Comparative analysis of Russian approaches towards the UN Role in conflict resolution on the cases of North Korea, Ukraine and Syria

Russia, as a neighboring country of the DPRK, insists on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to avoid destabilization, decrease the possibility of the nuclear causality and reduce the US influence as with the continued tests conducted by North Korea in 2017, there emerged more preconditions for further American advancement of its presence in South Korea, justified as a necessity to provide more security and maintain balance. For instance, stationing of the U.S-led anti-ballistic systems.

Russia and China proposed a draft resolution for the lifting of the measures applied against North Korea by a number of approved UNSC resolutions, which included provisions that are aimed to cut North Korean revenues to continue the development of its nuclear and ballistic missiles program.Russian and Chinese position is rested upon the view that the hardline towards North Korea can only stimulate its reluctance to act following the adopted UNSC resolution on the NK denuclearization process.Russian and Chinese proposals in the draft resolution consist of measures aimed at recalling previous resolutions and the sanctions listed in them.

According to the document Security Council should:

- lift the ban on North Korea exports (textiles, seafood, statues)

- lift the ban for labor from North Korea

Commenting on these measures, Russian officials highlight that some of the adopted sanctions have no relation to the nuclear industry and cause serious consequences for the humanitarian situation in North Korea and present a direct threat to its citizens, as a result making for further disintegration of North Korea from the rest of the world.

The US officials are following another strategy. Their view on the issue is based on the assumption that severe sanctions on North Korea will result sooner or later on their agreement to anything that the US will propose to them in order to achieve even partial removal of imposed sanctions. However, Russian mission in the United Nations expressed concerns on this hardline policy towards the issue of the North Korean nuclear development program and recent missile tests. Russia argued that the only way to reach consensus and find a solution is to show a sign of mutual aspiration to start negotiations and therefore take measures that will show thewillingness and the seriousness of intent to do it. This is reachable in case of North Korean compliance to the UNSC resolutions and the ease of sanctions from the UN and from states that imposed them unilaterally. The main problem in the deadlock in the possible denuclearization of NK is the coercive style ofthe diplomacy conducted by the US and its western partners. Russian representatives in the UN pointed out that the dialogue is impossible due to the absence of anything in return for Korea for its start of the denuclearization process. According to Nebenzia, in his press conference at the UN in 2019, North Korea conducted almost all of its promises to stop nuclear missile tests. North Koreaabstained from long-range missile and nuclear tests for two years. However, it is unlikely that Pyongyang will continue doing so if the UNSC will not adopt a new resolution on the ease of the sanctions. The permanent representative of Russia in the UNSC

An inference can be made that, Russia tries to sustain stable and modest relations with both Korean Republics; in other words, it pursuits to establish trilateral economic cooperation.

Despite the fact that Moscow has undertaken to express its flexibility in the North Korean crisis by making attempts in coordination with China in October 2018 to lift the sanctions against DPRK, insisting on the damaging character of these coercive measures on the local population of North Korea. And motivated to continue its trilateral projects with South and North Korea such as rail hub in the port of Rajin in the territory of DPRK, and the projects directed to energy cooperation, Russian long-desired interest to build a gas pipeline through the territory of the DPRK and connect it to South Korea.

Ukraine

The way Moscow approached Ukraine crisis is considerably contrasting to the two other cases of Syria and especially North Korea. In comparison to these cases, Ukrainian had a special status for Russia. Consequently, the strategies applied were drastically different and were concerned more with the achievement of Russian objectives and less with the role of the United Nations and international law, although Russia attempted to justify them. As a result, the argumentation of Russian policies towards Ukraine was based on political realist considerations rather than legal. Nevertheless, Russia insists that all of its activities were managed with respect and in accordance with international law. Moscow presented several arguments that justify its powerful strategies approached in the Ukrainian conflict.

Significance of Ukraine for Russian Foreign Policy & their bilateral relations

Ukraine as an ally

Ukraine, in the same fashion as the Belarus Republic, were always regarded as Russia's two most vital allies and friends with strong family ties, the cultural, national identity which were shaping throughout their shared history. Common wars, faith, crises, heritage, and to some extent, language, made Russia and Ukraine the closest political and economic partners for years. Moreover, the control of Ukraine also played a significant role in the self-perception and identity of Russia as a strong regional (great) power.

