The nature of the armed conflict in the donbas: a postnonclassical viewpoint

As Shufang Wu from Central China Normal University (PRC) argues:

“Democracy has also become a component of Chinese culture ever since the early 20th century. Although the development of democracy has lagged far behind that of science and the progress of economic development, it has been rooted in the soil of Chinese society and is comprehensively admired by Chinese people, especially liberal intellectuals” (Wu 2015: 191).

That is why any analysis of cultural roots of a conflict, either civil or international, should take into consideration the development of democracy with regard to the concerned parties' political regimes.

Yue Yin draws attention to the fact that “direct democracy with Chinese characteristics” occupies an important and independent position in public perceptions of democracy in China, which reveals the limitation in using the binary categories “guardianship” vs. “liberal democracy” to explore what is on the minds of Chinese citizens when they think about democracy (Yue 2018).

I argue that fundamental principles of modern Western society, such as pluralism and the rule of law, have their traditional conformities among core values of the Chinese and broader Confucian social culture, although in substantially converted forms (Marmazov & Piliaiev 2018).

In contrast to Confucianism where there is no fundamental difference between ours and others, since relationships with all require harmonization, in the Western

discourse of the Alien (Other), the imperative of harmonizing relations is absent. Moreover, relations with the Other imply permanent conflict due to the immanent insolubility of the deep contradictions of identity, a certain estrangement in relations, distrust of a partner acting in the status of the “Other”--such a Protestant value- civilizational approach especially manifested in the concept of the “Other” developed by Norwegian political scientist Iver Neumann (1999), is especially characteristic of the Protestant worldview (conceptual and doctrinal thinking). Such (permanent or wavy) forcing tension in relations with the Other implies corresponding doctrines, such as brinkmanship, nuclear deterrence, containment, etc. (practiced, for example, in the US- USSR relations).

The fundamental problem for settling the strategic conflicts of value in Eurasia is the conviction of Western exceptionalism.

Olena Lyubchenko, while living in multicultural and ethnically tolerant Canada, has researched the substantial interaction between pro-Western liberals and the anti- Russian radical right forces during and after the victory of Euromaidan rally protests in Ukraine. She posits that within Carl Schmitt's classic friend-enemy mental distinction, which is “no longer geographically defined, those who have not embraced `Europe' for ideological or socio-economic reasons are deemed irretrievably backward and, virtually, ethnically different” (Lyubchenko 2017: 54). Such an essentialized and, ultimately, irrationalized cultural argument refutes and delegitimizes any opposite opinion with regard to national geopolitical choice, economic policy or cultural policy.

To our mind, the lack of progress in settling the Ukraine crisis is just due to the dominance in Western, Ukrainian and Russian political discourse of the culturally Alien (Other), relations with whom are doomed to conflict because of antagonistic values. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, since the conflict with Russia, “New Orientalism” is growing (Lyubchenko 2017) delegitimizing the “East” from the cultural standpoint as the Europe's OtherCarl Schmitt in probably his most influential work titled The Concept of the Political (first published in 1932) grounds his conception of state sovereignty (or autonomy) upon the friend-enemy distinction. The latter is to be determined subjectively, "existentially", i.e. the enemy is whoever may be “the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible." (Schmitt 2007: 27). This concept was further developed by contemporary Norwegian political scientist Iver Brynild Neumann (1999)..

Predominantly inter-ethnic (including ethno-linguistic) or inter-confessional conflicts are characterized by confrontation between traditional ethnic or religious identities (which are, as a rule, rather stable for many generations) and their corresponding values. By contrast, mainly ideological (ideationally) value conflicts are characterized by “fluidity”, vagueness, hybrid identity and opposition of ideological values (dependent on propaganda, information wars and manipulations), primarily relating to the population's political, historical and cultural orientations and preferences.

Serhy Yekelchyk (2015: 20) points out that the three-fourths of Ukraine outside of its westernmost part are “diverse and fluid”. In fact, it is difficult to say something about a Ukrainian until you know how he feels about Russia as his country's historically main “Other”.

