Trends and prospects of the development of democracy in the modern world

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Trends and prospects of the development of democracy in the modern world

Dmytro Lakishyk

Abstract

It is revealed that from the theoretical standpoint different "scenarios of the future of democracy " are possible: fundamentally new phases of the democratic process in some regions and its stagnation in others; interweaving and mutual enrichment of its various vectors. The key factors that will in the future determine the stability and spread of democracy are economic development and political management. The trends and prospects of the future of Ukrainian democracy in the global world are also examined.

Keywords: democracy, non-liberal democracy, the USA, Europe, Ukraine, the "third world".

Лакішик Д.М. Тенденції та перспективи розвитку демократії у сучасному світі

Ключові слова: демократія, неліберальна демократія, США, Європа, Україна, "третій світ". democracy world american

Лакишик Д.М. Тенденции и перспективы развития демократии в современном мире

Ключевые слова: демократия, нелиберальная демократия, США, Европа, Украина, "третий мир".

One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the world system of socialism was the real consolidation of political democracy as the main model of the world social and political regime. In the modern world, this process is becoming increasingly global. Almost all more or less developed countries have now become democracies or have chosen a strategy of democratization, which is carried out taking into account national characteristics and traditions. Thus, in 1950, the number of democratic and authoritarian regimes practically coincided, and, since the 1980s, there has been a steady increase in the number of democracies. It is noted in the beginning of the XXI st century. In general, this tendency was in the twentieth century leading, despite authoritarian, fascist, Nazi, communist and other anti-democratic experiments.

This is largely due to significant interactions and the relationship between democracy and economic development, as well as the logical intellectual search for overcoming the shortcomings of the market economy and liberal democracy. On the whole, it can be stated that the main tendency of world development lies in the movement towards democracy as an optimal form of organization of society.

However, in the twentieth century, the development of democracy had its ups and downs. More than seventy times the democratic form of government was dying and its place was held by an authoritarian regime. At the same time, it was a time of significant achievements of democracy. The XXth century was the era of democratic triumph: the truly global spread and the all-embracing influence of democratic ideas, institutions and procedures has made the last century the most favorable period in the development of democracy in the history of mankind.

What explains the establishment of democratic institutions in a number of countries located in different parts of the world? And why are the failures experienced by democracy?

During the twentieth century, major alternative currents failed in comparison with democracy. Until the end of the first quarter of the last century, undemocratic forms of government, whose ideas and practices were dominated almost all over the world - monarchies, tribal aristocracies, frank oligarchies - began to hopelessly lose their legitimacy and ideological power. They were replaced by antidemocratic alternatives that had a wider social base, including Italian fascism, German Nazism, socialism, and other varieties of authoritarian ideologies and regimes, but their period of flowering was short lived. Fascism and Nazism collapsed when the "axis" of the state were defeated during the Second World War. Then, under the burden of economic, diplomatic and even military failures, military dictatorships collapsed one after the other, especially in Latin America. And in the last decade of the twentieth century, the last and most terrible totalitarian rival of democracy - socialism, embodied in the Soviet communist system, unexpectedly disappeared, finally exhausted by internal degradation and pressure from the outside.

Does this mean that the democratic form of government has won and is not threatened with anything? Unfortunately no. Democracy did not receive a final victory and even did not approach it. Thus, in a large number of democratic countries, especially post-communist, power is transformed into a kind of dictatorship and becomes not a means of state governance aimed at general good, but an instrument of its own vision or, at least, the opportunity to live well beyond the requirements of its position. This is a tool that allows distributing at the expense of taxpayers the wealth among their loyal supporters, developing questionable financial schemes - in short, robbing people without any risk [1].

In addition, democratization does not necessarily bring economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets or the "end of ideology". Undoubtedly, some о f these qualities could make consolidation of democracy easier, but they are neither prerequisites nor direct results of it.

So Russia and China are two of the most important countries in the world that do not belong to liberal democracies. Their efforts to find affordable political and economic systems are of great importance to the rest of the world. Unfortunately, these states are moving somewhat different ways in building democracy. China has undergone reforms in the economy and the other parts of the legal and administrative system have become very slowly transformed, but little has been done in terms of democratization.