Nonetheless, with the dissolution of the USSR and Ukraine declaration of independence in 1991, the political strategy of Ukraine slowly started to shift towards further integration with the Western world, attempting to escape from overwhelming Russian dependency. Indicating the weakening of Russian influence not only in Europe but in the Post-Soviet space.

Economy

Ukraine was also a critical partner for Russia in terms of trade. According to the World Bank, bilateral trade with Ukraine in 2011 accounted for almost $49 billion. Making Ukraine the largest trading partner of Russia. Moscow had further ambitious plans to incorporate Ukraine into the Eurasian Economic Union along with Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. However, this was complicated by the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and by the prospects of Ukrainian further economic integration with Europe.

In contrast to the times before the Euromaidan, the figures indicate that today's trade between Russia and Ukraine accounts for only $6.99 billion in imports from Russia and $3.24 billion of exports.

Ukraine is also an important area for Russian economy, as it is the main area through which Russia conducts its export of gas to the Western Europe.

Ukraine as a geostrategic area for Russia

From the realist view, Ukraine has always been regarded as a territory of high importance in security terms and therefore has to serve as a neutral or even pro-Russian area that ensures Russian national security. The most notable work that describes Russian policy towards Ukraine is that of Mearsheimer (2014) in his article "Why the Ukraine crisis is the west fault". Russian intervention into the domestic affairs of Ukraine is viewed by Mearsheimer (2014) no more than just a means to defend Russia's most vital national interest - state security, and not due to the desire to restore Soviet Empire as the West usually portrays it, but he argued that the US and its European allies share responsibility for the seizure of Crimean Peninsula.

NATO enlargement to the Russian borders and West Expansion Eastwards in 2004, incorporating seven new East European counties, including the Post-Soviet Republic, which used to be a part of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, was a direct threat for Moscow national security and a sign to change its strategy. Nevertheless, the most profound concern appeared in 2008 after the NATO Bucharest Summit, where the organization expressed its willingness to integrate Georgia and Ukraine to the alliance in the nearest future. In the realist framework, it was the major consideration that compelled Russia to take immediate and decisive actions and affected relations with both countries. What in short time escalated into a war between Russia and Georgia and unprecedented conflict with Ukraine in 2014. Georgian war was a sign and warning for the international community and especially NATO that the ambitions directed towards vital Russian sphere of influence will not be left unnoticed.

However, Ukraine was vital for Russia not only in terms of its close historical ties but, most importantly, as a strategic geopolitical area. Ukraine has always served as a security cordon between threats from the West during the wars and instabilities. Along with that, the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol was home for Russian Black Sea Fleet with a long history dated back to the late 18th century and associated with bloody struggles against Ottoman Empire such as Crimean War of 1853 and outstanding achievements of Russian Navy, for instance, Battle of Kerch Strait. The Black Sea Fleet also took an active part during the battles in the 1st and 2nd World Wars. Thus, having symbolic military and political significance for Russia's security and status of a superpower.

Prior to the annexation of Crimea, there was an agreement between Russia and Ukraine on leasing the naval bases till 2042.

Holding control over the Crimean Peninsula is an essential condition for Russian prestige in the international arena and consolidation of great power image.

Brief outline of the Ukrainian crisis

Russian bilateral relations with Ukraine has never been so perfect as Russian officials and the head of state usually idealized them, arguing that Ukrainians and Russians are one nation or that Ukrainians and Russians are biggest brothers, ignoring different identities and regarding any shift from Russian influence as a betrayal (Trenin, 2018). The series of protests or "Orange Revolution" of 2004 in Ukraine, in response to the results of the winning of pro-Russian candidate Yanukovich, was one of the first signs of growing hostility between two neighboring states. Ukrainian willingness to integrate into the European hemisphere was also evident by its attempts to bring Ukraine-EU relations to a higher level by conducting a number of negotiations in the period 2007 and 2013 towards further strengthening of cooperation such as Association Agreement with the EU.

