Conclusions

In current paper we study the influence of the range of offshore ownership indicators on firm's performance in emerging economies using the empirical sample for 151 Russian companies for 2004 - 2013 years. Firstly, we find additional evidence of Russian ownership structure patterns that there is indeed a high share of offshore ownership, both ultimate anonymous one and intermediate non-anonymous. Secondly, we reveal that offshore dummy and number of offshores have significant negative effect on ROS, for ROA and Q Tobin performance measures only number of offshores in intermediate structure showed significant negative effect, while number of offshore countries influences significantly and positively all of the above performance indicators. Among other significant ownership variables included as controls are State Ultimate owner and Dispersed Ultimate owner dummies, Insider dummy, Share of undisclosed voting rights. We found the empirical evidence that offshore ownership has significant negative effect on ROS performance measure, while being negative and insignificant for ROA.

Total number of offshores in ownership structure has negative significant effect on both performance measures, while number of offshore countries where the owners are registered has positive significant influence on ROS and ROA. The first two facts correspond to the theoretical and practical knowledge of offshore effects on company's performance which lie in the increase in agency costs due to the asymmetry of information.

We then focus on companies with offshore ownership only and analyze the difference in influence on financial performance of offshore's country of origin, given that offshore ownership occurs. The analysis shows that level of secrecy ratio has significant negative impact on both ROA and ROS measures, meaning that on average, the less transparent the country of offshore or foreign ownership origin, the lower the efficiency of performance of offshore-owned companies.

The contribution of current research is thus, firstly, the analysis of current ownership patterns on Russian market as a representative country of emerging and transition economies. Secondly, we find empirical evidence of the proposition that offshore ownership by itself and through the fuzziness measured by number of total number of offshores in ownership structure has negative effects on firms' performance on developing markets, but that the diversification into several countries could have a positive effect.

Thirdly, we show that for offshore-owned firms there is the negative significant effect of level of transparency of the country where the owner is registered on performance. The latter may be helpful in the development of financial and economic theoretical models in the framework of corporate governance and even macroeconomic theories as well as for practitioners like beneficiaries of companies who seek to protect their property rights without loss in company's performance and policy makers who deal with the offshore ownership legislation issues.

Still, there are several limitations in current research which should be improved in future. Firstly, offshore ownership is proxied only by dummy, it would be also interesting to look at the extent of offshore ownership (develop the correct approach to calculate this in the framework of intermediate ownership structures) and the centrality of offshore firms in the ownership structure. So, one future direction of current research is enhancing the database both in terms of number of companies included as well as the range of indicators both of ownership structure and financial performance measures (particularly, Tobin's Q).

Secondly, although we already considered the endogeneity issue of ownership-performance relationship, there still a space for further discussion, for instance, addition of better instruments for the ownership structure such as pre-privatization indicators of company's performance.

Moreover, conditioning the offshore ownership concentration indicator added to the sample, one can analyze the determinants of it similar to what Gugler (2014) does for individual investor controls in order to find out whether the ownership has reverse causality with performance.

Thirdly, as we discuss the potential positive effects of offshore ownership structure, it might be interesting to reveal explicitly through which mechanisms this process can be enabled (i.e. which are the variables that moderate or mediate this effect). For instance, potential mediators of the positive influence of offshores in ownership structure on performance could be innovation and merging and acquisition (M&A) activities as they both connected with the need for higher levels of property rights protection or financial or legal infrastructure. Following this direction we can firstly analyze the relationship between offshore ownership structure and innovation and M&A activities as part of corporate governance strategy for Russian companies and then check if these strategic decisions indeed influence the relationship between offshore ownership structure and corporate financial performance.