As examples in various contexts, the bloody consequences of the collisions between the army and students in Beijing in 1989, presented by political scientists as a manifestation of undemocratic and cruelty of power, and as an incentive to accelerate market transformations and the gradual implementation of certain democratic norms, are presented.

Russia, by contrast, initially made very hasty steps on political reform. With the rejection of communism, Russia quickly moved to free and fair elections, hoping that they would promote the spread of Western-style liberal democracy. A striking example of the unjustified nature of such predictions was the October events of 1993.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the recent communist leaders took on the mission of introducing European democracy, political pluralism and individual freedoms. Under their leadership, privatization was carried out, and the consequences of which they took the advantage of; being experienced in the implementation of centralized economic policies, they are engaged in the formation of a market economy; with the experience of manual management, they proclaimed a course on open and honest competition in economic relations and the rule of law in relations between society and the state. Finally, the situation has developed so that the development of a civil society of the Euro-American model began to contradict the interests of the elites who left the previous system. In this situation, they launched a violent pressure, which is primarily directed against the key principles of representative democracy.

Confirmation of the advantages of democracy of the Euro-American model is the unmet disappearance of its political alternatives - fascism, socialism and communism. Although for many reasons authoritarian regimes remain widespread (today, 33% of the population of developing countries live under authoritarianism), this is not a decisive factor in the overall global trend. If you look at the relevant processes in the last two decades, there was a gradual spread of democracy. The well- known thesis of the 42nd President of the United States, B. Clinton, is firmly confirmed by the fact that in the modern world "democracies do not fight among themselves".

This important advantage of a democratic system for a long time could not be foreseen. However, in the last decade of the twentieth century, there was a stunning and unexpected effect. Between 1945 and 1989 there were 34 international armed conflicts, but there was not one that would have arisen between democratic countries. Moreover, "they do not observe military preparations and the expectation of war" [2]. This is also true in relation to the previous period: in the second half of the nineteenth century, countries with representative parliaments and other democratic institutions (such as the suffrage granted to most of the adult male population) did not fight with one another.

Of course, democratic countries were waging wars against countries where there were different political systems, the example of it is world wars. Democratic countries have been intruded and will continue to interfere in the political life of other states, trying to weaken their governments or helping the opposition to eliminate them from power in a violent way.

The possibility of a war between modern representative democracies is almost zero. In the nineteenth century, Frenchman A. de Tocqueville predicted this. Thus, he believed that "as equality, while developing in many countries, draws into the industry and the trade of the people of these states, people not only show the similarity of inclinations and tastes, but their interests are getting closer and intertwined to such an extent that none of the Nations can do any harm to other nations without sacrificing themselves, and that all peoples begin to treat the war as a catastrophic event, almost as terrible for the winner as for the defeated.

Therefore, on the one hand, in the age of democracy, it is very difficult to force the peoples to fight against one another, but on the other hand, it is almost impossible for a situation where two peoples fought with each other in complete isolation. The interests of all peoples are so intertwined, and their worldview and needs are so close that none of them will be able to maintain calm during a period of general excitement" [3].

In the current context, the intensification of the globalization process, the reaction to which was the intensification of international terrorism, international crime, regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the main world threats. Some of the representatives of political thought turned out to be false, who predicted that in the XXIst century the massive, if not self-liquidation of many state formations, will begin, at least, the loss of their ability to control and protect the political, military, socio-economic and cultural aspects of citizens' lives in the traditional sense. In the context of growing interdependence in modern international relations, the role of the national state is predominantly increasing, since this institution is the main means of avoiding periphery and protecting its own national interests and the political interests that are in line with these interests. So far-reaching conclusions about the "decline of the national state" are either a projection of the great-power propaganda of the leading countries of the world, or relate exclusively to specific "failed states", namely the use of the terms "state" and "nation" in relation to which it seems highly doubtful.

