Russian Private Military Contractors: A Case Study of Ukraine and Syria

As a result of this covert warfare, democracies may be able to employ more brutal and arguably more effective tactics which may be essential to waging a successful counter insurgency. These tactics are typically at odds with not only structural democratic constraints, but they are also at odds with the electorate's normative antipathy for brutal tactics. Although brutality may end the conflict quicker, it may be at odds with the so-called, hearts and minds approach which can also be useful in counter-insurgencies. This is because the development of local information networks and positive relations with locals are key to fighting counterinsurgencies. However, it can be argued that although PMCs give governments the flexibility to end conflicts in whichever way they see fit, it discourages governments from seeking more peaceful solutions, as brutality may deliver results faster. However, PMCs are less willing to take on risky conflicts which may not be profitable, which may in fact, limit the scale and type of war making operation conducted. This means that PMCs may not in fact have such a large impact on quantity or quality of war.

On the other hand, the difference in state and PMC tactics can cause tension. These differences may range from professional jurisdictional competition, identity cleavages and different social purposes. PMCs even vary amongst themselves, but differences in tactics may change operations overall. For example, the military tends to drive slowly towards checkpoints to avoid causing locals to panic, whereas PMCs drive fast through them to avoid roadside attacks. Tensions as a result of these differences make it difficult to overcome coordination problems. These problems can cause real issues on the ground, including a lack of interoperable radio and communications systems between PMCs and the military, and even friendly fire incidents. PMCs are increasingly infringing on the military's professional jurisdiction and are paid more for performing the same jobs. It can be argued that militaries see contractors as damaging to their brand, as they perform similar duties and are often difficult to differentiate by locals. Furthermore, soldiers unwilling to die for patriotism, instead choosing money, causes an ideological cleavage. Pay differences have caused some antagonism, as in todays materialistic society, expectations are much higher. The competition between the ideals of money and military virtue is exacerbating existing issues. As military soldiers see contractors as “cowboys” and “pseudo mercenaries,” who are not bound by the same conditions. The relationship between state militaries and contractors can have a detrimental impact on relationships with the local population. However, it can be argued that these are just teething pains and that as time goes on, cooperation is likely to increase as PMCs and state militaries get used to working together. Furthermore, PMC identities can shift over time, which may lead to improved competence on behalf of the PMC. However, as nonstate actors increase in quantity and scope, the challenge of future warfare may be to find a way to coordinate these diverse actors which may not be limited only to state and PMC forces.

This chapter has argued that PMCs are the result of a fundamental change in the nature of warfare - notably a shift towards neomedievalism. Arguing that NSAs have propelled this change, this chapter has analysed the changes to globalisation and alternative warfare as well as their effects. The increases in technological advancement and the ensuing need for specialisation and investment have provided further incentive for the use of PMCs. Furthermore, the US has acted as a market driver, both in economic policy and in the formation of the modern PMC industry, on the militaries of other nations. The 2008 invasion of Georgia was a turning point for Russian military modernisation, which laid the foundations for the introduction of PMCs into mainstream Russian military policy. In addition to this, the increasing demand for covert operations in an increasingly visible and globalised worldcreates a demand for PMCs due to their covert nature. There have also been issues in military recruitment both in the US and in Russia and this has negatively affected efficiency of PMC operations. PMCs can have a detrimental effect on the democratic process and public engagement with war. To finish, the market conditions which are present in Russiaaffect the way that their PMCs can operate, namely only under state employment.

Chapter 4 Ethics and regulation of PMCs

This chapter will examine the regulatory systems in place both nationally and internationally which are in place to monitor the activities of PMCs. This will include looking at the role of the UN and international law, the law of the host nation and the law of the country of origin of the PMC. In addition to this, ethical issues which can be faced by PMCs and states regarding contractors will be analysed, including the protection of state nationals and accountability of PMCs. This chapter will also look at how PMCs are able to hide their tracks by taking advantage of the advances in modern day technology and increased globalisation. Finally, the reasons behind the use of PMCs will be examined, as well as how the covert nature of these operations can influence moral considerations of contractors.

Firstly, domestic levels of regulation will be analysed. Russia has banned both its citizens and companies from participating in a foreign war to which Russia is not a party according to Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code, which defines these activities as naemnichestvo (mercenary). However, hardly any sanctions or investigations have ever taken place relating to this law, despite evidence of Russian citizens participating in conflicts abroad. Arguably, post-Soviet officials did not plan for the privatisation of security and as a result, there is no established procedure to regulate these cases. However, despite a bill to legalise PMCs failing in 2014, amendments have been made to Russian federal law concerning conscription and military service in 2016. This new bill effectively legalises Russian PMC personnel operating abroad without touching the issue of the legality of Russian PMCs themselves. It legalises “participation in activities to maintain or restore international peace and security” (limited to a year) and “suppression of international terrorist activities outside the territory of the Russian Federation.” Furthermore, Russian definitions of mercenaryism are not compatible with the definition of mercenaryism in international law. This enables the Russian state to have maximum control over any mercenary activities originating from Russia, as it allows the state to pick and choose what is or is not mercenary in addition to approving or disapproving their actions. The reason that mercenaries have not been completely legalised, is that the Russian state is trying to maintain its monopoly on force and to prevent Russian citizens from intriguing with other states or forming their own private armies.

