ivan IV the Terrible, during which the first known execution for a bribe took place), but "corruption is a chronic and incurable disease of any state apparatus of all time and all peoples" [Gilinsky 2004: 126-128].

The center of power of Russia, as the "heart" of a socio-state organism with hypertrophied "regional-muscular periphery", is in an situation of extraordinary collapse and constant total mobilization. Efforts, however, are nullified by a shortage of fertile arable land and the high labor costs of peasant labor. The latter constantly created the prerequisites for serfdom (including collective farms and state farms of the USSR as organizational forms of socialist feudalism), slavery and enslaving landlord methods of exploitation of the population of the agrarian periphery, which, using all despotic and extreme agonal technologies for obtaining a surplus product, still remained on low standard of living in a state of stagnant poverty. russia albania symbol political

In politics, these features of a national character were steadily manifested, on the one hand, in a tendency toward receptions in their mechanical combination with autochthonous political forms (a combination of German, Mongol-Tatar and authentic Russian forms of government and political regimes), on the other hand, in a tendency to idealization of foreign elites and a tendency to import elite-forming elements of other states. The last two trends were combined with unstable external assimilation of both the first and second.

On the other hand, in combination with white, which comes first, the meaning of blue can be interpreted as isolation in one's own representation-understanding of higher reality, that is, in insisting on a specific form of religious orthodoxy and identifying, in this connection, a specific version of cesarepapism.

In general, in the history of Russia it is difficult to deny the connection of the Orthodox hierocracy with a part of the state bureaucracy, which represented the structures of the political police and propaganda.

In the plots of visual media this is manifested in a combination of separation between the government / opposition (Putin-Zhirinovsky, Yeltsin-Zyuganov, etc.), and the alternation of periods of conservative stabilization and a return to the model of autocratic and original Russia.

It is enough to compare, for example, the reign of Peter the Great and Elizabeth with Catherine II, the reign of Alexander III with Nicholas I and Nicholas II to make sure that conservatism, inertia, the desire to maintain the status quo as attributes of the image of a strong hand ("blue") are steadily prefered in relation to the freemen of reforms, smoothly turning into confusion and chaos ("red"). At the daily level, tolerance for repressive power, ignoring the suffering and inconvenience of commoners, expresses the same opposition aggression / depression (suppression of retaliatory aggression) as blue / red.

So, red gives corresponds to the manifestations of aggressive dispositions of ethnic mentality and the desire for success, but, in combination with blue, creates a conflicting combination of multidirectional trends: motivation to achieve and motivation to avoid failure. In practice, this provides a rather interesting stratagem of Russian foreign policy. It combines a directly-aggressive persistent realization of intentions with a strongly pronounced tendency to lose interest in internal processes in the occupied space.

For Russia itself, aggressive seizure with an onslaught, huge human and material costs corresponds to numerous wars that have been and have been fought not so much to assimilate / absorb the conquered and conquered peoples, but to demonstrate strength, valor and the ability to control the situation. This form of mechanical annexation of territories, preserved from the time of Batu and Tamerlane, like no other, contributed to the preservation of the autochthonous cultural identities of the conquered peoples.

Their mechanical Russification did not contribute to the transformation of all other components of the cultural system and created the illusion of external loyalty to the metropolis. In practice, this led and leads to the autonomy of the periphery and the model of "forced consociality", which does not imply cultural and social unity, but mainly the ethocratic integration of ethnoses into a superethnos with a diffuse cosmopolitan identity.

This just explains that Russia did not exist for much of its history as a Russian state, as well as the weak manifestation of Russian nationalism and ethnocentrism, which is being replaced by a surrogate version of pan-Slavic cosmopolitanism and chauvinism.

In fact, the presence of blue is also accompanied by a peculiar sensitivity to detecting any shortcomings in the system of political government that are revealed when all "external", mainly foreigners, observe Russian reality (in the history of the country there are enough examples of how much foreigners have done here, for foreigners and for foreigners).

The blue color in this case expresses two attitudes: increased social sensitivity and, at the same time, a pronounced desire for self-sufficiency. For Russian politics (both foreign and domestic), this means the presence of extremes in the form of rejection of open imitation or total suggestion. It is a tendency to display the dichotomy of the choice in favor of an authentic image or total reception. So, when it comes to the development of production technologies, in Russia either foreign models are taken as a basis, or authentic versions of the same technologies are invented. On the other hand, the presence of red gives a great political spontaneity, which, however, does not exclude latent imitation of the political experience of European countries.

A comparison of Russian symbols with the state symbols of Albania requires an analytical consideration of the latter.

The national flag of Albania is represented by a black two-headed eagle on a red cloth. The symbol of the eagle for Albania acts as a totem, i.e. the image of a bird, from which the national hero Skanderberg produced the name of the country.