From a socio-economic point of view, the prospects for global democratization are sometimes quite optimistic. The current stage of globalization is accompanied by deepening of economic differentiation between the most developed countries the majority of others. Under the conditions of this trend preservation, we should not expect rapid and even economic and social progress, a radical increase in the living standards of the population and, consequently, the formation of social preconditions for a real representative democracy. In many of the countries where formally- democratic institutions were created, the democratic progress remains unstable and, under critical conditions, can even act as an additional factor in the social and political instability of political and transformational processes.

Thus, the head of the Royal United Services Institute M. Alexander believes that: "This confrontation, among other things, is the struggle between the wealthy and the poor, between those societies and young generations who feel politically and economically deprived, on the one hand, and those who, winning from the existing status quo, defends his traditions and principles from the other. ... The tension that generates terrorists in the Third World countries, not only in the Middle East, is aggravated by the information revolution, which encourages the disadvantaged ones to more actively rebel against their unequal situation" [4].

In fact, it turned out that civilizational confrontation involves the rejection of de facto Western civilization by many states in the Middle East, the rejection of democracy in the representation in which Americans and Europeans offer it.

For example, professor at Princeton University B. Lewis is inclined to seek an answer to the specifics of Islam. He sees the problem in the entire socio-political organization of society, which coped well with the challenges of the Middle Ages, but was extremely insensitive to the imperative of modernization, and even more so of globalization. "In the perception of Muslims there is no legislative power of man and there is only one law for all believers - the Holy Law of God proclaimed revelation ... It can not be changed, and in theory, not only one Muslim ruler could not add or remove a single rule" [5, p. IX].

The impossibility of effective "export" of Western democracy is due to the lack of representations of the individual in such regions as the primary social role of man. If this role is not defined, it remains unclear what acts as the main subject of social and economic life - an individual, family, group, clan, or some kind of community. Countries that lack such certainty "suffer from what could be called schizophrenia in relation to an individual. They seem to be a split personality. Depending on the circumstances, one side takes over the other one. In some cases it is recognized that a business entity is an individual. In others, more legitimate economic entity is considered a family, whose interests should be taken into account in the first place", - L. Siedentop believes [6]. At the same time, the American political scientist emphasizes that Western researchers, as a rule, do not adequately assess this phenomenon. They blame the countries in which there are such phenomena as "abomination" and "corruption", which complicate economic growth and disrupt the economic system. However, such allegations are unfair, because the words "fake" or "corruption" themselves can only be negative if the rule is economic individualism and equality of people before the law.

It follows that the worldwide expansion of the external forms of Western statehood - democratic institutions, the judicial system, recognition of equality of citizens before the law, etc. - not at all identical to the creation of a civil society, unless all of this is filled with economic individualism and the recognition of the values that are inherent in the western, that is, in essence, the Christian world.

As L. Siedentop argues, liberalism and Christianity are united by the commitment to moral universalism, and the latter must become the main criterion for the relation to new ideological trends, including the multiculturalism that is now popular. The manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism that concern the modern West are, from this point of view, not the intolerance of Muslims against liberalism and market expansionism as such, but because they see the Christian nature of Western social foundations behind these phenomena [6, p. 258].

In this atmosphere, globalization generates hostile anti-Western ideologies, including nihilist terrorists and countries threatening the rest of the western world. In addition, carriers of a new threat are exacerbating the already turbulent situation in unstable regions where full chaos is a by-product of already existing conditions such as general poverty, authoritarian governments, weak states and societies, crime and the absence of collective security institutions. In many areas along the giant "southern arc" [7], this leads to brutal hostility that generates new threats that pose a danger not only to peace and progress in these regions, but also to the common interests, values and security of the West.

A significant number of modern countries are not ready to accept democratic principles. This is due to the low level of economic development, when for the majority of the population, political freedom is not a priority issue at all and the specific structure of the national economy, which allows the country not to worry about improving the efficiency of its own activities. For most of these countries, the West is putting political pressure to accelerate their "democratization". The result is the construction of illusory democracy, which represents one of the most dangerous and vicious political practices of the present. F. Zakaria calls regimes "mixed with electoral non-liberal democracies" [8, p. 89].

