The causality of the Abkhaz war and Russia’s role in the conflict

Размещено на http://www.Allbest.Ru/

University of Georgia

UIllinois State University

Kyiv International University

Moldovan State University

The causality of the Abkhaz war and Russia's role in the conflict

Z. Gelenidze, N. Sekhniashvili

A. Akhvlediani, O. Semeniy

V. Zalamai

Abstract

The relevance of the research is determined by the active intervention of the occupying Russian troops and the implementation of the general policy of officials in the external and internal processes of the state system of post-Soviet countries, in particular, in the processes of the occupation of part of Georgia. The purpose of the work is to identify the main prerequisites for the beginning of the military conflict. The article used such methodological approaches as a theoretical approach, a formal-legal approach, a logical analysis method, a synthesis method, a deduction method, and others. The main reasons for Russia's aid to Abkhazia were identified, among which it is worth noting the geopolitical location of the territory, the obstruction of Georgia's accession to NATO, access to pipelines for the transport of hydrocarbon resources, and the increase in the sphere of influence in the space of post-Soviet countries. A detailed analysis of the factors influencing political and military processes in Abkhazia by Russia was carried out. An important stage during the work was proving the fact about the policy of a violent nature, which is manifested in the occupation and annexation of sovereign territory by another state. It was found that Russia usually uses a wide range of military and non-military influence tools and methods to implement its plans; such influence is carried out on a systemic basis and has a comprehensive character in various spheres. It is worth noting that the military confrontation between Russia and Georgia has a significant impact on the strategic and political outlook of Georgia and, directly, on the occupied region. The practical value of the obtained results will help establish the cause-and-effect relationship of the Russian-Georgian confrontation and highlight the role of Russia as an aggressor state, which will help to highlight ways to avoid possible military conflicts for other countries of the post-Soviet space

Key words: transit, international recognition, occupation, annexation, unrecognized states, post-Soviet space

Анотація

З. Геленідзе, Н. Сехніашвілі, Університет Грузії, А. Ахвледіані, Іллінський державний університет, О. Семеній, Київський міжнародний університет, В. Заламай, Молдавський державний університет

Актуальність проведення дослідження обумовлена активним втручанням окупаційних російських військ та проведенням загальної політики чиновників у зовнішні та внутрішні процеси державного устрою пострадянських країн, зокрема, у процесах окупації частини Грузії. Метою роботи є виявлення основних передумов початку військового конфлікту.

У статті було використано такі методологічні підходи, як теоретичний підхід, формально-юридичний підхід, метод логічного аналізу, метод синтезу, метод дедукції та інші. Було виявлено основні причини допомоги Росії Абхазії, серед яких варто зазначити про геополітичне розташування території, перешкоджання вступу Грузії до НАТО, доступ до трубопроводів для транспорту вуглеводних ресурсів, збільшення сфери впливу на просторі пострадянських країн. Було детально проведено аналіз факторів впливу на процеси політичного та військового характеру у Абхазії з боку Росії.

Важливим етапом під час проведення роботи було доведення факту про політику насильницького характеру, яка проявляється в окупації й анексії суверенної території з боку іншої держави. Було з'ясовано, що для реалізації власних планів зазвичай росія використовує широкий спектр інструментів та методів впливу військового та невійськового характеру; такий вплив здійснюється на системній основі та має всеосяжний характер у різних сферах. Варто зазначити, що військове протистояння між Росією та Грузією здійснює вагомий вплив на стратегічний та політичний світогляд Грузії та, безпосередньо, на окупований регіон. Практична цінність отриманих результатів допоможе встановити причинно-наслідковий зв'язок російсько-грузинського протистояння та виокремити роль Росії як держави-агресора, що допоможе виокремити шляхи уникнення можливих військових конфліктів для інших країн пострадянського простору

Ключові слова: транзит, міжнародне визнання, окупація, анексія, невизнані держави, пострадянський простір

Introduction

Russia's transition in the early 2000s to an active phase of political and economic expansion into the post-Soviet republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) necessitates a qualitative reassessment of its instruments of influence and purposes in the post-Soviet space.

As M. Orenstein notes, one of the main features of the current foreign policy of Russian concerning the territories of post-Soviet countries is the implementation of the “Putin regime doctrine” [1].

