Islamic fundamentalism as an element of hybrid warfare

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Islamic fundamentalism as an element of hybrid warfare

O. Petriaiev

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the methods of waging hybrid warfare used by Islamic fundamentalists. The methods of conducting hybrid warfare by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Turkey and the unrecognized terrorist state of the Islamic State (ISIS) are analyzed. The article focuses on the organizational aspects of the application of various methods of waging a hybrid war, goals, strategies and direct executors that pose a threat to the security of the regions of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.

Key words: Islamic fundamentalism, ISIS, terrorism, hybrid war, information war, Islamic Caliphate, Republic of Turkey, Islamic Republic of Iran.

ПЕТРЯЄВ Олексій Сергійович - аспірант Національного інституту стратегічних досліджень

Анотація

Ісламський фундаменталізм як елемент гібридної війни

Проаналізовано методи ведення гібридної війни Ісламською Республікою Іран, Турецькою Республікою і невизнаною терористичною державою Ісламська Держава (ІГІЛ). Розглядаються організаційні моменти застосування різних методів ведення гібридної війни, цілі, стратегії безпосередніх виконавців, які є загрозою безпеці регіонів Близького Сходу, Північної Африки і Європи.

Ключові слова: ісламський фундаменталізм, тероризм, гібридна війна, інформаційна війна, ісламський халіфат.

Main part

Problem statement. The global geopolitical transformation at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries marked the rapid development of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism. Islamic fundamentalists use a wide range of hybrid warfare methods to achieve their goals. In Iran, Turkey and ISIS, Islamic fundamentalism has begun to play an important role in shaping the global political agenda. The methods of the hybrid war of Islamic fundamentalism, both state (Turkey and Iran) and non-state (ISIS), require detailed comprehension and analysis. The work pays special attention to the peculiarities and forms of jihad (holy war of Muslims), as an integral part of modern global hybrid wars.

Analysis of recent research. Various aspects of Islamic fundamentalism and its participation in modern hybrid wars have been the subject of research by such scholars as Henry Kissinger, Yevgeny Primakov, Samuel Huntington, Michael Weiss, Alexander Korenkov, Eugene Rogan, Bagdasarov S.A., Naumkin V.V., Satanovsky E.I. and others.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the methods of waging hybrid warfare used by Islamic fundamentalists.

Main material. In the conditions of hybrid warfare, which is being waged today by various opposing forces, the methods of soft and hard force are widely used. Islamic fundamentalists have their own arsenal of hybrid methods, which allows them to solve their geopolitical problems. Due to the fact that the military-technical and information capabilities of the Islamists are far inferior to the forces of Western developed countries, this forces them to expand the variety of such methods. In our study, we will focus on the hybrid methods of Islamic fundamentalism, which is international in nature.

Islamic fundamentalism is not homogeneous, in our opinion, it can be divided into three types: Shiite, Sunni and Turkish (moderate Sunni).

Countries and governments, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the Republic of Turkey, use different arsenals of hybrid warfare. They follow from their historical mentality and chosen methods in solving geopolitical problems.

For Iran, the main goal is to build an empire based on Shiite Islam in the «Shiite Crescent» (Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen). The state formation of ISIS sees the construction of the Islamic Caliphate as the goal of its geopolitical conquest. Their arsenal of methods of conducting hybrid warfare is the most diverse in comparison with Iran and Turkey. After Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power, the Republic of Turkey adopted a course of restoring Turkey as a regional superpower, as well as extending its influence to Europe and Central Asia.