At the same time, non-liberal democracies differ neither in political nor in economic efficiency, since the ruling elites do not form a meritocratic principle. The basis of non-liberal democracy is either populism (as in Russia), or strict control over political life (as in most African countries). As such, it turns out to be possible due to the lack of a secured and independent middle class; often because non-liberal democracy is the result of premature democratization.

The main dangers hidden by non-liberal democracy are, on the one hand, the fact that the people who see how power manipulates their minds comes to a deep disappointment in democracy as such [8, p. 284]; on the other hand - that the economic foundations do not induce economic modernization, which leads to a gradual lag in the economic sphere and generates a sense of "disadvantage" in people [8, p. 145].

However, planting Western values and democracy in all non-Western societies is not correct. On the contrary, the premature transition to a Western-style democracy can lead to serious economic hardship and political instability and, as a result, to create authoritarian and dictatorial regimes that become a nutrient for drug trafficking, organized crime, slave trade and other plagues of the modern world. All democratic experiments in Africa ended in failure, and today, effective governance is needed to countries in the continent to a greater extent than democracy. The choice that, according to F. Zakaria, should make for developing countries is a choice between non-liberal democracy and liberal autocracy [8, p. 97].

Liberal autocracy, or at a more advanced stage of development, liberal constitutionalism, is more effective by the establishment of liberal democracy. Considering the many cases that have taken place in the last three decades, the transition of non-Western societies to liberal democracy is easy to find that countries that have used their version of the European model have achieved significant success: capitalism and the rule of law in the first place, and democracy in the second. As a result, they have achieved spectacular economic success, and over the past one and a half decades have passed to democracy - much more stable and effective [9, p. 51].

The probability of building a truly liberal democracy is much higher, where nonliberal democracy has rooted in. The future of liberty is the future of liberalism, not democracy. However, with this conclusion, they are in no hurry to agree in some western countries, especially in the United States, who are very concerned about how to accelerate democratization in countries where monarchical or autocratic regimes prevail.

Consequently, the post-bipolar era is marked by the coexistence of fundamentally different models, the incompatibility of which sometimes excludes the very possibility of understanding the representatives of different poles of development. It defines the opposite interpretation of the same phenomena, advocating opposing goals and making incompatible claims. Globalization processes do not provide clear recipe for equalizing the conditions of development of separate economic complexes, as well as transparent forms of responding to local challenges to the international order. The nature of modern world processes remains controversial and conflict. On the one hand, the latest trends find expression in promoting interpretation and convergence of development, and on the other hand, they are accompanied by significant deformations, deepening of coercive mechanisms, shaking and revision of traditional norms of international law, the application of double standards [10].

Turning the third millennium, we need to be more restrained in the forecasts regarding the prospects of democracy and a free society in the modern world. These prospects may turn out to be rainbow only if Western-style moral values are devised for societies that differ from the West in their religious and moral traditions and thus seriously underestimate the restrictions imposed on the market by the political foundations of these societies if they distribute Western ideas about economic entities in societies in which such representations are absent.

Successful functioning of democracy depends on citizens as independent individuals. This means the ability to keep one's personality, to avoid emptiness and loneliness with the help of resources of own intelligence. Along with the growth of democratic society, the importance of education is growing. The purpose of education is not the preparation for a profession, but a little more - the preparation for understanding and giving meaning to the civilization in which you live. Only the cultural maturity of the majority can ensure the long-term existence of democracy. Otherwise, people will be driven by fanaticism and violence, which will become the only means to fill the spiritual cavity of their existence, replacing personal freedom with collective exaltation.

In the modern world, there are a number of trends and factors that today and in the near future will threaten democratic institutions.

The first factor of anti-democracy is the growth of nationalism all over the world. Patriotic feelings are not in themselves incompatible with a democratic outlook because they mean the cohesion of their own nation, the attachment to cultural heritage and language, the desire to make the nation better and more civilized. Nationalism is disastrous and hostile to civilization, when it is self-asserted through faith in the natural superiority of its own nation and hatred of others. If nationalism seeks an occasion, whatever it may be, to invade another's territory, and above all, if it involves idolatrous confidence in the absolute superiority of national values, when they are contrary to the rights of people who make up this nation. This kind of potential totalitarian nationalism has spread in different parts of the world.

