Inclusion of the republic of Korea in the US defense perimeter after the Korean war

The American foreign policy establishment discussed further steps in regard to Syn- gman Rhee. Briggs described the situation as “disquieting and dangerous”. The CIA admitted that all the actions of the president of ROK could be nothing but the attempts to exert psychological pressure on the United States, but it called to take into account a high probability of irrational conduct as Rhee was in such an “agitated mood” South Korea NSC Briefing. 1954. October, 5. URL: (accessed: 13.09.20l9).. There were even suggestions to overthrow this unreliable ally (Everready plan) Tae Guyn Park. What Happened Sixty Years Ago? P. 50. See also: Sadakov D. A. For the extreme case: USA, Syngman Rhee and the «Everready» operation in the Korean war (1952-1953) // Perm University Herald. History. 2018. Issue 4. P. 40-49.. However, milder options were usually discussed. According to Briggs, there were many influential Koreans who would not willingly follow Rhee's “intemperate leadership” at the cost of the United States' friendship and support. The ambassador also highlighted the fact that Syngman Rhee was sensitive to the US opinion and influenced by it, thus he recommended that the United States should be clear about its opinion on current matters and make it public, and that it should be done without taking Rhee's interests into account: it was Rhee's responsibility to extricate himself FRUS. 1952-1954. Vol. XV, part 2. P. 1890-1891..

Briggs reminded that Rhee's anti-American campaign was actually unopposed on the peninsula. At his initiative, at the end of the year, Information Policy Coordination Committee was created, which consisted of representatives of all American agencies that provided economic and information support to Korea. The purpose of this body was to provide adequate coverage of American aid programs and help maintain the armistice agreement Ibid. P. 1890-1891, 1944; Jooyoung Lee. Making Democracy Korean: American Ideals and South Korean State-Building. 1919-1960: PhD Diss. Providence, 2012. P. 168..

On October 6, at a meeting of the NSC, Dulles stated that Syngman Rhee was becoming more and more unreasonable and cantankerous. The members of the Council, nevertheless, did not see any particular threats about his nervous demarches and, as it was suggested by Secretary Wilson, decided “to go slow in this matter” not to aggravate the situation Secretary Wilson was the President of General Motors corporation in 1941-1953 and was experienced in this sphere.. Governor Stassen, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, agreed that Rhee's actions could hurt South Korea more than it would hurt the United States and offered the Council members to wait when the Korean understood this themselves. There was general agreement by other members FRUS. 1952-1954. Vol. XV, part 2. P. 1892.. On the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded instructions to General Hull which ordered to be patient, to maintain security and prevent provocations, to ensure that the ROK observed the armistice terms, and to continue the process of redeployment of US armed forces from the peninsula Ibid. P. 1893-1894..

Meanwhile, Syngman Rhee tried to get the provisions of the Agreed Minute to be reconsidered so as to reduce the commitments of the Republic of Korea and to expand the US commitments Yong-Pyo Hong. State Security and Regime Security. P. 76.. On October 22, he made another unexpected move, handing Briggs the radically changed redraft of the Minute, which reproduced all the suggestions previously rejected by the Americans, including proposal that the US would support unification of Korea by any means, “even by force”. Briggs recommended that these proposals should be declared unacceptable at an earliest possible date FRUS. 1952-1954. Vol. XV, part 2. P. 1899.. The Secretary of State was of the same opinion Ibid. P. 1906-1907..

On October 29, Syngman Rhee had a meeting with Briggs. In response to the lengthy statement of the Korean leader about the imperfection of the Agreed Minute of understanding, the ambassador pointed out that the American position was firm, and that they were unwilling to change anything in the document. The parties discussed the problems of the exchange rate, economic cooperation, normalization of the Japanese-Korean relations and the activities of the Supervisory Commission. No specific agreements were reached Ibid. P. 1908-1910.. However, the next day Pyun sent a letter to Dulles, in which Rhee's lengthy rhetoric crystallized in two requests: to remove the phrase “by all peaceful means” from the article on US support for unification of Korea and the phrase “in violation of the armistice” from the American undertaking to protect South Korea in case of unprovoked aggression from the north Ibid. P. 1915..