In almost ten years from the Orange Revolution, another brick fell off the wall of Russian - Ukrainian relations and got it to the point of no return. It was the time to sign long-awaited agreement one the Association with the European Union at the end of 2013, that time President Yanukovich,in accordance with Kremlin's command failed to do so, what resulted in massive discontent from its citizens. This decision was met with unprecedented hostility from the Ukraine residents, especially from the Western part of Ukraine, who always associated themselves as a part of the European hemisphere. It provoked unrest in Ukraine capital Kyiv and escalated to the fierce rivalry between nationalists, the legitimate government, and those who supported the continuation of Ukraine's political strategy towards integration with Russia, especially by the residents of the Eastern part of Ukraine. Euromaidan of 2014 and its consequences in the face of the overthrow of Yanukovich government and the further escalation to the ongoing Civil War in Ukraine between nationalists and so-called separatists of the Eastern part of Ukraine, indicated the growing threat towards Russian-speaking residents of Crimea, which make up the majority of the population on the Peninsula.

The events of Euromaidan at the beginning of 2014 proved that at least one half of highly divided Ukrainian society desired liberation from Russian influence and asked for further integration with the West. Besides that, the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis has significantly changed the architecture of the European Security, indicating the wrong approach towards Russia conducted for years by its Western partners. The first time since the Cold War, Europe experienced the biggest collapse in its security system by witnessing brilliant operations conducted by Russian peacekeeping forces in Crimea and further takeover of Crimea (Masters, 2020 ).

Role of the United Nations

The adherence to the mechanisms of the UN in the management of the Ukrainian crisis is substantially complicated by Russian dual understanding of international law. According to Mдlksoo (2015), Kremlin has a unique perception of international law, on the one hand, Moscow places a tremendous role on the duty of all states to act in accordance with international law, which in Remler's (2020) opinion is narrowed to the provisions listed in the UN Charter. Which includes the ideas of universal equality, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Russian diplomats and president regularly point out the necessity to respect international law and condemn the idea of “rules based order”, which in their opinion, promotes and endorses western values, regardless of the different cultural, historical and political identity of all states. Holding negotiations at the UNSC, Russia devotes a lot of attention towards criticism of such concepts as responsibility to protect and military interventions conducted with the reference to that concept. On the other hand, when it comes to the management of the post-Soviet space, Russia's understanding of international law, to be more precise, the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, becomes more flexible. Bazz (2016) suggested that Kremlin still sees the current international system being divided by spheres of influences by independent great powers. Therefore, an inference can be made that, the political issues happening in Russian vital sphere of interest, such as post-Soviet space, is its regional concern, not an international one. Consequently, it shapes certain approach, which Russia uses towards the use of the United Nations as a platform for conflict settlement. Given Moscow's pragmatic view of international law and reluctance to involve international community to interfere to the affairs with its vital sphere of influence, it resulted in a more unilateral strategy of Russia towards Ukrainian crisis.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that Russia pays no attention to the justification and legalization of its actions in Ukrainian Donbass and Crimea and ignores international law.

To avoid complete disapproval of Russian strategy in the Ukrainian crisis.

As it is evidenced by the voting on the UNSC draft resolution concerning the illegal status of Russian presence in Crimea and its plan to hold referendum, the S/2014/189 tabled by more than 40 states was vetoed by Russia, stipulating grave concern of other member states about the effectivity of such mechanism of negotiation. The French representative at the UN G. Araud said that Russia's behavior at the Security Council bans the UN Charter and undermines its legitimacy. Fending off an endless stream of hostility to Russian approach on Ukraine, Vitaly Churkin on 15 March 2014, explained the use of veto, by saying that the case of Crimea is a special and extraordinary case, and therefore demands a deeper consideration as the local people of Crimea have a right of self-determination, especially when their future is endangered by the growing threat from Ukrainian Nationalists and illegitimate government that came to power as a result of a coup.

