Russian Private Military Contractors: A Case Study of Ukraine and Syria

The planning involved for the annexation demonstrates a high level of integration with national strategy and forces. The deployment of these unidentifiable soldiers was a clear use of hybrid warfare. Especially in that careful consideration was taken so that thresholds that would trigger a military response were not crossed.” These troops were crucial to avoiding a full-blown war, as Russia deployed enough state troops to stay under the threshold of 30,000 state troops, at which it would be required to inform other states of troop movements, but through a combination of PMC use and strategy, it was able to both stay under the threshold and retain the element of surprise. Eastern Ukraine was arguably the perfect location for the use of this tactic, as the region fits the conditions necessary to Russian hybrid warfare. The first condition involves being ethnically and culturally transparent by deploying Russian forces in Russian-speaking areas, which prevents immediate detection. The second condition is covert deployment, which is made easier by geographical proximity. The third condition is poor border control as a result of a weak state in the target country. As Ukraine fits all three conditions, with the correct implementation of this strategy, the annexation was a paradigmatic success. This demonstrates high levels of skill and responsiveness, which will be contrasted to the operation in Syria later on.

Not only was hybrid warfare useful in maintaining the element of surprise and the smooth running of the operation, but it also ensured freedom of interference from Western states. By confusing the West and not allowing them time to ascertain facts due to the covert nature of the operation such as no official uniforms, no declaration of war or large-scale national troop movements, Russia is able to conduct its operation without interference. This can be seen in a similar vein to the policy of disinformation, which has been attributed to the Russian government in recent years. By applying this to the military sphere, it puts other states in a problematic position, as it is difficult to deploy a fast response whilst abiding by international law if the facts of the conflict are uncertain. The post-conflict sanctions implemented by Western nations has had a minimal effect compared to the political advantages gained by establishing Russia's military superiority in the area. Due to Russia's realist view of international relations and an emphasis on great power politics, it can be argued that by using this method to capture Crimea, it has essentially kept Ukraine at a significant disadvantage for the foreseeable future. It can thus be viewed as a regional hegemon which can back up any threatening rhetoric to post-soviet states.

However, the greatest advantage of using such forces is privacy. The element of surprise having been used to great success in Crimea, this somewhat wore off during the fighting in Eastern Ukraine. The presence of Russian Wagner fighters was further proven by their own personal social media accounts. Despite the fact that Wagner fighters revealed less about themselves on Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki than Russian army soldiers, this is still an act which violates the principles of a covert presence. It can be argued that Crimea was a “safe bet” trial run for the use of PMCs by Russia, as the area is majority sympathetic to Russia, being majority culturally/linguistically Russian. By combining the element of surprise with an ill-equipped Ukrainian army, it was predictably an easy victory. However, in Eastern Ukraine it was not so simple, with populations being more mixed with Ukrainian peoples and the element of surprise being lost. It can be argued that the more overt nature of the soldiers of the Crimean annexation, wearing matching uniforms with Russian equipment using Russian military vehicles with Russian number plates, is a testament to how Russian leaders saw the ease of winning the conflict. However, in Eastern Ukraine, soldiers' equipment, tactics and uniforms are mismatched and lacking coordination, which may point towards a different approach. It can be argued that the Russian state scaled back the involvement of PMCs in Eastern Ukraine in order to save money on costs and pass on operations to volunteer militias, which, although less effective, are considerably cheaper to run.Wagner achieved the main goal of the offensive, which may have been worth the higher price of 250,000 roubles a month compared to the 62000 roubles per month salary of a Russian state soldier or even the salary of a senior general lieutenant of 117000 per month. Crimea can be seen as a political victory, with the territory being swiftly and efficiently seized in order to emphasise Russia's regional dominance. This also demonstrates excellent quality, skill and responsiveness by Wagner.

