The Slow Motion Train Crash of the Eurozone Monetary Alchemy

Cryptocurrencies

Alternative currencies such as bitcoin appeared as new competitors to the fiat currencies. Still, there are controversies regarding bitcoins and similar options. A currency should be a unit of account, medium of exchange and a store of value. If the price of any asset changes about 10 % or more a day, is it a currency? So,

“anything that is so volatile cannot be a satisfactory unit of account. It is itself stable so you can't measure other values against it. It can be a medium of exchange but you would have to fix the transaction price instantly, and in any case the capacity of even an established cryptocurrency to handle a mass of transactions is limited. As for store of value, well, it clearly isn't” McRae H. Cryptocurrencies are about to become worthless -- and this is what will happen when they crash. The Independent. 21 November 2018..

Such speculative cryptocurrencies are ideal assets to money launderers, criminals and terrorists.

The supply of bitcoins is limited. A growing economy needs more money. As there is no central bank to step in during inevitable crisis, bitcoins would create an unattractive deflation. In addition,

“although Bitcoin is perceived as the currency of the future, it is in fact, like gold, a currency of the past. The contrast with modern money is striking. Modern money is also called `fiat money' because it is made from nothing. Of course, the production of paper money costs a lot, but we use less and less of it. Instead we use more and more electronic money by making payments with debit and credit cards. Electronic money is produced with minimal use of scarce resources. As the cost of communication continues to decrease, the use of electronic money will become even cheaper in terms of resources needed to produce it. In this sense electronic money, not Bitcoin, is the money of the future. There is indeed a potential problem with fiat money. Because its production is so cheap, there is the danger that too much of it is produced. That then leads to inflation. However, since the 1990s, many central banks have followed a policy of strict inflation targeting. And that has proved very successful. It has ensured that annual inflation has remained close to 2 percent in the last 30 years in most industrialized countries. In the US, for example, average yearly inflation was 2.35 % from 1990 to 2017” Grauwe P. de. Bitcoin is not the currency of the future. Social Europe. 11 January 2018..

As long as the “independent” central banks are under political or industry pressure, or even worse, privatised by private banks, the public needs to worry that private business interests would take primacy over interest of the general public and taxpayers.

A banker or a financial consultant may take you for a ride by saying says: “This paper or this cryptocurrency is a superb investment for you, but it is too complicated for you to understand (and me to explain). Just give me your money and be delighted about splendid investment you made”. There is golden advice to the potential investors in various (toxic) “financial papers” or electronic transactions: “If you do not understand it, do not buy it”.

Where to Go from Here? To Gold?

Collapses of the international monetary system take place almost every thirty years. We are limping towards the end of the useful life of the current one. One is witnessing volatility, confusion and suboptimal performance of the economy since 2007. The financial structure that existed prior to 2007 is over, but the new system is not yet in place. The new systemic collapse is approaching. “The United States is not getting the growth it needs to pay the debt. Derivatives are piling up, the banks control Washington, and the financial system is falling. Gold is the only sensible insurance in this state of affairs” [Rickards, 2016, p. 70]. No matter its flaws, money based on gold would restore financial and monetary order. This may not happen very fast, as those that have political levers, i.e. politicians that have the money printing press and that are controlled by private bankers, would not give up. Gold would not let them opportunity to manipulate as they do with the fiat-money alchemy Fiat money and various financial/banking innovations (toxic documents for massive economic destruction) permit Ponzi schemes and various “bubbles”. The bubble burst when there are no new buyers of the offered asset, i. e. when the last guest arrives at the birthday party to find out that all the cakes have already been eaten.. In any case, the new currency may likely be something tangible, exchangeable and permanent, not fiat money that may soon have the value of the confetti.

Let us refer to the Constitution of the US and its Section 10 -- “Powers prohibited of States” which reads (emphasis MJ):

“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and

Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in

Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation

of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility”.

Hence, the recognition of value and importance of precious metals as the only legal tenders in the US. The only real money is gold (and sliver), the rest is just credit. If a national legal tender becomes accepted as an international currency, then it is used in international trade and finance in a much wider area than is the reach of its original central bank.

