David Chandler's analysis of resilience-thinking and political realism in international relations

It seems therefore that both realism and resilience-thinking may work in two different modes: (1) a politicizing/critical mode and (2) a depoliticizing/uncritical one. The first stresses plurality. The second, however, claims to have the best access to `the reality', uses fixed categories, reinforces unaccountable power and reifies a `reality' of permanent crisis.

The EU's turn to resilience-thinking and realism

The European Union has been the most influential international actor that has recently elevated resilience to the status of one of its overarching foreign policy goals. On the other hand, the EU's external action has rarely been considered using the potential of realism to its full; the EU has often seemed to be opposite to and inexplicable for realism (see also [9, p. 442, 444-445]). This makes it challenging -- but promising -- to apply the above comparison between resilience-thinking and realism to the EU's case. As I will try to show, it is possible to connect the EU's turn to resilience and realism. And this is fruitful, as this will contextualize the EU's policies on resilience and relate them to the age-old themes explored within and around realism. Such analysis will help to uncover potential problems of EU policies common to both realism and resilience-thinking.

Since the adoption of the EU's Global Strategy (EUGS), resilience has become one of the `priorities' guiding all of its external action [5, p. 18, 23-28]. In the same context, the EU's discourse has increasingly invoked themes that are close to the realist thinking. It is clear that the EU's practice, as any other political practice, cannot be a simple continuation of theory, either that of resilience or realism. Still, these theories are reflected in large part in the EU's practice and are useful for understanding it.

The EU's optimism has subsided significantly. Among the EUGS's opening statements are: `We live in times of existential crisis', `Our Union is under threat'; the world is said to be `difficult, more connected, contested and complex' [5, p. 13]. According to the main architect of the EUGS, Nathalie Tocci, `[t]he term “resilience” was chosen as a priority for two reasons', one of which `is that it reflected the notion of principled pragmatism' [35, p. 70]. `Principled pragmatism' is connected to combining `a realistic assessment of the strategic environment' and `an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world', and to `engag[ing] the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contingency' [5, p. 16]. Of course, the connections between resilience, on the one hand, and the EU's reduced `optimism', the discourse of `crisis, complexity and a sense of uncertainty', on the other hand, have been recognized in the literature [25, p. 7]. Also, resilience's relations with `principled pragmatism' have been explored (besides Tocci above, see [25; 34, p. 415-416]).

Unfortunately, however, those who have examined these themes have engaged with realism in a rather fragmentary way, at best. Ana Juncos, for instance, simplistically opposes principles and pragmatism in an either/or fashion, and thus reproduces the deadlocked norms-interests dichotomy once again [25, p. 2, 14-15]. She also seems to reduce realism to a `state-centric' approach concerned with `stability' and `security', and she insists `that resilience is not a realist or neo-realist strategy as understood in International Relations theory' [25, p. 12]. Yet, as was argued below, realism need not be reduced to any of these features only. At its deepest, realism has been for ages concerned precisely with how to combine pragmatic considerations and principles, while recognizing that this combination is extremely complicated. Juncos's own discussion of the relations between pragmatism and principles might have gained, had she paid more attention to insights accumulated during the centuries of realist thought. Ironically, Juncos does `rediscover' basically realist themes, yet they are never systematically related by her to realism. Thus, referring to Sven Biscop, she writes about `a turn to “Realpolitik” ' (in the original sense of the term coined by Ludwig von Rochau) [25, p. 11]. Juncos also notes the EU's stress on `responsibility' and `responsible engagement' (see [5, p. 17]) that cannot, of course, guarantee perfect results but that are still preferred to `passivity' [25, p. 9-10]. Finally, Juncos agrees that principled pragmatism is associated with a stress on consequences and with what we can consider as a Weberian ethic of responsibility (see [25, p. 11]). It is clear that all these themes -- i. e., how to engage actively and responsibly with the world, however imperfect it may be -- have long been central to realism.

Other authors note that, in terms of discourse, `the EU has increasingly started thinking about power and competition and in increasingly realist terms' and that it has emphasized the importance of `geopolitical considerations' [36, p. 3]. Cristian Nitoiu and Monika Sus call the EUGS `the most strategic document the EU has ever had' [36, p. 11]. However, their approach risks equating realism with `material power capabilities and geopolitics' [36, p. 4], while realism is not only about material power, let alone geopolitics.

Andrй Barrinha has so far been the only author who consistently applied the ideas of some classical realists to the EU's current external action. Namely, Barrinha used what William Scheuerman called `[progressive realism', which is exemplified by Niebuhr, Morgenthau or John Herz, but also can include those contemporary scholars who revive `the theoretical, political and philosophical sophistication of these classical authors' [9, p. 442-443]. Unfortunately, Barrinha did not analyze the final text of the EUGS and made no reference to resilience.

Now, relating resilience-thinking and realism seems to offer us some substantive insights for studying the EU. Analyses of the EU's turn to resilience need not necessarily be detached from realism. Instead of reinventing the wheel, we can gain from contextualizing the discussion and relating it to the age-old disputes within and around realism. It should be clear that I do not see either resilience-thinking or realism as the best approach in descriptive or normative terms. As we have seen, both have strengths and problems. My point is that reflecting on them allows us to better reflect on the prospective strengths and problems of the EU's external action itself.

The important insights of both resilience-thinking and realism identified above revolve around their critiques of simplistic, optimistic approaches and their stress on the plural aspect of politics. Clearly, the EU's discourse has been moving from its previous optimistic universalist conceptions to the recognition of more complex realities. This recognition is indeed important for the EU now, given the numerous external and internal challenges it is facing. But the successfulness of any actor always depends, almost by definition, on how `realistic' it is. The problem, of course, consists in defining what it means to be `realistic' in practice.