By letting the war continue at a slower pace in Eastern Ukraine, Russia is in a win-win situation. It is sapping vital resources from the Ukrainian state, destabilising Ukraine politically by encouraging the undermining of the state monopoly on power through the continued use of volunteer battalions by Ukraine and arguably most crucial of all, barring Ukraine from NATO membership by keeping it involved in a conflict on its own territory. It is an excellent example of hybrid warfare or “grey zone conflict.” In this this way, Russia is able to gain territory and political gains associated with open interstate warfare without exposing itself to the risks that open warfare may bring. In order to counter this kind of warfare, the defending state should have enough military prowess to win the initial conflict fought under the guise of an internal struggle, in this case the annexation of Crimea. As this was not possible with the element of surprise and the poor quality of the Ukrainian forces, Russia's tactics inevitably prevailed, which shows the skill and responsiveness of Russian forces.

The transference of control from Wagner and other PMCs to volunteer battalions is accomplished by first establishing a good reputation for the forces already fighting. By using Wagner as an example of battalions fighting for the Russian side, potential recruits are impressed by the organisation and successes of Russian forces. Due to the ambiguity of the Wagner forces, it was difficult for volunteers to know the difference between what had been accomplished by volunteers as opposed to Wagner. This encouraged volunteers to join volunteer battalions at a much lower pay rate, varying from 15,000 roubles a month to nothing at all. Kremlin-backed forces in Ukraine comprise of 39,300 active fighters, including 36400 volunteer fighters from Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics and elsewhere. The Kremlin denies supplying Russian volunteers with arms or other support, which may be relatively accurate considering that volunteer soldiers receive next to nothing in support. The remaining 2900 are regular Russian servicemen, although their existence has been denied by the Kremlin. Although the quality, skill, integration and responsiveness of the volunteer battalions on the ground is substantially inferior to that of Wagner, this is intentional on behalf of the Russian state. It is necessary to prolong the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in order to both financially hobble the Ukrainian government and to prevent any further European or NATO integration. This shows that despite a lack of military effectiveness, the volunteer battalions are in the interest of a longer-term strategy.

Furthermore, the main narrative being used to recruit volunteers is patriotism and a restoration of the Russkiy Mir. Most volunteer recruits are ordinary people with varying levels of military training. With a lack of coherent command structure and such wide differences in training, volunteers have been called“artillery fodder” due to the inefficiency of their operations. This can be seen by the amount of volunteer soldiers missing in action or returning in coffins to their families. Volunteers were attracted by the desire to protect Russian civilians from fascism in Ukraine and other narratives portrayed by the media. Russian media portrayed Russian volunteer battalions as heroes, but returning volunteer soldiers have no support from the government even if they have received severe physical or psychological injuries as a result of their service. Some serving Russian soldiers however, received medals for their bravery in Ukraine, despite not officially being there. This difference in treatment has served to highlight some of the disadvantages associated with not serving with a state military force. This heavily affects the skill and quality of the volunteer battalions, as they lack the motivation and resources to continue fighting for little to no pay or state support upon their return.

Wagner has played a pivotal role in the annexation of Crimea and has laid out the groundwork for the Russian volunteers to take over in Eastern Ukraine. By using Wagner to carry out the Kremlin's key strategic goals in the region, Russia has been able to successfully wage a hybrid warfare strategy to win a neomedieval war. The close relationship between Wagner and the state works to its advantage in terms of integration, quality and responsiveness, however, it is a disadvantage in the sense that the quality of operations on the ground depends on the relationships between the heads of Wagner and Putin's inner circle. By using Wagner to wage this conflict, Russia has used the privacy of the PMC to its advantage, by framing the narrative as a civil war, with Russian citizens under threat from neo-fascist Ukrainians. This encouraged volunteers to take over from the expensive PMCs and to implement this idea for real.