Being met with substantive amount of condemnation and critics, Russia introduced other platforms for the conflict settlement. Such as Normandy Four Summit, which is based on the Minsk Agreements only between the relevant parties, including Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France, and excluding Russia's principal antagonist, the United States from the peace efforts. Initially, the conflict resolution was held in a different format consisting of other parties involved in it, such as the United States, European Union, Russia, and Ukraine. However, the Geneva talks held under the auspices of the United Nations in 2014 proved to be inefficient due to the conflict of two power blocs. As a result, Russia rejected a certain format and established the Normandy Four Summits. Germany and France involved in the settlement are more beneficial parties for Russia than it may seem from the first sight. The previous format of Geneva Talks in which the European Union took part was a representation of the whole EU, meaning that Russian central conflicting states' voices are also taken into account. The new format helped to exclude Baltic states, which usually emphasize the threat presented by Russia to the Security of Europe, therefore considerably complicating conflict resolution efforts. However, according to Francis (2019). Kremlin's main benefit from the Normandy Four format is not rooted in the higher efficiency of establishing peace in Ukraine. However, a good chance to collect parties that will assist Russia in overcoming adverse effects and challenges to Russia's status in Europe appeared after the Ukraine crisis and annexation of Crimea. With the start of the negotiations, France exports to Russia increased to the highest figures in 2020 from 2014, constituting almost $800 billion. Consequently, increasing Russian role and influence in the format negotiations, giving Russia more power to manipulate and achieve agreement on its terms.

Germany is also an essential member of the negotiation, and possibly a beneficial party for Russia as Germany is highly interested in the construction of a new gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, as it helps Germany to avoid all transit countries, thus giving Germany an ability to control and secondly to regulate gas prices in Europe. Successful negotiation on the Nord-Stream-2 deal is an excellent opportunity for Kremlin not only to bypass territory of Ukraine and challenges Ukraine domestic conflict creates for the gas export, precisely, military instability in close proximity to gas pipelines, but also to increase European dependency on Russia's energy resources and strengthen Moscow's geopolitical influence.

Minsk Agreements which form the basement of the Normandy Four Summit is a protocol aimed at stabilization of the ongoing military conflict in Donbas Region in the Eastern part of Ukraine signed by official Ukraine government, Donetsk People's Republic, Luhansk People's Republic, and Russia in the Belarus capital Minsk in September of 2014, with support from the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The most important provision of which is to achieve mutual ceasefire under strict monitoring of OSCE.

A strategy of complete denial is the one most frequently used in the regulation of Ukrainian Crisis regarding Russian involvement in the military conflict between official Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatists of the Eastern part of Ukraine, namely, representatives of the self-declared DPR and LPR. According to Kijn (2019), the provisions listed in the Minsk Agreements indicate no relation to the Russian covert military campaign in the civil war in Ukraine and no assistance provided to the separatist groups. Instead, Russia portrays itself only as a mediator and guarantor of the agreement, despite the facts and evidence that prove the opposite. Hence, by denying the responsibility and its involvement, legally reflecting it in the document, Kremlin frees itself from any obligations and separates itself from the ongoing events and consequences. With the involvement of third parties such as OSCE, Moscow not only conducts negotiations on its terms but also legalizes them initially, avoiding unfavorable parties from the conflict settlement.

Factors that shaped Russian policy towards Ukraine

NATO enlargement Eastwards, getting closer to Russian borders, symbolized the strategic shift of Russia in the direction of the further escalation of its relations with the West and turn Eastwards. (Wolff, 2015) The West once more expressed disrespect to Russia's status as a great power and failed to integrate Russia into the system of common European Security by giving Russia a greater voice in European Security organizations. It paved the way for Russian isolation and transformation of its foreign policy strategy, conveying more self-assured and forceful responses to the threat to its vital interests (Larson, 2014). Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in his press statement in August 2008, that Russia will take all possible actions that will avoid any possibility of Georgia and Ukraine from joining North AtlanticTreaty Organization.