In the opinion of K. Pinniemi, at the global level, Russia strives to establish itself as a distinct pole with inherent independence in a multipolar international order and the status of an influential integration centre in Eurasia, especially in the post-Soviet space [2]. As R. Johnson defines, the policy of this state is oriented toward gaining decisive influence on the external and internal structure of post-Soviet states, which is an area of its priority geopolitical interests [3]. With such a concept, the former republics of the USSR would be stripped of their independence, and their sovereignty would be confined to those interests determined by Russia. Based on this, the model of relations will not be based on cooperation between equal partners but on demands for acceptance of Russian hegemony in the regions.

As M. Galeotti notes, among the main arguments for a certain “greatness” of Russian and its claim to a special place in the international arena, Putin mentions the existence of nuclear deterrent forces, the size of its territory, its subsoil wealth, and its “talents” in the production of cultural goods [4]. With these conceptual arguments, he justifies the “legitimacy” of the intervention against Georgia, the aggression against Ukraine, and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.

In the opinion of L. Jopling, the main thrust of Russia's aggression is toward those countries that have an explicit commitment to Euro-Atlantic and European integration, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, a factor that prevents Russia's ambitions from being implemented. Thus, Russia is not able to propose effective models of integration but cannot allow alternative options for this process in the post-Soviet space, as this would call into question their influence in the region and supremacy [5].

In general, Russia considers the territories of the South Caucasus as a sphere of its privileged interests and competes for the sphere of influence with the countries of the West and the regional factor, namely Turkey. The countries of the South Caucasus in geopolitics have to count on the support of external partners. In this sub-region, there is a geopolitical confrontation between Russia and Western countries that support Georgia as their “outpost”.

As noted by J. Almenga, the strategy of Russia provides for the preservation of power and control over such satellites as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as these territories provide an opportunity to use them as geopolitical springboards [6]. The analysis of the Abkhaz war, namely the identification of historical preconditions and causes, helps to analyse Russia's overall strategy in the international arena and the post-Soviet space. Determination of the causal link is especially relevant today, particularly due to the military aggression against Ukraine.

According to J. Gauter, Russia's attempts to influence have been applied systematically for many years, using a wide range of methods and tools in various fields, and are comprehensive and complex [7]. It targets individuals, institutions, and processes and is implemented on a global scale. The methods and ways of influence, and their priority, are not sustainable. Thus, analysing the situations in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia abandons the means of “soft power” in favour of “hard power”. In particular, describing the Abkhazian war, notably, that it is inherent in multi-stage, extended in time, and creeping nature of the expansion process. Based on the above, of particular importance is the issue of identifying the cause-and-effect relationship to describe the actions of Russia, and identifying the main ways to prevent military aggression for the countries of the post-Soviet space.

The relevance of the study is the exploration of the Russian occupation of Abkhazia. The purpose of the study is to identify the main causes of the outbreak of military conflict. The novelty is that the subject has not previously been researched as extensively as it is now.

Materials and Methods. The study, the scope of which is to identify the main causes, preconditions and consequences of the Abkhaz war and to determine Russia's role in this military conflict, has been conducted through the application of various methodological approaches, exposing the theoretical and practical content of the work. Due to the application of the theoretical approach, the main historical and political reasons for the outbreak of the military conflict between Georgia and Russia were identified. The Aristotelian approach helped to identify the main reasons for Russia's assistance to Abkhazia, such as the territory's geopolitical location, preventing Georgia from joining NATO, access to pipelines to transport hydrocarbon resources and increasing its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The method of logical analysis helped to identify the factors of influence on the political and military processes in Abkhazia by Russia. The dogmatic approach helped to prove the fact of interference and violent policy, in particular, the occupation and annexation of sovereign territory by another state, namely, Abkhazia by Russia. Due to the application of legal hermeneutics, it was identified that Russia usually uses a wide range of military and non-military instruments and methods of influence to implement its plans and that such influence is systematic and overarching in a variety of fields. Using a functional approach, the consequences of the Abkhaz war were analysed, and the factors contributing to the replenishment of the Russian regime's supporters in the annexed territory were assessed. The method of deduction helped to assess the impact of the military conflict on the strategic and political outlook of Georgia and the occupied region - Abkhazia - based on the identified causes, preconditions and consequences of the Abkhaz war. The method of induction, based on specific features of Russia's military aggression against Georgia, helped determine the role of the aggressor state in this conflict. The importance of applying the synthesis method is conditioned by the fact that based on the obtained results of theoretical and practical content the cause-and-effect relationship of the Russian-Georgian confrontation was established and Russia's role as an aggressor state was outlined, which will help to identify ways of avoiding possible military conflicts for other countries of the post-Soviet space in the future.