Elements of the hybrid war were used by Islamic leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the 1979 Islamic Revolution to overthrow the Shah's regime and establish their rule. The Islamic preacher Ayatollah Khomeini, expelled from the country for his anti-Shah activities, was in France, where in 1971 he wrote his major work, The Islamic State (Velayat-e Faqih). In this book, he outlined the ideology of the future of the Islamic State and his vision of governing it. Bypassing the Shah's censorship and Iranian counterintelligence, SAVAK, Islamists promoted the ideas of the Islamic Revolution and the change of power in Iran. To spread his teachings and sermons, Ayatollah used audiocassettes with their recordings, which were smuggled into Iran and distributed to the public, including students. Already in the territory of Shah's Iran, these records were repeatedly copied, reprinted in books in the form of self-publishing, distributed among the population, recited in mosques. By the end of 1978, more than 100,000 copies of audio cassettes had been distributed [1, p. 6-16]. The proliferation of propaganda and propaganda by Islamic fundamentalists in Shah's Iran should be seen as a soft power to solve problems in a hybrid war.

An example ofthe use of force in a hybrid war in the Islamic Revolution in Iran was an event involving the activities of fanatical people seizing administrative government buildings and foreign diplomatic missions. For example, on November 4, 1979, Iranian students surrounded a US embassy and held a sit-in peaceful protest, after which the team stormed the diplomatic mission and took 100 hostages (diplomats, technical staff, military guards, and marines). The students who seized the embassy demanded that the US authorities extradite to Iran a fugitive, Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi, to whom America had granted political asylum. On the same day, Shiite spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini called the embassy students and greeted them with admiration from the US mission and expressed full approval of their activities. Shiite fundamentalists also seized American consulates in Shiraz and Tabriz. In addition to the American embassy, the British embassy in Tehran was also seized, but the fundamentalist revolutionaries left it a few hours later. After all these events, Ayatollah Khomeini turned to blackmail, saying that if the United States does not extradite criminals (the Shah of Iran and the Prime Minister of Iran), the revolutionaries will do «what needs to be done» [2, p. 35-36].

A similar incident occurred in Libya in 2012, when on September 11, Islamic Sunni fundamentalists from the Ansar Al-Sharia organization attacked the US consulate in Benghazi at 9:40 a.m. The cause of the attack was the dissatisfaction of Sunni Muslims with the appearance of a video on the platform of the film «Innocence of Muslims», which was anti-Islamic in nature. About 60 Islamic fundamentalists took part in the seizure of the consulate. They opened fire with automatic firearms, then doused the US diplomatic mission with gasoline and set it on fire. The attack killed US Ambassador to Libya John Christopher Stevens and several other consulate staff. On the night of September 11-12, Islamic fundamentalists also attacked a nearby building near the US consulate, which housed a secret CIA office in Libya. During the attack, the Islamists used rifles, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns placed on light trucks (Technical), hand grenades, grenade launchers and mortars. Several CIA operatives were killed in the attack [3].

Attacks on diplomatic missions are carried out for various purposes: first, to take hostages to obtain trump cards in negotiations with the enemy; second, the physical removal of foreign diplomats and foreign intelligence officials is an element of intimidation; thirdly, the seizure and liquidation of the diplomatic mission is a condition that eliminates the point of hostile foreign influence within the country. These events are a clear example of the use of brutal force in a hybrid war in the arsenal of Islamic fundamentalists of the Shiite and Sunni types.

A characteristic feature of the hybrid war waged by Shiite Islamic fundamentalism is its management from a single center, the Guardians' Council. Iran is thus advancing its political interests through the Shiite religious-political organization Hezbollah (Party of God or Party of Allah), which was established in Lebanon in 1982 with the support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard of Iran in response to the Israeli army's presence in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah's ideology is the cooperation of the idea of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic on the basis of Shiite Islam. During this time, Hezbollah controls southern Lebanon, where Lebanese Shiites live. The main strategic goal of this organization is to deter Israel and the Levant and spread Iranian interests in the region. In the summer of 2006, Hezbollah fought against Israel, known as the Second Lebanese War. Since the start of the Syrian civil war (2011), Hezbollah and Iranian units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have been active participants in President Assad's civil war against Sunni Islamic fundamentalists.

