Lebanese Immigrants in Moscow: Development of a Religious Identity

Muslim religion is also quite often related to Christianity. Informants frequently put it in one row with Islam: “If there are three religions sitting in front of me, a Muslim, a Christian, then they should understand that God is the same for everyone, this energy is one among all people” (Faris, m.). Here it is visible that not only the division between branches of Islam are removed, but also on a higher level - between different confessions. Religion is united; God is one for all people. Such an understanding of religion is also above attributing it to any locations. The acceptance for diverse religious views and ways of practicing religion can be linked to the fact that Lebanon is historically a multiconfessional country. This is reflected not only in culture, but also in politics - Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with confessionalism, in which high ranks are distributed among religious groups. The conflict between Muslims and Christians during the Civil war of 1975-1990 seems to have had no effect on the attitudes of Muslim Lebanese. One Shia interviewee describes how both confessions are intertwined in the experience of her family: “In our family, we went to churches in Lebanon, we did all the stuff, and I even studied at a Christian school for some time. We ate that bread and drank wine. I was very small. We studied at a Christian school and therefore we are open. We were holding hands with Christians, Sunni, Muslims and others” (Zahra, f.).

Christianity is also understood in terms of allowed and forbidden actions. It is viewed as more “free” than Islam: “There were no restrictions, everything was open. For example, in our religion dancing is forbidden, and in their religion it's allowed. If I want to shake hands with my good male friend, I can't. And among them it's allowed. This is the difference, customs and traditions, religious rules” (Zahra, f.). Religious diversity in the home country, as well as the experience of Muslims going to Christian schools that was common in my informants' childhood, has had effect on this religious tolerance. Therefore, their religious identity in this sense has already been constructed before migration. The latter does not seem to have an influence on its development, rather than just be a logical continuation of the previous experience in Lebanon.

This continuation is especially evident in case of men, who form mixed families with women of Orthodox Christian background with low levels of religiosity as well: “My wife, for example, is Orthodox. But she doesn't know what is Orthodoxy” (Kareem, m.). Male informants were either married to Russian women themselves or often mentioned their Lebanese friends having a Russian non-Muslim wife. At the same time, there are no informants who reported their compatriots getting married to Muslim Russian women. They actually tend to associate more with Russian Orthodox Christians than with Muslims.

Members of the Lebanese community define their religious identity in terms of religious tolerance. They see their religious practice as “relaxed”, not excessive, and view positively a moderate approach to religion. The informants relate their religious identity to a more “free” Christianity and sometimes to more conservative manifestations of Islam that they have had experienced. Talking about her mother, Jasmeen (f.) says: “… she's older, so she knows more, I think. She went to hajj. […] But she's cool, don't think that she's very traditional, no”. The female interviewee identifies a “normal” religion as closer to casual and open than to conservative and traditional.

Generally, relation to other beliefs and confessions is not attached to locations or one's former and present views. It is brought out as something solid and unchangeable. However, there are ways in which the Lebanese interact with religious diversity in the host environment. They either try to stay away from any religious diversification and prefer social environment with no religious markers (“I try not to talk to religious people, because I'm not interested in listening to lectures on religion. That's why almost everyone around me is not religious” (Faris, m.)), or stay within their denomination (which is mostly true for women), or continue to interact with people of various religious backgrounds. The latter happens in two ways that may be described as peaceful religious interaction and conflicting one. According to Kareem (m.), migration experience unites representatives of different confessions: “Here they… Look, you are Lebanese, I am Lebanese, you are Christian, I am Muslim, you are Druze, and Shia, and Sunni, and so on. We, as Lebanese, are all [together]. Problems are in Lebanon, not here.” Although having religious conversations, they feel united under one nation and opposed to the “chaos” that is happening in their home environment. Religious identity does not strengthen on this basis, but rather a national one. The Muslim Lebanese may visit churches and share their religious life with Christians. One story told by Kareem (m.) is especially representative:

“I was walking with my friend. He's Christian, I'm Muslim. I said: “Hey, let's go [to a church]”. He said “You're Muslim, what for?” I said “What's the difference? What does a person need to do to become Christian?” He said “you should be sprinkled with water, baptized”. He started pouring water on me and stuff. I said “That's it, now I'm Christian?” He said “Yes. What do I need to do to become Muslim?” Me: “Ashhadu anna la ilaha illa llah wa muhammadun rasulu llah [I testify that there is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God]” That's it.”