Paradoxes are also associated with the Ukrainian “Piedmont”-Western Ukraine's historical land of Halychyna (Galicia), which is traditionally considered to be the region of the “most conscious Ukrainians” and the bastion of Ukrainian ethno-nationalism. Nevertheless, in this region, as in most other regions of Western Ukraine, there have never been any Cossacks or Hetmans-who have historically been the main actors and symbols of the Ukrainian ethno-national and state identity (moreover, the Hetmanate is probably the principal cornerstone of the Ukrainian political and state construction), a kind of “reference point” for the formation of the Ukrainian ethnic nation and state-building. Also, if compared with the central part of Ukraine (Naddniprianschina-literally “lands on the Dnipro”), those regions transitioned much later from the Ruthenian to the Ukrainian ethnic identity and language (in practice, this happened there only in the first half of the 20th century).

As Verena Fritz (2006: 114-115) posits: “The eastern part of Ukraine, the central part and the western part of the country have great differences in economic structure, proportion of ethnic population and historical and cultural memory. This has led to a large burden on the country's nation-construction process after independence, and it is difficult for the Ukrainian national identity to seek common ground.”

A vision absolutizing the political significance of some natural, historical or cultural frontiers (borders) and striving to draw some symbolic and distinct dividing line in Ukraine is characteristic of some European (especially Polish) and North American political scientists (Huntington 1996; Katchanovski 2006; Petro 2015: 31; Wolchik & Zviglyanich 1999; Zajgc 2016: 137). For example, Justyna Zajgc (2016: 137) argues:

“Politically and culturally, Ukraine is divided almost in half, with a pro-Western orientation prevailing in the western part of the country, and a pro-Russian outlook being predominant in its eastern part.” For more, see Wolchik & Zviglyanich 1999.

In fact, the dividing lines in Ukraine are fractal at all levels, not only along the Dnipro (Dnieper) line. Of course, if we compare the most politically radical regions of Galicia and the Donbas in their respective pro-European and pro-Russian sympathies, then the correlation between ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, on the one hand, and the indicated geopolitical sympathies, on the other, is obvious. However, in general, Ukraine is a continuum with fractally distributed dividing lines. And the splits are determined not so much by external formal identities as by mental-value categories, largely dependent on the ideological, axiological and moral choices within each community and every citizen. In this sense, Edward Said's conclusion from his well-known book Culture and Imperialism helps to better understand the nature of the Ukraine crisis:

“No one today is purely one thing. [...] No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness...” (Said 1994: 336).

Unlike the frozen post-Soviet conflicts in the Caucasus and Transnistria or postcommunist wars in the former Yugoslavia, the course of the armed conflict in the Donbas since 2014 indicates that it is more axiological, ideological and geopolitical than ethnic. In other words, it manifests in the absence of any ethnically based transversal splits in political loyalties of the civilian population in the conflict zone, and in the mainly economically motivated geographical destination of the Donbas' refugees and displaced persons. Though about ^ÚÀ of the Donbas pre-war population were Russian-speaking (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2003-2004), numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons from the region as a result of the armed conflict, respectively, into the territory of Russia (1.1 million pers.) and into the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine (0.8-1.0 million pers.) have been, as of February 2016, approximately balanced (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2016: 7), and the author has no evidence of the ethnic homogeneity, or at least any clear ethnic trends of such flows. One should distinguish between ethnic identification and political sympathy for Putin's multiethnic Russia on the part of some inhabitants of the Donbas, or nostalgia for Russian Imperial and/or Soviet times, in which there was a sharing of respectively “nonethnic Russian Imperial and supra-ethnic Soviet identities” (Minakov 2018: 284).

According to Mikhail Minakov's 2018 empirical study of the ideological motivations of separatists who supported the April 2014 revolt and the subsequent war against Ukraine, adherents to the Novorossiya myth The separatist project of unification of the mainly Russian-speaking “Novorossiya” (8 regions of southeastern Ukraine, namely the Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolayiv and Odessa oblasts) with the Russian Federation (Minakov 2017)., which has become “one of several guiding ideas behind the separatist movement in southeastern Ukraine” (275), are particularly “attentive to the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups,” (280-281) emphasizing that their political culture is based on a “non-ethnic statehood” (280). As Minakov concludes, their identity “is usually not ethnically coded” (284).

It is noteworthy how an ethnic Russian writer and ethno-politologist Alexander Karevin, living in Ukraine, characterizes its ordinary citizens' attitudes to the conflict in the Donbas:

“Who is one of us, who is a stranger? This is not determined by formal grounds. Neither origin, nor place of birth, nor even the spoken language is of decisive importance” (Karevin 2019).