Syria:

Like the Ukrainian conflict, the Syrian conflict is also aneomedieval war and as a result, it would be a logical strategy to use hybrid warfare. However, the way that Russia has attempted to transplant the same strategy as in Ukraine to Syria has seen more limited success. Wagner's experience in Ukraine shaped its actions in Syria in relation to tactics on the ground, recruitment issues and privacy issues. Furthermore, the reasons why Wagner were deployed in Syria and how effective this was for Russia's foreign policy strategy will be examined. However,there has been a shiftwithin Wagner from state interests to private interests, which has the potential to heavily affect the integration between the state and Wagner. Similarly, moral hazards associated with this conflict will be explored, as well as how the Russian state has reacted.Finally, the political narrative behind the conflict will be analysed, as well as how Wagner are portrayed. The above framework will be used to analyse the military effectiveness of Wagner in the Syrian conflict.

It is important to note that the conflict in Syria was key to the creation and implementation of Wagner in Ukraine and Syria itself at a later date. In 2013, Slavonic Corps PMC (registered in Hong Kong) went to Syria to fight for the Assad regime. Whilst the recruitment largely focussed on Russian ex-special forces and ex-military personnel, it is worth noting that PMCs are still illegal in Russia itself. The Slavonic Corps were officially hired by Hong Kong registered Russian company known as the Moran Security Group, which is a private security company and not a PMC. By hiding operations in such layers of secrecy means that companies are able to escape Russian domestic law, even if its employees are largely Russian citizens. Once Slavonic Corps had failed its mission in Syria, one if its employees, Dmitry Utkin (also known as “Wagner”) returned to Russia and was spared charges of mercenary activity which some of his fellow contractors were jailed for. This is a further example of how informal networks, especially the siloviki, play an important role in the world of Russian PMCs. This shows high levels of integration with government on an informal level, as Russian law does not encourage their existence.

Although the details are unclear as to why Utkin was spared prosecution, Wagner was formed as a company and deployed an unknown number of troops in Ukraine in 2014 and then around 3000 employees to Syria between 2015 and 2017. This number of troops in Syria almost matched the 4000 regular Russian military personnel. It can be argued that the deployment of Wagner to Syria in such numbers was a response to the successful operation in Ukraine. By allowing mercenaries to bear the brunt of losses in battles on the ground, the body count of Russian state soldiers are kept to a minimum. Following on from the conflict in Ukraine, as well as the numerous other border conflicts around Russia, it can be argued that the Russian public are war weary, especially with the sanctions following the annexation of Crimea and the previous disastrous attempt at intervening in Afghanistan. When spinning the Syrian intervention to the public, Russia had to minimise any possible ill-effects. Having PMCs take the full brunt of the war gives the Russian army plausible deniability. This shows responsiveness on behalf of the Russian state and skill in motivating PMC soldiers to take part in the conflict, whilst projecting positive publicity from the Syrian conflict.

However, the conditions for PMC soldiers on the ground are barely sustainable, which emphasises their nature as a short term solution. For example, Slavonic Corps operations in Syria have resulted in contracts likened to those of suicide missions, no pay, no mission strategy and even homemade armour. With the recruits being treated as cannon fodder, the body count is rising rapidly. This may end up overturning any advantagesof covert warfare domestically, as most of the fighters are Russian by nationality. Examples of contractors being put in perilous situations with no help are manifold. For example, Wagner employees Roman Zabolotny and GrigoryTsurkanu were held and executed by ISIS. The Russian government provided no help to the hostages despite their nationality. Going even further, Tsurkanu's parents claimed that Wagner operatives had moved into their house to prevent any contact with the press. Russian journalists investigating Wagner activities in Syria have also received threats of violence. It may end up that the amount of bodies is not as important as the manner in which they are killed. The horrifying nature of the kidnapping and murder of these two PMC fighters publicly displayed on the internet is a snapshot of the reality of the Syrian conflict which the Russian state is trying to shield the public from. By not making any attempt to recover the bodies or reassure the public that Russian citizens fighting in pro-Assad forces will be protected, this can undermine the patriotic narrative associated with Russian state soldiers fighting in Syria. This shows a lack of responsiveness and skill on behalf of Wagner and the Russian state in mitigating possible negative consequences of PMC soldiers fighting in Syria.