Another factor that complicates the issue of Russian intervention in Ukraine is the Kosovo case of 1998-99, which is commonly used by Russian officials to refer to when Moscow faces a wave of critics and accusations for its actions in Ukraine. As was already mentioned above, the Ukraine crisis is a special case and differs considerably from the Syrian crisis. Regarding Ukraine as a vital sphere of its influence and control, Russia modifies its policies in accordance with its political considerations, paying less attention to the norms of international law and multilateralism principles. What stands for the Kosovo case and its effect on Russian policies in Ukraine, it is based on the idea that Russia as a great power allows itself to act breaching international laws and pay little attention to the management of the crisis collectively, therefore identifying unilateral actions in situations when its vital national interests are at risk. Moreover, Russia feels free to perform controversial acts as there were precedents conducted by the US, more precisely NATO, and its unilateral action with the absence of the mandate to conduct airstrikes in Serbia. Kosovo conflict embarked on a negative turn not only in Russia-US relations but also showed the weakness of the role of the UN in the settling of international conflicts. Brutal military intervention conducted by NATO in the late 90s also signified a new era of uncontrolled interventions, the era of R2P, that usually served as an instrument to intervene rather than a tool for peace enforcement. The following military intervention unauthorized by the UN in Iraq in 2003, intervention in Afghanistan, and sponsored color revolution in Ukraine in 2004 showed that Russia has to be more attentive to the political instability near its border and therefore, not to let similar situations again. In his famous speech in 2014, Putin highlighted that such revolutions result neither in democracy, neither in political stability; on the contrary, they bring chaos and uncontrolled violence. Besides, the Kosovo conflict is also similar in the way NATO supported the Kosovo region in gaining sovereignty outside of the Serbian jurisdiction (Antonenko, 2007), which is similar to the Crimean secession from Ukraine. Baranovsky (2000) argued that the Kosovo factor had a dramatic impact on Russian reassessment of its relations with the West and rising concern over West's non-recognition of Russia as a Great Power and consequently no respect for its vital national interests in South-East Europe. Baranovsky (2000) added that Russian understanding of the use of military force was also changed and became more assertive; it was apparent with the war in Chechnya.

For Russia, the secession of Kosovo can be used as a precedent to legitimize the Crimean referendum and following incorporation to the Russian Federation.

Russian argumentation for its approach

Russia usually indicates the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference as one of its core values. Nonetheless, its takeover of the Crimean Peninsula with the assistance of peacekeeping forces was met with a dramatic hostility by the international community and members of the United Nations.

Its argumentation and justification of operation in Crimea was explained by the duty to protect ethnic Russians, which have always accounted for the overwhelming majority in the Crimean Peninsula, from possible civil war, mass atrocities and genocide as they logically become the principal target of Ukrainian nationalists. According to the World population review, Russians make up almost 17% of the total population in Ukraine, which consists of roughly 43,7 million people. Russian nationals are the largest minority in Ukraine. Apart from that, Russian is the native language for almost 30% of residents of Ukraine.

The foreign minister of Russian Federation S. Lavrov emphasized severe concerns about the security of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and especially Crimea in his statement in the United Nations Human Rights Council, pointing out that Ukrainian ultra-nationalists pose a direct threat to other people. Who does not share the same view on the future of Ukraine. It is evident in their anti-Russian slogans (nytimes,2014). With reference to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Russia will counter all extremist and nationalist manifestations. Another argument that Russia appealed to was the illegitimate.

The new government in Kyiv was illegitimate as it came to power as a result of a violent coup "Euromaidan" and legitimate government of Yanukovich was overthrown

Besides that, S. Lavrov stated that the attempts of the West to portray the Russian decision to place troops in Crimea as an act of aggression are wrong assumptions. Lavrov added that the operation was first and foremost one that was aimed at preventing provocations, acts of violence against the local citizens of Crimea, and in whole, maintain peace in the Peninsula.