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Appendix 1

Classification of offshore countries

Country	Region	OECD 2009 list	Original OECD Tax Haven list	TIEA	Sovereign country
Andorra	Europe	1	1	1	1
Anguilla	Caribbean	1	1	1	0
Antigua&Barb	Caribbean	1	1	1	1
Aruba	Caribbean	1	1	1	0
Bahamas	Caribbean	1	1	1	1
Bahrain	Middle East	1	1	1	1
Barbados	Caribbean	0	1	1	1
Belize	Central America	1	1	1	1
Bermuda	Pacific	0	1	1	0
British Virgin Islands	Caribbean	1	1	1	0
Cayman Islands	Caribbean	1	1	1	0
Channel Islands	Europe	1	1	1	0
Costa Rica	Central America	1	1	1	1
Cyprus	Europe	0	1	0	1
Dominica	Caribbean	1	1	1	1
Gibraltar	Europe	1	1	1	1
Grenada	Caribbean	1	1	1	1
Guatemala	Central America	0	0	1	1
Hong Kong	East Asia	0	1	0	1
Ireland	Europe	0	0	0	1
Isle of Man	Europe	0	1	1	1
Jordan	Middle East	1	0	0	0
Lebanon	Middle East	1	0	0	1
Liberia	West Africa	1	1	1	1
Liechtenstein	Europe	1	1	1	1
Luxemburg	Europe	0	1	0	1
Macao	East Asia	0	1	1	0
Maldives	Indian Ocean	1	1	0	1
Malta	Europe	0	1	0	1
Marshall Islands	Pacific	1	1	1	1
Mauritius	Indian Ocean	0	1	1	1
Monaco	Europe	1	1	1	1
Monserrat	Caribbean	1	1	1	0
Nauru	Pacific	1	1	0	1
Niue	Pacific	1	1	0	1
Panama	Central America	1	1	1	1
Samoa	Pacific	1	1	1	1
San Marino	Europe	0	1	1	1
Seychelles	Indian Ocean	1	1	1	1
Singapore	East Asia	1	1	0	1
St.Kitts	Caribbean	1	1	1	1
Saint Lucia	Caribbean	1	1	1	1
St.Vinc	Caribbean	1	1	1	1
Tonga	Pacific	1	1	0	1
Turks	Caribbean	1	1	1	0
USVirgin	Caribbean	0	1	0	0
Uruguay	South America	0	0	1	1
Vanuatu	Pacific	1	1	1	1