Another way is described by Hussein (m.): “There are people, for example, Sunnis, they work at the same place as me. Sometimes the topic of politics is discussed. And we start arguing: “why do you help Bashar Assad, Russia is killing Muslims.” Well, they don't have it right, roughly speaking. We just sit and an argument begins.” According to this informant, there is an opposite path of being engaged in religious interaction, which presupposes some tension between religious opponents. However, it happens not among compatriots but among Lebanese and people of other ethnic and national backgrounds, like migrants from Central Asia - in case of Hussein, it was a “Tajik guy”, who “used to work at my [job].” He also mentioned other Central Asians among his colleagues.

Apart from relating their religion to other religions, Lebanese Muslims bring out their religiosity in relation to other locations inside Lebanon. A great variety of confessional groups settle in diverse locations of the country and shape their religious life. The interviewees reflect that diversity when they talk about religion: there seems to be no single view of home environment. Faris (m.) recollects his image of home: “For example, where I used to live, there are Sunnis who practice tough Islam, and Shiites are the same, they have their own regions [..] But in Beirut, everything is mixed, that's why there are no such things”. This view is confirmed by Hussein (m.): “In Lebanon, religion is various. Religion in the South, in Dahyeh - it is calm, no one insults, no one does this or that. And in Tripoli, in other places there are Sunnis… They may offend or something”. The interviewees acknowledge the diversity of ways of living the religion in their home environment and place themselves in relation to these other ways.

Moreover, the Lebanese see religious diversity on the level of a “house”, or an extended family. They point out aging and parents' rural origin as factors that raise religiosity level inside a family: “In general, Muslims come back [to religion] in older ages, when they are already 40, plus-minus. Those who used to say “I don't believe in god” come back […] They suppose it's time to wash away the sins” (Faris, m.). While older relatives are mostly religious, the rest live their lives depending on the situation in each house (“Everything depends on the house” Kareem (m.)). Lebanese immigrants describe the diversity in their families as a confirmation of “normal” religiosity and their connection to the “Western” and Russian culture, making parallels to behavior and practices: “If you're Muslim, it doesn't mean that you wear an abayya [a black cloth covering the body] or… the black scarf. My mom wears just a hijab, two sisters do not wear anything. When they came here, it was also normal to them. I've seen some Russian women wearing headscarves, too” (Nisma, f.).

Although there are a lot of similarities to the religious context of Russia, the informants also indicate the differences between living a religion in Russia and in Lebanon. Although both places are considered diverse, relatively free and liberal, the context of Lebanon presupposes more contrast between the public and the private. While religious practices are performed openly, personal religious views are not always expressed freely:

“But in Lebanon I couldn't have talked to you like that. You should understand me correctly here. I've told you: there's God or there's no God - it's a loose concept. You understand me, I understand you. In Lebanon, there are narrow-minded people. I couldn't talk to them like that. To protect myself, I wouldn't say such things. In Lebanon, I have to be a diplomat, to say things that you need, not the ones that I need”. (Kareem, m.).

Other interviewees discussed forbidden and allowed practices that characterize Russia in comparison to their home country. There is also an issue of private and public spaces mentioned:

“You know, in all our Arabic countries, there're things that you're not allowed to do, so you do secretly. For example, here you can have a boyfriend when you're 14, you can make sexual relation, right? In our region, even for Christians in Lebanon, it's not allowed. You go to have a sexual relation before getting married. That's the difference. That's why in our countries some people make it secretly. But here - no. Maybe here they are more honest” (Jasmeen, f.).

Other participants have noticed that Russian environment is “nice”, “open”, and “open-minded”.

There are differences of perceiving a host environment that are based on gender. For men, Russia is viewed as a place for professional development without any religious underpinnings. They describe Russia as a “secular” and “Orthodox” state. Many Lebanese, including most of my male interviewees, form mixed families with Russian women. There is a special term polovinka (“a half” in Russian) that is widespread among the Arab community. It is used to describe second generation immigrants with parents of Arab and Russian origin. Coming for education and business, the Lebanese create a new secular life for themselves.