Bitcoin and gold have, however, a few similarities. Both exist in rather limited quantities; neither generates any revenue; and both are searched by investors that worry about the depreciating value of the dollar, euro or other fiat currencies.

Some argue against the use of gold as a currency. Their strong arguments include the following ones: (a) investment in gold is old fashioned; (b) gold does not bring interest; (c) gold has a deflationary bias; (d) there are important storage and transportation costs.

Those advocates are the ones that have faith in the fiat money and related financial manipulations “Markets are manipulated by special interests. For instance, JPMorgan Chase set aside $1 billion on legal reserves in 2014 because of possible hefty penalties over allegations that it manipulated the foreign

exchange market” [Braithwaite T., Hall C. JPMorgan sets aside $1bn to cover cost of penalties for market manipulation. Financial Times, 15 October 2014].

“Furthermore, the Swiss UBS paid $1.5 billion to the American, British and Swiss regulators as a fine for the manipulation of interbank lending rates” [Masters B., Binham C., Burgis T. UBS pays price for epic scandal. Financial Times, 20 December 2012].

“Or Standard Chartered set aside $900 million in 2019 to cover potential fines in the US and Britain” [Weinland D., White E. Standard Chartered sets aside $900m for fines in US and UK. Financial Times, 21 February 2019].. Counter arguments include that:

• the gold standard system is simple, direct and understandable to all (the eurozone rules are not only complicated, but also they are applied in an arbitrary way);

• gold protects value in the long term as it is rare, divisible (without any loss in value) and durable;

• gold does not rust;

• gold is trusted, especially during crisis and in the long term;

• gold cannot be stolen by hackers;

• once central bankers are deprived from their unlimited fiat money printing authority, manipulations with fiat money shall be replaced by the use of intellectual and other resources towards innovations in technology Rather than being employed by the banks to create and manipulate models there on how to `steal' money from others, the best talents from mathematics, physics or management would be employed in the real economy to create there, for instance, new and more efficient energy systems (batteries, solar panels, reduction in CO2 emissions...), improved management of transport and the like., production and better management, towards productivity that creates real, not paper wealth which ultimately creates disorder and chaos for the 99 % of the society.

With hard money (gold) in place, corporations will have to compete and compete hard with their products and services, not with their influence on those that have the button in the money-printing press. With fiat money, governments and lobbies may go into war (the US is constantly in wars since 2001) in a much simpler way than would be the case with hard money. Easy money permits wars for which future taxpayers would foot the bill for generations. With hard money, governments would go to war when it is really necessary.

Men in the street normally have a poor idea about the role and operations of central banks. This is compounded by Delphic speeches by central bankers such as Alan Greenspan. Few could understand his ambiguous speeches about the fiat-money related financial alchemy. Gold is different. It is timeless, tangible and the same everywhere (which is not the case with, for instance, iron ore of crude oil). While gold has its eternal intrinsic value, i.e. melt value, fiat money is a currency without its intrinsic value. It is created from thin air. The value of fiat money is either established by the government regulation or by the agreement of the parties that use it. The gold standard would turn (central) banking from monetary manipulations into what it needs to be: boring.

If gold is a “barbarous relict” and old fashioned, then there is one “killer question” for the proponents of such ideas. If gold is of marginal importance or irrelevant, why don't you sell all your gold to the Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Russians, Kazakhs, Turks or Hungarians? Many of them, especially the Chinese and others in Asia, would be delighted to pay for it in fiat money (to move away from dollars and euros). In addition, why is almost the entire US gold hoard located on military bases (Fort Knox Fort Knox, constructed in 1937, was to hold the gold confiscated from the US citizens from 1933 [Rickards, 2012, p. 72]. in Kentucky and West Point in New York) rather than in civilian bank vaults [Rickards, 2012, p. 34]? China, Russia, India Women and temples in India are supposed to be the biggest private hoarders of approximately 22.000 tons of gold. This was collected over centuries. Demand for gold (jewelry) in India is high especially during the wedding season. A as matter of comparison, there are about 4.600 tons of gold in Fort Knox. and others are constantly adding to their gold stocks. These countries in the East are preparing not only for the post-euro, but also for the post-dollar financial world. The further East one goes from the US, the more there is demand for gold. When there is a currency crash, those that have gold have the best life-saving financial boats.