Any bifurcation (splitting) in the image structure means the loss of integrity, holonomy of consciousness and corresponds to fragmented perception, as well as split thinking. In macroidentity, this corresponds to the recognition of the duality of the religious-philosophical-ideological axiosphere, which correlates with compromises in the field of higher value consciousness, for example, in attempts to combine paganism and Christianity (Orthodoxy), Christianity and Islam (which, with a certain compatibility in monotheism, nevertheless however, they are incompatible in the recognition of the Tri-apostasy of God and in the recognition of the God-man. For Islam with its radical monotheism, the latter generally seems unacceptable.

Given the Byzantine origin of the symbolism of the double-headed eagle, it is also worth taking into account the visualization of dual power, expressed in the symphony of Byzantine caesarepapism. Perhaps this can explain the lack of inquisition and persecution of heretics in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire, since there was no one to pursue, to put it mildly.

Repressive religious censorship, as was the case in the Catholic states, was absent, since this function was performed by state power, so that the priesthood itself turned into a kind of officialdom, and officialdom received part of the priestly prerogatives. The latter, however, did not prevent corruption (which is also built on double standards), as well as the contradiction between unfit laws and the real needs of society.

This situation resembles what happened later and is happening in the states of the Byzantine civilizational macroidentity, including Russia and Albania. It is, on the one hand, about the reproduction of the feeding system in the bureaucratic environment, and on the other hand, about the practice of coups d'etat, which has become a kind of "political fashion", expressing the lack of connection between the interests of the oligarchic establishment and the masses.

For example, as the French historian A. Guillau points out, for many centuries there has been a practice of selling officials' posts. Each official, at least in the highest echelon of the Byzantine bureaucracy, officially bought his position, and later, of course, sought to recoup the money spent in this way due to some additional fees or bribes from the population.

This fact alone, no doubt, indicates the presence of corruption. Another fact that testifies to the corruption of power is a fierce struggle for power during most of Byzantine history, moreover, the struggle was not by political methods, but by force - through a military coup, rebellion or the assassination of the current emperor. So, it was estimated that out of 109 emperors who ruled in Byzantium, 74 ascended the throne by overthrowing or killing their predecessor [Arsh 1965: 78-79].

In the geopolitical positioning of Albania, this was due to Skanderberg's attempt to combine two in one: Islamic and Orthodox Christian identities, as well as the situational adjustment of the country's political elite to the next occupier: from 1443, i.e. years of the struggle against Turkish domination and until 1944 the coat of arms acquired alternately Turkish, Austrian, Greek, Italian and Soviet-Russian details.

"Above the two-headed eagle, either the Skanderberg helmet appeared (after the Zogu monarchist coup in 1928), then two lictor beams and the Savoy crown (during the period of the Italian occupation of 1939-1943), then lightning in the legs of the eagle (in the Austrian manner), then a red pentagram (after the formation of the communist government in Permet in 1944" [Smirnova 2003: 100-211; Bogdani 2007: 30-80; Pearson 2006: 69-111].

After the anti-communist coup, the entire heraldic decor disappears from the coat of arms, and the eagle on the red background of the panel becomes the only macro-identity. The eagle's bifurcation corresponds to Albanian defense militarism in the macro-identity of the state, which is combined with the uncertainty and precariousness of power (in most cases, a two-headed eagle as an image gives the power perception of itself as unstable, shaky, uncertain and forked-split). However, this does not prevent Albanians from displaying militaristic aggression against ethnic groups that do not have pronounced expansionist inclinations.

Conclusions. For the coat of arms of the Russian Federation, the double-headed eagle implies a split macroidentity: Europe in Asia and Asia in Europe, which, in fact, can be considered the main fluctuation of the Russian geopolitical vector. The multi-vector eagle also points to the directions of the Russian superethnos' export, oriented towards expanding the sphere of influence on both the European and Asian heartlands. However, with various peculiarities of ethnogenesis, states that have a double-headed eagle in the coat of arms, in most cases, were objects of hidden cultural or political occupation and at the same time assimilated the peculiarities of the manifestation of aggression of an invader.

In the case of the Russian Federation, we are talking more about hidden cultural occupation, which in the history of the empire led to the separation of state-forming structures from the intellectual layer, which created the basis for the ongoing intellectual (most often pro-Western and pro-American) fermentation and opposition (reaching a frenzied fanatical political terror ) with the inertia and conservatism of political institutions focused on the Asian-Prussian model of quasirepublican statehood.

In the Albanian mentality like this, latent aggression also manifests itself. The history of the originally Serbian Kosovo, which quietly became Albanian, is one of the most striking examples. Using the strategy of creeping demo expansion, the Albanians first implemented a quiet relocation, probing the Serbs for countermeasures, however, the Serbs showed the characteristic Orthodox feminine tolerance. After the number of Albanians exceeded 80% and the question was raised about changing the territorial and political status of Kosovo, S. Milosevic tried to return Kosovo, which a little later ended for Serbia with the guerrilla war of the Albanians [Albanian crisis 2002: 79-95].