Resilience-thinking obviously privileges plurality in politics. And for realism, as Bar- rinha reminds us, `the need for plurality' (of interests) is important at the international and domestic levels, reflecting both `the diversity of national interests' and `the internal plurality of a given political entity' [9, p. 446]. At the international level, this stress on pluralism may prompt the EU to take more into account the specificities of other players and the need for compromise with them (see also [9, p. 446-447]). According to Chandler and most other theorists, resilience refers to the internal development of every specific system; transformation `needs to come from within; resilience cannot be “given” or “produced” by outside actors', whose leverage over other societies is limited [37, p. 277] (see also [34, p. 424; 25, p. 4]). The EU's discourse partly reflects this recognition; it states that `[Resilience is context-specific, and requires tailor-made approaches' [6, p. 23], and that it `will support different paths to resilience to its east and south' [5, p. 25].

But the theme of plurality is also important for the internal processes within the EU itself. The heterogeneity and contestation which are characteristic of the EU mean that different conceptualizations of resilience may be expected to evolve within it and influence its external action. From a realist perspective, a genuine `grand strategy' could soften the EU's internal `democratic deficit', because such a strategy would imply `a process of permanent self-reflection and critique' on the EU's policies within it [9, p. 449].

On the other hand, the problems of both resilience-thinking and realism identified above also point to practical problems the EU may face. The first range of problems concerns the elements of relativism in both. In normative terms, the plurality that we have explored above contains little in terms of substantively rational criteria which could show which actors the EU should accommodate for the sake of compromises, and which it should not. There is a slippery slope from pragmatism and contextual morality to cynicism, which has long been clear to the critics of realism and which is relevant for the current discussion on resilience. The EU may indeed become subject to `more criticisms of self-interest, selectivity and double standards', which will thwart its `normative' image and thus also the effectiveness of its policies [25, p. 2].

The second range of problems revolves around the contradiction in realism and resilience-thinking between the modesty of assuming limitations to knowledge and their claim to be `more realistic' than other approaches. Both realism and resilience-thinking raise the problem of how governance is possible when the world has been declared to a large degree beyond understanding and control. This contradiction will likely play out between the EU's respect for pluralism and attempts to impose its own templates. Despite its discourse, the EU may still be tempted to promote its fixed understanding of resilience as a single `correct' one. Or it may simply view resilience as a more `realistic' (and cheaper) new instrument to promote its old universalist agenda. This agenda, as many authors show, has not been entirely abandoned (see, e. g., [25; 34]). Resilience thus may lose its critical potential and be used in a depoliticized/uncritical mode as a mere tool for an uncritical and unreflective promotion of the EU's norms. However, in either case, this will provoke concerns on the part of external actors. And this will hardly be realistic in the end, given that resilience cannot be brought ready-made to other societies. Moreover, the uncritical use of resilience will mean not only that the EU will not heed the critical voices of external actors, but also that its internal democratic deficit will exacerbate as it will not listen to domestic critiques of and be accountable for its policies on resilience.

Finally, both realism and resilience-thinking may be used to assume as self-evident and unchanging a reality of permanent crisis, thus foreclosing the possibilities for cooperation and change. This may serve as an excuse for the EU to give up attempts at compromises and at the resolution of the root causes of social problems. Blame for these problems will be laid on their victims themselves. This will be thus an excuse for the EU's lack of responsibility, both internationally and internally (see also [34, p. 419-421]).

Conclusion

We have identified some affinities between resilience-thinking, as analyzed by David Chandler, and political realism. The stress of resilience, as a novel conception, on the complexity of the contemporary world is very important, yet, it is possible and indeed useful to contextualize it and relate it, if in part, to the age-old concerns of the realist tradition.

Some of the strengths and problems that we identified in resilience-thinking and realism show that both may be used in two modes, a politicizing/critical and a depoliticizing/ uncritical one. In the first mode, the theme of plurality and modesty will be foregrounded, as discussed when we noted the strengths of these approaches. In the second mode, resilience-thinking and realism will suffer from the weaknesses that we discussed as the second and the third range of problems, which deal with the claim to know the `reality' best, the use of fixed categories, the irresponsibility, and the reification of an understanding of reality as a permanent crisis. The identification of these two modes is not surprising. They largely coincide with two broad strands that we find in both the literature on resilience and on realism. Resilience is understood either as an uncritical/depoliticizing ideology or as a notion that may be used in various ways, including critical/politicizing. Realism is also subject to either criticisms as an apologia of power and stasis, or to more nuanced approaches that find critical/politicizing elements in it. In this article, we have tried to approach both resilience-thinking and realism as rich theories that, at least potentially, have strengths. But, of course, the criticisms addressed to them cannot be ignored, as these theories risk being used in an uncritical/depoliticizing mode, including in political practice.

Moreover, we have identified another vulnerability in both theories. It concerns elements of relativism discussed as the first range of problems. Even if resilience-thinking (at least as analyzed by Chandler) or realism are used in a critical/politicizing mode stressing pluralism, they offer few substantively rational criteria for deciding which actions it is normatively acceptable -- and indeed realistic in the long run -- to take, and which it is not. To be sure, many advocates of realism and resilience will sincerely choose the acceptable and effective course, but their approaches will still be subjective. Both approaches risk therefore being used in attempts to transform pluralism into destructive conflict and/or normative arbitrariness. And the subjective/relativist elements in both also make it very hard to predict how they will be used in political practice, as the EU's example will likely show in the future. We may only explore general problems and prospects that will likely emerge in different scenarios, such as those that we outlined regarding the EU.

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