The issue of sovereignty creates issues as to whether the contractors ate subject to domestic or international law. For example, military consultancy services would not be illegal under international law, whereas combat operations and interference in public order and security come under the responsibility of the state. The difficulty faced in defining mercenaries vs PMCs contributes towards the difficulties faced by states and international law in holding mercenaries accountable. States who use PMCs often use them in order to influence the internal affairs of states they have a political interest in. Russia is legally in a difficult position, because it is in their interest to uphold the principles of the UN Charter on sovereignty, whereby “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Russia's repeated emphasis on sovereignty in international law is based on the principle of Westphalian peace, whereby any threats to the state monopoly on violence must be eliminated. In this way it can be free of any interference in its own affairs as was commonplace by the US during the Cold War. It would therefore be logical to uphold this law domestically, as private armies can pose a threat to the state monopoly on violence, possibly supporting revolution, starting a war with a neighbour and dragging states into a conflict they had no intention of entering. However, by allowing the use of PMCs in conflicts to the benefit of the Russian state, Russia can use PMCs to augment its power and maintain its monopoly on violence.

There has however, been limited enforcement of this domestic law. This may because the Russian PMC market is small and lacks development beyond a few largely state-controlled firms. It is also worth noting that their main activities are abroad, for example, employees of the PMC Center Antiterror in the 2000s worked in Iraq, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and other countries. One company, the Moran Security Group operated successfully in Iraq as well as protecting ships from pirate attacks, which caused concern amongst British competitors. Nigerian naval forces seized the PMC ship and held its crew for a year in prison. Once they returned to Russia, senior staff members were prosecuted as mercenaries according to Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code. This was a case which demonstrated potential inadequacies in operations, by which the Nigerian government was not in agreement to the use of contractors in its waters. It can be argued that Russia tries to regulate the activities of its contractors abroad in the case that they work against the interests of Russian foreign policy whether intentionally, or through incompetence.

Quality control in the PMC industry is arguably one of the most controversial issues to date. One of the most infamous cases of poor quality control is the Nisour Square incident in 2007, whereby Blackwater personnel killed seventeen unarmed civilians, which resulted in the ruining of the hearts and minds strategy by fuelling strong anti-US sentiment in Iraq. The controversy was publicly addressed by the US government and the Blackwater contractors walked free as they are not subject to Iraqi law due to Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority. It can be argued that contractors have no incentive to behave in an appropriate way towards civilians of the host state, as it only has an incentive to accomplish goals set by the client, in this case the US. However, the lack of contractual obligations between the contractors and the host state can lead to activity which may have a negative effect on the long term goals of the client, especially in the context of neomedieval wars, which require effective counter-insurgency strategies.

The weak oversight of PMCs by client states has a detrimental effect on their performance on the ground and value for money. For example, DynCorp, one of the US' largest PMCs has been accused of sending questionable invoices with vague descriptions of their activities. These firms are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act or any other legislative tools designed for transparency. Furthermore, Congressmen cannot access the details of the contracts they voted to pay for. This can lead to poor quality outcomes such as the insensitive recruitment campaign paid for through a US contractor, which featured posters of healthy children in a country traumatised by child soldiers and suffering from poor healthcare. It can be argued that there is a principle-agent issue, whereby the employer is the principle and the PMC is the agent. This is a problem, as PMCs can exploit the fact that they are in control of information distribution as it is difficult for employers to monitor their activities. One method used to remedy this in medieval times was representative of the employer called a provveditori, who would accompany the mercenaries for the duration of their contract and ensure quality. However, this system was flawed in that the mercenaries were able to influence the provveditori in order to cherry-pick the information they received, or they continued to act inappropriately, as there are no immediate consequences. There is a similar state of affairs today, where the modern provveditori consist of Contracting Officers' Technical Representatives, who face the same issues as their medieval counterparts. This is due to the fact that they are too few, lack training or any tools they can use to manage multimillion dollar contracts in warzones. This poor oversight is so bad that it has led to multiple investigations into contractors, including one in 2010 which found that the state department did not adequately supervise contractors who were paid $1.6 bn to rebuild the Afghan National Police.

