NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications: theory and practice

Important signals were sounded at the Madrid summit, which demonstrated significant changes in the goals and content of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications. NATO Allies have agreed to step up and sustain their support for as long as necessary, so that Ukraine prevails. NATO stands with the people of Ukraine and its legitimate, democratically elected president, parliament and government. The Alliance will always maintain its unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders extending to its territorial waters. In the longer term, the Alliance is exploring its options for supporting Ukraine's future efforts on its path of post-war reconstruc-tion and reforms. Therefore, ensuring the victory of Ukraine in its just war of liberation against Russian aggression and establishing peace became the main goals of the NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications.

Immediately after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the creation of an International Contact Group on the Defence of Ukraine under the auspices of NATO, which will include more than 40 countries. The first meeting of the interstate association took place on April 26, 2022, in Rammstein (Germany). “The group will be a driving force for states of goodwill to intensify joint efforts, coordinate aid and focus on victory (of Ukraine) in the current confrontation (against Russia), as well as in the future struggle”, - Austin said. This position was clearly demonstrated by the next Rammstein- meetings. The Rammstein-8 meeting, which took place on January 20, 2023, was the most resul- tative. Then, the defence ministers of almost 50 countries improved cooperation in the interaction with Ukraine to counter Russian aggression. The USA will provide 2.5 billion dollars, Germany 1 billion. Ukraine will also receive armored vehicles, artillery, and thousands of shells. Several countries helped with air defence systems. In particular, Latvia will provide Ukraine with helicopters, MANPADS Stinger, and other equipment. [19]. On February 14, 2023, another meeting of the Contact Group on Defense of Ukraine (`Ramstein-9') was held in Brussels. The heads of defence departments of 54 countries took part in it. The main issues on the agenda: protection of the Ukrainian sky, including through the involvement of an aviation platform; development of the “tank coalition”; formation of safety margin for ammunition; training programs for Ukrainian soldiers; stability of support - logistics, maintenance, repair, practical implementation of `Military Schengen'. According to the results of the meeting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the USA, Mark Milley, noted that the partners in the `Ramstein' format were able to accumulate a lot of aid for Ukraine [28]. So, the `Rammstein' became a powerful instrument of high-effective strategic communications and interactions.

NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications for the purpose of the interaction are also carried out on other platforms. On 14 February 2023, at the panel of NATO Defence Ministers' meeting Allies discussed the situation on the ground and Ukraine's most urgent military needs with Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov. NATO is stepping up support for Ukraine, while further strengthening deterrence and defence and increasing stockpiles, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on 15 February 2023 following a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers. Highlighting Ukraine's window of opportunity to tip the balance of the war, Mr Stoltenberg welcomed the pledges of support made by NATO Allies to Ukraine, including more heavy weapons and military training [20].

But individual member-states of the Alliance looked at the ways of achieving these goals in different ways and at their own discretion placed emphasis on their priority. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland most strongly and unanimously supported Ukraine. From the first days of the Russian aggression, these states carried out constant communication not only at the highest governance level, but also at the level of civil society. The result of this communication was the provision of not only military equipment, but also weapons to Ukraine, as well as the acceptance of thousands of refugees and volunteer assistance. Communication with the USA and Great Britain became the most effective. These countries provided Ukraine with powerful material, technical and financial assistance. As early as April 2022, the United States began supplying Ukraine with HIMARS multiple- launch rocket systems and communicating with other NATO allies so that Ukraine would receive more rocket systems. Canada also provides strong support to Ukraine. As for France and Germany, the leadership of these countries in the spring of 2022 took a wait-and-see position, although they condemned the Russian invasion. Communicating with the President of Ukraine, Macron and Scholz emphasized the need for peaceful negotiations with Russia. These countries provided the most significant humanitarian aid to Ukrainians, but delayed the adoption of a final decision on the supply of heavy weapons to Ukraine until the summer of 2022. An even more cautious position was taken by Italy, where the supporters of Russia, led by Berlusconi, occupy a rather influential position. Although Italy provides Ukraine with some types of weapons. including air defense. As always, Turkey has taken a peculiar position. After the start of the war, Erdogan continues to communicate with both Zelenskyy and Putin. This has certain positive results, in particular regarding the achievements of the `grain agreement', which ensured the export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. In addition, it must not be forgotten that even before the start of the full-scale invasion of Russia, Turkey concluded an agreement to supply Ukraine with Bayraktar UAVs, which turned out to be one of the most effective types of Armed Forces of Ukraine armament from the first days of the war. Hungary takes the most pro- Russian position among NATO member states. Prime Minister Orban, referring to the oppression of the Hungarian minority, which seems to be taking place in Ukraine, tries not only to block the movement of Ukraine to NATO but also to put obstacles in the way of the deployment of military assistance. Thus, even under the conditions of war NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications are not unanimous within the Alliance, which was certainly not in the case of NATO-Latvia Strategic Communications.