Having studied the suggested changes, Dulles asked Briggs to remind Rhee and Pyun that more than third current fiscal year had passed In 1954, the fiscal year in the United States started on July 1. This existed until 1976, when the beginning of the fiscal year was moved to October 1, and the end of it, respectively, to September 31 of the following year., and their refusal to agree with the Agreed Minute cost their country millions of dollars. Briggs had to inform the Koreans that if they failed to reach an agreement on the Minute in the near future, the Department of State would have to inform the Congress that the developed aid program could not be implemented. He also pointed out that the Minute was regarded as package, and that it must be dealt as whole without negotiating its separate parts. Dulles also informed Briggs that the maximum concession the United States could make would be a complete exclusion from the document of the article on US undertaking to support Korea unification by peaceful means FRUS. 1952-1954. Vol. XV, part 2. P. 1915..

On November 8, 1954, a meeting attended by General Hull, General Taylor, Briggs, and Wood was held in Tokyo. The participants agreed that US-Korea relations were in an unsatisfactory state and outlined a plan that consisted of four series of actions to influence Syngman Rhee; the choice of them depended on how serious the situation would be. The first of them, the mildest one, was to be applied in the event of Rhee's further refusal to sign the Agreed Minute. It included reducing the supply of strategic goods and slowing down military and economic aid programs. If the situation deteriorated, the Americans would continue to cut aid, to establish contacts with the political opponents of South Korea, and to accelerate gradual withdrawal of their specialists from the country. This would culminate in the withdrawal of American military advisers from Korea. The authors of the plan considered that the action described in Series 1 should be implemented immediately Ibid. P. 1911-1913.. Briggs reminded that over 4 months had passed, and it was highly desirable to bring the developed aid programs to action, so it was necessary to resolve disagreement as soon as possible Ibid. P. 1915..

As early as on November 14 it became clear that US diplomatic efforts were finally having an effect. Pyun invited Briggs and said that he was leaving for New York on November 16 to participate in the UN General Assembly, but first he wanted to close the issue of signing the Agreed Minute. He confirmed that his government's claims were only limited to two points that he had reported to Dulles in his letter of 30 October. After that, the parties were able to quickly clarify their position and amend the wording approved of by both Dulles and Syngman Rhee FRUS. 1952-1954. Vol. XV, part 2. P. 1917-1918; Yong-Pyo Hong. State Security and Regime Security. P. 77..

The change in the attitude of the South Korean president, according to Briggs, was explained by his desire to win the support of the United States at the UN General Assembly. The domestic political situation had also had an effect: Rhee was going to pass off the settlement of the foreign policy questions with the Americans as his victory, which could strengthen his position in the parliament before voting on important amendments to the constitution. Furthermore, this time he had to face a really uncompromising opinion of the American politicians and chose to step back. At the same time, he might still act unexpectedly, so Briggs advised to monitor the Koreans' compliance with the Minute carefully Ibid. P. 1920-1921..

As soon as on November 17 these fears were confirmed. At another meeting with Briggs, Rhee suddenly returned to the rhetoric that he had used for the past four months, giving a long speech and reiterating all principal objections against the Minute and, finally, yielding on almost everything except two new points. He intended to add to the American commitment on support for peaceful unification of the country his own statement to proceed unilaterally if it was necessary at a later date. Briggs objected that this action would violate the Agreed Minute due to ROK position on cooperation toward unification set forth in the document, and an attempt to revise this section would lead to new delays in signing the document Ibid. P. 1922.. Rhee also declared his intention of making public appeal to nation to establish the exchange rate for hwan at 180 to 1. He added he would permit US to exchange for military needs at any rate they would consider fair but that the rate should be kept secret. In response, Briggs reminded that this proposal would also violate the provisions of the Agreed Minute. Interestingly, Pyun and Sohn (Defense Minister) who were present at the meeting tried to persuade their president to accept the terms of the Americans. They later expressed relief and satisfaction with the agreement and told Briggs that they were aware of Rhee's fantastic views on economy Ibid. P. 1922-1923..