Results

According to the principles of international law, the Republic of Abkhazia is an integral part of Georgia, but the latter does not control the territory. With limited support from the international community, the Republic of Abkhazia prefers an uncertain status on the international stage rather than being under the control of the Georgian government. Russia is the patron state assisting Abkhazia; military, economic, financial, political, technical, and other types of assistance enable Abkhazia to exist in rather difficult conditions, in particular, Russia receives geostrategic benefits and “reinforcement” of national security [8].

Russia sees patronage of the new political entities as part of its assertion on the international stage and the transformation of the current system of international relations through the weakening of those countries on whose territory these aggravations have emerged.

After the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1992-1993, Abkhazia declared its independence. The specific feature of this conflict is that Georgia tried to preserve the integrity of its territory, and Abkhazia - expanded the rights of autonomy and independence [9].

However, Russia's support for Abkhazia increased as a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 2008, which began with an armed confrontation between South Ossetian separatists and the Georgian authorities. Before the occupation of the territories of Georgia, Russia had been carefully preparing for at least 2.5 years [10]. One of the reasons for this was the new course of the Georgian authorities, which purpose was to conduct democratisation and cooperation with the Western countries. However, as a result of the events of August 2008, the situation on the territory of Abkhazia changed drastically, as two opposite trends emerged, namely, an increase of Russian influence and patronage and a weakening of the international presence in the region.

In analysing the main reasons for Russia's support of Abkhazia, notably, the strategic significance of the territory for Russian foreign policy, as it provides open access to western Georgia; in addition, significance is the presence of the largest military airfield in Transcaucasia, in Gudauta, and Sukhumi airport, which has one of the best runways in the world and can accommodate “Ruslan” cargo planes [10]. Thus, the most significant factor in Russia's support for Abkhazia is the geopolitical location of this territory, which allows expanding influence in the Caucasus region and Georgia and strengthens the security and military-political sphere of Russia's policy [11].

Among other factors, there are obstacles to Georgia's accession to NATO [11]. Notably, the strengthening of control over the Caucasus, in particular, over strategic pipelines that provide an opportunity to transport hydrocarbon resources and restore influence in the post-Soviet space by force.

The policy of Russia is strengthening its position in the international arena by establishing itself in the countries near its borders. Thus, the common purpose of Russia in the post-soviet space is to strengthen its supremacy and dominant position, which should be based on economic, political, and security components that unite the neighbouring countries with Russia [12]. The war with Georgia allowed Russia to expand its military presence in the region.

The influence of Russia can be traced to the consequences of granting Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia, which began in 2003 [13]. As a result, most citizens received Russian citizenship, which allowed them to travel across the border and receive Russian pensions. It is part of Russia's overall strategy, known as “certification”; its purpose is to enhance the number of citizens who will be loyal to the Russian regime in the post-soviet space.

Notably, Russia is the main sponsor of the budget of Abkhazia, as more than 50% of revenues are official assistance from Russia or the result of trade with it. Thus, for example, in the period from August 2008 to May 2010, 900 million US dollars were spent on the development of Abkhazia [14]. The official currency of the Republic is the Russian ruble. In the period from 2017 to 2019, 6 billion rubles were used to fund investment projects [14].

Russian culture penetrates all spheres of public life in Abkhazia. Due to the expanding influence of Russian television, Russian has emerged as the main language for receiving news from abroad. The presence of minorities and the popularity of Russian culture and language provide Russia with additional levers of influence on Abkhazia.