At this stage, the outstanding question of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications regarding Ukraine's membership in the Alliance appeared in a new dimension. Ukrainian compatibility with NATO and compliance with its standards are confirmed daily on the battlefield. But as Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine's foreign minister, emphasized, “some very good friends of Ukraine are more afraid of a positive reply to Ukraine's bid for membership in NATO than of providing Ukraine with the most sophisticated weapons”. In the December 2022 Politico commented this a contradictory situation that is characteristic of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications: “Ukraine's leadership has argued that for all intents and purposes, it is already a member of the Western military alliance - and thus deserves a quick path to formal NATO membership. “We are de facto allies”, - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared in September 2022, when announcing his country's bid to join NATO “under an accelerated procedure”. “De facto, we have already completed our path to NATO. De facto, we have already proven interoperability with the alliance's standards,” - he added. - Ukraine is applying to make it de jure”. The Ukrainian leader's statement caught many of Kyiv's closest partners by surprise - and left several grumbling” [2].

The overture threatened to derail a plan the alliance's most influential capitals had essentially settled on: Weapons now, membership talk later. It was an approach, they felt, that would deprive Moscow of a pretext to pull NATO directly into the conflict. It's an issue so potentially combustible that many NATO allies try to avoid even talking about it. When Ukraine in September 2022 requested an accelerated process to join the military alliance, NATO publicly reiterated its open-door policy but didn't give a concrete response. And, of course, a polite person will not enter the door without an invitation, even if it is open.

Be that as it may, today it should be stated that there is a fundamental teleological difference in NATO's Strategic Communications with Latvia and with Ukraine. The aim of interaction within the framework of strategic communication in Latvia was defined as the country's membership in the Alliance from the beginning. The purpose of cooperation in Ukraine has so far been vague - “deepened partnership”. This is explained by the fears of Germany and France to “irritate the Russian bear”. This inertia persisted even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian aggressor on February 24, 2022.

But the situation changes very quickly and the Alliance is able to quickly change its approaches, as demonstrated by the `tank coalition' reached in January 2023 literally in a few days as a result of active communication between the United States, NATO member countries and partners. And, as Lily Bayers notes, a Ukrainian victory, of course, could shift the calculus. Max Bergmann, director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued his forecast: “If Ukraine is stuck in a stalemate, then NATO membership isn't gonna happen. But if it retakes its territory and accepts its borders - whatever those borders may be, whether it includes Crimea or does not, because that's the fundamental question for Ukraine - then I think things can move very quickly” [2].

In December 2022, when NATO foreign ministers met, their final statement simply pointed to a vague 2008 pledge that Ukraine would someday join the club. And in February 2023 Zelenskyy reminded that Ukraine needs security guarantees, and the best guarantee for Ukraine will be NATO membership. The President of Ukraine said: “We believe that we will be in NATO before all the leaders decide that our package of security guarantees is the right one. Because they make decisions slowly, it's bureaucracy... And I believe that after victory we will be in NATO” [2].

On February 10, 2023, during a meeting at the University of Latvia, when I asked Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy of NATO Baiba Braze what she guess about the place of Ukraine in evolving NATO - near to the Alliance as a partner or within the Alliance as a member, she answered that this issue will be on the agenda after the peace settlement will be reached. At a briefing on February 15, 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated more clearly: “Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance, but now the focus should be on ensuring Ukraine's victory in the war. For this, the Alliance should help Ukraine protect its sovereignty” [33].