Furthermore, the worst incident of loss of life was in mid-2017, where as many as 200 contractors were killed in a bombing carried out by the US military. Although the Russian state says that no Russian servicemen were killed in the attack, it has acknowledged that the incident took place. Kremlin officials have denied or downplayed the number of Russian victims as well as denying knowledge of the activities of Russian citizens in Syria. The Russian Foreign Ministry does not acknowledge any responsibility for Russians in Syria and place the burden of regulating their activities on the host country. The foreign ministry is keen to distinguish Russian service members from any other Russian citizens operating in Syria. They have admitted the deaths of five people and do not confirm their nationality. There is evidence that the operation was commanded by Prigozhin himself, liberating Syrian oil fields in exchange for 25% of oil captured from ISISor rebel forces for a company he is associated with known as Euro-Polis. This company bankrolls Wagner itself and has significantly increased mercenary activity compared to its operations in Ukraine, as can be seen by the decrease in state involvement and the private gains which were not available in Ukraine.

It can be argued that Russian acquisition of Middle Eastern oil couldbe seen as an attempt to mitigate the current low oil prices, as the additional supply would strengthen Russia's position. However, this is not a priority in a region which already has so many other issues, which may make it difficult to maintain the supply outside of the country. It may be a gamble on behalf of a private individual, Prigozhin, who may wish to try to gain long-term profit from the war in Syria. The personal involvement of Prigozhin as well as the fact that he secured permission from a senior Russia minister shows that this was a state-sponsored project. In addition, it is important to note that in Russia, the public and private spheres often overlap in Putin's inner circle. What may be a private project can involve public figures. However, Wagner may have lost Russian state support, as during its second deployment to Syria in 2017 soldiers experienced sudden cuts and delays in pay, as well as shortages in ammunition and out of date weapons. When this is contrasted toWagner in Ukraine and its earlier deployments in Syria, which prided itself in the use of the best weapons, the best salaries and the best soldiers, it seems that there has been a turning point. This has significantly decreased the integration and quality of Wagner fighters, which may be indicative that the main strategic goal of this conflict according to a hybrid warfare strategy - to ensure the ability of the Assad regime to win the Syrian civil war -has been achieved and that any remaining presence is purely a private enterprise centred on private gain. The lack of Russian volunteer battalions fighting on behalf of the Assad regime highlights the decline in the quality of Wagner troops in a way which may not have been so obvious in Ukraine, where volunteers were able to pick up the slack. This is also indicative of the neomedieval nature of the Syrian conflict, in which there is no clear beginning, middle or end. The hybrid warfare strategy used to win this conflict has been ultimately more successful but less palatable to the Russian public in a PR sense, as there is not a convincing narrative which motivates the public to side with the PMCs.

Furthermore, Russia became involved in this conflict as a way to not only maintain influence in the Middle East, but also to thwart Western meddling in the affairs of sovereign states in order to avoid another result such as in Libya with Gaddafi. By becoming involved in the conflict, Russia was likely to bring the war to an swift end and gain a political goal against the West to maintain state's rights to self-determination. The use of PMCs in Syria was largely a PR exercise for the Russian state. This raises Russia's profile on the national stage as an ally to states wishing to maintain their sovereignty, as well as being an effective fighting force, able to take credit for battles won by PMCs such as the battle of Palmyra in 2016, without any domestic concerns for the soldiers involved.