Although the people of Abkhazia see Russia as the main guarantor of security and receipt of financial assistance, they do not want to be completely overtaken by it. Notably, a survey was conducted among the population in 2019 (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Survey among the population of Abkhazia. Source: [15]

Thus, according to the statistics, the majority of the population is in favour of preserving the independence and national identity of Abkhazia, while less than 1/3 is in favour of the republic's inclusion into Russia. It allows concluding that despite the provided assistance in “guaranteeing” security and finances, the population of the unrecognised state does not have the will to be completely absorbed by Russia.

Notably, the federal centre of Russia has poor control over the internal policy of Abkhazia. The admission of another uncontrolled entity to Russia can be a factor in weakening Russia's influence in the North Caucasus. Although Russia's popularity in Abkhazia is quite high, this does not deny the fact of regional pragmatism, which will "force" the Abkhaz elite to assert independence and autonomy in matters of domestic politics. Since Abkhazia has no desire to become part of Russia, the scenario of the republic's accession to Russia is improbable. Currently, the status of an unrecognised state suits both sides. Based on this, it is most obvious that the Republic of Abkhazia will remain a de facto independent quasi-state on the Black Sea and will act as a buffer between Russia and Georgia.

Notably, Abkhazia expected Moscow's support back in the 90s of the last century, but then it was limited [15]. The support increased after Russia and other states recognised Abkhazia as an independent state, after which the republic became partially recognised but dependent on Russia. In addition, it is essential to note that Russia's support for Abkhazia constitutes pressure on Georgia to respond to its will to steer policy toward the West and prevent it from joining NATO [16]. Although the population of Abkhazia de - sires to preserve its autonomy, independence, and national identity, the most probable scenario is a gradual absorption of the republic by Russia and a greater involvement of the quasi-state in the field of Russian geopolitical interests.

In general, the fixation on the expansion of the territory of Abkhazia has been hampered for many reasons, and several factors contribute to this. Among these is the “hybrid” nature of aggression, in which the aggressor state, namely Russia, does not recognise its role as a proximate party to the conflict, attempting to identify itself as a "peacemaker" and attributing the role of the attacker to the target. Notably, there are socio-cultural, socio-economic, ethnic, and political reasons for the confrontation, which will mask the fact that the conflicts are artificially supported and controlled from the outside. In the future, notably, Russian expansion is inherent in a multi-stage, creeping, and multi-stage nature. Particular attention needs to highlight the difficulty of proving the legal nature of the involvement of certain individuals, structures, or states in the initiation and organisation of armed conflict, due to the disguise of real political objectives and the obstacles for international organisations to monitor the situation in conflict areas [16]. Equally significant is the dependence of the intellectual orientation on Russian narratives and excessive academic political correctness, which prevented the situation in Georgia from being unambiguously qualified as a Russian occupation.

A study of the situation in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine provides sufficient grounds to assert that armed conflicts and the resulting pseudo-states are one of the instruments of hybrid aggression by Russia in the post-Soviet space, whose purpose is to regain its geopolitical influence in this region.

The involvement of Russia in armed conflicts is part of a well-established mechanism of hybrid warfare, which is playing an increasing role in the discourse of military orientation in the post-Soviet space. In the most general terms, this mechanism has several stages. First of all, it is the support or instigation of interstate or intra-state conflict, which manifests itself in provoking or allowing a crisis in the conflict; subsequently, this crisis is escalated to the stage of confrontation using weapons; the intervention of Russia as a “peacemaker” and “defender” of a particular category of the population on the respective territories; the next step is to “freeze” the conflict, which manifests itself in preventing its real resolution, while the key objective is to maintain influence over the parties to the conflict by imposing various negotiation processes, peaceful settlements, etc.; subsequently, a political-territorial entity is established in the conflict area, which will position itself as an independent republic; the last step is to escalate or intensify the conflict, using weapons at the right time to exert pressure [17].

The main advantages of conducting “frozen conflicts” for Russia are that they divert significant material and human resources that could have been used for defence and development; impede democratic and economic transformation and force the government to favour unpopular and authoritarian solutions; compromise the authority of the central government; establish conditions for external interference against countries weakened by internal conflicts, which allows the Russia to use hybrid warfare tools and open a wider space for manipulation and influence the positions of political elites; notably, establishing a potential threat to national security for a category of such countries, and implementing an adverse impact on regional and global security [17].

