Revolution in Kyrgyzstan of 2020 and the Sadyr Japarov's populist project

Following the Soviet tradition, the Kyrgyz nation has been broadly defined for many decades in ethnic and exclusivist terms as a community of people that differs from others in common culture, language and origin [71]. Notably, that it is precisely the Soviet legacy to understand national culture as a, mainly, traditional culture with special emphasis on its folklore and ethnographic [33, 42, 72]. The latter became the reason why the development of nationalism in Central Asia has little alternatives but to develop by the practices of traditionalisation [73]. As a result, although paradoxical to a certain extent, the invention of national traditions and identification in modern Kyrgyzstan were followed by denying the Soviet heritage as the symbol of modernity, especially regarding gender equality and secularism [74]. This explains why nationalism in Kyrgyzstan was usually presented by its agents in the rhetoric of `national revival' or return to the original, pure, and unspoiled forms of the national culture of pre-Soviet (and even pre-imperial) times. Thus, the categories of profound spirituality, wisdom, and pure morality became the central for national discourse. At the same time, following the Soviet tradition, the very fact of the existence of the Kyrgyz nation before the Soviet Union has been widely recognized and never contested.

Morality is also a category that is very significant for populist discourse in which the `pure people' is opposed to the `corrupted elite' [10]. The combination with the national discourse allows Japarov to construct `the people' using it as a synonym for the nation. With this technique, he does not need to prove the purity of `the Kyrgyz people', which is simply borrowed from the national discourse:

The great Kyrgyz people, as evidenced by thousand-year life experience, embodying the true nomadic spirit only then made a conscious conclusion when comprehending what he saw with his heart. The ability to discern the essence of everything, to blur together with nature, to choose a place for a camp, an interest in a pedigree, readiness for self-sacrifice for the Fatherland, self-identification as a nation - all this together formed a national character, a way of life and was embodied in the wisdom of the people ... If we look at wise popular aphorisms, proverbs and folksays, and even on ornaments and patterns, then we discover the deep philosophy hidden in them. Preserving, honouring national traditions, the spiritual heritage of the Kyrgyz people is one of the important components of Sadyr Japarov's position as a leader and statesman Logotip predvybornoj kampanii kandidata v prezidenty KR Sadyra Zhaparova, available at: https://zhaparov.kg/wp- content/uploads/2020/12/Istoriya-logotipa-Kandidata-1.pdf, accessed 06 March 2021..

Populism is inseparable from nationalism in this citation, and both discourses are united in order to substantiate Japarov's claims to represent both the people and the nation at the same time. And although there is no victimization of the people in this text and nothing is said about `the corrupt officials' it should be considered as one of the pieces of `the people' mosaic designed to divide society into two camps, one of which - the people - claims to be a whole [20], i.e. a nation, leaving no social field for the existence of the `corrupt officials'.

The people's leader. Japarov's behaviour pattern as a populist leader correlates well with Ostiguy's [26] `low' style of communication, i.e. simplistic and straightforward public image pretending, at the same time, to be frank, credible and also strengthened with vernacular rhetoric. As Moffitt points, in this way, through `bad manners' populists pursue the goal of separating themselves from other political actors and at the same time emphasizing their closeness to the people [6]. It is the reason why populists valorize common sense and first-hand experience as `the people's wisdom' over abstract and experience-distant forms of knowledge [11]. Finally, it means that the leader of the people has to break the rules of `good manners' in the name of the people.

In Kyrgyz politics, Sadyr Japarov is the very kind of politician who exploits the `low' style. He performs it like the reincarnation of the Soviet myth about a politician from the working class, unprofessional in politics, but possessing `people's wisdom' due to his contiguity to the people. Of course, new technologies have changed the meaning of the people's lifestyle. Following the recent trends, Japarov distinguished himself by pretending that messages in WhatsApp and posts on Facebook Account on Facebook available at: https://www.facebook.com/japarov.sadyr, accessed 06 March 2021. and Instagram Account on Instagram available at: https://www.instagram.com/sadyr_japarov/, accessed 06 March 2021. are his main channels of communication with the people.

[I] created groups in Odnoklassniki, Facebook, Instagram. I have collected people's contacts on WhatsApp and created over 50 groups there - one group holds 256 contacts. Through these groups, I spread information [...] about my work. So, in three and a half years I reached all the people [54].