Appendix 2

Financial Secrecy Ratio historical values

Secrecy Jurisdiction	2009 FSI	2011 FSI	2013 FSI	2009 FSI Rank	2011 FSI Rank	2013 FSI Rank
Andorra	0.07	133.6207578	43.37763	57	45	74
Anguilla	0.08	36.04731967	96.76443	55	65	61
Antigua & Barbuda	0.08	88.46715871	60.47441	46	58	67
Aruba	0.28	124.9300921	113.3252	36	47	55
Australia	NA	NA	168.1538	NA	NA	44
Austria	42.32	453.4871247	400.8232	12	17	18
Bahamas	1.1	431.110463	226.8748	33	19	35
Bahrain	23.53	660.3148226	461.1659	14	10	13
Barbados	2.6	266.5653179	317.4745	28	30	26
Belgium	78.6	467.1602626	199.2665	9	15	40
Belize	0.2	198.3999755	129.8344	37	40	52
Bermuda	122.3	539.8775265	432.3802	7	12	14
Botswana	NA	121.2662673	98.99626	NA	49	60
Brazil	NA	NA	283.9142	NA	#Н/Д	29
British Virgin Islands	14.98	617.8850568	385.4457	16	11	20
Brunei Darussalam	0.1	45.79904958	50.63406	39	63	73
Canada	NA	366.1569807	418.5234	NA	24	17
Cayman Islands	403.48	1646.67297	1233.567	5	2	4
Cook Islands	0.08	13.39634467	25.26854	46	70	78
Costa Rica	0.51	177.2174434	157.6024	34	41	46
Curacao	NA	NA	106.41	NA	#Н/Д	58
Cyprus	11.59	406.5143262	198.9163	18	20	41
Denmark	NA	121.6806958	63.11788	NA	48	66
Dominica	0.1	12.45284756	26.94115	39	71	77
Dominican Republic	NA	NA	193.7889	NA	#Н/Д	42
France	NA	NA	190.9599	NA	#Н/Д	43
Germany	NA	669.7714873	738.3376	NA	9	8
Ghana	NA	146.8078402	109.9242	NA	44	57
Gibraltar	0.08	174.6427276	147.8179	46	43	49
Grenada	0.08	57.60750966	55.7658	46	61	70
Guatemala	NA	174.8035251	142.4216	NA	42	51
Guernsey	36.2	402.3383479	419.3564	13	21	15
Hong Kong	76.34	1370.740769	1283.445	10	4	3
Hungary	7.65	94.79689408	54.65056	22	56	72
India	NA	344.0421554	254.5711	NA	25	32
Ireland	143.73	264.2156913	155.5173	6	31	47
Isle of Man	5.79	230.4174787	237.258	24	36	34
Israel	10.37	230.2969209	205.9219	20	37	38
Italy	NA	231.1939797	118.9649	NA	35	54
Japan	NA	693.6381377	513.1047	NA	8	10
Jersey	76.22	750.1455758	591.7031	11	7	9
Korea	NA	317.1874912	328.7934	NA	28	24
Latvia	4.11	88.8864986	128.1165	26	57	53
Lebanon	2.65	397.3275649	747.8594	27	22	7
Liberia	0.08	316.8840234	300.8851	54	29	27
Liechtenstein	0.08	239.214042	240.963	55	34	33
Luxembourg	1127.02	1621.157151	1454.483	2	3	2
Macao	1.89	389.7947257	360.4904	29	23	22
Malaysia (Labuan)	7.2	319.2789828	471.6878	23	27	12
Maldives	0.06	78.45620857	21.05039	58	60	79
Malta	8.68	98.63070036	78.0526	21	54	64
Marshall Islands	0.08	457.0060042	329.6054	46	16	23
Mauritius	1.2	261.5523825	397.8627	32	32	19
Monaco	0.04	37.73045046	38.84132	60	64	75
Montserrat	0.06	50.1146765	0	59	62	82
Nauru	0.08	0	0	46	NA	81
Netherlands	23.18	199.6975153	204.929	15	39	39
New Zealand	NA	NA	151.4267	NA	#Н/Д	48
Norway	NA	NA	142.7945	NA	#Н/Д	50
Panama	10.83	471.5422459	489.6098	19	14	11
Philippines	5.1	253.9256398	206.6698	25	33	37
Portugal (Madeira)	12.36	119.3885608	57.91351	17	50	69
Russia	NA	NA	325.2539	NA	#Н/Д	25
Samoa	0.1	27.50107447	31.03195	39	68	76
San Marino	0.1	30.86461955	59.53545	39	67	68
Saudi Arabia	NA	NA	274.2	NA	#Н/Д	31
Seychelles	0.1	95.01644304	293.483	39	55	28
Singapore	109.34	1117.958613	1216.86	8	6	5
South Africa	NA	NA	209.7911	NA	#Н/Д	36
Spain	NA	98.79348649	111.3811	NA	53	56
St Kitts & Nevis	NA	31.16919967	18.45872	NA	66	80
St Lucia	0.08	78.7209814	66.89086	46	59	65
St Vincent & the Grenadines	0.1	100.9028576	85.14934	39	52	62
Sweden	NA	NA	55.71366	NA	#Н/Д	71
Switzerland	513.4	1879.215803	1765.25	3	1	1
Turks & Caicos Islands	0.08	218.8583265	81.81755	46	38	63
United Arab Emirates (Dubai)	1.52	439.5830274	419.0078	31	18	16
United Kingdom	513.4	516.4732436	361.325	4	13	21
Uruguay	1.82	331.0032555	277.4804	30	26	30
US Virgin Islands	0.08	104.24046	102.8635	46	51	59
USA	1503.28	1160.059104	1212.971	1	5	6
Vanuatu	0.5	14.32583422	164.9674	35	69	45

Source: Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy Index. URL: http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com



Appendix 3

Results of 3 specifications (Arellano Bond one-step system, Arellano Bond one-step difference, Arellano Bond two-step, respectively) testing for ROS variable with inclusion of 3 offshore ownership indicators: offshore intermediate dummy, total number of offshores and total number of offshore countries

	(3)	(4)	(5)
Setting 1: ROS	RE	AB one-step	AB two-step
Liquidity	-0.00474	0.00933**	0.00965**
	(0.00887)	(0.00361)	(0.00411)
Leverage	0.000300	0.000610***	0.000471**
	(0.000652)	(0.000216)	(0.000233)
Size	-0.101	0.0354*	0.0417*
	(0.111)	(0.0196)	(0.0221)
Age	-0.848	0.000698	0.000564
	(0.977)	(0.000523)	(0.000469)
Year 2005	-5.085	0.0500***	0.0412**
	(5.869)	(0.0176)	(0.0173)
Year 2006	-4.204	0.0534***	0.0396**
	(4.891)	(0.0161)	(0.0155)
Year 2007	-3.326	0.0276**	0.0133
	(3.913)	(0.0131)	(0.0126)
Year 2008	-2.469	0.00420	-0.0112
	(2.924)	(0.0145)	(0.0140)
Year 2009	-1.684	-0.0248**	-0.0264**
	(1.954)	(0.0113)	(0.0115)
Year 2010	-0.800	0.0101	0.00644
	(0.972)	(0.0120)	(0.0104)
Year 2011	0.840	0.00131	0.00292
	(0.977)	(0.0103)	(0.00876)
Year 2012	1.684
	(1.960)
Year 2013	-5.085	-0.0264	-0.0253**
	(5.869)	(0.0224)	(0.0123)
Number of offshores	-0.00528	-0.0122**	-0.0103*
	(0.0129)	(0.00524)	(0.00589)
Offhore intermediate dummy	-0.113	-0.119*	-0.0865
	(0.249)	(0.0615)	(0.0602)
Number of offshore countries	0.00925	0.0988***	0.0780**
	(0.132)	(0.0374)	(0.0393)
Undisclosed voting rights	-0.336**	-0.0658	-0.0334
	(0.166)	(0.0803)	(0.0721)
State ultimate owner	-0.0436	0.0444	0.00677
	(0.307)	(0.0627)	(0.0583)
Dispersed ultimate owner dummy	0.0620	0.00559	0.00848
	(0.0663)	(0.0332)	(0.0271)
Insiders dummy	-0.192	0.106	0.0766
	-0.00528	(0.0680)	(0.0723)
Lagged ROS	0.244	0.513***	0.475***
		(0.168)	(0.162)
_cons		-0.389**	-0.433**
N	1164	1164	1164