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the Russian authorities will continue to influence the post-Soviet countries by using hybrid wars. The most significant objectives for all post-Soviet republics are to strengthen their defence capabilities, develop their economic system, be able to resist disinformation and find new non-standard and comprehensive responses to asymmetric armed aggression. Notably, every opportunity should be explored to maximise the existing international legal mechanisms to restore territorial integrity and inviolability on the principle of respect for national interests. One of the most rational solutions for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and for the other post-Soviet countries, is to join NATO and move as close to the EU as possible; this would represent a kind of victory in the hybrid war with Russia since the purpose of introducing these conflicts is to prevent the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries, and to preserve Russian dominance and supremacy in the post-soviet space.

Further research will focus on a more detailed analysis of post-Soviet policy, namely in the area of EU rapprochement; assessing the prospects and challenges of EU and NATO accession, and providing recommendations to close gaps in current policy.

Discussion

The events of August 2008 shook the international community with a new aggression on the territory of the post-Soviet state and a new confrontation in the Caucasus, where the Georgian-Abkhazian-Russian conflict has been ongoing for many years. In analysing the history of this issue, the origins of the conflict can be seen in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the new states, which were forced to solve conflicts with members of national minorities on their territory.

While highlighting the main causes, note that they can be evaluated variously based on the intentions of the geopolitical orientation of the conflict factors. According to the conclusion of the International Commission of Inquiry under the leadership of H. Tagliavini established that Georgia started the war, but Russia provoked it, using the disproportionality of the used forces [18].

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in the 1990s was one of the most acute conflicts of ethnopolitical nature, which required a diplomatic approach of all parties involved in the confrontation.

In the opinion of A. Kvakhadze, among the primary factors that manifested themselves in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, is the migration policy pursued by Beria; the consequence was a decrease in the number of Abkhazians in the region; as of the 1990s, Abkhazians accounted for 17% of the population, and the rest were Georgians and Armenians; until the 1950s, the Abkhazian language was not taught in educational institutions, as it was replaced by Georgian [19]. Subsequently, in 1989, 30 thousand people of Abkhazia declared the restoration of the union status of the republic and secession from Georgia [20].

In the opinion of K. Berglund, Georgia lost Abkhazia in 1992, as the population of the republic, having a rather conditional autonomy, was able to preserve its own national identity and nationalised power structures at the local level [21]. Most of the key positions in the administrations of the Abkhaz SSR were occupied by representatives of ethnic Abkhazians, and it was they who performed a decisive role in raising the issue of Abkhazia's obtaining the status of a union republic with the support of Moscow [21].

After the abrogation of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR by Georgia and the restoration of the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic, the Abkhaz leadership single-handedly restored the Abkhaz Constitution, according to which the country was declared sovereign [22]. However, the international community has not recognised these acts of arbitrariness.

On August 14, 1992, the Georgian-Abkhazian war began using heavy artillery, aviation and other means of military weapons [20]. As noted by A. Kartsonaki, the purpose of the Georgian government was to establish control over a part of the territory and maintain territorial integrity, just as the purpose of the Abkhazian government was to expand autonomy rights and obtain independence [23]. The material and political assistance offered to Abkhazia by Russia, under the leadership of B. Yeltsin, contributed to partially and temporarily defusing the confrontation [23].

Russia attempted to maintain its neutrality status, although its armed forces were accused by Georgia of conducting intelligence operations [24]. Later, a Georgian-Abkhaz protocol was signed, according to the provisions of which the upper part of the Kodori Gorge was transferred under the control of Russian peacekeepers and UN observers [24].

In October 2006, the Abkhaz leadership presented an appeal to the Russian leadership to recognise the territory's independence; however, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stated that it recognises the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is a part [25].

At the beginning of the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, the territory of the autonomy was governed by citizens and natives of the Russian [25]. Notably, other significant events in 2008 were the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the US and most EU countries, and the NATO summit in Bucharest, according to which Georgia and Ukraine were to become NATO members [26]. In the opinion of A. Gavrich, these decisions were unacceptable for the Russian authorities, as it is losing control and supremacy over the territories of the post-Soviet countries [27].

Before the events of 2008, Russia had developed plans for a military operation to impose its will on Georgia; the purpose was to provide the Russian authorities with a plausible denial of Georgia's accusations of the conflict and prevent the country from choosing its strategic vector of development [28].