Furthermore, there is in fact no obligation for PMCs to stay at their posts in the event they decide to resign or pull out of the operation. This may be the only way that contractors can protect themselves from conditions they may not have signed up for. For example, a Russian citizen was held against his will in Sudan and forced to work for unfair contract terms, which led to him and his colleagues escaping and approaching the Russian embassy for help. However, diplomats were unwilling to help them, as allegedly Russo-Sudanese relations could have faced significant damage. There are few options for contractors in similar situations and their unclear legal situation makes it difficult for them to receive outside assistance. A similar situation can be seen during the Syrian conflict with the kidnapping and murder of the two Russian-speaking Wagner operatives, as well as the high risk operation in which over 100 Wagner contractors lost their lives to aerial bombardment by US forces. It can be argued that by choosing to fight, contractors lose their rights as civilians, including the right to life and liberty, but gain rights as combatants and potentially, as prisoners. However, this distinction between rights for combatants and non-combatants does not take into account that some fighters, like the Russians in Sudan, do not fight by choice.

Similarly, contractors lack any personal motivation to weigh up any moral considerations in the wars they are paid to fight in. As a result of this, they present an affront to the warrior's moral code to protect as well as serve, duty, honour and sacrifice for your country which serves to differentiate soldiers from civilians. By fighting purely for money and not a national or other cause, they essentially break the informal contract between citizen and state, meaning that the state then has no incentive to protect its citizens abroad. However, this separation from any state association or moral incentives on the part of the contractors may make them more effective in battle, especially in a neomedieval environment. This lack of indoctrination on either side of the conflict enables contractors to maintain objectivity. This helps to prevent atrocities associated with propaganda, such as the Rwanda genocide. The diverse nationalities of troops involved makes the PMC anonymous and unaffiliated with any national narrative. The ability to tailor troops to the particular conflict, such as using non-white troops in post-colonial nations prevents a group narrative for the host nation to rally against. This means that PMCs are especially useful in neomedieval wars.

However, the one thing that unites PMC soldiers are their purely financial motivations. This can be a source of concern for PMCs engaged in weak states or PMCs which have insufficient oversight. For example, in the middle ages, mercenaries fought for the highest bidder in wartime, and became marauders in peacetime, which attracted more mercenaries who were hired to get rid of the marauders. If there is no process in place for a failed contract or how to move contractors on once the conflict has ended, this is likely to reoccur, especially in weak states. Contractors may be forced to survive by plundering which leads to warlordism. Hart Security was hired by Puntland officials to create a local coastguard, which protected shipping lanes from illegal fishing. However, the firm managing the coastguard, SomCan, began to blur the line between PMC and pirates, in much the same way as medieval mercenaries, rarely handing over the revenue they collected to the Puntland government. The PMCs run by the UK, South Africa, US and Russia may all place a strong emphasis on vetting and are run by experienced ex-military or intelligence staff. However, PMCs originating from weak states tend to run along the more mercenary angle, with less diversity of nationalities and little to no vetting, which leads to a more chaotic, violent and predatory PMC.

It is easy to set up a PMC. Companies need only financial capital to get set up and stay in business, as labour is cheap and plentiful. Companies can be registered in one country, based in another country, hire personnel from many countries and be run by ex-military usually from a state with a high-quality military. An example of the spread-out nature of PMCs can be seen by Sandline International, which was registered in the Bahamas, was based in London and Washington DC and operated on the ground in Oceania and elsewhere with staff from all over Africa and equipment from Eastern Europe. This globalised structure makes it difficult to tackle the industry from a state level. These companies are essentially virtual, with very few permanent employees, they are able to recruit qualified personnel from online databases on an ad hoc basis per contract. Any equipment used is rapidly bought or leased from the international market on an ad hoc basis. This floating nature of PMCs enables them to dissolve and reappear whenever they are needed, whether to dodge regulation or to rebrand themselves. This shows how globalisation facilitates PMC operations. The closure of Executive Outcomes following the banning of PMCs by South Africa is an example of this, as it then split into multiple other firms outside the country to avoid regulation. This shows how PMCs can mutate to exploit different opportunities and to avoid high-risk situations.