If the value and/or the future of a fiat money, especially international one, is in question, then both borrowers, lenders and savers alike normally chose to avoid such a currency. If the crisis is looming, then the risk-averse holders of such a currency would prefer to get rid of it.

There is also a fundamental difference in attitude towards gold between investors in Asia and the ones in the West. While the western investors use their dollars to buy gold in order to resell it when the price of gold increases (they get back more of their dollars), Asian investors buy gold in order to save and to store value. They have less confidence in fiat monies.

Conclusions

The euro is the crown jewel in the EU integration project. No similar currency circulated throughout Europe since the times of the Roman Empire. Measured by adoption, expansion and official political support, the eurozone is a great success. However, there are other and more important measures of success. Growth (or the lack of it), transformation of the economy and democracy (Draconian `ruling' of Greece by the Troika) are those yardsticks. At the same time, the euro is the EU's weakest link. It needs a substantial federal-type overhaul if it is to survive. Uncertainty about its future and the impact on the whole EU and beyond is paramount. There are contingency plans in the preparation for the eventual split of the EU Khan S. Brexit: Macron warns Europe could split after Britain leaves EU and calls for unity. The Independent. 5 January 2018; Rankin J. Jean-Claude Juncker: EU is facing existential crisis. The Guardian. 13 September 2016; K. von Hammerstein. Militдrplaner halten Zerfall der EU fьr denkbar. Der Spiegel. 4 November 2017; Mason P. The Germans are making contigency plans for the collapse of Europe. Let's hope we are too. The Guardian. 6 November 2017; The EU existential crisis was analysed by [Sidjanski, 2018]..

The properties of a well-functioning economy are clear and well known. They are a rapid economic growth the benefits of which are shared widely in a society (solidarity) and there is low unemployment [Stiglitz, 2016, p. 5]. The results of the two decades of the operation of the eurozone are just the opposite. There are too many losers and too few winners. Is it worth continuing with such an important, but a vanity political elite-sponsored project or would it be better to dissolve it, lick wounds and try something superior?

In spite of great hopes and political support, the eurozone has been a failure “The euro crisis was yet another very bitter chapter in the history of the failures of financial capitalism” [Fricke, 2019, p. 51].. It failed to deliver growth and it contributed to various discords. As for the eurozone architecture, “the euro was a system almost designed to fail. It took away governments' main adjustment mechanisms (interest and exchange rates); and, rather than creating new institutions to help countries cope with the diverse situations in which they find themselves, it imposed new strictures -- often based on discredited economic and political theories -- on deficits, debt, and even structural policies” Stiglitz J. Can the Euro Be Saved? Project Syndicate. 13 June 2018..

The initial diversity among the eurozone countries, both economic, institutional and behavioural were great and unfriendly with monetary integration. One-size-fits-all eurozone policies without the supporting institutions (federal budget managed by a minister, fiscal transfers to the ones in trouble [automatic stabilisers], banking union with a common insurance of deposits, fiscal rules, common bonds, dispute resolution mechanism and political union) which economic theory and rich experience propose, had no great chances for success. Still, the EU patrician elite was apathetic to warnings by economists. If the eurozone wants to survive in the longer term those suggestions by economists need to be supplemented by the abandoning of the existing fiscal rules that choke growth and by changing ECB mandate to include economic growth and fight against unemployment (the current mandate is to keep inflation low).

It is hard to find one positive economic effect which the eurozone can provide now or in a decade to come. Some would argue that the gain may be found in the ease with which travellers may make payments; of course, only those whom have enough euros to travel (many tourists are taking only short holidays). Others would argue that the gain may be found in the simplicity in trade, while others would argue that this easing in trade is the problem itself as countries traded too much, i.e. southern EU countries imported too much because loans were cheap. Germany was the principal exporter of goods and capital and the eurozone “worked well” until the importing countries could service their debt. This could not last forever.

In spite of serious troubles the euro survived and it expanded its coverage. Still, the greatest eurozone success is that it has survived by now, although at a huge cost in terms of growth and employment in most participants. However, there is a big difference between surviving and surviving well. Inflation was low and under control, but many would change low inflation for real economic growth. There was a cost of eurozone paid by most participants (bar Germany): austerity, low or no real growth, divergence in living standards, crisis, unemployment and contempt of principles of representative democracy.