As in the case of other populists, the utilization of social media was intended to achieve two main goals: to separate Japarov from `the elite' as well as to associate him with `the people'. To start from the first, Japarov pretends to address the people directly, bypassing mainstream media, which are suspected of conspiring with `the corrupt officials' and therefore `trying to hide the truth'. This made it possible to strengthen the opposition between `the people' and `the elite' as a similitude of the opposition between `popular' social media and `corrupted' mainstream media. Indeed, the rhetoric of mistrust in the media was not an invention of Japarov since it has already been actively used by European and American populists many years before [75-77]. However, Japarov's case is interesting because he directs criticism at journalists accusing them of misrepresenting and denigrating him in their broadcasts and materials `by order of the West' [78]. In this rhetoric, another vivid example of the close relationship between populist and nationalist discourses can be found. Japarov's critics from among journalists are suspected not only in corruption (as `other' along the vertical up/bottom axis) but in conspirations with the West (as `other' along the horizontal nation/outsiders axis) [25].

What is especially interesting is that the `other' in national terms does not embrace Russia or other countries from the former USSR with which Kyrgyzstan has intensive relations but `the West' in the sense of Western Europe and the United States whose presence in Kyrgyzstan is limited, mainly, to the support of NGOs. Therefore, the question arises why Japarov pays so much attention to the West and accuses Western countries of conspiring with corrupt officials and journalists. The answer can be found, again, in the symbolical legacy of the Soviet nationalist discourse. During the Soviet times, the West was the main scapegoat for the Soviet press and officials blamed it for the numerous troubles of the Soviet people like the growth of drug addiction or the failures of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Among other things, this allowed the authorities to turn a blind eye to any criticism portraying it as part of the Western `anti-Soviet activities'. Since then, the image of the West as a source of the people's troubles has been constantly reproduced in the Kyrgyz political discourse especially towards non-governmental organizations whose criticism of the authorities was usually disavowed by the latter with reciprocal accusations of NGOs in serving as `foreign agents' of Western states [79]. Japarov's innovation was only in the linking `the agents of influence' concept and `the corrupt officials' which allows him to maintain the public image of a politician who is far from everything non-popular whatever it is bureaucracy or the West.

To continue with social media, posts on Facebook and Instagram also aimed to position Japarov as a person who communicates with friends and supporters by phone, who writes messages on Facebook and Instagram along the way as many ordinary Kyrgyz do. Publications often contain photographs taken deliberately unprofessionally on a phone with a bad camera with a blurred background, or with a shaking picture creating the impression of an ordinary person with a simple phone who shares pictures and videos made by himself on the streets. Moreover, Zhaparov's publications contain many grammatical mistakes as well as simplified, emotionally charged vocabulary such as `how can you tell such a lie' or `do not shame yourself that create the impression that there are no editors and proofreaders between Japarov and the people.

Finally, some words about one more important characteristic of Japarov's style. It is the intention to present himself as the politician of `the people's origin' with allusions to the Soviet style of political leadership. As Moffitt stresses, populist leaders utilize not only `bad manners' to emphasize their ordinariness, but also perform extraordinariness in the sense of presenting themselves as the singular figure who can fix `the people's' problems [6]. Creating this myth populists tend to exaggerate their own professional qualities, masculinity, national identity as well as to deny the inability to solve very complex, sometimes even global problems in a short time in power. However, Japarov's style is characterized by a rather unusual performance of extraordinary. To start with his self-conscious moderateness: he does not wear clothes of bright colours (and never coloured ties), he refused a solemn cortege, a banquet, and festive events on the day of the inauguration, and he does not enter into debates with political opponents suggesting that people should judge him by his deeds only. On the Defender of the Fatherland Day, February 23, celebrated in Kyrgyzstan since the times of the USSR, Japarov posted on Instagram a black and white photo of his compulsory service in the Soviet army (1987-1989), in which he appears in the uniform of a junior sergeant without any orders or medals [80] (which is in great contrast, for example, with many cases of Latin American populists who are boast of their high military ranks and numerous awards).

To continue, Japarov does not claim to be able to change radically the country alone and constantly emphasizes that he needs the assistance of the entire people to implement his socio-economic program, in particular, the development of energetics [81]. Also, despite his strong inclination towards ethnic nationalism, Japarov does not resort to aggressive rhetoric towards ethnic minorities. On the contrary, he constantly emphasizes the intention to preserve the official status of the Russian language and even kindly invites Russian tourists to the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul:

The possibility of recreation and tourism in Kyrgyzstan is not a novelty for Russians since, during the Soviet times, cycling, rock climbing, mountaineering and long-distance hiking in the Kyrgyz SSR was very famous and popular. Soviet guides included mountain routes in our country. For example, the leading Soviet tourist magazine Tourist published many articles on the tourist routes of the Kirghiz SSR. Also, in Soviet times, cosmonauts were sent annually to the coast of Issyk-Kul for rehabilitation, treatment and rest [82].