In contrast to essentially inter-ethnic or inter-confessional interstate conflicts, which may last indefinitely-e.g., the Arab-Israeli, the Armenian-Turkish, and the India- Pakistan (in Kashmir) conflicts, etc.-ideological conflicts tend to attenuate and transform along with the ideological transformation of their public actors, due to objective processes in the world and regional transformations. As an example, Aleksandr Etkind, Dirk Uffelmann and Ilya Kukulin (2016) have revealed the mechanism of transforming social cleavages into cultural cleavages and then (sub-)ethnic identities in the Russian Empire (save indigenous population) when “social groups were nominated and treated as sub-ethnic groups” (p. 122).

Although the present conflict is not generated or determined by ethnic confrontation (Fischer 2019: 31), it is, as Lodewijk Smoor sustains (2017: 73), “rooted in ethnic tensions”. Prominent Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Paniotto argues that if the principles of Ukrainization were more flexible, they would not be so painful for the East.

Russian-speaking Ukrainians, however, have been treated not quite as full citizens (Sudakova 2019).

Nor does the conflict in the east of Ukraine “represent a clash of two civilizations. It is rather a clash of interpretations of history and values and a sign of a deepening cultural divide between Russia and Ukraine” (Smoor 2017: 73).

One may conclude that the armed conflict in the Donbas is geopolitical and determined by values; but the values themselves are largely influenced by the ethno- national and linguistic identity of the population. In this context, one may talk about value identity, since, according to the extant Ukrainian legislation, nationality and mother tongue are subjects of voluntary conscious choice of every citizen.

Another factor of value identity may also be an administrative-territorial entity's historical affiliation to a certain polity, which varies in its cultural and civilizational nature.

With regard to the Donbas' various territories' historical affiliation one may recall that the former lands of the Zaporizhian Cossack Host (around the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions) are located at the intersection of the Baltic-Black Sea and Azov-Black Sea geopolitical massifs, and it is there that “one of the key geopolitical centers of modern Ukrainian statehood” is located (Gorbulin 2015: 23).

Accordingly, the historical belonging to the Don Cossack Host may be considered, in terms of the fractal-value dichotomy, as a cultural-historical indicator of the Eurasian (pro- Russian) identity.

Thus, one may observe that the fractal dichotomy of values and geopolitical orientations throughout a vast steppe between the Dniester and the Don Rivers, inhabited by the Cossacks, acquired throughout history the institutional format of Ukrainian and Don Cossack autonomies.

Although intersecting closely in language, customs and culture, they in fact personify, respectively, the extreme eastern boundary of the axiological- behavioral Europe and the extreme western boundary of the axiological-behavioral Eurasia (Piliaiev 2015).

The armed conflict in the Donbas, in its deepest worldview-value dimension, is the clash between the postmodern “rhizome” structure of state and society, which denies the dominant core and is based on an uncentered multiplicity of heterogeneous and diverse social phenomena (for example, a bizarre combination and non-conflict interaction at Euromaidan of libertarians and radical ethno-nationalists, both protesting against Yanukovych's corrupt regime) and the “tree-like” linear hierarchy of a clan-oligarchic state corporation (post-Soviet/pre-Modern) with a clearly defined main trunk of “the Father's family” (be it the Yeltsin, Putin or Yanukovych clan) and many regional and local branches of the same tree having an indispensable hierarchical relationship with the main trunk- or, by another analogy, as cogs in a single mega-corruption wheel for converting power into property.

Moreover, the conflict in the Donbas takes place simultaneously in the geopolitical, international, transnational, and regional scales, being fractally broken into many local, interpersonal, and even intrapersonal conflicts.

The same worldview and value conflict between the “tree” and “rhizomes”, but already in the Confucian dimension, is present in the conflict between the “red” modernity of mainland China and the “white” Taiwan, with Hong Kong embraced by the relativistic values of postmodernism. Moreover,

the ultra-modern megacities characteristic of the East Asian “dragons” and the deindustrialized, depopulated new “Wild Field” typical of many areas of the modern Donbas fit equally into the concept of such a conflict.

