The world-system dynamics and the realities of our time

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The world-system dynamics and the realities of our time

Popkov V. V.

Dr. (Political Sciences), Professor,

Department of Political Science,

Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University,

Odesa,

Fuad Hamid

Postgraduate Student,

Department of Political Science,

Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Odesa,

The article analyzes the main provisions of the world-system theory from the point of view of its applicability to the consideration of the global situation surrounding the Russian-Ukrainian war. Also, the authors apply the methodology of world-system analysis when studying the factor of geopolitical hegemony and the possible change of hegemon in the first half of the 21st century. In the context of the analysis of modern geopolitical conflicts, is considered I. Wallerstein's hypothesis about a series of so-called “thirty-year wars” as immediate “drivers” of the change of hegemon and the world order, established by him. The article updates such concepts as “cycles of hegemony”, the overlap of “cyclical rhythms” and “century trends”, the correlation between “Kondratiev's cycles” and “cycles of hegemony”, the ascending and descending cycles of “century trends”, etc. The analysis of the I. Wallerstein ideas is supplemented by the analysis of the views of F. Brodel, J. Modelsky, U. Thompson, J. Arrigy, T. Hopkins, and others. The authors conclude that predicting the development of the new world order is a difficult task and that it is still difficult to assess whether this new world order will be “better” or “worse” than the existing one. To explain this, the authors point to the unnamed nature of the epic struggle between “Good and Evil” and the physical process of “mutual resistance and mutual displacement of forces”. In this struggle, according to the authors, the winner is not the “kindest” but the “most effective”. The authors call February 24, 2022, the signal for the beginning of the great redistribution. This date became the starting point in the battle for global domination of any of the world systems without a guaranteed outcome. The authors pray for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Key words: world-system analysis, cycles of hegemony, century trends, thirty- year wars, Kondratiev's cycles, Wallerstein.

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ÎÍÓ ³ìåí³ ². ². Ìå÷íèêîâà,

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ѲÒ-ÑÈÑÒÅÌÍÀ ÄÈÍÀ̲ÊÀ ÒÀ ÐÅÀ˲¯ ÑÜÎÃÎÄÅÍÍß

Ðåçþìå cycles hegemony century trend

Ó ñòàòò³ àíàë³çóþòüñÿ îñíîâí³ ïîëîæåííÿ ñâ³ò-ñèñòåìíî¿ òåî𳿠ç òî÷êè çîðó ¿¿ çàñòîñîâíîñò³ äî ðîçãëÿäó ãëîáàëüíî¿ ñèòóàö³¿ íàâêîëî ðîñ³éñüêî-óêðà¿íñüêî¿ â³éíè. Òàêîæ àâòîðè çàñòîñîâóþòü ìåòîäîëîã³þ ñâ³ò-ñèñòåìíîãî àíàë³çó ï³ä ÷àñ äîñë³äæåííÿ ôàêòîðà ãåîïîë³òè÷íî¿ ãåãåìîí³¿ òà ìîæëèâî¿ çì³íè ãåãåìîíà â ïåðø³é ïîëîâèí³ XXI ñòîë³òòÿ. Ó êîíòåêñò³ àíàë³çó ñó÷àñíèõ ãåîïîë³òè÷íèõ êîíôë³êò³â