Therefore, Russia is seen as forming a space where male interviewees can pursue professional opportunities and also marry. By doing this, certain male interviewees carve a new life in which religion may not have an important place. They embrace a secular lifestyle. At the same time, they may have made the choice of living a non-religious lifestyle already in Lebanon, but have more freedom to do this in Russia.

Women mostly live a more isolated life and form their view of this country based on their personal experience in the field (which is rather scarce): “I like living here, except for the cold. I don't have friends. I only have two Lebanese, but they are too far from here. I should spend 1-1.5h in route, you know? But I like. In general, I'm happy” (Jasmeen, f.). There is lack of interaction even for those who speak Russian language. The main communication is held with the family during the day time (all women stated that they “talk every day”), children (for some of the informants) and the husband in the evening. Main events like holiday celebrations are also held with the husband and with children (if they are present): “For example, for Women's day my husband congratulates me and we drink tea. And for Mother's day, we actually celebrate it: we go to a restaurant, eat nice food” (Zahra, f.). For women, this country does not have a particular meaning. It is not connected to religion, whether it is expressed stronger or weaker. Neither does it relate to professional development. In case of my informants, women follow their husbands.

The topic of politics always arises among male Lebanese informants when discussing religion. Many members of the Arab communities in Russia came to the country in the second half of the last century, when the ideas of communism were very strong in the Middle East. The Lebanese who supported this ideology came to the USSR for education since they were receiving larger quotas. At that time, atheism was also much more widespread in the region than it is now, which influenced the world view of the Lebanese to a great extent. Faris (m.) says: “I can't call myself a proper Muslim, because I'm a former communist”. He refers to his non-religious background to explain his present religious identity. Amir (m.) uses the discourse to distinguish “real” believers from “not real” ones: “There are people who sincerely believe in God, in Allah, and there are the ones who just follow the trend. Like back then, Communism was the thing, and everyone said “I'm communist, I'm atheist”. But who knows how they actually thought. And now it's getting popular to be religious.”

Religious identity is also constructed in relation to the current political situation in the Middle East. Rise of radical Islam and emergence of new extremist groups like ISIS has brought a new reference point in identifying own religious views: “ISIS is not a real Islam” says Amir (m.). “What, Muslim religion has told them [members of ISIS] to eat [human] liver or heart? Is that a religion? No,” - confirms Kareem (m.). These views actually correspond with quantitative data provided by Pew Research Center (Aug 2017): 100% of the Lebanese people disapprove ISIS - the highest rate in the region. Mostly having a Communist background with low levels of religiosity, and viewing Russia as a secular space, Lebanese immigrants perceive radicalism as an intolerable phenomenon in their host society. In this sense, it is interesting how they define radicalism. According to the interviewees, any public manifestation of one's religious views is excessive. When asked about choosing a place for living in Moscow, Kareem (m.) replies: “There are no such people [who settle near mosques on purpose]. We don't have radicalism here. [] If there's a mosque close to you, you go. But if the mosque is on Prospekt Mira, and you live on Yugo-zapadnaya [metro station] or Odintsovo, no God tells you: “go, drive for four hours in order to pray”. For Lebanese immigrants, spreading religious ideas is literally against the law.

Indeed, a fear of extremism, terrorist and other security threats does exist in Russia, even on the official level (Light, 2012). In this sense, the opinions of my male informants correspond with the official ones. It might be true that this is due to a long period of time that these Lebanese have stayed in Moscow, as well as high levels of self-assimilation with the host society and official Russian political track. The Lebanese state their support for Putin's foreign policy and their blame for potential extremist threats.

Russia is also referred to the political and religious situation in the home environment. War in Syria that affects the whole Middle Eastern region is mentioned very often to indicate personal political position and attribute oneself to the host society: “I'm a patriot. A patriot of Russia. Even my nephews defended their country from ISIS, from everyone” (Hussein, m.). Using the political topic, the interviewees make a connection between their home and host society: “What does Russia do in Syria? It stands against terrorism. And there are Lebanese people who fight against these terrorists on the side of Russia” (Kareem, m.).

Therefore, informants view religion from two perspectives. The first one is shared between all interviewees and is connected to belief in God and private practices, and is perceived as normal. The second is shared among male informants and is connected to public manifestations in a host environment and is linked to politics and power. This perspective is viewed as a wrong one. According to my informants, combining religion and power is dangerous for the society. When religion is used by a vicious leader, it results in violence, absence of tolerance and other devastating things. Thus religion has to be excluded from any political institutions. The fact that the interviewees brought out this topic by themselves may be explained by their experience in the home country. Having been constantly engaged in the political issues of the region, they seem to transfer their ways of explaining the environment to their present life in Russia.