The second antidemocratic factor is religious intolerance and theocratic aspirations. Of course, the theocratic tendency, which naturally eliminates the separation of the state from religion and establishes ideological despotism, is most obvious and most dangerously active in the Islamic world, where there are reasons to predict its growth. Islamic countries, which make up most of the planet, at the same time, none of them are completely democratic in the western sense, in addition they differ in degree of intolerance. Similar tendencies in Christianity do not seem strong or dangerous at the present time, but their sprouts are quite viable and from time to time show their vitality.

The third threat to democracy comes from terrorism and criminal violence. The danger is not that terrorists or drug dealers seize power in civilized countries, but that they can force democratic governments to fight them, perhaps by common consent, with means that violate democratic rights of citizens. As proof of checking at airports is evidence that anyone is seen as a possible terrorist. What to be expected, if the effective fight against terrorists and criminals will demand not only the large-scale illegal searches, but preventive killings, the abolition of the principle of "innocent, not guilty yet"? Democratic society can take such measures under pressure when it feels that they are necessary for the protection of democracy, but it should not appear that such measures leave democratic institutions intact.

The fourth danger is that the current model of socio-political system, which prevails in most developed countries of the world, has actually depleted itself. The established forms of Euro-American democracy are increasingly showing their inability to effectively carry out the public functions assigned to them and respond adequately to the fundamental challenges of our time. Certain evidence of this is a significant increase, first of all in the EU, the influence and popularity of various radical parties and groups. At the same time influential and authoritative political parties are experiencing far from the best period in their activities.

The issue of fascism and neo-fascism today, at the beginning of the XXIst century, remains relevant, of increasing practical significance, despite the fact that world development is no longer under the sign of the confrontation between the two opposing socio-political systems and the idea of the priority of universal values over class, group or other interests. Unfortunately, the example of J. Haider (Austria), P. Fortuyn (The Nederland), J.-M. Le Pen (France), etc. demonstrates that fascism as a phenomenon successfully crossed the boundary of centuries. And now, many profascist right-wing radical groups exist in Germany and Italy, Spain and the United States, in Latin America and Russia.

In Western liberal democracies, in which the free market provides a decent material existence of citizens, it takes away from them a civic initiative, spiritual freedom, making them hostages of the escalation of advertising-manipulated needs, and condemning to mass selfishness, against which politicians and corruption flourish. The reasons for weakening democratic institutions can also be attributed to the growing role played by politicians in advertising and media advisers (so-called PR managers), lack of interest in public affairs when it comes to protecting their specific interests: hence the decline of participation in political life, beginning with the elections.

In general, the activities of public authorities are predominantly "cosmetic" in nature, more and more often non-fundamental, but palliative decisions that only preserve existing contradictions are adopted. According to G. Kissinger: "Politicians who are under the pressure of the electorate reluctantly address the problems, the very existence of which extends beyond the boundaries of the electoral cycle" [ 11, p. 260].

The common failure in the United States and many Western European countries over the past decades has been to overcome socially acute problems such as chronic unemployment, too high taxes, and the lack of effective mechanisms for regulating labor immigration, especially from Latin America, Asia and Africa, with increasingly poorer quality social services provided by the state, first of all - medical care of the population. Taken together, the above shows that there are certain signs of exhaustion of potential and prospects for the development of the entire model of modern Euro- American democracy. Consequently, western democracy, subjected to internal erosion, is still unable, as before, to offer the world renewed ideals and values. The obvious need is not only technological, but also moral, political, value innovation of modern liberal democracy.