Regulation from a state level has a limited effect and the market is de facto self-governing. This does not solve the issue that individuals involved in inappropriate behaviour are likely to be redeployed in less developed PMCs who place less emphasis on vetting or background checks. There is little possibility of firms being held to account over issues on the ground due to the fact that there are so few permanent employees and such opacity over who or what body has the authority to investigate them. It can be argued that the Russian market has an advantage to Anglo-Saxon firms when it comes to missions of the more mercenary kind, as Russia's structure of informal networks allows for recruitment and contracting enshrouded in a further layer of secrecy not available in Anglo-Saxon firms. Russian businesses also provide another layer of secrecy by using falsified contacts and accounting fraud with implicit permission from government agencies to hide their participation in contracting operations, for example by funnelling money through seemingly unrelated foreign companies. The organic nature of PMCs enables them to avoid regulation, with Russian PMCs being particularly opaque and resistant to regulation.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the state is no longer the main actor in international affairs. Weak states can fall victim to the multinational firms, whether the PMCs themselves or other multinational corporations who may hire PMCs. For example, Papua New Guinea faced non-negotiable terms to its contract with Sandline International, which ultimately resulted in a failed operation. Weak states ultimately create a vacuum for governance, which either they are able to fill with PMCs, or they completely lose their sovereignty to the UN, multinational corporations or illicit actors such as ISIS or drug cartels. The reality is that many of these actors create an overlapping system of authority. For example, in 2002, the UN handed over the handling of the HIV/AIDS crisis from weak states to multinational corporations in providing retroviral drugs. This is an example of the shift towards a neomedieval system based on overlapping authorities which can support or replace each other if one is not effective. Networks of private actors struggle against states for power, who will in turn rely upon private support. This can be seen in Syria by ISIS fighting the Syrian state, who in turn use Russian PMCs. However this vacuum in weak states also creates a window of opportunity for more powerful states such as Russia to step in and secure influence. By adapting to the multiplicity of actors in international affairs, Russia uses non-state actors such as PMCs to enforce state foreign policy. An example of this is Wagner in Sudan and the Central African Republic, where it has been used as a pawn to gain greater influence for the Russian government through combat and guarding of resources. This shows that actors will overlap and replace one another if there is a power vacuum, but that states can still have an important role if they adapt to this new system by relying on tools outside of the traditional Westphalian repertoire.

However, there are issues to consider regarding moral conditions. Multinational corporations or PMCs have no motivation to ensure the wellbeing of the citizens in the country they are working in. Commercial resources such as oil, timber or diamonds are handed over to multinational corporations in order to raise funds for support from local militias, which essentially creates a parallel military budget which pays for a parallel private security structure. This removes the authority of the state to provide for the public, as state responsibilities are handed over to private actors. This can be argued to be the next step in capitalism, as the elimination of state authority provides the ultimate free market. This could have some benefits, as contractors are often more able to accomplish tasks more efficiently than states or even the UN. An example of this is when Executive Outcomes drastically outperformed the UN in Sierra Leone in providing security, logistics, intelligence and assisting with civilian resettlement in conjunction with humanitarian groups. It can be argued that contractors saw it in their commercial interest to adhere to international humanitarian norms. This can arguably lead to a whole new humanitarian side to PMCs, which would use their capabilities for good. It can be argued that using contractors provides greater control on the ground and less accountability for the UN or states and allows for longer term commitment on the ground. NGOs such as USAID, the International Rescue Committee, ICRC, UNICEF, CARE, the World Food Program and Caritas have all hired private security firms. As a result of this increasing client base, PMCs are creating security products more adapted to UN and NGO clients. This new kind of PMC work will provide some much-needed positive PR for the industry. PMCs are even creating not-for-profit humanitarian deals whilst emphasising the firm's ethical conduct. It can be argued that much like other corporate firms, corporate social responsibility is increasingly important to clients, which will create demand and thus the ensuing supply for more ethical contracting.

The UN however, has proven to be a reluctant customer. There is a clear conflict of interest if the UN hires the companies it does not yet know how to regulate or define as legal or illegal. Contractors are increasingly hired as security guards but are in reality performing military activities, making PMCs such as Blackwater a new form of mercenary and therefore illegal under international law. UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights has limited application to PMCs, as in reality it is impossible to enforce laws in an anarchic space such as a war zone. There are few customary norms or treaties at the international level which are relevant or potent in the regulation of PMCs. UN registration and practical regulation have been goals of certain PMCs for some time, as this would provide legitimacy and a more positive reputation to the industry. However, PMC regulation will not come into effect until the interests of companies, governments and human rights organisations converge, which seems unlikely to occur. Clients have little incentive to encourage regulation, as it would shine a spotlight on their operations, which removes the attraction of using such covert services in the first place. However, in an increasingly globalised world, it can be argued that the state will no longer be able to protect itself by claiming domestic legal jurisdiction. The uncertainty on legal jurisdiction is the key issue to holding PMCs to account and the only way for the industry to be properly regulated on an international level is through the creation of a new Geneva Protocol.

In terms of self-governance of the industry, the 1989 Mercenaries Convention could not even define what a modern PMC consists of. The International Peace Operations Association, the first body to represent the interests of companies in the peace and stability industry, created a code of conduct which was more focussed on corporate public relations than creating any real change in the norms and practices of PMCs. It is not in the interest of all PMCs to participate in any kind of formal regulation, as many of the services they provide are covert in nature. This would push covert services even further into the illicit market, which may lead to even worse human rights abuses.