At the end of April 2008, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft was downed over Abkhazian territory from Georgian territory. This event caused a serious international scandal. Georgia brought accusations against Russia due to its air force being downed, thus the case was referred to the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter the UNSC) [29]. However, the UN Security Council did not agree on the situation on the territory of Abkhazia, thus its members heard only the opinion of Russia [29]. In the opinion of N. Torun, due to this, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict became sharply escalated, and therefore the Russian authorities sent additional forces of “peacekeepers” to Abkhazia; the Georgian authorities regarded this step as military aggression [30].

By the end of May 2008, the railway connections between Russia and Abkhazia were repaired, which allowed Russia to deploy large-scale forces to the separatist enclave in case of hostilities with the Georgian side [31]. After Abkhazia requested recognition of its independence and Russia granted the request, Russian authorities argue that they have a full right to have their military units, subject only to an agreement with the Abkhaz leadership [32].

According to the opinion of J. Sharkin, Russia was interested in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and acted as a mediator [33]. Annexation of the autonomies that were part of Georgia was a denial of the territorial integrity and inviolability of an independent sovereign state.

However, despite the historical background of the Russian-Georgian conflict, the current outbreak of violence demonstrates the instability of the political situation in the Caucasus. As R. Ganoharitti notes, this lies in the fact that peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia have been ineffective in establishing the necessary conditions to solve the conflict; the essential objective for the separatist entities is not separation from Georgia but recognition of their independence in the international arena; Russian policy towards Abkhaz residents is a factor that contributes to deepening the contradictions in the positions of the parties to the conflict and increases their radicalisation [34].

The conflict between Georgia and Russia should be a serious lesson for the post-Soviet countries. Namely, it is a question of uniting political elites around the national interests of the state, identifying and defending important priority areas in foreign policy that are of particular importance for society and the state, strengthening the sphere of national security in the concept of development of the country, and providing information course in international policy and relations with neighbouring countries.

Common interests of the post-Soviet countries provide greater opportunities for cooperation. Of significance is the issue of implementing inter-state cooperation of a diverse nature in a wider regional context, namely within alternative integration projects and cooperation frameworks such as the Lublin Triangle, the Associated Trio, military cooperation with the EU Eastern Partnership program states, etc. In addition, it is essential to stimulate the revival of GUAM and the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice with the expansion of the competencies of these organisations, which will provide an opportunity to be a hybrid response to the aggression of Russia.

The analysis helped to clarify the main mechanism and essence of modern hybrid aggression, and identify mechanisms to counteract the “brutal force” of Russia, which will help to restore the territorial integrity of both Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Further research will be oriented toward identifying the prospects and problems that may arise in the development of international cooperation in post-Soviet countries.

Conclusions

In conducting research, the field of study, which was to determine the causal relationship of the Abkhazian war and the role of Russia in this conflict, the main mechanism and stages of the hybrid war of the Russia in the territories of the post-Soviet countries were identified.

First of all, it was analysed that the origins of the Abkhazian war originate from the conflict between the republic and Georgia, after which Abkhazia declared its independence. One specific feature of this conflict is that Georgia's purpose was to preserve the territorial integrity of the state, while Abkhazia's purpose was to expand its autonomy and independence.

It was determined that Russia's support for Abkhazia increased as a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 2008. One of the reasons for support was the new political course of Georgia, which purpose was to implement democratisation and cooperation with the Western countries. In addition, notably, the territory of Abkhazia has significant strategic importance for Russian foreign policy; that is, the geopolitical location has been a significant factor, allowing the process of exercising influence in Georgia and the Caucasus to spread and strengthening the Russian military-political and security sector.

As Russia's role in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia has been defined, it serves as a mediator with a “peacekeeping” outlook. However, the crucial purpose of this peacekeeping mission is the occupation of the territory and its further use for strategic purposes. These occupations continue to exist in the territories of the post-Soviet countries and damage the territorial integrity and inviolability both in Georgia and in Moldova and Ukraine. Based on this, the ways of counteracting aggression against Russia were considered in the study.