ðîçãëÿäàºòüñÿ ã³ïîòåçà ². Âàëëåðñòàéíà ïðî ñåð³þ òàê çâàíèõ «òðèäöÿòèð³÷íèõ âîºí» ÿê áåçïîñåðåäí³õ «äðàéâåð³â» çì³íè ãåãåìîíà ³ âñòàíîâëåíîãî íèì ñâ³òîâîãî ïîðÿäêó. Ó ñòàòò³ àêòóàë³çîâàíî òàê³ ïîíÿòòÿ, ÿê «öèêëè ãåãåìîí³¿», ïåðåòèí «öèêë³÷íèõ ðèòì³â» ³ «â³êîâèõ òðåíä³â», ñï³ââ³äíîøåííÿ «öèêë³â Êîíäðàòüºâà» ³ «öèêë³â ãåãåìîí³¿», âèñõ³äíèõ ³ íèçõ³äíèõ öèêë³â «â³êîâèõ òðåíä³â» òîùî. Àíàë³ç ³äåé ². Âàëëåðñòàéíà äîïîâíþºòüñÿ àíàë³çîì ïîãëÿä³â Ô. Áðîäåëÿ, ß. Ìîäåëüñüêîãî, Ó. Òîìïñîíà, Ä. Àðð³ã³, Ò. Õîïê³íñà òà ³íøèõ. Àâòîðè ðîáëÿòü âèñíîâîê, ùî ïðîãíîçóâàííÿ ðîçâèòêó ôîðìóâàííÿ íîâîãî ñâ³òîâîãî ïîðÿäêó º ñêëàäíèì çàâäàííÿì ³ ïîêè ùî âàæêî îö³íèòè íàñê³ëüêè öåé íîâèé ñâ³òîâèé ïîðÿäîê áóäå «êðàùèì» ÷è «ã³ðøèì» çà íàÿâíèé. Ïîÿñíåííÿì öüîìó, íà äóìêó àâòîð³â, º íåïðîãíîçîâàíèé õàðàêòåð åï³÷íî¿ áîðîòüáè «Äîáðà ç³ Çëîì» ³ ô³çè÷íèé ïðîöåñ «âçàºìíîãî îïîðó ³ âçàºìíîãî âèò³ñíåííÿ ñèë». Ó ö³é áîðîòüá³, çà âèñíîâêàìè àâòîð³â, ïåðåìàãຠíå «íàéäîáð³øèé», à «íàéåôåêòèâí³øèé». Ñèãíàëîì äî ïî÷àòêó âåëèêîãî ïåðåä³ëó àâòîðè íàçèâàþòü 24 ëþòîãî 2022 ðîêó. Öÿ äàòà ñòàëà ïî÷àòêîâîþ ó áèòâ³ çà ãëîáàëüíå ïàíóâàííÿ áóäü-ÿêî¿ ç³ ñâ³ò-ñèñòåì áåç ãàðàíòîâàíîãî ðåçóëüòàòó. Àâòîðè ñïîä³âàþòüñÿ íà óñï³õ Çáðîéíèõ ñèë Óêðà¿íè.

Êëþ÷îâ³ ñëîâà:ñâ³ò-ñèñòåìíèé àíàë³ç, öèêëè ãåãåìîí³¿, â³êîâ³ òðåíäè, òðèäöÿòèð³÷í³ â³éíè, öèêëè Êîíäðàòüºâà, Âàëëåðñòàéí.

Statement of the problem

About 50 years ago I. Wallerstein proposed a fundamentally new research perspective for the analysis of social, economic, and political processes. We are talking about his famous world-system analysis. The main world-system principles were already formulated in the three-volume “Modern World-System”, the main work of I. Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 1989). Currently, his methodology is not as active as it was a few years ago when it was in the focus of actual political discussions. However, the events of recent years and, above all, the very fact of the “unthinkable” Russian-Ukrainian war require us to move from the practice of “narrow commentators” to the practice of “social thinkers”, to see reality in the context of those fundamental processes that radically change the world.

The purpose of our article is to understand the phenomenon of the Russian- Ukrainian war in the context of the categories of world-system analysis and consider the trajectory of development of likely events using such concepts as “Kondratiev's cycles”, “century trends”, “cycles of hegemony”, etc.

Analysis of previous studies

It is quite clear that Wallerstein's research was not alone, without predecessors, followers, and opponents. The appearance of his works was preceded and later accompanied by the experience of a number of scientific schools and directions. His methodological developments were to a certain extent based on the theory of civilizational cycles by A. Toynbee and the typology of historical time by F. Brodel (1992), J. Modelsky and W. Thompson (1996), J. Arrigy (1994), T. Hopkins (1994), etc., who entered into discussions with him and studied with him. Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills were trying to overcome and improve him (Frank & Barry, 1996).