Conclusion

The inductive approach to interview analysis was used to reveal common categories mentioned and described by my informants in order to answer the questions of how the Lebanese migrants or members of the Lebanese community in Russia live and understand their religion and how the migration experience influenced it. The topics that emerged during the interviews, through which the informants identified their personal religion (or manifested religious identity) and religiosity of others, are religious practices (dressing, prayer, fasting, haram and halal practices, pilgrimage), religion in relation to other religions (Christianity, Shia and Sunni Islam), locations (regions inside Lebanon, Iraq, Russia) and politics (Communism, conflicts in Lebanon, extremism). When talking about religious topics, they narrated their experiences and opinions through the categories of collective/individual, private/public, male/female, forbidden/permissible, relaxed/strict, accepted/excessive. While some religious identity descriptions were used in relation to the informants' previous lives in Lebanon and present lives in Russia, other ones indicate a “supra-national” religious identity that is not tied to any locations and is articulated by the interviewees as solid and unchanged.

According to some studies, wearing religious clothing is not only meant to create a familiar environment among immigrants, but also serves as a visual identity marker for other migrants. This was shown on the example of Somali women in Canada, who start practicing Islam even stricter than at home to respond to `othering' (Ajrouch & Kusow, 2007). That process seems to fall into Peek's declared identity status (Peek, 2005), when a person starts emphasizing his or her religious views and demonstrates visual religious identifications as a reaction to negative attitudes or threats from the religious majority.

However, unlike other Muslim immigrants who come to a secular host environment, the Lebanese do not reinforce their religious identity through the visible practices in the settings of Moscow. Even those community members who stated their strong religious commitment do not wear any ostentatious religious markers: women do not cover up their hair (as I saw during my interviews and as they confirmed to me); men do not wear beards or any religious clothing. The Lebanese insist on the possibility of personal choice and diversity of views in their home region. When talking about others, the informants connect the choice of Muslim dress code to ageing and rural background, but are not convinced by the necessity of it. For male interviewees, dressing is seen differently in relation to the two locations of Russia and Lebanon: while in their home environment it is perceived as common but not related to them personally, in the host environment it is viewed as excessive and sometimes even linked to extremism. According to them, the religion should not be visible. Since none of the informants claimed to ever wear religious clothing and none have mentioned previous views on it, that would differ from the present opinion, it is not possible to talk about a new stage of religious identity expressed through clothing in Russia.

A prayer is a practice that did not change significantly upon migration as well, but due to different reasons. Its performance differs for males and females: unlike men, women are not allowed to pray in public spaces, except for secluded zones of mosques. Praying in mosques is not common among Lebanese women; therefore they only perform it in the private space of homes. This means that they did not have to readjust in a host environment, since private settings are similar. Lebanese men, who tend to insist on invisible religion, did change their practice of salat - it shifted from public to private and from collective to individual, even though they are provided with opportunities to perform prayers in Russian mosques. However, other male informants did not observe this practice initially, so they did not have to readjust similarly to women.

Living a religion during the month of Ramadan shifted from collective to individual after the migration. For many informants, it used to be a major collective feast in Lebanon with extended family and friends reunification during the whole period, but in Russia they tend to celebrate it with nuclear family or individually. Although there is a community with similar religious views, the Lebanese seem to prefer solitary fasting and celebrations at home. Women and men also differ in how they view this practice: the former are more sensitive to its collectivity/solitariness and perceive fasting as a spiritual experience, while for the latter Ramadan seems to have a less symbolic meaning.

The categories of permissible/forbidden were used to describe practices and to indicate their acceptance or rejection. The practices of alcohol consumption, eating pork, wearing short clothes, having extramarital and premarital sexual relations are discussed in this context. Here, similarly to the case of dressing, the interviewees articulate personal choice and diversity in their home environment. Since Russia is also seen as a “free” and diverse space, the Lebanese can perform these haram/halal practices based on their personal views, which mostly do not correspond with common Islamic rules and did not before the migration, according to them. There are also differences based on gender: men employ these notions to describe personal religiosity, while women only refer them to abstract others.