It can be argued that Russia became involved in the Syrian conflict due to the presence of Russian-speaking fighters fighting alongside anti-Assad forces. As fighters came from post-soviet backgrounds and were learning skills which could be used to destabilise Russia through terrorist activity, siding with Assad is an opportunity to eliminate Russian-speaking fighters before they became a problem domestically or in the post-soviet sphere. By hiring a PMC to undertake the task, it lessens the opportunity to rally against Russia as an enemy, as the Wagner fighters represent a variety of post-soviet nationalities, much like the anti-Assad fighters themselves. As Syria acted as prime networking ground for diverse post-Soviet extremists, allowing them to continue their activities in Syria unchallenged could have resulted in a much larger issue for the Russian state in terms of domestic security and influence within the post-Soviet region. The conflict itself can be seen as a rebellion against state power from both the Russian and Syrian opposition sides. Locals rebel against their government and Russian-speaking fighters joined the fight in an attempt to undermine state monopoly on power. The fact that Russia chose a non-state actor to fight this threat demonstrates that Russia as a state maintains the monopoly on power even when it comes to non-state actors. This shows responsiveness in combatting a potential domestic threat as well as skill in implementation of Wagner forces and integration with Russian state policy.

However, there has been achange in government attitudes towards the PMC. The strength of state-PMC bonds can be measured by what resources the Wagner soldiers received. In addition to being given a lot of money, a state military base and top quality equipment, Wagner soldiers had previously received state medals usually only awarded to Russian soldiers. This was despite the fact that their activities are technically illegal under Russian law and that the Russian state has denied knowing anything about their operations in Syria. Identical statues have even appeared to glorify Wagner in Eastern Ukraine and in Syria, with unknown origins. Wounded fighters have even been found in Russian military hospitals in Moscow and St Petersburg.

However, following the shift in relations, there has been no glory for those killed in the bombings or kidnapped and slaughtered by ISIS. This is in stark contrast to the Russian state response of the death of Major Roman Filipov, a Russian state soldier who blew himself up rather than avoid capture by ISIS and was posthumously awarded Hero of Russia, the country's highest honour. 30000 people attended his funeral and his story received a high level of publicity in the Russian media. This shows not only the inconsistencies in the Kremlin's narrative, but also how PMC fighters are at the mercy of their paymasters. The narrative of Wagner being the elite force capable of winning any war for Russia has been undermined by a lack of state support and high-risk missions which may drive away their most elite soldiers in favour of a better strategy and command structure. This therefore creates a severe lack of integration, skill, quality and responsiveness.

The lack of national diversity within Wagner itself is arguably to its disadvantage outside of the post-Soviet theatre of war. This is because where Russian contractors are able to blend in seamlessly into the local population both ethnically and linguistically, it is easier to conduct stealth operations. However, in a country such as Syria, any attempt at secrecy is lost if the fighters are composed of a largely homogenous national group, as it makes it easy to identify their origins and employers. Furthermore, this also shapes domestic perception of the conflict, as Russians at home are aware that their fathers, sons and brothers are out fighting and dying in Syria whether in Wagner, other PMCs or the Russian national forces. There is a concern that Syria will turn into another Afghanistan which can be seen in that 49 percent of Russianssupport an end to military operations in Syria. It can be argued that domestic stability is more important to the Kremlin than foreign policy goals, as arguably Moscow does not have a grand strategy, and the focus is more on short-term political goals. This shows that the Syrian operation has not proven successful in terms of hybrid warfare strategy, as the troops do not match the area of their deployment linguistically or ethnically.

Furthermore, the theatre of war used was not geographically close which makes deployment more obvious. However, there is poor border control and a weak state in Syria which makes it easier to enter undetected. This is not an advantage in this case however, as Russian forces were invited by Assad. This therefore shows a lack of responsiveness and skill, as troops have not blended into their environment in a covert way. On the other hand, it can be argued that the advantages to covert warfare in the Syrian conflict are not manifold, as Russian forces were formally invited. In addition to this, PMCs were deployed to Syria duringphase 3 of the conflict, during which it is far more difficult to deploy a hybrid warfare strategy. By being only able to trailblaze and privateer, Wagner's strategic arsenal is severely reduced and relegates them to the same impotent position as many US contractors during the war in Afghanistan. With their identities exposed, they are only able to fight standard battles, not employ other counter-insurgency strategies.