However, the world-system method received the greatest conceptual design precisely from I. Wallerstein. In his interpretation, the world-system acts as a definite structural whole, which behaviour determines the vital activity of the entire set of nationalities, societies, and states which inhabit our planet.

Such an approach allows us to look at the numerous wars and revolutions that have shaken and are shaking the world, as internal moments of the evolution of the global world-system. That system arose at the turn of the XV and XVI centuries and still holds humanity “in its embrace”. We are talking about the 500-year-old capitalist world-system with its Anglo-Saxon core, with the semi-periphery and periphery.

Presentation of the main material

In his interpretation of the capitalism genesis, I. Wallerstein denies the “cultural and civilizational” background of bourgeois relations emergence. He does not consider capitalism to be a historical product of purely European civilization. In Europe at that time, Wallerstein did not see any “unique” features that could clearly confirm that capitalism is a child of the West. Such explanations, in his opinion, are frankly teleological, work on the Western supremacy apologetics, and are based on the principle of “post hoc ergo propter hoc”.

“European capitalist miracle” is not perceived (by Wallerstein) as a gift of “European genius”. In his general work “The West, Capitalism and the Modern World-System” (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 561-619) he emphasizes that the origin of capitalism in Western Europe is accidental in a certain sense. It is explained by certain conjuncture “constellations”, that are spontaneous, improvisational, and local combinations of random events in the XIV-XV centuries. At that time, he believes, a whole set of circumstances arose under the influence of sudden changes in the economic, state, and religious structures of post-Renaissance Europe.

The triggering role here was played by the “Black Death”, the second-largest plague pandemic in the history of mankind. (The first wave was the so-called “Plague of Justinian”, which broke out in the VI century PC. It devastated almost all the countries of the Mediterranean and lasted for about 60 years. The peak of the second wave occurred in 1346--1353. Repeated outbreaks continued until the XIX century when the epidemic reached Odessa. According to various estimates, from 30% to 60% of the medieval Europe population died from infection.

In addition, the crisis of the Eurasian transcontinental trade (the axis of which was the Great Silk Road) complicated the situation dramatically. In the XIV-- XV centuries the “Mongolian link” fell out of such a long trade chain. A huge area of land was outside the Mongolian military and political control, which Karakorum provided in Eurasia for more than two hundred years. This geopolitical shift had the most dramatic impact on Western Europe's fate. It was struck by a deep systemic crisis - the crisis of the feudal management in the economy, the crisis of the institutions of the feudal state -- in politics, the crisis of the Catholic Church (and the appearance of its antagonist -- Protestantism) -- in spiritual life. Thus, the causes of the European capitalist “upgrade” were laid, (according to I. Wallerstein), mainly in the external world-systemic and world-economic shocks of the XIV--XV centuries.

It was they who unexpectedly led to the structural weakening of the European world-empire of the Habsburgs. As a result, the Habsburgs lost control over the internal proto-capitalist process development. This showed its qualitative difference from the brilliant world-empires of China, India, the Great Porta, etc., which managed to maintain state control over the domestic market.

Conjectural (that is, caused by “events of the moment”) crisis of European political and economic structures (1350--1450s) turned out to be more radical than in the centers of the rest civilized world (India, China, the Muslim world, etc.). Moreover, the relative underdevelopment and peripherally of Western Europe, in comparison to the East, played a decisive role here. A stream of initial capitalist accumulation and financial speculation poured into the resulting “gap”.

Let's emphasize: this did not happen because of more “progressive” or “culturally more unique” European West, than the rest of the (Islamic, Indian, Chinese, etc.) world. Just the opposite: West turned out to be more “backward” and less “organized” in comparison to many other developed regions. Therefore, it was less resistant to the “intrigues of capitalism”. But this annoying historical “minus” of the West ultimately brought him great historical dividends.

Let's highlight the main distinguishing features of the world economy, which began to form due to the “system failure” in the western part of Eurasia. First of all, this is the continuous accumulation of capital, which has turned into the driving force of the Western world economy.