On April 18, 1983, an Islamic Shiite fundamentalist from Hezbollah crashed on a truck loaded with explosives into US Embassy in Beirut. The blast completely destroyed the consulate and office buildings, killing 63 people [4].

Hezbollah was also involved in terrorist attacks against the United States in Lebanon during the country's civil war. On October 23, 1983, in Beirut, Iranian Hezbollah special services stole a tanker truck, filled it with explosives, and quickly crashed into U.S. Marine barracks stationed there. The terrorist attack was carried out early in the morning, when the personnel were still resting. The incident killed 241 American servicemen and wounded many others. Syrian diplomats, Iranian intelligence operatives, and Islamic fundamentalists from Hezbollah took part in the preparation of this terrorist attack [5].

Hezbollah also has an official website on the Internet, which publishes information about the organization's activities, and conducts propaganda and anti-propaganda against Israel, the West, and Sunni Islam [6].

The flag and battle flag of Hezbollah is a yellow banner with the image of a hand holding a machine gun as a symbol of struggle. Below this image is the text of the name of the organization «Hezbollah», and above the image - a quote from the Qur'an «The party of Allah - they will win.» At the bottom of the flag is written «Islamic resistance to Lebanon» [7].

In addition to helping Hezbollah, since 2015, Iran has been providing military and political assistance to the Hussite people in Yemen, which professes a moderate course of Shiism - Zeidism. After the country's civil war between Sunnis and Shiites began, Iran saw an opportunity to strengthen its position in the Arabian Peninsula by assisting a Shiite militant group. Unlike Hezbollah, which is a paramilitary political party, the Hussites are united by tribal relations and are a good ally for Iran in the military-political game in the Arabian Peninsula. These relations are based on mutual interests: for Iran, the Hussites are a close regional ally, which allows it to control the Gulf of Aden, and for the Hussites, Iran is a strong ally and helper in the fight against Sunnis [8].

Iran also uses cinematography in its arsenal of soft power techniques in hybrid warfare. In 2018, the Iranian film «Damascus Time» was released. The plot of the picture tells about Iranian pilots of the IL-76 plane, which transports humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees. Captured by ISIS, they miraculously survived the public execution of Shiites in Palmyra. At the cost of his life, one of the pilot's rescues captured people and destroys field commanders. The film also shows the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian fighter and bomber pilots as positive characters fighting together in Syria against Islamic fundamentalists of ISIS [9].

These facts of Iran's activities in the Middle East suggest that this state is based on Islamic fundamentalism of the Shiite orientation, aimed at forming in this region a single union of the «Shiite Crescent» under its control. This will allow Iran to have permanent access to the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in the future, including control of the Suez Canal. Such a program is carried out by Iran with soft force, which includes methods of information propaganda, and hard force - seizure of diplomatic missions of Western countries, political and economic support of Shiite fundamentalists in various countries in the Middle East and terrorism, primarily in the form of suicide attacks.

In modern political and military history, the Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or the Islamic Caliphate, is the most successful project to force the spread of Sunni Islamic fundamentalism through hybrid warfare. Sunni Islamic fundamentalism itself, as an element of hybrid warfare, has a more developed arsenal of methods of war than Shiite. The main goal of Sunni Islamic fundamentalists is to build a global world caliphate, ie an Islamic empire based on the Sunni branch of Islam.

Modern Sunni fundamentalism began to develop during the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan. The ideology of the USSR, based on the construction of socialism, industrial development and atheism, was hostile to the archaic and religious population of Afghanistan. The Soviet army in Afghanistan was opposed by an armed opposition consisting of various tribes divided into detachments under the command of field commanders. Their main ideology was the holy war against the «infidels», ie jihad (holy war). The Afghan opposition fighters themselves called themselves Mujahideen, ie «defenders of the faith» [10, p. 5-6].