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Results of 5 specifications (Arellano Bond one-step system, Arellano Bond one-step difference, Arellano Bond two-step, respectively) testing for ROA variable with inclusion of 3 offshore ownership indicators: offshore intermediate dummy, total number of offshores and total number of offshore countries

	(1)	(4)	(5)
Setting 2: ROA	OLS	AB one-step System	AB two-step
Liquidity	0.00784	0.00624	0.00805**
	(0.00653)	(0.00546)	(0.00386)
Leverage	-0.00465	-0.0000463	-0.0000247
	(0.00537)	(0.000424)	(0.000140)
Size	-0.852	0.0138	0.00941
	(0.672)	(0.0181)	(0.0167)
Age	-3.407	-0.000498	0.000368
	(4.151)	(0.00101)	(0.000909)
Year 2005	-24.19	0.0670***	0.0416*
	(29.13)	(0.0254)	(0.0215)
Year 2006	-20.68	0.0707***	0.0474**
	(24.98)	(0.0203)	(0.0182)
Year 2007	-16.89	0.0284	0.0214
	(20.76)	(0.0241)	(0.0161)
Year 2008	-13.22	0.0159	0.0132
	(16.54)	(0.0222)	(0.0185)
Year 2009	-10.14	-0.0433***	-0.0485***
	(12.44)	(0.0139)	(0.0124)
Year 2010	-6.529	0.0117	0.00884
	(8.261)	(0.0121)	(0.00961)
Year 2011	-3.389	0.00855	-0.0000172
	(4.151)	(0.00920)	(0.00732)
Year 2012	-24.19
	(29.13)
Year 2013	3.654	0.0852	0.0141
	(4.211)	(0.112)	(0.0463)
Number of offshores	-0.0773	-0.0176*	-0.0136**
	(0.0684)	(0.00908)	(0.00640)
Offhore intermediate dummy	0.144	-0.0769	-0.0874
	(0.721)	(0.109)	(0.113)
Number of offshore countries	0.175	0.116**	0.0855
	(0.349)	(0.0474)	(0.0561)
Undisclosed voting rights	0.227	0.109	0.00900
	(0.499)	(0.109)	(0.114)
State ultimate owner	-1.986	-0.0764	-0.0667
	(2.385)	(0.101)	(0.0590)
Dispersed ultimate owner dummy	-0.133	-0.103	-0.0182
	(0.239)	(0.0744)	(0.0460)
Insiders dummy	0.342	0.130*	0.0896
	-0.0773	(0.0676)	(0.0617)
Lagged ROA	0.571***	0.464***	0.529***
	(0.120)	(0.0899)	(0.0873)
_cons		-0.118	-0.0860
		(0.185)	(0.174)
N	1167	1167	1167

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Stata output for ROS Arellano Bond system one-step regression



Appendix 4

Results of Arellano Bond two-step specifications testing for ROS, ROA dependent variables with inclusion of offshore intermediate dummy and number of offshore countries

All_Dummy

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	(1)	(2)
	ROS	ROE
L.f_ebitsales	0.537***
	(0.162)
f_liquidity	0.00818**	0.00802*
	(0.00376)	(0.00444)
f_leverage	0.000481*	-0.000274
	(0.000245)	(0.000334)
f_size	0.0350*	0.0106
	(0.0184)	(0.0177)
c_age	-0.0000798	-0.000590