The following are:

— rigid spatial division of labour, stimulating unequal exchange within the capitalist world-economy, which increases the tension between the centre and the periphery of the system;

— the mandatory semi-peripheral and peripheral zones present in the structure of the dominant world economy, that fuel the enrichment of the Centre;

— along with hired labour, wide use of various elements of quasi-feudal exploitation and even slavery as a necessary condition for the Centre's economic prosperity;

— the coincidence of world economy core boundaries with the boundaries of the capitalist industry leaders' political cluster;

— the XVI century as “downstairs” (initial) historical limit of the world-economy presence;

— the capitalist world-economy progressive development, which initially arose in North-Western Europe with subsequent spread to the rest of the world;

— mandatory presence in the capitalist world-economy the hegemon states structure, with their comparative short period of undisputed dominance;

— the secondary, derivative nature of states, ethnic groups, and family formations, in relation to the world-economy transformation process;

— bringing to the fore the racism, nationalism, and sexism as an effective functioning distinctly differentiated system of the capitalist peace-economy, motivators;

— provoking the anti-systemic movements uprising, which capable of simultaneously undermine and re-cultivate the capitalist world-economy;

— the mutual superimposition of small “cyclical rhythms” and long-term “century trends” that exacerbates the internal contradictions of the world-system (and can develop into a deep structural crisis of the entire world-economy) (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 267--268).

As we can see, initially it arose as a random mutation, the new world-systemic process quickly self-organized and began the rapid spread throughout Europe and beyond, gradually transforming the entire surrounding acumen. The mobility of the world-economy core draws attention. It does not stand still but constantly moves from zone to zone, changing its location depending on the world's political and economic situation. I. Wallerstein singles out some of the most noticeable displaces of the world-system cores on the political-economy map.

First step: the end of the “long” XVII century (about 1640). At this stage, Holland, England, and northern France form the world-economy core. The countries of Mediterranean Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Southern France) were in the semi-periphery. Eastern Europe and Latin America become the periphery.

The second step: the period from 1640 to 1760. It is characterized by the moderate growth of the capitalist world-economy, and the strengthening of the Anglo-Saxon centre. At this stage, the north of the USA, Prussia, and Sweden are moving into the semi-periphery zone. The periphery becomes the South of the USA and the Caribbean area. Most of the world is outside of the capitalist world-system. They are forming an external trans-peripheral zone.

The third step is marked by the period from the end of the XVIII to the beginning of the XX century. I. Wallerstein calls it “the second era of the great expansion of capitalism”. At this stage, a stable core configuration (consisting of Great Britain, the USA, France, and Germany) emerges. Where Britain played the central, leading role. The semi-periphery at this stage consists of the Eastern and Southern Europe states, as well as Russia, Japan, and some relatively developed countries of Latin America (such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay). Colonial and semi-colonial states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America remain in the peripheral zone.

At the same time, every new the capitalist world-economy epicentre shift, every new step in the next world-system core formation is marked by a sharp surge in world struggles (even world wars). Moreover, one feature is noted: countries that have succeeded in capitalist development (Britain, USA) strive to preserve that peace-economy model, where they feel their superiority.

The countries of catch-up development (Napoleonic France, Kaiser, and Hitler Germany, Romanov's Russia, Stalin's USSR, Putin's Russian Federation, etc.) aspire to achieve the peace-empire model - the total military-political and administrative control over the world-system with the establishment of their own strictly regulated world-order. Modern China strives for a combined model -- a synthesis of world- economy and world-empire.

Deepening his world-system analysis, I. Wallerstein reveals another regularity: each stage of the world-economy and the world-system, (as its epiphenomenon) evolution is accompanied by cycles of hegemony change. Wallerstein in general pays great attention to the problem of the cyclicality of history. The most important cyclical rhythm for him is the so-called “Kondratiev's cycles”. It lasts an average of 45--60 years and consists of two phases: the expansion phase (so-called A-phase) and the decline phase (B-phase). In the A-phase, is observed the process of the largest monopolistic structure's creation and growth. And in the B-phase we see the process of their decline, disintegration, and the effective competitors' appearance.