Among the identified recommendations are the identification and defence of important foreign policy priorities of particular importance to society and the state, the strengthening of national security in the country's development concept, and the ensuring of an informative course in international policy and relations with neighbouring countries. To mention the implementation of interstate cooperation of a diverse nature in a broader regional context. The recommendations will help the countries of the post-Soviet Union to protect themselves from the hybrid aggression of Russia.

Further research will concentrate on the analysis of problematic aspects and prospects in the implementation of international and interstate cooperation of the post-Soviet countries.

References

1. Orenstein, M.A. (2019). The lands in between: Russia vs. the West and the new politics of hybrid war (1^st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. Pinneniemi, K., & Yokela, M. (2020). Perceptions of hybrid warfare in Russia: Means, goals, and objectives as defined in the Russian debate. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 6, 828-845.

3. Johnson, R. (2018). Hybrid war and its counteraction: Literary criticism. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 1, 141-163.

4. Galeotti, M. (2019). Russian political war: Going beyond the hybrid (1^st ed.). London: Routledge.

5. Jopling, L. (2018). Countering Russia's hybrid threats: An update. NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

6. Allmeng, J. (2019). War, uncertainty and hybrid warfare. Defense Research, 2, 189-204.

7. Hauter, J. (Ed.). (2021). Civil war? Interstate war? Hybrid war?

8. Gabro, I., & Kurylenko, A. (2021). Historical background and causes of the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. Antiquities of Lukomorya, 3, 128-134.

9. Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 3083 “On the Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia”. (2008, September).

10. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin's green light. (2021).

11. Telenko, O.M. (2018). Russia as the patron state of the Republic of Abkhazia. Gilea: Scientific Bulletin, 130, 447-451.

12. Learning from conflicts past: What recent history of Abkhazia tells us about the future of Donetsk and Luhansk. (2022).

13. Kordun, O.O. (2021). Armed conflicts and unrecognized “republics” as tools of Russia's influence on post-Soviet countries. Problems of World History, 4, 54-73.

14. Allocation of money from the Russian Federation to the budget of Abkhazia. (2019).

15. Kopolovets, R. (2019). The political and military role of Russia in the occupation processes on the territory of Georgia and an empirical analysis of democratic development. Lviv: Ivan Franko National University of Lviv.

16. Bakke, K.M. (2022). Mobilizing in Uncertainty: Collective identities and war in Abkhazia. Perspectives on Politics, 1, 361-362.

17. Lutterjohann, N. (2022). The depth of the deadlock? Underlying themes in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Moldovan- Transnistrian Post-Soviet conflicts. National Identities.

18. Presentation of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia. (2009).

19. Kvakhadze, A. (2021). Transnational coalition building: The case of volunteers in the conflict in Abkhazia. Caucasus Survey, 2, 159-179.

20. Key dates in the history of Abkhazia and the evolution of Abkhaz-Georgian relations. (2022).

21. Berglund, C., & Bolkvadze, K. (2022). Sons of the soil or servants of the empire? Profiling the guardians of separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Problems of Post-Communism.

22. Act on the restoration of the state independence of Georgia. (1991).

23. Kartsonaki, A., & Pavkovic, A. (2021). Declarations of independence after the Cold War: Abandoning grievance and avoiding rupture. Nations and Nationalism, 4, 1268-1285.

24. Chronology of the Abkhaz war. (2022).

25. Decree of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Abkhazia. (2006).

26. Countries that Recognize Kosovo. (2022).

27. Gawrich, A. (2021). Conflict management, International Parliamentary Assemblies and small states: The cases of Georgia and Moldova. In Between Peace and Conflict in the East and the West (pp. 3-22). New York: Springer Cham.

28. We knew what was coming, but we were slow to believe it. (2022).

29. Drone Wars. (2020).

30. Torun, N. (2021). Soviet nationality policy: Impact on ethnic conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Karadeniz Aragtirmalari, 70, 245-263.

31. Abkhazian railway. (2017).

32. Abkhazia reaffirms will for independence as South Ossetia revives union with Russia. (2022).

33. Sarkin, J.J. (2022). Law and state practice in Georgia: Dealing with the issues concerning the search, exhumation and identification of missing persons in conflict zones. Caucasus Survey, 2, 223-243.

34. Ganohariti, R. (2021). Politics of passportization and territorial conflicts. In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies (pp. 1-8). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Размещено на allbest.ru