The results of a sociological survey with regard to the link between national identity and foreign policy preferences funded by Umee University (Sweden) and conducted by Michael Gentile in the city of Luhansk in late 2013, on the eve of the armed conflict in the Donbas, testified that “geopolitical identities in Luhansk have a complex political stratigraphy that includes demographic, socio-economic, cultural and attitudinal components” (Gentile 2015: 13). Gentile rightly claims:

“Luhansk is one of (currently) two main hubs in the ongoing armed conflict in the Donbas, meaning that an in-depth understanding of the political stratigraphy of the geopolitical identities in this city provides the key to a better understanding of the specific context upon which the Russo-Ukrainian war--let us call things by their name--has been projected. (Gentile 2015: 13)”

Below we will apply our analysis to the entire Luhansk oblast disaggregated into various raions.

Let us consider--at least conditionally and for the purposes of the local fractal- value analysis of the Luhansk region as an inter-civilizational borderland zone actualized by geopolitical armed conflict--Ukrainian ethnicity, Ukrainian language, and historical affiliation to the Yekaterinoslav In the second half of the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries most of the future territory of the Yekaterinoslav province was controlled by the Zaporizhian Host (Sich) a polity of Cossacks having been at those times under the sovereignty of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Markova &Khvedchenya 2007). or Kharkiv Kharkiv province is the province that existed from the 18^th to the early 20^th centuries on the territory of Sloboda Ukraine (Slobozhanshchina). Those lands from the second half of the 13^th century until the 16^th century were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and during the 17^th and 18^th centuries the Ukrainian population, especially the Cossacks, of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth seeking for free land was resettling en masse to that newly formed border region of tsarist Russia (Markova 2013). provinces to be indicators of European identity; and Russian ethnicity, Russian language as well as belonging to the region of the Don Cossacks to be indicators of the pro-Russian (pro-Eurasian) historical and cultural identity.

Respectively, we may consider ethnicity, native language, territorial affiliation and historical memory as determinants of some relatively stable value identities, even though the latter may be changeable under crucial circumstances.

According to the results of the last All-Ukrainian Population Census held in 2001 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2003-2004), Ukrainians make up 58.0% of the national composition of Luhansk oblast, with Russians at 39.0%. Ethnic Ukrainians constituted the majority in all raions of the oblast, except for the Stanychno-Luhanske and Sorokine (former Krasnodon) raions, and in the cities of oblast subordination--Sorokine (former Krasnodon), Dolzhansk (former Sverdlovsk), Khrustalny (former Krasny Luch) and Kadievka (former Stakhanov)--in which Russians predominate. At the same time, the Sorokine raion and all the above-mentioned cities have been on the territory that is not actually controlled by the Ukrainian authorities since the spring of 2014. By contrast, in 2001, only 30% of Luhansk oblast's population considered Ukrainian to be their native language, specifically 63.8% of the rural inhabitants and 25.5% of the urban dwellers. In 8 of the 12 raions of Luhansk oblast where the Ukrainian authorities exercise powers, the Ukrainian language is considered native by anywhere from 93.8% (the Markivka raion) to 62.8% (the Troitske raion) population, while from 6 raions where the state authorities of Ukraine temporarily do not exercise their powers, only in one--the Dolzhansk (former Sverdlovsk)--did more than half of the population (56.0%) indicate Ukrainian as their native language.



Ðèñ.1

The author has carried out a fractal analysis of the cities of oblast subordination (regional significance) and raions of Luhansk oblast according to three criteria: ethno- national (the population's absolute majority having Ukrainian ethnic identity-2E, or Russian ethnic identity-2A, the population's simple majority having Ukrainian ethnic identity-E, the population's simple majority having Russian ethnic identity-A, no absolute or simple majority-AE); language identity (Ukrainian-speaking absolute majority-2E, Russian-speaking absolute majority-2A; Ukrainian-speaking simple majority-E, Russian-speaking simple majority-A, no absolute or simple majority-AE); and pre-revolutionary (pre-Soviet) belonging to the Yekaterinoslav and Kharkiv provinces (respectively E) or the Don Host (respectively A). The author's analysis has shown that the most conflicting sense of identity is found in cities of oblast subordination-Bryanka, Alchevsk, Golubivka (former Kirovsk), Kadievka (former Stakhanov), Severodonetsk-and the Perevalsk raion (2E-2A).

The strongest pro-Ukrainian identity is mainly in the northern mostly rural raions (the historical Slobozhanschina and the Zaporizhian Host's historical lands): Bilovodsk, Bilokurakyne, Kreminna, Markivka, Milove, Novopskov, Svatove, Starobilsk (all 5E), Popasna and Troitske raions (both 4E). The strongest pro-Eurasian (pro- Russian) identity is present in the raions of Sorokine (former Krasnodon)-4A, Antratsit, Dovzhansk, Khrustalny (former Krasniy Luch) --all 1E-4A, and the Stanychno-Luhanske district--4A; the latter, unlike the cities listed above, is now controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (see map below).