Wallerstein also talks about the so-called “century trends” (“century logistics”). They are long. They cover a large period from 150 to 300 years, and are associated with the so-called “cycles of hegemony” -- periods of world-system control by certain “Great Powers” (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 216--217, 258--260). Here, the concept of “hegemony” implies the dominance of some states over others. These give possibilities to establish principles, procedures and rules to oblige all other participants to follow the “pack leader” preferences. In this context, the Ukrainian tragedy, that broke out on February 24, 2022, can be seen as the demand of new contender for hegemony -- China, to change the “pack leader” and his rules on the significant part of the planet.

If we are talking about the existing “world of rules”, here are the maximum possibilities for the most effective capital accumulation. It occurs precisely when the world-system reaches a certain balance between the world-empire (with its direct military-political integration of the under-controlled world) and the “acceptable” rivalry of several roughly equal players. That is, the presence of a superpower that, possessing imperial power, prefers to play a “free” economic game with all participants, but according to its own “code of game”, is optimal for the current western “world of rules”.

The ideal situation from the point of view of capital accumulation within the system as a whole writes I. Wallerstein, “is the existence of a dominant state strong enough to determine the rules of the game and ensure that they are followed to the end. When rivalry, as a systemic condition, is replaced by hegemony, this does not mean that the hegemonic power can do everything. But this means that it can prevent the change (violation) of the rules by others” (Wallerstein, 1996, p. 98).

That is, hegemony in the capitalist world-system is exercised by a leader surrounded by a “team of dedicated players” who have the economic, political, military, and ideological capabilities to force other participants to observe the established (by the strong side) “distribution roles” regime.

I. Wallerstein identifies striving for hegemony in the world political system with the striving for a monopoly in the economic world. Moreover, this attempt was never fully successful both in the first and second cases. World history is full of examples of how one or another state achieved superiority (hegemony) in relation to other states and began to implement world-system reconstruction on a world-order basis established by it. However, all hegemonic states sooner or later lost their hegemony and left the foreground.

In his research of the capitalist world-system history, Wallerstein counted only three states that had the status of a hegemon. This is, firstly, the United Provinces (Holland) in the middle of the XVII century (1620--1672), secondly, Great Britain in the middle of the XIX century (1815--1873) and, thirdly, the USA -- in the middle of the XX century (peak, according to Wallerstein, - 1945-1973).

Moreover, the initial prerequisite of hegemony is no means of military power (although, in the end, it becomes the decisive factor). The most significant “driver” of hegemony in the world-system process is the achievement of a high level of production efficiency and financial operations. Each of the three hegemon states dominated only during the period when they gathered the three main parameters of efficiency: production, trade, and finance (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 256-257).

Let us emphasize once again that the hegemon states have not made large capital investments in the creation of numerous armies for a long time. Instead, each state, striving for its power, created, first of all, a large merchant fleet, which, in addition to its direct economic function, ensured the power of its naval forces. “Possibly..., -- writes I. Wallerstein, - .this was really a key factor in the fact that these states were able to defeat their main rivals in the struggle for hegemony.” (Wallerstein, 199, p. 99).

However, the desire for a general victory in the geo-economic and geopolitical struggle has always required the elites to strengthen state support for non-market structures. The gradual expansion of these structures sooner or later leads to qualitative changes in the overall capitalist world-economy composition. And the final stage of the struggle for hegemony ultimately and inevitably ends in a decisive military clash. I. Wallerstein named such clashes as conditional “thirty-years wars”. All interested competing forces participate in these wars, and such a huge struggle covers wide planetary spaces.

Wallerstein counted only three similar “thirty-years wars” in the history of the capitalist world-system.

First “Thirty-Years War” (1618-1648). As a result, Holland's economic interests prevailed over the imperial political interests of the Habsburgs.

The Second “Thirty-Years War” (in the form of the Napoleonic Wars of 1792-1815). As a result, the pragmatic economic interests of the British prevailed over Bonaparte's imperial political idealism.