By nature the PMC market encourages mercenary activity. As the market is a monopsony, with the US as the predominant buyer, it can shape working practices and higher standards by only hiring companies with a good track record. However, this then creates a divide, by which many PMCs will not work for countries who are not allied with the US, such as Sudan. In this case, PMCs from Russia, China and other countries satisfy the demand from non-US-aligned states or contracts which may involve violations of human rights or international law. Many of these smaller firms were hired by the US as subcontractors in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia and once US involvement came to an end, these new firms expanded, offering more combat-offense and risk-taking measures not offered by mainstream firms. Furthermore, once the Afghanistan and Iraq contracts end completely and the US employs a less interventionist foreign policy, PMCs will look to new buyers meaning that they may offer more offensive and less ethically concerned services. BRICS firms may face a huge boost from a lower US demand, as the majority of contractors in larger Western firms such as DynCorp, G4S and Triple Canopy, are from developing countries. These contractors have been trained to an exceptional level and often form their own PMCs upon returning home, willing to work for the highest bidder. These new offensive or risk-taking capabilities will attract new clients across the board, from the UN who needs more peacekeepers, to multinational corporations protecting their assets to tyrannical regimes or movements seeking regime change. This causes a cleavage between firms who pride themselves on a positive brand name, and firms who corner the “low rent district” of the industry. These smaller and less risk-averse firms sell themselves on their ability to complete any task for any client for the right price.

This cleavage can be seen by firms the US work with versus those who agree to work for parties not allied with the US. Many of these issues run along older Cold-War lines, which can be seen by the fact that most foreign states who hire Russian PMCs tend not to have received any aid from the US after the Cold War. As a result of this divide, Russian firms often fill the gap in the market for the “low rent district” firms, usually used for more controversial contracts which may contravene UN treaties or laws. It is interesting to note that countries with developed PMC markets, mainly in the West, wish to maintain the legal status quo regarding the use of PMCs, which is largely consequence-free use and weak regulation. However, BRICS countries and other developing nations argue in favour of eliminating grey areas in the use of PMCs. This may be due to the fact that PMCs have long been a tool of post-colonial intervention. For example, the UK stopped Sandline from assisting the Kosovar Liberation Army as it was determined that this would not serve the interests of the UK. The US has also prevented MPRI from working with the Mobutu regime in Zaire in 1997. This shows how there may be a further division between states who value sovereignty over international law, but this may change as BRICs firms grow in importance.

Arguably, there is an uncomfortable dynamic between Western PMC chiefs and the rest of the personnel from developing nations. For example, in Afghanistan, only 16% of contractors were US citizens. This demographic is the highest paid, lowest risk category with the majority in management or highly technical positions. The rest of the workforce can be split between local nationals who perform low-risk mundane tasks such as food preparation or driving for the lowest pay and third country nationals who fill mid-range positions and are almost always paid less than their US colleagues for the same jobs. The role of nationals from developing countries as essentially cannon fodder can be argued to be morally questionable. However, this has not been the case to such as extent with Russian PMCs, as there appears to be a broad representation of Russian and post-Soviet nationals.

However, in Western firms, this creates even more motivation for contractors from developing nations to found their own firms and to work for non-US contracts. Due to the fact that the US as the biggest PMC buyer, places an emphasis on operational and ethical standards, especially following the Blackwater scandal, which has raised ethical standards across the board. However, these ethical standards have driven PMCs offshore and underground in order to satisfy the demand for the kind of warfare which is most commonplace worldwide, which has little regard for human rights. There is also an issue of neutrality, whereby if a majority of PMC troops are of a certain nationality, it can implicate their home state in the conflict. For example, it is common for Nepal and Fiji to export PMC labour to a particular conflict, the opponents to the PMC could win the conflict by threatening to bomb Kathmandu or Suva. This is an issue where Russia is particularly at risk, as the majority of their troops are from Russian-speaking nations. This makes Russia a fairly obvious participant to whichever conflict the PMC troops are engaged in and places the state at risk of attack.