The differences in structure of Wagner to US PMCs such as the fact that there is less national diversity, more state control and more informal networks involved shows that the Russian state fundamentally operates under a different assumption of what the state is. In Russia, it can be argued that the state is formed by the informal networks which were first developed in the parallel shadow economy of the Communist era and the same is true of the cold-war networks related to Russian PMCs. These have persisted to the present day and it can be argued that in Russia the interests of the private individual and the state often overlap in this system. Private individuals can use state resources for their own private gain, as can be seen with Yevgeny Prigozhin using his Russian state-funded PMC to gain shares in oil fields captured from Syria. It can also be argued that the fact that Wagner is majority Russian or Russian speaking is not only due to language barriers, but also due to the fact that soldiers were recruited through these informal networks. Furthermore, by recruiting only Russian speakers, the state can maintain more influence over the individual fighters involved as this is more secure and the state can affect their domestic situation, as can be seen by the families of fighters being forbidden from speaking to the press. Although this has an unparalleled positive effect on integration, it has a negative effect on responsiveness, as it creates a limited pool and inflexible body of soldiers whose characteristics may not match those required for an operation outside of the post-soviet sphere.

Now that the conflict is coming to an end, Moscow has wound down the Russian presence in Syria. Such conflicts can be argued to be a key way of improving military capability. This can be seen for example in the plans to further expand airlift capacity to guarantee mobility for troops as a result of the experience gained in Syria. This demonstrates responsiveness, integration and skill in that this shows that Russia is preparing itself for more hybrid warfare. This is a positive step forward for the Russian military, as it is acknowledging the neomedieval nature of modern warfare and modernising its capabilities in order to better deliver hybrid warfare in future. By improving troop mobility, it will be easier to deploy PMC troops and overcome geographical boundaries, whether there is a weak state or not, which is a key feature of Russian hybrid warfare.

PMCs were used in Syria in an attempt to replicate the highly successful operation in Ukraine, as well as being an effective way to achieve foreign policy goals without negatively affecting public opinion domestically. The conflict in Syria is an example of how the type of PMC used should be taken into consideration, as in contrast to Ukraine, a majority post-Soviet force worked against the secrecy of the operation and led to more domestic discontent regarding the loss of life of Russian soldiers in the Syrian conflict. Despite this issue, using Russian contractors for the Syrian conflict may have gained Russia an ally in the Middle East, as well as maintaining a firm hand on soldiers completing such a sensitive mission. Furthermore, as the conflict advances, it is important to note the weakening of command structure, funding and general state support. The implementation of high-risk operations without sufficient remuneration and with poor conditions can be risky to the loyalty of troops who have chosen private service for the attraction of superior conditions to state service. The Russian state should consider the risks of the narrative it chooses for its PMCs, deciding whether they are illegal and lacking in moral fibre, or whether they are a de facto arm of the state apparatus, risking their lives alongside Russian troops in often more perilous conditions.

Overall, both of these conflicts highlight the advantages of hybrid warfare and the benefits of using PMCs. However, they also bring to attention the main problems associated with Russian PMC use - namely the fact that the Russians state is still unsure of how to use them. Although it attempts to emulate the American military style by bringing these actors to the table, Russia lacks the formal structures to ensure the smooth running of operations beyond achieving a certain objective. By contracting firms to achieve a goal but then leaving them to their own devices may lead to such activities as warlordism or even an undermining of initial state goals. The recruitment of troops through informal networks provides an extra layer of secrecy, but ultimately limits the pool of troops to hire from only post-soviet nationalities. This can prove an advantage on a post-soviet field of battle such as Ukraine but is lacking in discretion in other nations such as Syria. By being unified by their Russian language, Wagner provides an incentive for their opponents to rally against the Russian state. This undermines the advantage of having a diverse force for counter-insurgency purposes, as seen in British and American PMCs. However, despite these shortcomings, Wagner has proven to be highly effective in helping the Russian government to achieve its foreign policy goals in both Ukraine and Syria. Their best levels of effectivnesss were seen in the annexation of Crimea and the first deployments to Syria, whereas their least effective operations were seen in Eastern Ukraine and later deployments to Syria. The covert nature of this company has meant that Russian state interests can be achieved without the direct involvement of the state. As a result of this success, each deployment is an opportunity for the Russian military to learn from its mistakes, adapt to neomedieval warfare and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Russia has managed to succeed in adapting to neomedieval warfare whereas the US has failed, as can be seen by Afghanistan and Vietnam.