The Third “Thirty-Years War” (in the form of the Anglo-Saxons “two-stage” war against Germany in 1914-1918 and 1939-1945). As a result, the USA defeated Germany and established an American-centric world order and an American-centric world-economy (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 258). The extrapolation of this Wallenstein's formula to our time leads us to the unhappy assumption that the Russian-Ukrainian war is just a fragment (God forbid) of the XXI century “Thirty-Years War”.

About the “thirty-years wars” I. Wallerstein writes: “They took place sporadically rather than continuously (and the states participating in them often changed sides and allies, changing their ideological beliefs along the way), and ultimately ended with the defeat of one of the warring parties. In all three cases, sea (and air) power overcame land power. And in every case, the forces committed to preserving the basic structure of the capitalist world-economy defeated the forces that sought to transform it into a world-empire” (Wallerstein, 1996, pp. 99--100). Thus, after the first “Thirty-years' War” the Habsburgs world-empire began to fall apart. After the second “Thirty-years' War” -- the Napoleonic empire had destroyed. The German Second Reich collapsed, and Hitler's Third Reich made the same after the third “Thirty-years' War”. And after the fourth (“forty-years”) “Cold” war - destroyed apart the world-empire, the USSR.

Wallerstein revealed another regularity: during a long period of hegemony decline, at least two potential “contenders for the inheritance” always appeared. Such contenders were England and France during the decline of Holland hegemony, such were the USA and Germany during the decline of the British-centric world. And at the end of his life, Wallerstein saw Western Europe and Japan as contenders for the American heritage -- after the gradual decline of US hegemony. At this point, as it turned out today, he made a mistake. But this is quite understandable, Sir Wallerstein made his prediction back in the 1980s, when both the EU and Japan, as they say, “were in trend”. Today, China clearly claims the role of “heritage managing”.

Wallerstein notes one more regularity: the end of each “Thirty-years' War” is finishing with the restructuring of the international relations system and the establishment of a new world order. This ensures long-term political and economic advantages for the victorious hegemon state. Such was the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Such was the system of the “European concert” after the Vienna Congress of 1815. Such was the UN system after the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. At the same time, the dominant state is able to maintain its hegemony only as long as it is able to maintain the world order established by it. It gives the possibility of imposing institutional restrictions on the world market and international politics.

Initially, hegemon states may win in the conditions of unblocked and free world trade (the advantages of their starting positions are reflected). However, in the medium term, they ultimately move to the “loser state” because they faced new competitors (with high efficiency and lower cost of production).

This circumstance inevitably limits the term hegemony. Usually, it is a period of 25--30 years, after which the former hegemon state “falls” or “rolls” off the hill and returns to its original, more modest status. It is possible that this state will demonstrate its strength (mainly in a military sense) for some time “by inertia” (Wallerstein, 2000, pp. 435--436). In general, the decline of the hegemony of the state is characterized by a decrease in its overall economic efficiency, and the appearance of additional types of non-productive costs, defined as “burden of the hegemon”. That is, the “descending” hegemon state recklessly resorts to those expenses that it carefully avoided during the years of its “ascension”.

In the I. Wallerstein world-system vision, history appears as a bizarre sinusoid of cyclical ups and downs of hegemonic states, which constantly restructure the world- system in search of the most effective investment and accumulation of capital. And: “Hegemony that lasted too long would turn the system into a world-empire. And a system in which a hegemonic state did not arise would not have the opportunity to create stable... orders necessary for maximum accumulation” (Wallerstein, 1996, p. 102). In other words, the ossified hegemony seeks to preserve the world-system, and turn it into an empire, but a “preserved” world-empire sharply reduces its economic efficiency.

According to I. Wallerstein, the emergence of a global hegemon is an inevitable function of the world-system development. And the weakening of the hegemon leads the world-system to a deep crisis and decline. We find something similar in another American political scientist, Z. Brzezinski, who claimed that from all the empires, is only one empire, which is truly a global hegemon -- the USA. It is “the centre of the global world order” (Z. Brzezinski), or the “core of the world system” (I. Wallerstein), which is, in principle, complementary.

