United States - Azerbaijan Relations (1991-2020)

Upon assuming office, President Obama sought to avoid missionary rhetoric, asserting that his administration would refrain from imposing `American-style democracy' and instead prioritize `patient diplomatic engagement' in matters related to democracy and human rights. This approach characterized U.S. policy in Azerbaijan from 2009 to 2011. For instance, during Secretary Clinton's visit to Azerbaijan in July

2010, her focus was on repairing bilateral relations strained during the Rapprochement process and securing Azerbaijan's support for NDN shipments to Afghanistan. However, despite the initially non-interventionist stance, global political events after 2011 prompted the administration to become involved in democracy-promoting initiatives. The repercussions of this policy shift began to manifest in Azerbaijan after

2011. During Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 2012 visit to Baku, she held a one-on- one meeting with recently released opposition youth group leader Bakhtiyar Hajiyev. While commending his efforts, Clinton openly criticized the deteriorating human rights situation in Azerbaijan during a joint press conference with Azerbaijani MFA Mammadyarov. She urged "the government to respect their citizens' right to express views peacefully, to release those who have been detained for doing so in print or on the streets or for defending human rights Clinton H. Remarks With Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov. U.S. Department of State.

Diplomacy In Action. 2012, June 6. URL: https://2009-

2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/191855.htm."

The altered stance of the Obama Administration became more evident following the 2013 Presidential elections, in which Aliyev secured an 85 percent victory. The State Department's official statement sharply criticized the conduct of the elections, citing `serious shortcomings' such as ballot box stuffing and irregularities Azerbaijan Presidential Election. U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy In Action. 2013, October 10. URL: https://2009-2017.state.gov/rZpa/prs/ps/2013/10/215283.htm. This marked a stark departure from the State Department's response to the 2009 Presidential elections, where Aliyev claimed an 89 percent victory. Despite previous criticisms from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) mission, the State Department had applauded the Azerbaijani government for `improvements' in election conduct at that time.

Transformations in both domestic and international variables contributed to the diminishing significance of Azerbaijani energy in US foreign policy during this phase. On the domestic front, a recalibration of US energy security policy commenced in 2007, emphasizing the pursuit of energy independence through investments in clean energy, a reduction in the reliance on imported oil, and augmented domestic production via unconventional oil exploration. The Obama Administration bolstered this policy by allocating over $3.4 billion for the development of Smart Grid technology and research in clean energy, aiming to diversify away from oil President Obama Announces $3.4 Billion Investment to Spur Transition to Smart Energy Grid, 2009. US Department of Energy. URL: https://bit.ly/3O6YmeO.

Crucially, the unconventional oil and gas revolution in the US substantially augmented domestic oil and natural gas production. This trend triggered a decline in global energy prices and markedly diminished the importance of swing producers like Azerbaijan for US energy security. It is noteworthy that US energy policy toward Azerbaijan was formulated in the late 1990s when the US and the West were heavily dependent on imported oil, with expectations of even greater dependency due to declining US production and escalating demand. In the wake of the unconventional revolution, which witnessed a surge in US oil and gas output, the international oil industry experienced a surplus capacity, altering the landscape for US energy policy. The Obama Administration, instead of concentrating on modest producers of conventional oil like Azerbaijan, launched two global programs to promote unconventional oil and gas exploration worldwide, particularly in Europe.

The descent in natural gas prices resulting from the oil price slump, coupled with the expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity and the potential transportation of American LNG to Europe, further diminished the relevance of accessing Azerbaijani energy for American and European energy security during this period Ratner M., Belkin P, Nichol J., Woehrel S. Europe's energy security: options and challenges to natural gas supply diversification. Congressional Research Service. 2013. URL: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42405.pdf. Additionally, internal dissensions within the EU regarding natural gas procurement from Russia weakened European countries' inclination to support Azerbaijan's natural gas projects, consequently reducing Azerbaijan's role in the Western energy landscape. Given the bilateral nature of natural gas transport deals between European countries and Azerbaijan, the United States assumed a facilitating role rather than being a direct stakeholder. Consequently, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) ceased to be a pivotal component of US energy security policy, with American objectives regarding Azerbaijani gas aligning as a derivative of European interests in diversifying gas resources away from Russia.

A confluence of international and domestic factors played pivotal roles in molding the shifts observed in US security policy during this period. Concerning the Russian invasion of Georgia, the anticipation of American military intervention to support Georgia proved unfounded. This discrepancy arose from a misconceived notion that the United States was engaged in a geopolitical rivalry with Russia, vying for territorial control in the Caucasus. Additionally, towards the conclusion of Bush's second term in office, a palpable aversion to military interventions had permeated both the American public and bureaucratic elites JahangirliJ. Contradictions of Realism and Liberalism on Interstate Relations....