The fifth and, potentially most important, danger to democracy can come from long-term changes that really harm humanity. Overpopulation, reducing the resources of agricultural land, water and ecological disasters will surely force humanity in the near future to devote more and more effort and money to eliminate the damage to the environment and prevent future catastrophes. This will not only increase the restrictions imposed on our freedom of movement and on property rights. First of all, this will be reflected in the weakening of our expectations for "more" and, undoubtedly, to acknowledge that we have enough and have to do less, limit our desires and adapt to a more modest life. The degree of frustration, irritating anger and aggressiveness that these imperatives will cause will be enormous, and will equally affect the rich and the poor. Since the degree of frustration does not depend on the entire level of satisfaction, but on the distance between the entire equals and our subjective needs, and our needs will grow infinitely on the endless spiral of thirst. It is difficult to predict which ideological expression or other ways this disappointment can find, but to curtail it and keep society from being immersed in chaos or becoming a victim of lawless tyranny, many undemocratic restrictions are required [12, p. 500-513].

If we talk about Ukrainian realities, then the modern stage of democratic transformation in Ukraine is marked by the fact that on the one hand, democracy is a symbol of the desired future, on the other - democratic institutions and the media, the practice of participation in the elections coexists with disappointments in democratic reform. Controversy also manifests itself in the combined inertia of the monopoly of power and the constant reproducibility of authoritarian reflexes with an orientation towards Western democratic values, where the definition of the main trends in the formation of new value orientations is the basis for forecasting further development, and the acquisition of new quality is extremely important for a more adequate understanding of the peculiarities of the political system and the content of political processes occurring in society [13].

If we evaluate our democracy not as an abstract ideal, but as a living reality, then it becomes obvious that it has a set of formal attributes that did not provide people's aspirations. Their rights and freedoms did not save the country from chaotic development, and the majority of the people from impoverishment. This is because there is no adequate material and spiritual base for a full-fledged democracy. These social categories develop in organic unity.

Modern Ukrainian political realities are largely determined by the social structure of society. Low socio-political activity of the population, the superficial nature of political parties and the political process as a whole, the ineffectiveness of mechanisms for the design and representation of the interests of social groups and strata, the prevalence of "shadow" forms in the relations between different political forces - all of these are largely determined by social factors. All this creates a favorable environment for the rooting of such a distorted form of political regime as semi-democracy.

Democracy as the basis of governance has a greater restraining force only in those countries where there is a common interest and fundamental values that are shared by the vast majority of citizens. That is what makes living a democratic, parliamentary government possible. The collapse of democracy comes when the unity of values and interests collapses when there is no more general agreement on the basic principles and objectives when supporters of one or another party no longer seek to work with the state, but they themselves want to become a state [14, p. 40].

Specific features of the democratic as well as political process in Ukraine include the fact that the parties functionally perform somewhat different roles than in Western democracies. Yes, the parties reflect the interests of individual groups, individual figures, but not public interests. Some scholars see the inertia of shaping the social environment of post-communist Ukraine, when democracy is actually monopolized and secularized. According to the author, modern multi-party system can be considered as a result of confrontation between innovations and traditions.

The lack of development of political institutions, legislative obstructionism, frequent changes in government and the low efficiency of its activities, not to mention bribery, corruption and bureaucracy of the officialdom, are also not conducive to stabilization. Consequently, political systems become unstable because of the deep divisions of society - economic, social, ethnic, regional, and ideological. The institutional structure of our political power reflects the split of society rather than prevents it.

So, before the Ukrainian authorities and before the Ukrainian society, there is a need for socio-political transformations. However, aware of the specifics and magnitude of such transformations, it becomes obvious that the focus is unacceptable and dangerous on the problems of accelerated approach and accession to Western European military-political and economic institutions.

Proceeding from the current economic and political realities of Ukraine, the implementation of an overcoming strategy of social development will not allow to reduce significantly the distance from Western European countries even in the long run. In addition to what is most important in the strategic dimension, Ukraine will inevitably be on the sidelines of the European and, moreover, general civilization development. In particular, it will not be able to form its own social and productive environment, without which the future of the country's entry into the community of highly developed countries will be extremely complicated.

That is why it is necessary to concentrate public resources and efforts on working out the main directions of the further development of Ukrainian society and state in accordance with the leading tendencies of the progress of the developed countries of Europe and the world, as well as realization of concrete measures on such guidelines. Solving these problems is an extremely complex and long-lasting process. Moreover, modern economic, social and political realities further complicate the achievement of the necessary results of social transformations.

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