Digging further into the illicit end of the market which Russia is more involved in, there is a strong overlap between organised crime and the PMC industry. Recruitment in Russia and other developing nations occur through informal networks which often overlap with informal networks for organised crime which saw a boom in the 1990's. Governments often saw it as expedient to co-opt criminal organisations for foreign policy purposes, such as during the Indo-China clashes of 1962-75, through extensive CIA operations, the US became a narcotics trafficker to retain influence over anti-communist gangsters. States in the same era also worked with organised crime in attempts to assassinate foreign leaders. Examples include Colonel Yair Klein of Spearhead Ltd who trained both drug cartel employees in Colombia for the Colombian drug baron, Gonzalo Rodriguez, as well as the criminalised Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and the soldiers who wrought havoc several times in the Comoros Islands. The intersection of crime and PMCs can have a detrimental effect on state policy, for example, counterintelligence, electronic warfare and high-grade weaponry received by Colombian and Mexican drug cartels from Spearhead Ltd, far outmatched those of the state, which made it impossible to win the war on drugs. As PMCs and non-state actors have more flexibility and often more resources than states, they have access to superior technology than states and are more easily able to implement their strategy due to a lack of red tape. This raises concerns as to who is able to wield such a dangerously effective force as a PMC. It is entirely possible for wealthy private individuals to hire their own armies. With a willingness to use crime, it is possible for anyone to raise such funds which could be used to equip a private force, as can be seen by the rise of Russian oligarchs in the 1990's. Examples of this include Rakesh Saxena, a Thai businessman who personally financed the Sandline International operation in Sierra Leone. However, it can be argued that this is unlikely to happen in Russia due to the tight networks between the siloviki and PMCs. If a Russian oligarch wanted to fund his own army, he would have to do so through a foreign contractor and risk the ire of the siloviki.

It is also interesting to examine the effects of PMC use on just war theory. The breaking of the state's monopoly on violence is a direct challenge to the assumption of state supremacy in the just war tradition. Just authority is then affected, as states no longer consist of the primary actors in modern day conflict, although they do maintain the monopoly on declaring war. However, this is not relevant in a neomedieval system whereby most wars have no clear beginning or end and blur the lines between war, organised crime and large-scale violations of human rights. It can be argued that states should be treated in the same way as individuals, in that aggression at the level of international society can be likened to robbery or murder and that just cause would consist of the preservation of sovereignty. Furthermore, the principle of last resort is affected, as PMCs increase the feasibility of war and remove the effects of public scrutiny and legislative oversight. However, PMCS increase the reasonable chance of success due to their efficiency. An example of this would be in 1992, Angola paid Executive Outcomes $60 million for an eleven-day operation which forced UNITA to negotiate with the state, which compared to the $678 million Angola spent on its own army which failed to win the conflict, shows the effectiveness of PMCs. Augmenting state forces and ensuring a swifter victory satisfies the principle of a reasonable chance of success. The principle of proportionality is difficult to analyse, as information about casualties in the PMC industry is hard to come by. However, the principle of just peace is undermined by the fact that PMCs have an interest in extending their employment. On the other hand, it can be argued that PMCs have more of an interest in ensuring a swift end to the conflict, as this would reflect better on their services and ensure better contracts in future, especially seeing the emphasis put on corporate social responsibility seen in recent years. PMCs also operate outside of the state military structure, which means that holding them to account is not possible in a way which would comply with the jus in bello or just war traditions, as states are also able to avoid being held to account by using PMCs.

In conclusion, PMCs raise a number of complex ethical issues. It can be argued that the main issue in the regulation of PMCs comes from the issue of sovereignty. Domestic regulation in Russia is applied sporadically and often only when PMCs operate without state approval.This is an issue faced globally, with issues in definition and lack of information making it impossible to regulate PMCs. Furthermore, the oversight of PMC contracts, including how states can maintain quality control with their contracts is severely lacking, meaning that the same issues from medieval times are repeating themselves in the present day. Poor regulation also affects the contractors themselves, who may face slavery or unfair contract terms. The lack of state involvement in defending Russian nationals demonstrates the divide between citizen and soldier, which is often blurred with PMCs. The issue of morality also affects quality of contracts on the ground, as neomedieval warfare depends on winning phase 0 and phase 4, which may be ruined by the abuse of civilians. The adaptability of PMCs is the industry's biggest strength and lawmakers biggest weakness, as they are able to avoid any accountability and adapt to changing market conditions. However, contractors can be used for “good” in the field of humanitarian affairs, which may be increasingly popular with the rise of corporate social responsibility in Western contractors. International law is the only way to begin to regulate the industry, but the lack of converging interests means that this is not possible at present. Any international regulation will push the industry into the mercenary end of the market and will not benefit any actors involved. When looking at just war theory, the use of PMCs in war has mixed results, but there is potential to be more just with increased openness around the industry.

Chapter 5 Modern Case Studies: Syria and Ukraine

This chapter will explore modern case studies of Russian PMC use in the conflict in Ukraine from 2014 to present day and the Syrian Civil War from 2011 until present day.Main sources will be news media in order to identify the most relevant and recent information from on the ground. It is important to be conscious of the possible bias of “fake news” but it is the only way to evaluate the impact of these groups to date.The focus is on the Russian PMC Wagner, as this has been the most widely-used and effective PMC in both conflicts. To begin, this chapter will define and analyse Wagner as a PMC and outline the framework for analysis which will be used for this chapter. Wagner will then be judged by its effectiveness in each conflict by the factors used in Dunigan's definition of effectiveness according to responsiveness, skill, quality and integration. Furthermore,it is determined that contractors were used in relation to military strategy, which is influenced by factors addressed in the previous chapter on neomedieval warfare. Additionally, the impact of Russian informal networks on the use of PMCs in these conflicts will be examined.Recruitment, training, deployment and tactics as well as the impact of contractor deaths will be analysed. Concluding withthe advantages and disadvantages of PMCs in relation to each conflict.