Pilgrimage is less frequently mentioned when discussing religious identity. None of the informants have completed a major pilgrimage hajj, but they used it to identify its contribution to the spiritual growth of others. Spirituality was also evident in narratives about visiting Shia holiday of Ashura in Iraq, which was put on the same level as hajj by Shia informants. Since pilgrimage is linked to a “third” location and did not receive a lot of attention, it is not clear whether migration has influenced perception of this practice.

Examples of the practices described above show that the tendency to practice a stricter Islam in a host environment as a way to build a religious identity, which exists among other Muslim immigrant communities (e.g. Haddad, 1994), does not work in the case of Moscow Lebanese. Unlike the former, Lebanese Muslims tend to experience their religions in a rather individualistic, personal, private way in Russia by opposition to Lebanon where it was lived in a more collective, public and visible way. At the same time, they also cannot be seen as having had a strict religious lifestyle in Lebanon; the way they live their religion in Russia does not differ fundamentally from Lebanon except for a more pronounced individual, private and personal dimension. Other studies on migrant Lebanese communities in secular host societies (Ajrouch & Kusow, 2007) have shown that “announcements of religious identity challenge placement into dominant social status” and “alter an identity from acceptable to unacceptable” by the majority. Although for some members of the Lebanese community in Moscow such religious manifestations are not seen as acceptable initially, this finding may still be an appropriate explanation for the public to private shift among those Lebanese who express higher levels of religiosity.

The informants position their religious identity in relation to other religions or branches of religion. The majority of the interviewees demonstrate clear tolerance towards representatives of Sunni/Shia Islam and Christianity. When talking about other religions, the informants use the notions of “strict” and “free”, where Christianity is usually understood as the latter. They also place practices in other religions between the poles of halal and haram and this way relate to them. There are a few informants demonstrating less understanding towards the “opposite” branch of Islam as an unreasonably “stricter” one with much more prohibitions (that fall under the haram category). Christianity, however, does not receive any criticism from their side. In spite of that, religion for the most Lebanese is not divided but united and is not linked to any location. They talk about confessions as of having the same meaning and value, disregarding the distinction between “us” and “them” which is present in the Muslim discourse (Varshaver & Rocheva, 2014). Having a background that is always characterized as diverse and mixed, they project their experiences to the present situation in a host society, building a social environment that is diverse as well. They do not use Islam as the uniting factor in their migration experience, but rather build connections with other confessions, like Christians and non-religious people, unlike it is shown for other settings in other studies (Humphrey, 1998). For example, many male informants are married to Russian Christian Orthodox wives or have Russian Christian Orthodox mothers. Mixed marriages are common, at least on the side of Muslim men. None of the male informants were married to Russian Muslim women.

Comparing this finding to situations inside other migrant groups in Moscow, it is possible to say that the Lebanese definitely do not form communities based on religious similarities, or as Varshaver and Rocheva (2014) call them, Muslim poly-ethnic communities. It was previously shown by Varshaver and Rocheva that there are two factors that influence and control formation of a Muslim community: frequent community meetings for religious purposes (like gatherings for Friday prayers) and a setting for universality, which means that the Muslim community is in principle poly-ethnic and presupposes a religious identity domination over an ethnic and national ones. The domination of religious over ethnic identity among immigrants was also discussed in Peek (2005), while the prevailing meaning of a religious identity over a racial one was shown in Ajrouch and Kusow (2007). None of these studies have addressed religious identities of the Lebanese migrants, the authors were rather interested in visible minorities from Africa: Senegal, Somali, Guinea (Ajrouch & Kusow, 2007, partly Varshaver & Rocheva, 2014), South and Southeast Asia (Peek, 2005), North Caucasus and Uzbekistan (Varshaver & Rocheva, 2014) in Western societies. Therefore it is interesting to add the Lebanese migrant group to the discussion.