In this context, the formation of interactive fractal maps (tables) of value identity in the context of regions (oblasts), raions and administrative-territorial units of local selfgovernment seems relevant.

Accordingly, the maps (tables) should zoom in fractally even further-to the level of individual settlements, their historical and functional parts, streets, micro-districts--and then zoom out fractally--to the level of the regions, Ukraine, countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the whole of Europe, Eurasia, and so on. Searching for “red” (problem) indicators should be carried out in the automatic search mode throughout the entire fractal depth for each indicator (index).

On the basis of recent scientific achievements regarding the fractal nature of the universe and society, and taking into account the relativity and fractality of the East- West dichotomy, as well as other value paradigms, it seems appropriate to create in the future, in contrast to a discrete-dichotomous approach, a computer model of the value continuum to the full depth of fractal analysis--from the world system to local levels--searching for a dynamic equilibrium of value parameters in the conflict zone. We see this as an important task of modern conflictology.



Conclusions

The Ukraine crisis is in its essence primarily a value conflict (rather than inter-ethnic or inter-confessional one). As such, it is the first armed conflict of this kind in the post-Soviet space. Ultimately, it is a continental crisis, reflecting fundamental problems in the present East-West relations.

The value conflict in the Donbas, blurred with the ethnic and language identity cleavages, has its origins in the Cold War era and its legacy (in particular, in political psychology, in attitudes of political elites in the West, in the CEE and in the post-Soviet space). That is why the whole Ukraine crisis is really “the product of residual Cold War mentality” (The Trilateral Commission 2014: 27). Thus, it may be classified as the postCold War syndrome, like the analogous ideological, (geo)political and cultural value conflicts around Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula.

The armed conflict in the Donbas may be better understood through localizing the East-West fractal dichotomy in the conflict as national, pluralistic and competitively democratic European Rus-Ukraine versus pro-empire, multinational, strongly authoritarian Eurasian Rus-Russia. The latter's political values and aspirations completely deny the rhizome principle while absolutizing the centric tree principle with regard to state, society and individual. From this viewpoint the historically, linguistically, confessionally and culturally diverse Ukraine should be analyzed as a continuum of fractal differences and oppositions from the national to local levels.

As our analysis shows, a long-term settlement of the Ukraine crisis is possible only with the combination of an international political settlement and a domestic political settlement. That is why it is necessary--in parallel with rethinking and restructuring the European and Eurasian collective security architecture in a possibly more inclusive way, and with the assistance of the international community--to launch a process of comprehensive internal political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, an integral component of which should be, in accordance with the Minsk agreements, “inclusive national dialogue” (OSCE Secretariat 2014).

The Ukraine crisis cannot be settled until Ukraine, according to the concept of fractality and the fractal nature of society, represents a certain balance (dynamic as well as geographically and value-varied in space) between East and West. Transforming Ukraine into a “pure East” or “pure West” without destroying the “polluting” parameters of the East-West dichotomy organically is not possible. That is why the one-sided intervention of Western power factors in Ukraine would not bring the desired result, just as it did not bring it in the course of “humanitarian interventions” in Iraq or Syria.

The only way for global actors to avoid hot confrontation and global nuclear catastrophe is to avoid doctrinal or fatally messianic thinking by mastering planetary (or noospheric according to Vladimir Vernadsky 1943 and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 1959) postnonclassical thinking that opens a way to the global civilization of the future, bridging and transcending the East-West and Self-Other dichotomies.

Without the formation of an inclusive cooperative model of security in Europe and Eurasia, which includes the institutional participation of Russia, even more dangerous and terrible conflicts may follow the Ukraine crisis. Reasonable compromises should be found regarding sensitive political issues, thus elaborating win-win strategies of implementing global and regional cooperation initiatives. For its part, Ukraine may have a crucial significance for a success of the Asia-Europe transcontinental dialogue.

Thus, the most efficient and lasting settlement of the Ukraine crisis can be seen in the inclusive multilateral dialogue on the new institutional and legal framework of European and Eurasian continental security and cooperation with the participation of Ukraine as a pivot, or bridge, between the Euro-Atlantic (Western) and various Eurasian normative orders.



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