Definition of Wagner PMC

Firstly,it is necessary to define Wagner - the PMC at the centre of this chapter. It was founded by Dmitry Utkin, formerly of the GRU, with roots in the Slavonic Corps PMC. It's funder and director, is Yevgeny Prigozhin, a successful businessman, is at the very core of Putin's inner circle. The PMC first gained notoriety for its role in the annexation of Crimea, as well as fighting in Eastern Ukraine and Syria. Its personnel are mainly made up of Russian and post-soviet nationalities, although accurate figures on this subject are hard to come by.

Wagner fits into the category of PMC due to the fact that they are paid, armed combatants, employed by the state at the very tip of the spear. However, they edge more along the mercenary side, as they do not merely train and raise armies but participate in combat themselves. It can however, be argued that Wagner is unusual in that it has elements of a PMC, a state force and of a mercenary outfit. It is state-related in thatsalaries and their equipment is bought by both unidentified private individuals and the Russian state. It is also bankrolled by Evro Polis, a company owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin who is a member of Putin's inner circle, as well as having tight links to the Russian state in training and deployment. The informality of networks within the Russian government also make it difficult to distinguish public from private at the highest level. However, a further shift towards a mercenary angle is that Evro-Polis gains 25% of oil and gas field output from the Syrian government for captured areas. This is a direct financial incentive which would not be seen in a non-mercenary PMC.

In terms of size and capability, observers in Ukraine have described Wagner as a mechanised brigade-size unit. Descriptions of the group vary, with some describing it as a “battalion tactical group” with an estimated total strength of over 2,000 men, equipped with modern T-72 tanks, D-30 122mm howitzers, and BM-21 “Grad” multiple rocket launchers. Others describe it as“three reconnaissance-assault companies, each with ninety to a hundred men. Three platoons with recoilless rifles and automatic grenade launchers - a fire support company. An air defence company with Iglas [Russian man-portable surface to air missile]. A communications company, a guard company and a medical unit, plus civilian service personnel. Without civilians - six hundred people.” It may be that capabilities and numbers change in accordance with demands on the ground, which is one of the main advantages of PMCs. It affects the types of operations it can carry out in that it is mobile and easy to deploy on an ad hoc basis.

It is also important to define the matrix of assets available to the states at the outset of any conflict, as it is helpful in understandingthe reasons behind the use of PMCs. States have at their disposal:

1. National Armed Forces (including covert operation forces and intelligence agencies)

2. Foreign Intervention Forces (including allied armed forces)

3. Organised informal agents (including armed political movements and local rebel movements)

4. Ad hoc foreign forces (including mercenaries and foreign volunteers)

5. Armed Criminal organisations (including national, international, transnational and foreign)

PMCs fit into this categorisation as ad-hoc foreign forces. However, Wagner is somewhat of a hybrid force, due to the largely homogenous post-soviet nationalities of the fighters. For the purposes of this analysis, Wagner will be classified as an “ad hoc foreign force”.

The choice to use one or many of these assets is indicative of a wider strategy much like a chess game. PMCs are typically used for short, sharp operational strikes, either to acquire a target or provide a specialised technical service, such as operating high-tech planes. National and foreign armed forces, as well as organised informal agents are the most common forces used in non-neomedieval wars. However, in neomedieval wars, armed criminal organisations, ad-hoc foreign forces and organised informal agents tend to be the more common actors. It can be argued that a neomedieval threat requires a neomedieval solution.This is evident in the case of Afghanistan,where national militaries are ineffective in combatting this threat.

Military Effectiveness:

One of the main reasons for the increasing use of contractors, is their effectiveness in providing specialised services. Effectiveness can be defined as “the capacity to create military power from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size and human capital.” Military effectiveness can be achieved with the following attributes: integration, responsiveness, skill and quality. This has been chosen as a framework for the case studies, as it is a way to analyse Wagner from a multi-faceted perspective.

Integration is defined as “the achievement of consistency within and across levels and areas of all military activity.” In the case of PMCs, this means that both the PMC and other actors including state militaries and volunteer battalions are on the same page regarding operating procedure and broader goals. Integration is best achieved with common training, strategy, operations and tactics. An example of this can be the seamless co-deployment of state military and PMCs in the acquisition of an asset such as an oil field.