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Islamic fundamentalism, as part of the hybrid war, manifested itself in the following conflicts: the Chechen War of 1994-1996 and 1999-2009, the civil war in Afghanistan in 1992-1996, and the civil war in Tajikistan 1992-1997, the war in Iraq 2003-2011, the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, the civil war in Iraq 2011-2017, the civil war in Libya from 2011 to the present, and others. But it was ISIS that managed to assert itself in 2014 as a new state formation based on Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, taking control of large areas of Iraq and Syria, using a significant arsenal of methods of conducting hybrid warfare.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, were an important milestone in the hybrid war of Sunni fundamentalism against the West. For the first time in US history, they were attacked on their own territory by militants from the al-Qaeda terrorist organization (the terrorist organization adheres to the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, Sunni Islam, Wahhabism, Salafism and Takfirism). For the first time, terrorists also used commercial airliners that were hijacked immediately after takeoff to ram civilian and military targets in the United States. Two planes, out of four stolen, crashed into the skyscrapers of the International Trade Center, which collapsed in a short time; another plane rammed one section of the Pentagon; the fourth plane crashed under mysterious circumstances in a field in Pennsylvania. The total number of victims of the terrorist attack was 2977 people. This form of terrorist act was tested by terrorists for the first time.

Islamic organizations based on fundamentalism are waging a permanent hybrid war against Western Europe, the United States, Israel, Russia and other countries, the main goal of which is to build a geopolitical project «Islamic World» based on fundamental Sunni Islam [11, p. 567].

After a series ofArab Spring revolutions and the start of the Syrian civil war in 2014, the Islamic State emerged in the Levant and Mesopotamia region, becoming a new actor (a participant in international politics who can influence world affairs) in the region. The state system of government of the Islamic State (Caliphate) exercised its government in the following way: the caliphate is governed by the caliph (head of state), who concentrates religious, political and military power. The caliph governs the Shur Council (Council of Elders), which consists of members of the organization who have a high reputation, experience in public administration and knowledge of Islam. Shur Council acts as an adviser to the Caliph and carries out strategic planning. There is a «Committee of Commissioners» to govern the provinces (provinces), which includes viziers (ministers) and sofas (governors). In 2017, there were 17 central sofas in the Islamic Caliphate, divided into 35 provinces (19 in Syria, 16 in Iraq and outside ISIS-controlled territory), and an additional 5 separate services and departments. Most sofas are similar to the ministries of modern states. There are also additional sofas, which, for example, are responsible for the distribution of trophies [12, p. 78].

ISIS divided its territory into provinces, which included Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the North Caucasus, Russia, Nigeria and Yemen, ie countries and regions directly affected by the Islamic State. The ISIS also included in its Caliphate other countries where there are Sunni Islamic groups that have sworn allegiance to the ISIS. Such countries were Somalia, Mali, the Philippines and Indonesia [12, p. 82].

ISIS also paid important attention to Rome as the center of Western Christian civilization. This fact was often mentioned by ISIS preachers in their speeches. The Caliph of the Islamic Caliphate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has repeatedly stated that capturing of Rome is one of the Caliphate's goals. ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnan also said: «We will seize your Rome, break your crosses and enslave your women.»

It must be understood that in this appeal Rome does not act as the capital of Italy, but as a symbol of the Christian Western World. Thus, ISIS (Islamic-Sunni fundamentalism) openly aims to destroy Western civilization in an apocalyptic battle. This is one of the reasons why many young Arabs and Europeans join the organization in search of adventure and adrenaline: «The brutal battles of Western countries with ISIS in the Middle East are the beginning of the final battle between Muslims and the armies of Rome.»

The state of ISIS cannot be perceived from the standpoint of Western thinking, based on the Westphalian system of nation-states. The concept of the state of the Islamic Caliphate is called «Daula» (dynasty or state). ISIS does not build a state to become part of the international community, in the plans of its leaders to build a new Islamic empire in which there is no place for Christendom [13, p. 5-6].

In essence, the ideology of ISIS is a hybrid of several religious and political ideas:

- The Islamic State, in its original historical form, practiced Salafism and relied in its faith on its most radical version - Wahhabism.