Upon the inauguration of the Obama Administration in 2009, a discernible trend of US disengagement in Azerbaijan took shape. Azerbaijan's security interests progressively waned in significance for the US as the Obama Administration accorded priority to addressing issues in the Afghan and Iraq theaters, executing a pivot to Asia, and recalibrating bilateral relations with Russia. In alignment with these strategic objectives, the Obama administration curtailed bilateral military assistance to regional allies under the aegis of the Global War on Terror (GWoT). This recalibration had a consequential impact on US military aid to Azerbaijan, reflecting the administration's strategic realignment and shifting security priorities.

Distinctive Trends in United States Policy Towards Azerbaijan (2015-2020)

At the close of 2015, it is evident that US policy toward Azerbaijan has entered a distinct phase characterized by limited engagement across the energy, security, and democracy promotion dimensions. In the realm of energy, the pattern of US disengagement initiated in the late 2000s persists, aligning with the diminishing significance of Caspian energy resources for US energy security. While the primary objectives of US policy, such as the establishment of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and trans-Caspian connections, remain unchanged from the preceding period, there has been a discernible reduction in the level of US commitment to realizing these goals. Despite the SGC project securing loan support from the European Investment Bank for the construction of TANAP and TAP, notable backing from the US government has been lacking. Additionally, efforts to expand the project eastward to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and southward to Iraq and Israel have not garnered the anticipated interest, even within Europe Roberts J. The Southern Gas Corridor. Hafner M., Tagliapietra S. (Eds). The European Gas Markets.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. P. 315-357. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-55801-1_14.

In the domain of security, Azerbaijan, while continuing to contribute to the NATO mission in Afghanistan and serving as a transit point for the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), has struggled to elicit heightened US interest in bilateral security cooperation. During the latter part of the Obama Administration's second term, the policy focused on maintaining existing low levels of security cooperation through routine meetings. President Aliyev participated in the Nuclear Security Summits in 2014 and 2016, engaging with Vice President Biden and Secretary Kerry in 2016. However, these meetings did not yield the articulation of new areas of security cooperation Kramer D., Kauzlarich R. It's time for the United States to act on Azerbaijan. The Washington Post. 2016, September 8. URL: https://wapo.st/3O7tv1O.

Democracy promotion, an area of active US engagement in Azerbaijan during the preceding period, witnessed a reduction in emphasis under the Obama Administration after 2015. Official statements in the final two years of Obama's second term avoided explicit discussions of Azerbaijan's human rights record, despite an intensified crackdown on civil society following President Aliyev's visit to Washington in 2016. This trend further intensified with the election of Donald Trump as US president in 2016 Ibidem..

The continued US disengagement in Azerbaijan during this period is contextualized by the ongoing unconventional oil and gas revolution, declining overall importance of Central Asia in US foreign policy, a surge in isolationist sentiments in the US, and the election of Donald Trump. The Trump administration, emphasizing the expansion of domestic oil production, has yet to formulate specific policies for collaboration with Azerbaijan in developing Caspian energy resources. Simultaneously, the European Union is pursuing alternative solutions to its natural gas challenges, including the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing capacity, a unified energy market, energy regulation liberalization, energy conservation, and the promotion of clean energy sources Austvik O.G. The Energy Union and security-of-gas supply. Energy Policy. 2016. Vol. 96. P. 372-382.

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.06.013.

In the domain of security, the Obama Administration substantially contracted the scope of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWoT), leading to Azerbaijan losing its status as a crucial locus in the struggle against international terrorism. Concurrently, the Obama Administration's overtures to cooperate with Iran and the subsequent signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) altered the perception of Iran from an existential enemy necessitating support to a state with which the US could engage. While Russia's geopolitical expansionism emerged as a potential gravitational force in the region, the Obama Administration, considering the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict as an intercommunal rather than an international affair marked by Russian expansionism, did not respond to Russia's growing influence in the South Caucasus.

Against this backdrop, Russia continued to consolidate its mediator role in the NK conflict without encountering opposition or counteraction from the US. Consequently, Azerbaijan and Armenia, disillusioned by the inconsistent and lackluster engagement of the US and the Minsk Group, lost trust in these entities. The violent clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in April 2016 underscored the waning US interest in security matters in the South Caucasus. The OSCE's Minsk Group meetings in May and June 2016 yielded no tangible results, with the ceasefire eventually brokered under Russian leadership. An International Crisis Group (ICG) report in June 2017 underscored the consequences of Western inaction, arguing that the absence of proactive Western participation left the conflicting parties with no genuine alternative to Russian mediation Nagorno-Karabakh's Gathering War Clouds. International Crisis Group. 2017. URL:

https://bit.ly/4b1sFNI.