Conclusion

This dissertation has covered not only a review of the existing literature, but also an in-depth deconstruction of the modern Russian PMC environment. It has explored the global context of the industry, giving the US as an example of established PMC practice and comparing this to the current Russian situation. It has analysed industry definitions, historical implications, ethical considerations including industry regulation and conducted an examination of how PMCs have changed the modern military landscape. The main subject of the analysis were the case studies of Russian PMC Wagner in Ukraine and Syria, and how this related to military effectiveness, as well as themes discussed in earlier chapters.

There is discord as to how to define PMCs, as well as how the opaque nature of PMCs is an integral feature to the survival of the industry. This does however make it difficult for academics to study the industry and makes information hard to obtain, often many years after events have taken place.PMCs can be categorised, based on distance from the battlefield, as well as function and by individual contracts.

Neomedieval global conditions favour the resurgence of private force, as was seen in the medieval Italian city states. The rise of globalisation, the technological unification of the world and increasingly costly technological specialisation on the battlefield all contribute towards this. The US have established themselves as market drivers and this has influenced global military structures in that demand has risen for high-tech warfare and PMCs. This means that Russia now has to follow their lead, whilst maintaining Russian methods of governance, mainly maintaining their own Westphalian sovereignty. The main issue which Russia is grappling with is the fragmentation of sovereignty and overlapping of authority through state and nonstate actors. However, neomedievalism also affects the battlefield itself as wars can no longer be won through state forces alone. This has forced Russia to follow the US' lead and employ a strategy of hybrid warfare, using contractors and state troops to win wars.

This method of hybrid warfare using PMCs creates an ethical and regulatory quagmire, from which there is no obvious extrication. This lack of regulation allows complete freedom for PMCs and their employers to undertake controversial operations. Domestic regulation has seen limited success and has been used in Russia mostly for the purposes of maintaining the state monopoly on power. International regulation is non-existent due to the lack of converging interests globally. This allows states to conduct high-value operations at a low risk of consequences. However, the quality of the operations may not always be guaranteed and the result is that operations may end in an unsatisfactory way for all parties involved, much like the medieval conflicts of the past.

Russia has mastered the art of hybrid warfare, which is crucial in gaining victory in neomedieval wars, as can be seen in Ukraine. However, it has not been successful to the same degree in Syria, where the same strategy may not always work in different scenarios. Where Wagner was able to seamlessly infiltrate and carry out operations undetected in Crimea, its homogeneity worked against it in the altogether foreign territory of Syria. This compromised the covertness of the operation and led to the exposure of high risk operations and brutal kidnappings at the hands of ISIS. There is a risk that the overlap of public and private may cause negative consequences in the field, with high-risk operations providing little reward and an increasingly public body count of Russian nationals. The main value of PMCs is the private nature of operations, which provides state deniability and the surprise element needed to win neomedieval wars in their initial phase.

It may be interesting for future researchers to examine these cases in greater detail once more information emerges over time. It will also be interesting to see how the PMC industry emerges in developing nations and to what extent they can be used as a force for good. The latest uses of PMCs by Russia have put the industry in the spotlight of international military affairs, and this form of warfare is likely to be the future of war as we know it.

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