The current content of interaction between NATO and Ukraine shows that in 2023, NATO's Strategic Communications' nature undergo changes. Now their slogan can be formulated as follows: “NATO should not be afraid to irritate Russia, NATO is irritated by Russia and will make it afraid”. These changes open a perspective for solving the main problem of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications - its clear orientation towards Ukraine's membership in the Alliance, which should be achieved as soon as possible. As it has been defined that interaction is an indicator of the effectiveness of communication, the positive results of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications can best be confirmed by the words from the speech of US President Joe Biden on his stunning visit to Kyiv on February 20, 2023:

We have assembled a coalition of nations from the Atlantic to the Pacific region. NATO. Japan. The number of nations is more than 50, which are helping Ukraine to defend itself with unprecedented economic, military and humanitarian support. The world's strongest economies have gathered to block the lifeblood of the Russian economy. Together, we have gathered 700 tanks and thousands of armored vehicles, a thousand artillery systems and more than 2 million artillery ammunition, more than 50 missile systems, air defense equipment. Ukraine gives a worthy rebuff to the aggressor, and the civilized world helps it in its struggle [34].

Conclusions

Strategic communications are determined by their spatial and temporal characteristics: they are conducted in the geopolitical area and have a longterm nature.

Communications, unlike information and manipulation, aim to organize interaction between parties to achieve a certain result. The effectiveness of communication is determined by the identical understanding of the goal and common orientation to the final result of all communication process participants. It is a teleological criterion of communication.

A necessary prerequisite for communication is the presence of a certain value compatibility between communicators. The level of value compatibility determines the level of trust, and the level of trust in turn affects the effectiveness of cooperation. So, common values are the ground on which communication is built. Qualitative characteristics of the valuable ground are an axiological criterion of communication. NATO's Strategic Communications are built on the values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

Ukraine choses these values as guidelines for social and political development after the restoration of independence. So, since 1991 NATO- Ukraine Strategic Communications have begun.

These Communications use such tools: regular dialogue between as NATO and Latvian, as NATO and Ukrainian officials, public diplomacy activities, media engagement, and information sharing, as well as joint peace-making and peacekeeping missions, military training and capacity building.

But the effectiveness of these tools to promote stability and security in the region, as well as to support Ukraine's aspirations for closer ties with NATO turned out to be insufficient. It is caused by the fact that the goal of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications is still vague - `deepened partnership'. This uncertainty can be explained by the fears of Germany, France and Italy to “irritate the Russian bear”. As a result of these concerns, in 2008 NATO refused Ukraine to join the MAP. As subsequent events showed, this refusal was a strategic mistake of the Alliance. It actually freed Russia's hands first for a hybrid, and later for a full-scale hot war against Ukraine.

By the time, the process of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications experienced both ups and downs. The main problem lies in the teleological differences. NATO considers Strategic Communications with Ukraine as a stimulus for Ukrainian reforms, a means of developing partnership and preventing Ukraine from returning to Russia's sphere of influence. While Ukraine aims to use them as an effective means to gain full membership in the Alliance. This contradiction persisted even after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its incitement of the conflict in the Donbas in 2014.

But precisely since 2014, drastic changes have been taking place in the content of NATO Strategic Communications in general and NATO- Ukraine Strategic Communications, in particular, and therefore also in the content of NATO- Ukraine political and military interaction. These changes were caused by the need to resist Russian aggression. Since then, the development of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications has been divided into two stages - pre-war and wartime. The parties improved the crisis communication's mechanisms of dialogue and consultations, as well as raised the level of crisis communication both between officials in the process of negotiations and between the military in the process of exercises, which became more frequent and took on a larger and more specific nature. The Ukrainian authorities have created a powerful legal framework for interaction and communication with NATO. But a pro-NATO campaign of broad public support involving non-political leaders of public opinion was not launched in Ukraine. Nevertheless, since 2014, the vast majority of the Ukrainian population has supported the country's join to NATO. In 2022, the level of this support reached 73%.

After the start of full-scale Russian aggression NATO Strategic Communications entered a new phase. The new Strategic Concept of the Alliance was adopted at extraordinary NATO summit was held in Madrid in June 2022. NATO Allies have agreed to step up and sustain their support for as long as necessary, so that Ukraine prevails. New Strategic Communications tools were created to ensure interaction. An International Contact Group on the Defence of Ukraine (`Rammstein') was formed under the auspices of the Alliance and unprecedented assistance was deployed.

But in the process of deployment of NATO- Ukraine Strategic Communications, it became clear that the ordinary `open door' policy should be replaced by the extraordinary `guaranteed accelerated membership' policy after the victory of Ukraine and the peace settlement. Only such a perspective can solve the essential problem of NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications and ensure the victory and sustainable development of the values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe and in the whole world.

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