Other states who “want to join the system”, but are unable to take the role model really, should at least simulate their “close to hegemon” image. But even these poor “simulacra” may be acceptable for leader. They are a sign of the peripheral countries' loyalty to the “champions”, and indicator of their “domestication” to the “powers of this world”.

Thus, according to Wallerstein, the entire capitalist world-system function when a few countries end up as winners and the majority, -- as losers. And, let's emphasize once again, the appearance of unexpected new alternative centres of capital concentration causes active opposition from the existing world-system, up to opponent liquidation. This is one of the decisive motives for the another “Thirty Years War” resolution.

Therefore, within the framework of the dominant world-system, a dominant military-political world order is necessarily formed. Its entire structure and logic of behaviour “works” for the capital concentration and centralization, for the interests of self-preservation and self-development of the dominant world-system. And if somewhere there is a desire to crush the dominant world-system, first of all, it starts with the destruction of the world-order, which protects it.

To complete the characterization of I. Wallerstein's contribution to the theory of world-system analysis, draws attention to his forecast: the next world “thirty-year war” with the subsequent “time of hegemony” fall on the peak period of the century trend (the first half of the XXI century) -- before or after its achievement (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 216-217, 258-259). With the subsequent international agreement that restructures the world order.

According to F. Brodel (Braudel, 1992, p. 73), the culminating moment (peak) means the point from which the “century trend” begins its downward movement. In other words, this is a “crisis point”. In the interpretation of I. Wallerstein, F. Braudel's “century trends” are connected with the constant movement (rise and fall) of the “locus of hegemony” on the scale of the Western world economy (which was already discussed above). At the same time, we note one more significant detail: the European (and Mondial, after the Holland hegemony establishment) capitalist world-economy desperately resisted the demands of the European continental world-empires. That were the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, the Napoleonic Empire, the Second and the Third German Reaches, or the Eurasian Socialist Empire (with the USSR leadership). Now we see the resistance to the putin's empire aggression.

Of course, it is possible to find certain inconsistencies and contradictions both in the theory of the world system as a whole and in the concept of the superimposition of “cyclical rhythms” and “century trends”. However, the analysis of these details is not the subject of our article. For us, the scenario-prognostic aspect of world-system analysis is of much greater interest.

Conclusions

Analysis of the “century trends”, and “long centuries” correlation with Kondratiev's cycles and “cycles of hegemony”, which are contained in the works of F. Brodel, I. Wallerstein, J. Modelsky, U. Thompson, J. Arrigy, T. Hopkins, etc.

allows to better understanding the algorithm of world-systemic changes in the first half of the 21st century.

The “common ground” of many theoretical constructs is the predicted gradual decline of the USA hegemony, which creates ample opportunities for the implementation of various geostrategic scenarios of the hegemony change and the new world order establishment. As I. Wallerstein noted in the article “Peace, stability and legitimacy, 1990-2025/2050”, “...the period from 1990 to 2025/2050 will probably lack peace, stability, and legitimacy. This is partly explained by the decline of the USA as the hegemon of the world-system, but to a greater extent by the crisis of the latter precisely as a world system" (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 435). In this sense, the period following American hegemony somewhat resembles the post-British period in the second half of the 20th century and the post-Holland period in the second half of the XVII century. However, the current stage will be different from theirs: there is a much greater degree of disorder and disintegration. The bifurcation points that arise at the moment of breaking the next historical system will create the most chaotic picture of the current stage.

Already now, it is becoming obvious how much living reality has moved away from the predictions of Wallerstein, his followers, and opponents. Thus, his assumption that the role of the post-American hegemon would be Japan or the European Union was absolutely not confirmed. But China, which at the end of the 20th century was considered an unlikely contender for the leadership, rose to full strength. It is possible to argue about the dating of individual stages of the world-system process and to discuss the details of the correlation between various cycles and phases of development, but the world-system analysis really gave us a number of fundamental ideas that allow us to navigate in the harsh circumstances of the 21st century quite correctly.

Firstly, the understanding that the capitalist world-system, which once being arise at the turn of the XV and XVI centuries, reached its peak by the end of the XX century and is now on the verge of decline.