- The Islamic State relies on the jihadist literature of the clergy, who do not formally support the organization. However, these priests adhere to religious ideas that are very different from the mainstream of Islam, and many of these ideas are based on Sahwa, an intellectual religious movement that began in the 1970s.

- Sahwa in a broad sense is seen as a mixture of Salafism with the revolutionary ideas of political Islam, which are followed primarily by the Egyptian organization «Muslim Brotherhood».

- ISIS uses its Islamic preachers, who call for a fight against the Saudi-led Al-Saud tribe by spending resources on entertainment and supporting the Western economy, rather than fighting for a caliphate. The preachers also call on the people of the Middle East to support the fight against the official institutions of power of their countries that do not obey the Islamic State.

- The imams of the Islamic State justify the original cruelty of the organization against Muslims and non-believers, based on legends from the first Islamic texts, which call for cruelty on the way to the Caliphate.

- The Islamic State calls on its supporters to wage war against «close» enemies, Shiites and Arab Christians, and at the same time against «distant» enemies, in Western countries and Western Christianity.

- The extremist ideas of ISIS are directed against any manifestations of the West in the field of social modernization and democracy. Any Muslim states that have to some extent adapted Western social norms and institutions of power are subject to destruction [14, pp. 1-2].

- ISIS uses the flag of jihad as its official state symbol. A black banner with the Shahadah (testimony) and the seal of the Prophet Muhammad written in white in Arabic. Above is written in white Arabic letters: «There is no God but Allah.» In the center of the black canvas is the seal of the Prophet Muhammad. This is a white circle in which it is read: «Muhammad is the messenger of God.»

In the tactics and strategy of building the Caliphate, the Islamic State was not limited by international law and public opinion, which allowed it an unlimited arsenal of methods of conducting a hybrid war with the Western World. At the same time, methods from traditional and guerrilla warfare to terrorist and information warfare were widely used.

In the traditional war, ISIS used large-scale offensive operations against enemy troops and military targets to capture and destroy them. Heavy equipment and suicide squads were used for this purpose. The method of guerrilla warfare was used to attack the enemy's armed forces in order to weaken them, destroy communications, demonstrate their presence in the geographical area and mobilize the population. This involved psychological operations, the killing of enemy officials and officers, small group attacks and suicide bombings. Terrorism has been used to target military and civilian targets to cause panic among the military and civilians. To do this, they also used suicide bombers who blew themselves up, destroying targets.

ISIS military commanders were formed from experienced Islamist fighters who studied military affairs in camps in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and other countries where there was an armed conflict, as well as from former officers of Saddam Hussein's army [12, p. 102-105].

In the war in the Middle East, ISIS used a new method of war called the «Non-Nuclear Triad of the Islamic State.» It includes Istishhad or Shahid suicide bombers, «Ingimasi» suicide bombers and combat drones. Suicide bombers are also divided into types, depending on the methods of detonation: suicide bombers who wear a suicide belt or vest filled with explosives; suicide bombers in armored vehicles filled with explosives, with a machine gunner, who together carry out an attack and explode with enemy equipment and manpower; suicide bombers in SUVs, trucks, fuel trucks, Hummers, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, armored personnel carriers and bulldozers.

20% of ISIS troops are Ingimasi fighters (Islamic State stormtroopers). The Ingimasi break through into the thick of the enemy, fight and, if surrounded, severely wounded or run out of ammunition, can blow themselves up with the enemy. The main weapons of the Ingimasi are an assault rifle, hand grenades and a suicide belt.

As combat drones, ISIS used household quadcopters made in China, purchased in a retail chain. They were started with explosives and used as guided shells against the enemy [12, p. 111-130].

The Islamic State waged a large-scale information war, which had several directions. Yes, in every fighting group that fought, there was always a videographer who recorded the fighting for propaganda purposes. The fighting was carried out directly by ISIS fighters from cameras mounted on helmets and from drones to cover the scale of hostilities. Each ISIS-controlled province had its own media center for information work.