The Trump Administration seems similarly disinclined to invest substantial political or military capital in the peaceful resolution of the NK conflict or in ensuring Azerbaijan's security and independence. Although Trump's National Security Strategy (NSS) document National Security Strategy of the United States of America. December 2017. P. 47. URL: https://bit.ly/48VIW56 acknowledged Russia's subversive measures in Europe and willingness to violate regional sovereignty, it has not articulated a concrete policy aimed at supporting the independence and sovereignty of South Caucasus countries.

Furthermore, President Trump's evident disregard for democracy promotion is notable. His belief that promoting democracy abroad is not in the United States' interest is reflected in proposed budget cuts to funding for US-supported NGO networks and USAID Remarks by the President at Clinton Global Initiative. The White House. 2014, September 23. URL: https://bit.ly/48CF8WN. Trump has signaled a hands-off approach to the internal affairs of Muslim- majority countries, aligning with various authoritarian leaders and praising them for their perceived strong leadership. Consequently, tensions between the US and Azerbaijan over human rights matters have diminished, with Trump even extending a congratulatory message to President Aliyev after his re-election in 2018, strategically sidestepping mention of democracy and human rights concerns Donald Trump sends message to Ilham Aliyev: I look forward to working with you. Report.az. 2018.

URL: https://bit.ly/47H6A4q.

Russian Perspective on United States Policy Towards Azerbaijan

During the stage spanning from 1993 to 1996 in Russian foreign policy, a discernible shift unfolded with the waning influence of liberal Westernist ideas in favor of a resurgence of fundamentalist nationalist principles. With the formulation of the Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev introduced the "Yeltsin Doctrine." This doctrine contended that Russia, as the most efficacious guarantor of stability across the expanse of the former Soviet Union, should undertake the role of peacemaking within the post-Soviet political landscape Jackson N. Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS. P. 69.. Andrei Kozyrev, in a 1994 speech, asserted that the states within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltics constituted the focal point of Russia's vital interests: “States of the CIS and Baltics constitute the area of concentration of Russia's vital interests. This is also the area from which the main threats to these interests emanate... I think that raising the question about complete withdrawal and removal of any Russian military presence in the countries of near abroad is just an extreme, if not extremist, suggestion comparable to the idea of sending [Russian] tanks to all the former republics to establish there some imperial order.” МИД избавляется от “беловежского синдрома”. Газета «Коммерсантъ», 19.01.1994. URL:

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/68994

Following Boris Yeltsin's departure from the Russian presidency due to health issues in 2001, Vladimir Putin, his Prime Minister, assumed office, prompting speculation about potential shifts in Russian foreign policy. Putin, renowned for his resolute actions against Chechnya during his premiership, triggered concerns that Russia might adopt a neo-imperial stance toward former Soviet republics, coupled with discussions on the emergence of Eurasianism Berman I. Slouching toward Eurasia? Perspectives. 2001.Vol. 12, № 1 (September-October). P. 1-9. URL: https://open.bu.edu/handle/2144/3589. However, some scholars, such as Akerman, Graeme, and Giorgadze, positioned Putin within the pragmatist school, suggesting a continuity of policies rather than a radical departure Akerman E., Herd G.P. Russian Foreign Policy: The CIS and the Baltic State. In Ross, C. (Ed.). Russian Politics under Putin. Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press, 2004. P. 270-271.. Giorgadze outlined the key tenets of `Putin's Doctrine' encapsulated in four documents Giorgadze K. Russia: Regional Partner of Aggressor? The Review of International Affairs. 2002. Vol. 2, № 1 (Autumn). P. 64.. The Defense Doctrine asserted Russia's right to a first nuclear strike under specific critical conditions for national security Russia's Military Doctrine. Arms Control Association, 2000. URL:

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-05/russias-military-doctrine. The National Security Doctrine rejected attempts to establish a unipolar world, advocating for a multipolar order and regional spheres of influence to diminish American power Russia's National Security Concept. Arms Control Association, 2000. URL:

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-01/features/russias-national-security-concept. The Foreign Policy Doctrine envisioned Russia as the dominant Eurasian power, aiming to exert influence over neighbors and foster friendly states along its borders. The Concept of International Security identified free media, television, and the internet as potential threats to Russian security, emphasizing the need for management Gul M. Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations after 1989. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. 2008. Vol. 7, № 2-3. P. 47-66.. In the context of Azerbaijan, these doctrines illuminate Russia's strategic approach, implying a desire for regional dominance and influence over neighboring states, including considerations of their alignment with Russian interests.