Secondly, during its transformation, the world-system is grouped around a certain core, the epicentre of which is a specific hegemon state.

Thirdly, the world-system in the process of its growth, maturity, and decline goes through several stages of “hegemon changes” and the establishment of the next world order. As a rule, so-called “thirty-years” world wars flare up at these “transitions” (I. Wallerstein). As a result, the victorious states “reorganize” the world in their own way.

Fourthly, the contemporary crisis phase (the first half of the XXI century) is not just a simple “change of hegemon”, but (according to the assumptions of I. Wallerstein) the end of a 500-year era of one world-system and some other world-system emerging.

All these assumptions make it possible to look at global processes, with Ukraine, and her tragic and heroic fate, in the epicentre of possibly moving to the hybrid “thirty-years' war” (God forbid!). From the beginning of this war we see a whole complex of military, political, economic, media, psychological, and diplomatic means and methods which are involved. The war, in which the winner must install his own world order and “open the floodgates” to a new world-system process.

To what extent this new world order will be “better” or “worse” than the existing one is difficult to say. Since it is not about the epic picture of the “Good against Evil” fight, but about the physical process of “mutual resistance and mutual displacement of forces”.

In this struggle, not “the kindest” but “the most effective” wins. In 24.02.22. the signal sounded. A world battle for global domination of any of the world-systems has begun. Without a guaranteed outcome. But we all pray for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

References [Ñïèñîê âèêîðèñòàíî¿ ë³òåðàòóðè]

1. Arrighi, G. (1994). The Long Twentieth Century. Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. London: Verso [in English]. [Arrighi G. The Long Twentieth Century. Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. London : Verso, 1994. 432 p.]

2. Brodel, F. (1992). Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. III: The Perspective of the World. Berkeley, California, USA: The University of California Press [in English]. [Brodel F. Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Vol. III: The Perspective of the World. Berkeley, California, USA : University of California Press. 1992. 704 p.]

3. Frank, A.G. & Barry, K.G. (1996). The World System: Five hundred years or five thousand? New York: Routledge [in English]. [Frank A.G., Barry K.G. The World System: Five hundred years or five thousand? New York : Routledge. 1996. 344 p.]

4. Hopkins, T., Wallerstein, I. (1979). Cyclical Rhythms and Secular Trends of the Capitalist World-Economy. Review, II (4), 483--500 [in English]. [Hopkins T., Wallerstein I. Cyclical Rhythms and Secular Trends of the Capitalist World-Economy. Review. 1979. Vol. II, Is. 4. P. 483-500.]

5. Modelski, G. & Thompson, W.R. (1996). Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press [in English]. [Modelski G., Thompson W.R. Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics. Columbia : University of South Carolina Press, 1996. 282 p.]

6. Wallerstein, I. (1996). The inter-state structure of the modern world-system. In Smith S., Booth K., Zalewski M. (Eds.) International theory: positivism and beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 87-107 p. [in English]. [Wallerstein I. The inter-state structure of the modern world-system. International theory: positivism and beyond / Eds. by S. Smith, K. Booth, M. Zalewski. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996. P. 87-107.]

7. Wallerstein, I. (1989). The Modern World-System. Vol. III; The Second Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s. San Diego: Academic Press [in English]. [Wallerstein I. The Modern World- System. Vol. III; The Second Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s. San Diego : Academic Press, 1989. 390 p.]

8. Wallerstein, I. (1991). Unthinking Social Science. The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms. Cambridge: Polity Press [in English]. [Wallerstein I. Unthinking Social Science. The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms. Cambridge : Polity Press, 1991. 296 p.]

9. Wallerstein, I. (1992). The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System. Review, XV(4) (Fall), 561-619 [in English]. [Wallerstein, I. The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System. Review. 1992. Vol. XV, Is. 4. P. 561-619]

10. Wallerstein, I. (2000). The Essential Wallerstein. New York: The New Press. [in English]. [Wallerstein I. The Essential Wallerstein. New York : The New Press, 2000. 471 p.]

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