In ISIS, had an information unit called Al-Hayat Media Center or Al-Hayat, translated as Life. The main task of the media center was to develop basic propaganda narratives, information campaign strategies and dissemination of jihadist information. This agency managed the following information departments:

- al-Bayan Media Service - a radio station in Mosul; the Voice of the Caliphate radio station operates in Afghanistan;

- the daily newspaper al-Naba in Arabic, which is distributed on the Internet; the task of the newspaper to report on news from the front line and on civilian life;

- Muktaba ah-Khammatov Media Agency (Library of Wisdom), which is responsible for the preparation and dissemination of religious literature;

- al-Hayat media agency, which serves to prepare Rumia (Rome) magazines in Italian, Konstantin in Turkish, Istok in Russian, and Dabik and Dar al-Islam magazines;

- al-Furkan media agency, which prepares jihadist videos and films;

- al-Ajnad media agency specializes in the preparation of nashids (religious hymns and songs) and audio speeches with propaganda;

- al-Yakin agency created infographics and graphic products with information about the losses of the enemy and the successes of the Islamic State;

- al Moati Agency is a news agency of the Islamic Caliphate.

The main tasks in the information war of the media were as follows:

1. In the controlled territory:

- propaganda of Islamic fundamentalism among the Arab population of the Middle East;

- demonstration of ISIS successes in military and administrative affairs.

2. In areas of potential expansion of areas of influence:

- to convince the population of the superiority of ISIS over al-Qaeda;

- recruit new fighters and involve their families in assisting ISIS to help seize new areas of control and influence;

- intimidation of potential opponents;

- to convey to the population the idea of the need to expand the controlled territories of ISIS.

3. In the international arena:

- to report on the strength of ISIS and its ability to carry out terrorist attacks abroad;

- intimidation of ISIS opponents;

- provoking conflicts between Western authorities and immigrants from Muslim countries; between Muslims and non-Muslims; between Sunnis and Shiites.

4. In the Internet space:

- to spread the idea of ISIS that Islam is waging a global war and will definitely win;

- radicalize the minds of representatives of various audiences who sympathize with ISIS;

- coordinate attacks by groups and individual terrorists in Western countries [12, p. 149-157].

In its information activities, ISIS actively used social networks: Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Vkontakte, Telegram and others. For example, for Twitter, ISIS used smartphones with Android operating systems - 69%, Apple - 30% and Blackberry - 1% [15, p. 26].

The infographic shows a map of recorded reports of terrorist agitation, which was sent via the social platform Twitter from the Levant and Mesopotamia [16].

Through its propaganda on social networks, ISIS coordinates the attacks of non-professional terrorists in attacks on citizens of the European Union. Such attacks are usually carried out individually or in groups. Individual attacks involve killing as many European citizens as possible with a cold steel weapon or hitting a group of citizens with a stolen vehicle. The attack by a group of Islamic fundamentalists is carried out with the use of automatic firearms.

After Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power, Turkey set out to develop Sunni Islamic fundamentalism. This was a departure from Kemalist political reforms aimed at building a secular society. Today, President Erdogan is building his strategy in such a way that Turkey takes the lead among Muslim countries. The military presence in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh is a clear example of Turkey's desire to dominate the region. In addition, Erdogan is using refugee Muslims in Western Europe to put pressure on and manipulate the European Union. The main signal that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was on the path to a return to political Islam was the abolition of museum status and the restoration of the Hagia Sophia mosque in Istanbul, which provoked mixed reactions among the world community and a positive one among Muslims [17]. All the activities of the current Turkish government are carried out with the use of soft and hard force in a hybrid form of modern warfare.