Russia's stance on Azerbaijan-USA relations is deeply rooted in its historical and strategic interests in the near abroad, influenced by evolving domestic politics and foreign policy goals. As the successor of the Soviet empire, Russia harbors strategic interests in the North Caucasus, aiming to maintain the region within its sphere of influence and prevent encroachment by other major powers, particularly the United States. This sensitivity is intricately tied to Russia's perceived global status and prestige. Moreover, Russia pursues economic interests in Azerbaijan, seeking control over its abundant natural resources, particularly oil, to secure access to industrial and defense facilities. This control is envisioned to guarantee a market for Russian products and create revenue streams through transit fees for Caspian-to-Europe oil and gas pipelines. The control of Azerbaijani oil would not only enhance Russia's standing as a major player in the global energy market but also fortify its influence in the international arena Bakhshaliyev A. 1990 sonrasi Rusya-Azerbaycan ilijkileri. Karabuk: Karabuk Universitesi, 2021.. Additionally, Russia views its involvement in Azerbaijan as a means to protect its territorial integrity, responding comprehensively to potential regional rebellions, such as Chechnya Ambrosio T. Authoritarian backlash: Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union. Farnham: Ashgate Publ. Company, 2009.. Thus, Moscow aims to ensure that Caucasus states, especially Azerbaijan, do not pose threats to Russian territorial integrity by supporting any form of rebellion. Understanding these multifaceted interests provides a crucial backdrop for comprehending Russia's nuanced approach to Azerbaijan's relations with the United States.

The Caspian Sea's legal status has historically been a contentious issue between Azerbaijan and Russia, significantly impacting their relations. The disagreement, rooted in Russia and Iran's contention that the Caspian is a lake rather than a sea, revolved around demands for equal and cooperative exploitation of its reserves. Azerbaijan, along with other littoral states, asserted its right to exploit its own territorial waters. Russia, particularly concerned about the strategic implications of potential European and American interests in its near abroad, opposed Azerbaijan's early attempts to collaborate with Western oil companies and insisted on equal revenue sharing among littoral states Zainullina N. Political and legal status of the Caspian Sea: The position of the Republic of Kazakhstan in regard to the Caspian Sea. Kocaeli: Kocaeli Universitesi, 2020.. The initial opposition intensified when Azerbaijan, under Elchibey's leadership, signed an agreement with a British Petroleum-led consortium in 1992. Russia's rejection, articulated in a letter to the UK, was interpreted as resistance to perceived encroachment on its interests. Another factor behind Russia's continued opposition was Azerbaijan's refusal of Russian military peacekeeping in Nagorno- Karabakh Bdlukbasi S. Azerbaijan: A Political History. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.. However, as Russian interests were partially accommodated in Azerbaijan's oil industry, and Western powers de facto accepted the Caspian as a sea, Russia's stance evolved. In 1998, a mutual agreement was signed, recognizing Azerbaijan's right to exploit waters coinciding with its borders. This change in Russia's position marked the resolution of a significant obstacle to normalizing relations between Azerbaijan and Russia Bakhshaliyev A. 1990 sonrasi Rusya-Azerbaycan ilijkileri....

Conclusions

The author identifies 4 periods of US-Azerbaijan relations in 1991-2020: 1) 19912001, 2) 2001-2007, 3) 2007-2015, and 4) 2015-2020.

From 1991 to 2001, the United States underwent a transformative phase in its policy towards Azerbaijan, marked by an increased focus on regional stability and economic partnerships through energy initiatives like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Security concerns in the South Caucasus also influenced policy decisions, while considerations of democracy and human rights were weighed against broader strategic imperatives. This period set the foundation for subsequent shifts in U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan.

In 2001-2007, U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan underwent significant changes, prioritizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and intensifying efforts in combatting international terrorism. The Global War on Terror played a crucial role, leading to strengthened U.S.-Azerbaijan relations, though democracy promotion took a back seat to energy and security interests.

The period from 2007 to 2015 saw a nuanced shift, with decreased U.S. focus on energy and security, increased attention to democracy and human rights, and challenges arising from Azerbaijan's opposition to the Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement. Azerbaijan's strategic concerns regarding Nagorno-Karabakh intensified, and U.S. engagement faced limitations in influencing regional outcomes.

Between 2015 and 2020, U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan further disengaged across energy, security, and democracy promotion dimensions, influenced by factors like the unconventional oil and gas revolution, decreasing Central Asia significance, rising isolationism, and the Trump administration's priorities. The U.S. response to regional dynamics, notably the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, showcased a trend of reduced involvement. Finally, from 1993 to 1996, Russian foreign policy shifted towards fundamentalist nationalist principles, laying the foundation for an assertive stance in its near abroad, including relations with Azerbaijan. Putin's pragmatist approach, outlined in `Putin's Doctrine,' emphasized continuity, and Russia's interests in Azerbaijan centered on historical and strategic factors. The resolution of Caspian Sea disputes in 1998 marked a positive turn in Azerbaijan-Russia relations.

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