The mention of the Soviet times, magazine, and Kirghiz SSR in this quote, as well as the photograph in the uniform of the Soviet army on Instagram, are not accidental. All these are allusions to the Soviet style of political leadership in which the leader had to be simple and moderate because it was a leader of `the people's origin'. Positioning the Soviet Union as a state of the working class, Soviet propaganda constantly emphasized the working-class or the people's origin of the Soviet political elite [83, 84]. As a rule, there was nothing extraordinary in their official biographies: birth in a working-class family, conscript service in the army, work in junior positions at a factory (official biographies were usually silent about other sources of career success such as personal networks and patronage). The official biography of Japarov is also built according to Soviet canons. It begins with `ordinary' childhood: from the cradle, he understood what the responsibility is. The family was large - 11 brothers and sisters. He had to wear clothes and shoes for his older brothers. He, like all children, cleaned the barn, mowed the grass, weeded the beds, looked after the cattle. The father raised the children in severity. He could give a slap on the head. But Sadyr got it the least. Why? He was absolutely honest and very diligent.

Continues with the `ordinary' career start:

After [his] leaving school, the question of choosing a profession arose. He got a job as a worker at the Santash communal farm, and in the same year, he entered the Kyrgyz State Institute of Physical Culture. His teacher and trainer Medetbek Bukuev say that in those years Sadyr Zhaparov had been already distinguished among young people by his humanity and goodness Osobyj put' Sadyra Zhaparova, available at: https://zhaparov.kg/osobyj-put-sadyra-zhaparova/ (accessed 06 March 2021)..

Indeed, Japarov's outstanding personal qualities are emphasized literally in every paragraph of his biography. He is portrayed as the person extraordinary in his ordinariness with allusions to the classics of Soviet literature `How the Steel Was Tempered' by Nikolay Ostrovsky as well as to the discourse of the official biographies of the Soviet leaders. Following these allusions one who is well acquainted with Soviet literature, propaganda and ideology will easily understand that this is a biography of a leader of `the people's origin' and therefore, undoubtedly, an extraordinary person.

Conclusion

Among other cases of populism Sadyr Japarov's mobilization excels for its swiftness and efficiency. In just 3 months he managed to make his way from a prisoner to the President of Kyrgyzstan as well as gain widespread support for constitutional reform in a referendum. There are two important reasons for the success. Firstly, his platform did not have strong alternatives since the ethno-nationalist project of the 2000s was completely discredited, but no viable alternative was formulated in the 2010s. In the conditions of prolonged anomie, Japarov's populism gave hope for the emergence of a new social order to all those who were not satisfied with the ontic order of the 1990-2010s. The involvement of the Soviet symbolic legacy upcycled to the new realities promised that the new order would be similar to the Soviet past, rather than the last thirty years of uncertainty. The lack of alternatives at present suggests that Japarov will remain in power at least until the end of his first presidential term (provided that no powerful challenges from outside Kyrgyzstan will play havoc with his plans).

However, the use of populist logic has its cost. During recent months, Japarov has constructed a frontier between the Kyrgyz people and `the corrupt officials' claiming to represent the will of the people. When he became the president, Japarov de facto crossed this frontier as head of the state apparatus and, accordingly, the state bureaucracy. Such a contradictory situation cannot last long, especially given that the frontier still exists as well as the social demands of the people. Therefore, Japarov has to satisfy at least some of these demands to destroy the frontier. Otherwise, the rise of another populist politician is inevitable who will simply take Japarov's place as the people's leader.

Finally, the symbolic content of Japarov's populist project full of allusions to the Soviet past indicates his intention to break with everything associated with the post-Soviet transition period (except for Soviet ethno-nationalism which was widely used in the 1990-2010s). Especially given that there is no place for representative democracy, parliamentarism and political pluralism in the Soviet legacy. Accordingly, there is no reason to expect that Japarov's political regime will be more liberal and democratic than his predecessors. On the contrary, one should expect the strengthening of the traditionalist and authoritarian tendencies. This can lead to the transformation of Japarov's populism through the rethinking of the categories of the people and the elite as floating designators to reconsolidate the first against new `enemies of the people' (again, through the upcycling of the Soviet category of `enemies of the people). As a result, repressions against political opponents are possible, as well as the violent suppression of any opposition.

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