Responsiveness is defined as “the ability to tailor military activity to a state's own capabilities, its adversary's capabilities and external constraints.” In terms of PMCs, adaptability is the keystone of the industry's survival. An example of this would be the ability to hire personnel to fit certain operational demands and be successfully deployed within a limited timeframe.

Skill is defined as “measuring military personnel and their units against some objective standard or benchmark in assessing their ability to achieve particular tasks and to carry out orders” and “also captures a military's capability to motivate soldiers and to ensure that they carry out orders, fight hard and seize the initiative in combat.” An example of this would be a PMC capturing a town with no operational difficulties and no casualties.

Quality is the military's ability to provide itself with highly capable weapons and equipment. This largely depends on the contract obtained by the PMC and how many funds are available for this purpose. However, it also involves having an efficient internal structure which ensures the safety and efficiency of PMC troops.

This framework provides an overview of military effectiveness and is able to identify gaps in capability of PMCs or state militaries. This framework will be used throughout the chapter in analysing the successes or failures of the use of Wagner in the field.

Ukraine:

This case study will examine the big picture of Russian strategy and how PMCs fit into this. Then chapter will then examine the informal networks which knit together the public and private spheres regarding this conflict. Following this, it will look at the advantages of using a majority Russian-speaking force in terms of secrecy and why this was necessary to the success of this operation. Exploring this will lead to an analysis of hybrid warfare tactics and how this was both a relatively new phenomenon and crucial to the success of the operation. The benefits of replacing Wagner with volunteer battalions to fight in Eastern Ukraine will be analysed. Furthermore, the neomedieval aspects of this conflict will be highlighted, showing how medieval conditions have influenced the use of PMCs in this conflict. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the Russian government narrative for recruitment, which frames the conflict to the Russian public andrecruits volunteers. Throughout this section military effectiveness of the operation will be examined using the above framework, looking at skill, quality, integration and responsiveness.

Firstly, it is necessary to examine the variety ofactors in the Ukrainian conflict. Of the matrix of assets available, Russia has chosen to use Organised Informal Agents, Ad Hoc Foreign Forces and National Armed Forces. This conflict involves nonstate actors and no clear beginning or end to the war, both of which are indications of a neomedieval war. The choice to use a PMC such as Wagner to achieve the initial annexation of Crimea shows responsiveness to the changing nature of warfare and effective use of tactics. The so-called “polite people” or “little green men” are an example of swift, organised and professional specialised deployment designed to keep casualties to a minimum and achieve operational efficiency. In this way, Russia successfully conducted hybrid warfare by using the strategic methods of cloaking the state, trailblazing and privateering. The near-bloodless annexation of Crimea demonstrates high levels of skill and the co-deployment of state and Wagner troops demonstrates exemplary levels of integration.

Furthermore, the invasion of Ukraine fits into the Russian foreign policy concept of protecting Russian diaspora and reaffirming connection to homeland, as well as countering NATO. This is because Wagner is able to accomplish the protection of Russian citizens by annexing Crimea in the most politically palatable way by remaining anonymous, unaccountable and professional throughout. There is even reference to the use of PMCs in the Russian foreign policy concept whereby “extrabudgetary resources raised on a voluntary basis through public-private partnerships can be used to finance foreign policy activities.” This may be a reference to Dmitry Utkin and Yevgeniy Prigozhin who both head up Wagner and have close ties to the Kremlin. It could even be argued that these ties are so close that Wagner may be a de-facto arm of the Russian state, this may be why there is such excellent integration.

The relationship between the state and private force is arguably the most distinctive feature of this conflict. As informal networks are key to Russian political culture, they have had an important role in who is being deployed and why. In Russia, Wagner PMC has been financed by Yevgeniy Prigozhin also known as “Putin's chef” as he owns a highly successful catering company and is in Putin's inner circle. Dmitry Utkin heads up the practical side of the organisation and uses skills gained during his service in the GRU. This link between Wagner and the Russian state extends even further, whereby hacked emails reveal that the FSB was closely involved in recruitment operations for this supposedly “private” outfit. This taps into the siloviki network which governs the majority of Russian politics to date and differentiates Russian PMCs from others seen globally, as this creates a largely insular group of fighters with limited access to non-Russian-speaking recruits. Furthermore, Wagner was also allowed to use a military training facility as its base in Molkino, Krasnodar region, which coincidentally houses the 10th Special Forces Brigade of the GRU. These tight links with government point to a high level of integration with national military strategy. However, although this may be an advantage in the integration of forces under favourable state conditions, it can also be a disadvantage to forces on the ground in the face of unfavourable state conditions. This can be seen by the fact that the quality of weapons, food and rations on the battlefield seem to be heavily influenced by relations between Yevgeny Prigozhin and Putin's inner circle. There are no guarantees for PMC soldiers of job safety or conditions, which may end by negatively influencing their performance on the battlefield and therefore their quality.