Thus, Islamic fundamentalism, which today faces the world of the Middle East and Western Europe, is represented by three main movements: Shiite - whose goal is regional dominance in the Shiite crescent (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen); Sunni - who sees as his goal the construction of a New Caliphate (empire), which includes all the territories of the Middle East, North Africa and Western Europe; and Turkish moderate Sunni fundamentalism, which aims to restore Turkey as a superpower with control over Western Europe, North Africa, the Levant, Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In solving their tasks, these movements use a wide arsenal of methods of soft and hard force of modern hybrid warfare.

hybrid warfare terrorist security

Conclusion

- Islamic fundamentalism has today become a political, informational and military tool for hybrid warfare in the confrontation of the worlds. The use of hybrid warfare by Islamic fundamentalism is caused mainly by insufficient material resources for open military confrontation.

- Islamic fundamentalism, which is historically divided into Shiite Islam and Sunni Islam, has different goals for building the Islamic World, respectively. Shiite fundamentalism expresses the state ideology of Iran, and on this basis carries out the formation of a regional Islamic world, which includes countries that profess Shiite Islam. After President Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power, Turkey has embarked on the islamization of Turkish society and the use of Sunni fundamentalism to reconstruct the Turkish Caliphate and its global influence. The most radical Islamic fundamentalism of the Sunni orientation, based on Wahhabism and Salafism, was the ideology of ISIS. Its important difference from Turkish Sunni fundamentalism is the desire to build a global project of the Islamic World, which aims to form territories of unlimited influence.

- Islamic hybrid warfare has much in common, but there are also significant differences. Iranian Shiite and Turkish Sunni fundamentalism are limited geographically. Islamic Shiite fundamentalism is limited by geographical area in the Levant, Persia, Mesopotamia, and parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Islamic Sunni fundamentalism, unlike Shiite, is not limited to countries where Sunni Islam is widespread. In its ideology, it is global in nature and is gradually expanding its spheres of influence. Today, the zones of penetration of Islamic fundamentalism have become the countries of Western Europe, Africa, Central and Southeast Asia.

- Islamic fundamentalism of ISIS set itself the main goal of reviving the Islamic Caliphate and the physical extermination not only of Western Christian civilization, Catholicism and Protestantism, but also of Muslims who disagreed with its ideology. Sunni fundamentalism, in the form of Wahhabism appealed to by ISIS theologians and militants, is based on Puritan Islam, which simplifies the complexities of political life and offers a simple and clear division into good and evil, permissible and forbidden. Everything that can be interpreted as evil, or serves as a source of vice, must be destroyed.

- Unlike state-funded Shiite and Turkish Sunni fundamentalism, Sunni fundamentalism, which professes Wahhabism and Salafism, exists at the expense of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Much of the proceeds also come from donations from parishioners, the illegal extraction and export of oil, the production and trade of drugs, the sale on the black market of museum exhibits and works of art, and trafficking in human beings and their organs.

- Religious fundamentalism as an element of hybrid warfare is carried out using soft and hard methods. In Shiite fundamentalism, the use of suicide bombers is limited. They are mainly used against hostile military forces and diplomatic missions to create panic and force them to leave a Shiite region.

Sunni fundamentalists, especially ISIS, due to limited resources and a high degree of fanaticism, cultivate and use suicide bombers on a large scale. To this end, in the structure of the ISIS armed forces there were entire units consisting only of suicide bombers, whose task in battle was to destroy as much of the enemy's manpower as possible.

- As an element of soft power, mass migration of the world's peoples has become a hybrid war of religious fundamentalism.

The aspect of Sunni fundamentalism, which professes Wahhabism and Salafism, describes as a soft power the occupation of new territories by refugees from the Middle East, North and Central Africa and Central Asia, who are rapidly moving to Western Europe. Due to the high birth rate (as an organized demographic change program) among Muslim communities in Europe and the demographic crisis among the continent's indigenous population, Muslims will gradually dominate European countries such as Germany, France, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries by 2050. In addition, unsocialized Muslim refugees are used by Sunni Islamic fundamentalists for terrorist activity in European cities.

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