Finally, President Rhee agreed with the American position on all points. As Yong-Pyo Hong points out, the disappointment of many South Koreans, who had previously supported their president's tough policies in regard to Americans, played a significant role. The reason for the change in public opinion was the growing awareness that Rhee's actions jeopardized implementation of US aid programs to Korea Yong-Pyo Hong. State Security and Regime Security. P. 78..

The initialing and exchange notes ceremony was held on November 17. According to Briggs, it went off smoothly and in the atmosphere of marked good will FRUS. 1952-1954. Vol. XV, part 2. P. 1923.. The final Agreed Minute included the following provisions: economic and military programs of up to $ 700,000,000 in the current fiscal year, expansion of ROK forces to 720,000 personnel, but it committed the ROK to some measures and cooperation for the effective carrying out of these programs. Instruments of ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK were also exchanged on November 17 Ibid. P. 1944..

In 1953-1954 the US-Korea relations developed in the context of conflict. While the goal of the Americans was to stabilize the situation on the peninsula and create a security system in northeast Asia, the Koreans, primarily, sought to restore the unity of the country. In 1954, it was not easy to reconcile these priorities.

There was a gap of a year and thirty-seven days between the signing of the US-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty and its entry into force. While the strategic guidelines of the ROK leadership remained practically the same throughout this period, for the United States, it was the time of updating the doctrinal foundations of the entire foreign policy course. In the summer and early autumn of 1953, the Mutual Defense Treaty was considered in Washington an instrument of pacification for Syngman Rhee (who was, according to Eisenhower, an “unsatisfactory ally”), but starting in November (CNS 170/1), it was seen as an important element of the Far East US security policy. Within its framework, South Korea was assigned a role of a special link that had a continental front line with the communist world.

The bilateral relations along the Washington-Seoul line throughout this time was part of a long-term American policy in this region, which was clearly manifested in a sequence of interrelated events: March 8, 1954 -- Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement; September 8, 1954 -- Manila Pact which actually established SEATO; November 17, 1954 -- an Agreed US-South Korean Minute that brought the Mutual Defense Treaty and economic and military aid programs into effect; December 2, 1954 -- the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Taiwan-based Republic of China.

The American-South Korean dialogue at the end of 1953 and 1954 was characterized by both internal tension and a dynamic sequence of events largely brought into the negotiation process by the personal qualities of the South Korean President Syngman Rhee. Washington was aware that the leader of the Republic of Korea was a power-hungry nationalist, whose rule could hardly contribute to economic prosperity and democracy in the country. However, he was a consistent anti-communist and this was of decisive importance for the Eisenhower administration in 1954 See: Divine R. A. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York, 1981. P. 33-34.. He had many admirers among the US leadership who were ready to close their eyes to the fact that a significant part of the American aid would support the authoritarian regime.

It is interesting that as South Korea was included into the geostrategic programs of the United States, American politicians and diplomats forgot about the arguments regarding the inability of the South Korean economy to provide for the modern army of many thousands. In 1954, the Eisenhower administration was primarily concerned with strengthening its “defense perimeter”, so to achieve this goal, the army of 720,000 people did not seem to be an unbearable burden either for the economy of South Korea or for the US budget.

Being totally dependent on the Americans in the military and economic spheres, Syngman Rhee was forced to yield on the main thing: he agreed to adhere to the terms of the armistice. The Korean president's list of counter-claims included creation of the

US-Korean alliance and implementation of economic and military aid programs. Having made some concessions regarding all the points, the United States managed to create sufficient counterbalance to restrain Syngman Rhee: they established control over the South Korean military forces; assigned broad authority to the Economic Coordinator of aid programs; had considerable armed forces on the territory of Korea. The Republic of Korea was included in the US regional security system on the terms of the Americans.

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