Factors that shape a Muslim community were not found in the case of Muslim Lebanese in Moscow. Neither do they participate in collective religious events themselves or with other Arab Muslims, nor do they clearly associate with Russian Muslims and engage with them in collective feasts such as Ramadan or in collective praying at mosques. Their religious identity does not dominate over ethnic, national or racial ones. Members of the Muslim Lebanese community also do not use their religion to develop social capital with either other Lebanese or other Muslims, which is different from Peek's (2005) finding on visible Muslim minorities in the US. It is more apparent that the national identity of Lebanese migrants in Russia is stronger in this sense. The informants emphasize that they, as Lebanese, unite on the basis of a common homeland and oppose themselves to the disunity (caused by the political instability) of their compatriots back in the home country. It is possible to relate this finding to homeland-rooted communities (zemlyachestvo), revealed by Varshaver and Rocheva (2014). However, some more investigation on networks inside the Lebanese community is needed to correlate them appropriately. Also, Roy's concept of `globalised' Islam (2004) may work in case of Muslim Lebanese immigrants, since they do support connections with other Muslims from the diaspora all over the world (many have mentioned relatives from countries other than Russia and Lebanon) and do not connect their religious identity to local communities, as well as ethnic characteristics. This assumption also needs more examination.

When talking about religion in relation to locations, the informants stress the diversity as a characteristic of their home environment. They used to live a religion in many ways in the Middle East, depending on the context. Lebanon is seen as consisting of various regions, each one described from strictly, conservatively religious to mixed and relaxed. Each region presupposes different visual religious markers and different behaviors. The same is true for the “third” places like Iraq for Shia pilgrimage. Diversity is also observed on a lower level - inside a family. Lebanese community members state freedom of choice as the basic principle for living religion in their families, but also mention that everything depends on each “house”. They link this principle to the settings of Russia. Russia is also seen as a country that allows to make decisions based on personal values (although demonstrating religiosity is not a part of this freedom, according to them) and is also seen as diverse. Many employed informants feel themselves a part of this country (“a patriot of Russia” Kareem, m.). In contrast to Lebanon, where there is a stronger inconsistency between private and public opinion expression, Russian environment is viewed as open to any ideas, except for extremist ones. For male Lebanese, Russia is a setting where they can build a career and shape a new secular life (e.g. in case of mixed marriages). Living a religion does not change, but becomes more pronounced in terms of its low expression (“[Lebanese Muslims] came here not for the sake of religion”, Kareem, m.). For female informants, it is a more “difficult” and solitary space (“Here, in Russia... I can say I'm more lonely. Yes. I go out, go shopping and ride a metro, but mostly I don't mix up with anyone” Marwa, f.) in comparison to a collective and easy space of Lebanon, both for regular and religious lives.

There is also a difference in how Lebanese men and women view religion in relation to politics. While the majority of women do not make this connection, men always try to insert religion into the political discourse. They acknowledge the influence of Communist ideas, which were widespread in the region in the second half of the 20^th century, on their religious identity, that is rather weak. This lack of religiosity in the home environment of that period has continued to the present day host environment with no influence of a migration experience. They also relate themselves to the present situation in the home region: oppose themselves to any extremist ideas spread by ISIS, pronouncing a difference between terrorism and “real” Islam, and criticizing political situation in general. A strong connection is made between official Russian policy and their own political views. In addition to that, they state the danger of religion being involved in power. This strong manifestation of political concernment is not unique for the settings of Russia. The Lebanese seem to take part in political discourse in other host countries (Humphrey, 1998). This may be connected to the constant vulnerability in their home region, which shapes their worldview.

Analysis of mentioned practices has revealed that religion in Lebanon is lived collectively, publically and visibly, while religious views are not expressed openly. Religion in Russia is lived individually, privately, invisibly, but it is an open space for opinion expression. Visible religion (like clothing and public praying) here is understood as excessive. There is a gendered difference in both practice and perception of Islam in Russia, since men and women initially live this religion differently. Practices that are connected to private and public spaces did not go through any change for women - they perform them privately in both settings - but shifted from public to private in case of men, in spite of possibilities for public and collective religious practice provided in Moscow. Women are more sensitive to the shift from collective religion to individual one (e.g. during Ramadan), since in their new setting they live solitarily and with much less interaction than in their home environment. Women perceive their religion as a more spiritual experience than men, which is visible in case of praying and pilgrimage.