Vitaly Churkin, the permanent representative of the Russian mission in the United Nations Security Council in 2014, told at the UN, that the Crimean Peninsula was given to Ukraine as a gift and sign of the friendship between two Soviet Republics by Secretary-General Nikita Khrushchev without any considerations of the residents of Crimea, people who always identified themselves as Russians. Therefore, after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Crimean residents became Ukrainians. For years, Russian nationals living in Crimea showed their friendly and welcoming attitude to Russia, being significantly unsatisfied with their status as Ukraine citizens. When the threat to the destiny of Crimean Peninsula became evident by series of cruel and bloody events conducted by Ukrainian ultra-right nationalists against the residents of Eastern Ukraine, which majority consists of Russian-speaking populations, for instance, such unprecedented and

A provision related to this act is listed in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, which states that Russia is under obligation to ensure security and the non-violation of the rights of its citizens abroad, as they are subjected to the provisions in the international law which Russian Federation has ratified. Therefore, according to this logic, Russian placement of its troops in Crimea in 2014 was a necessary measure to provide the security of its nationals abroad as it is spelled out in international agreements with full respect for international law.

The legal justification of Crimean occupation, how it usually portrayed by the West, was also based on the controversial and disputable referendum, which results indicated that absolute majority of Crimean residents showed their willingness to secede from Ukraine and to the merge with Russian Federation, to be more precise over 96 % of all voters (82% of the total population of Crimea) voted in favor of uniting with Russian Federation.

The majority of the UN countries denied accepting these results and recognize Crimea and Sevastopol as a part of the Russian Federation. After series of unsuccessful attempts to make Russia accountable for its imperialist ambitions towards Ukraine or at least to evaluate the legality of such a precedent using the mechanisms of the United Nations Security Council due to the Russian ban of all such efforts. Russia has put veto on everything what was regarded to the agenda of invalid results of Crimean Referendum.Thus, the only way to surpass the Russian veto right at the UN is to initiate the General Assembly Session. General Assembly, by its 68th session on the integrity of Ukraine on 27th March, passed the resolution and declared the referendum in Ukraine invalid and expressed its disapproval.

The West keeps assuring an opinion that the referendum is illegitimate and therefore invalid as it violates International and Ukrainian law and was conducted as a result of military occupation.

Syria

The Syrian crisis brief outline

A domestic conflict between the official government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition groups that dates back to the spring of 2011 and continues till these days, have escalated into a long-term and bloody Civil War. Which eventually incorporated numerous international actors and has gained a status of one of the gravest concerns and threats to the whole international community. The political instability accrued after the unrests in the city of Derra on 18 March 2011 provoked by the human rights abuse by Syrian Government in relation to the protestors. The subsequent spread of unrest throughout the Syrian stateand following Civil War, has become a fertile ground for the dissemination of terrorist groups. Global threat of terrorism and political instability in Syria engaged other stakeholders into the conflict. Each participant, namely Russia, Turkey, Iran, the U.S and its allies thought to follow their own interests, significantly complicating the peace efforts conducted under the auspices of the UN. Contradictory political interests and views on the settlement of the Syrian crisis have contributed to the worsening of the situation and still ongoing military conflict.

The significance of Syria in Russian Foreign Policy and bilateral relations

The bilateral relations between Russia and Syria play a defining role in the modification of Russian policy approach towards the Syrian crisis. The Syrian Arab Republic is regarded as one of the most critical Russian partners in the Middle East Region.

The conflict in Syria today is one of the major battlefields where Russia exerts its great power politics competing along with other stakeholders. By strengthening its ties with the allies of the United States.

Active participation in Syrian crisis and the strengthening of its positions in the region, contributes to the ability of Russia to project itself as an important state actor which has a strong say not only in the Middle East, but in all international issues. The growing international influence of Russia as a powerful and military equipped state, contributes to the changes in the current international system by shifting the balance towards greater multipolarity. What is highly appreciated by Russia and listed as one of its goals in the Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2016.

Syria has strategic importance for Russia and its superpower status, the military intervention conducted by Russia by the request of the official government of the Syrian Republic, is aimed not only to undermine the influence of its main competitor in the Middle East region - the U.S, but also an ability to demonstrate international community its power and military capabilities.

Another reason that Russia tends to pursue by actively participating as a mediator between parties is a great chance to improve its relations with other members of the conflict. By arranging alternative formats for negotiations and peace efforts, Russia managed to gain progress in the advancement of its bilateral cooperative relations with Iran and Turkey, which are regarded as the key regional powers in the Middle East.