At the celebration of the 20^th anniversary of the eurozone, Jean-Claude Junker, the President of the European Commission, said:

“For 20 years, the euro has delivered prosperity and protection to our citizens. It has become a symbol of unity, sovereignty and stability, and we must ensure it continues. 'Thus spoke JeanClaude Juncker, president of the European Commission, in `celebration' this week of the 20th anniversary of the adoption in synthetic form of Europe's single currency” Warner J. The dismal euro will stagger on and condemn Europe to further disaster. The Telegraph. 3 January 2019..

One may really admire his sense of humour. There were no celebrations by the general public. Anywhere, a currency needs to be organised around the economy in order to serve it, not the other way around as is currently the case with the euro. Automatic intercountry fiscal transfers are essential for the currency union to work. This federal instrument is absent in the eurozone. The eurozone as we know it is almost finished. The new one is not yet emerging. However, the next (imminent) financial crisis will be the test of make it or break it. The triggers may be various and many. One may be the failure of the insolvent Deutsche Bank which is kept together by the scotch tape A rescue financial package from Qatar in February 2019 may just postpone the debacle.. Hard choices need to be made. What will come out of it is anybody's guess. Nonetheless, one thing is certain: the outcome will not be glorious.

Many believed that a common currency was unthinkable in Europe some three decades ago. It looked like a pie in the sky. Still, it happened. Many think that fiscal and political unions are impossible now. Political will and commitment (if they exist) may prove them wrong and may avoid turning Maastricht into Arnhem (air distance 127 km). No matter how the eurozone crisis ends, it will not be happy. The final message from this article is that, in spite of gloom and doom, some hesitant optimism about the future of the reformed eurozone is justified, with an emphasis on `hesitant, however, as time passes by, these federalist hopes evaporate Applying purely economic analysis and theory, [Jovanovic, 1997, p. 68] was strongly in favour of monetary integration in the EU; however, he was quite sceptical ab out its structure and actual implementation in the future as set in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). He argued in favour of the postponement of the implementation of the eurozone. The eurozone was missing from the outset other necessary federal elements for long-term operational success: automatic stabilisers, eurozone bonds, rescue funds, fiscal transfers and strong fiscal coordination. Jovanovic was wrong because he underrated at that time the strongest political commitment and determination to implement the eurozone as it was set by politicians in Maastricht. Is Jovanovic this time overrating EU leaders' political commitment, will and funds?.

Economic performance of the eurozone has been a great disappointment for most of the participating countries. The euro has been overvalued for most of its member countries which hampered exports. The objective of the euro was to stimulate growth and provide certain stability, however it became a dysfunctional currency that created troubles chaos and a currency with unhappy and uncertain future. Rather than fostering growth and certain economic convergence among the participating countries, the euro “has fostered divergence among its member countries thus leading to the underperformance of the euro area and undermining its resilience to external shocks” [Bagnai, Granville, Mon- geau Ospina, 2017, p. 524].

There exists a consensus about the dysfunctional structure of the eurozone. Having this diagnosis is important, but there is a discord on the way to resolve the problem: the Germans and a few thrifty others argue in favour of strict application of the existing rules, while many others such as French or Italians are in favour of relaxing those statutes.

The eurozone was supposed to serve the Europeans and to provide them with a brighter economic future. Now, the Europeans are asked to serve and save the eurozone, i. e. to accept lower wages, higher taxes and reduction in social benefits (yellow vest protestors). Is this the promising way forward for the eurozone?

Fiat currencies are not forever. The longest surviving ones and shining exceptions are the US dollar, the pound sterling and the Swiss franc. The possible dissolution of the eurozone would not be the end of the world. It would just return the EU where it was in 1992, hence one needs to prepare for the post-eurozone EU. If federal-type reforms are not belatedly implemented, it may be better to leave the eurozone and save whatever could be saved in the EU.

I am grateful to Eric Fiechter, Zeynep Kaplan, Jovan Njegic, Marko Malovic, Patrick Minford, Sergei Sutyrin and two anonymous referees for their comments, assistance and suggestions. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the institutions for which I work. I am solely responsible for all errors and mistakes.

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