The same shakiness is evidenced by the selection of red and black colors of the coat of arms, which indicates self-isolation and self-direction of efforts in the field of military aggression and partisan inclinations, i.e. the strategy and tactics of subversive and terrorist content used both in relation to external aggressors (for example, during the occupation of Albania by Italy and Germany), and in relation to non-assimilable minorities.

One of the autostereotypes used by Hodgist propaganda and expressing a disposition of self- isolated and inconsistent militaristic aggression against Russia (the USSR) was the image of Albania as a "besieged fortress". The autostereotype had an initial geographical conditionality, which, due to the circumstances of the ethno-political humiliation and infringement of Albania by the leadership of N. Khrushchev, grew into the ethnocentric mythology of "ideal socialism" in Albania. The bet on administrative-military technologies for maintaining labor discipline undoubtedly expressed the components of Islamic identity, due to which this very ideology of orthodox purity non-existent in socialism was formed.

It is clear that for the leadership of the USSR the adoption of the Maoist version of socialism meant revisionism in theory and in practice. On the other hand, the very construction of socialism in the USSR was also a kind of deviation in the Marxist canon with its laws of conformity of productive forces and production relations and the possibility of the victory of socialism in the advanced bourgeois societies of Western Europe. Therefore, even for Khoja (as well as for the second "revisionist" - Mao) the primary source of "heresy" was obvious. The bicapitals-eagles were the symbolic indicators of this heresy, expressing the bifurcation of the macroidentity of both Albania and Russia (as the state-forming superethnos of the USSR).

In both cases, both Russia and Albania, the bicapitality of the image of the eagle expresses corrupt practices immanent for revisionist socialism, which stemmed from an attempt to combine quasi-republicanism and quasi-democracy with feudal nepotism and corporate law.

References

1. Албанский фактор кризиса на Балканах: Сборник обзоров и статей / Гуськова Е.Ю. (отв. ред.) (2002). [Albanian crisis factor in the Balkans: Collection of reviews and articles]. Москва: ИНИОН РАН.

2. Арш Г.Л., Сенкевич И.Г., Смирнова Н.Д. (1965) Краткая история Албании [A Brief History of Albania]. Москва: Наука.

3. Гилинский Я. (2004) Девиантология: социология преступности, наркотизма,проституции, самоубийств и других “отклонений” [Deviantology: the sociology of crime, narcotism, prostitution, suicide and other “deviations”]. Санкт-Петербург: Издательство “Юридический центр Пресс”.

4. Павлова-СильванскаяМ.П. (1999) `Три века отечественных реформ' [Three centuries of domestic reforms], Pro et Contra 4 (3): 211-213.

5. Пантин В.И. (1997) Циклы и волны модернизации как феномен социального развития [Cycles and waves of modernization as a phenomenon of social development]. Москва: Московский философский фонд.

6. Романенко Ю.В. (2017) Осевые символы идентичности в государственной атрибутике [Axial symbols of identity in state attributes]. Киев: Меркьюри-Подолье.

7. Смирнова Н.Д. (2003) История Албании в XX веке [History of Albania in the 20th century]. Москва: Наука.

8. Этническая идентичность: социосистемологическое измерение геополитики.

Романенко Ю.В. (ред.-коорд.) (2016) [Ethnic Identity: The Sociological Dimension of Geopolitics]. Киев: Меркьюри-Подолье.

9. Bogdani M., Loughlin J. (2007) Albania and the European Union. London-New York: Oxford University Press.

10. Blumer H. (1935) The Human Side of Social Planning. New York: Univ.-Press.

11. Blumer H. (1937) Social Psychology, Chapter 4 in Emerson. Peter Schmidt (ed.) Man and Society: A Substantive Introduction to the Social Science. New York: Prentice-Hall.

12. Blumer H. (1939) Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences: An Appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki's “The Polish Peasant in Europe and America”. New York: Prentice-Hall.

13. Blumer H. (1969) Symbolic Interaction: Perspective and Method. New Y ork: Prentice-Hall.

14. Joas H. (1993) Pragmatism and Social Theory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

15. Levi-Strauss Claude. (2005) Biography. Dictionary of Literary Biography on Claude Levi- Strauss, <http://www.bookrags.com/biography/claude-levi-strauss-dlb/#gsc.tab=0>

16. Levi-Strauss Claude. (1963) Structural Anthropology. New York: Basic Books.

17. Moore Jerry D. (2009) Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists. Lanham-New York-Toronto: AltaMira Press.

18. Pearson O. (2006) Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History. Vol. III: Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy. From Isolation to the Kosovo War 1946-1998. London-New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

19. Vilinbakhov G. (1998) `The Fate of the Double-Headed Eagle', Moscow Magazine May/June: 28-31.

20. Van Den Heydt V. (1976) Prospects for the Soul: Soundings in Jungian psychology and religion. London: Barton, Longman and Todd.

21. Waal de C. (2005) Albania Today: A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence. London-New York: I.B. Tauris.

22. Weyss N. (1991) `Der Doppeladler Geschichte eines Symbols', Adler Bd. 16 (XXX). Janner/Marz: 78-81.

Размещено на Allbest.ru