Religious identity in a home environment for the Lebanese immigrants is based on diversity, personal choice, and is often influenced by a Communist ideology. Therefore, it cannot be considered strong, especially taking into account their liberal views on necessary practices and commonly forbidden actions in Islam. Religious diversity of the home environment logically continues to a host environment. Russia is seen as a setting for career and secular life among male immigrants, while women appear to be their partners' followers. Due to this reason or because of cultural differences, members of the Lebanese community do not associate with local Islam. They rather interact with Christians or non-religious people when shaping their new life. Religion is often above confessional differences.

These peculiarities of Muslim migrant groups in Russia were not discussed before. Also, unlike it was shown in a number of previously mentioned studies on Muslim immigrants in secular societies, religious identity of Muslim Lebanese does not strengthen in a host country. Although they constituted a religious majority (especially Sunni Muslims) in a home environment and changed the status to a religious minority in Moscow, there are no changes in perceiving a religion indicated. Religion does not become a uniting factor in a new environment, contrary to previous findings. The informants stress their national identity much more often. They also identify with Western and Russian world view, especially when it comes to politics.

I propose several tracks for a further research based on the findings presented above. Examination of networks of the Lebanese migrants in Moscow on a local level may properly attribute them to other migrant communities of Russia's capital. Is it actually possible to call them a homeland-rooted community in which they identify with home areas more than with ethnicity or religion? It would be also useful to analyze the network on a global level, that would help to place them in a wider Lebanese diaspora and check the validity of the `globalised' Islam concept, which would possibly add to the explanation of their religious identity. Another proposition is to look at other Lebanese communities in Russia, preferably in more religious settings. For example, it may be fruitful to compare Lebanese communities in Moscow and Kazan (if a proper community is revealed) in order to see whether a potentially more common environment would produce a different change in religious identity upon migration. Also, it may shed more light on interactions between Lebanese and indigenous Russian Muslims. Would they still associate with Christians more, still perceive Russia as a secular space or would they strengthen their Muslim identity? There seem to be many areas to explore.



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Appendices

Appendix 1: Social-demographic characteristics of the interviewees

Name	Age, gender	Other information
Amir	49, male	Sunni, married, employed, 15 years in Moscow
Faris	31, male	Sunni, married, employed, 5 years in Moscow
Hussein	50, male	Shia, married, employed, 20 years in Moscow
Jasmeen	29, female	Shia, married, housewife, 7 years in Moscow
Kareem	50, male	Sunni, married, employed, 30 years in Moscow
Marwa	41, female	Sunni, married, employed, 14 years in Moscow
Nisma	32, female	Shia, married, housewife, 6 years in Moscow
Zahra	35, female	Shia, married, housewife, 5 years in Moscow



Appendix 2: Interview guidelines

Part 1. Setting the connection, establishing trust, revealing interviewee's biography, giving space to talk about religion spontaneously (not prompted).

1. Can you please describe how you decided to come to Russia? How did it happen?

2. How do you like it here? What do you like and what not?

3. What is your typical week? What do you do?

4. Do you face any difficulties? What are they?

5. For you personally, how is life in Moscow different from life in Lebanon?

6. How often do you talk to your family there? What are their views about your departure and life here?

7. Do you have any friends here? What do you do? Do you celebrate holidays together? Where and how?

Part 2. Directing the interviewee into religious topics (if not mentioned before).

1. Where do you meet with your friends? Do you ever meet in a mosque? What do you do there? How do you like mosques here? How are they different from Lebanese?

2. Do you have difficult experiences at your workplace?

3. Do you know any Russian Muslims? How do you hang out/communicate? What do you usually talk about?

4. What are your thoughts about Ramadan in Russia? Do you fast? For you personally, how does the experience in Moscow differ from Lebanon?

5. Can you describe what's your family like? Do you consider yourself similar to them in religious views?

Part 3. Deeper religious questions.

1. How do you practice your religion in Moscow?

2. Do you feel more religious here or in Lebanon? Why?

3. What does it mean for you to be religious?

4. What about other Lebanese? How do they view religion?

5. What are your thoughts about Islam/Muslims in Russia?

6. What does the prayer mean to you? Hajj?

7. What is God to you?

8. Have you always sticked to the same views on religion? What did it mean to be Muslim in school? University? After migration?

9. When did you realize that being Muslim is important to you? What happened?

10. Has it ever happened that you questioned your religious views? Why? How did it change you? Have you solved all the questions?

Follow-up questions: Can you give an example? What happened? Who participated? What did it mean to you? Did it change your attitude? How?

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