Apart from that, by conducting military operations in Syria, Russia is also taking advantage of it by the demonstration of its military might, which in comportment with the increasing ties with traditional US allies, results in the closer partnership and an ability to benefit from selling its arms. The most striking example is Turkey, which despite its membership in NATO, several warnings and a threat of economic sanctions, initiated a tremendous deal on purchasing Russian S-400 missile system. Consequently, considerably undermining the prestige of NATO alliance.

Syria is also an essential purchaser of Russian arms. According to the figures presented by Kulimova (2019), Russian arms in Syrian arms imports account for 85 % of total arms purchases. Most importantly, however, the maintenance of Assad's regime in Syria is associated with Russian permanent political and military presence. By intervening in Syria, Russia strengthened and assured the future of its military bases, for instance its naval base in Tartus, which lease was extended for the following 49 years in 2017 (Roberts, 2019).

As neo-classical realists would point out, Russian international prestige, including the success in Syria, with high probability will culminate in bolstering of President's Putin domestic legitimacy and authority. As it was evident in the case of Ukraine crisis when after the announcement of the results of Crimean Referendum and the following return of the Peninsula back to the borders of Russia, Putin's approval rating among Russian population rose to the unprecedented record levels constituting almost 86%.

The role of the United Nations in Russian approach

As it was already mentioned, Moscow tends to give greater attention and priority to the mechanisms of the United Nations when its positions in the conflict are weaker than the status of other stakeholders involved in the conflict, however, when Russia manages to enhance its influence, the policy approach becomes more robust and less reliant on the framework of the United Nations, in such conditions Moscow leans towards other formats of the conflict resolution, commonly those which were created by its initiatives.

Russian approach in the resolution of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic was characterized by a higher role of the United Nations, mostly at the beginning of the crisis between 2011-2013 and initiatives of diplomatic efforts before military interventions such as round table discussions between all conflicting parties.

Moscow tend to highlight the impossibility of repeating the scenarios of the past, by expressing that another unauthorised intervention in the Middle East state will be regarded as a colossal mistake. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at his press conference in 2013 added, that such scenario will be deemed as a gross abuse of international law and will substantially undermine the work of peace institutions. Therefore, condemning any strives to conduct military intervention in Syria.

In contrast to the approach in the years after 2014, when Russia accepted the request of the Syrian government to provide military aid and conduct airstrikes against terrorist groups, considerably strengthening Russian positions and influence in Syria, rewarding Russia with higher opportunities to conduct its foreign policy aims and pursue its interests in the region. What resulted in the increasing inefficiency of the UN Security Council as a platform for successful negotiations.

Nevertheless, the permanent membership at the UNSC and right to impose veto continues to play an essential and determining role in the ability to successfully implement Russian policy concept to Syrian conflict. According to the voting records of the UNSC, Russia put veto on 14 draft resolutions concerning Syria since the beginning of the crisis in the period between March 2011 and December 2019. These initiatives demanded the ceasefire, ban of aerial bombing, and covered the issues of human rights abuses from the Syrian government and called upon to stop the use of force against the locals.

However, such strategy resulted in the deadlock in negotiations due to conflicting views on the settlement of the conflict. Thus, significantly reduced the efficiency of the UNSC in achieving any consensus, proving the limitations of the UN as a platform for discussion.

Russian regular use of veto in the negotiations concerning Syria, indicates its reluctance to make advancement towards the peace settlement and improvement of humanitarian situation in Syria, but rather directed to the achievement of its goals and interests, namely, providing the environment for the maintenance of Assad's regime.

The sustainability of the Assad's regime is the central goal of Russia due to a number of reasons, and this is evidenced by the fact that Russia ensured that any resolution that could damage the sovereignty of the Syrian regime would be blocked through the use of Russia's veto power within the UN Security Council (Allison,2015). In February 2012, Russia, with support from China, put a veto on the draft resolution S/2012/538 that called on Assad to resign and promote political transition of Syria. Russia was averse to any possible regime change in Syria, humanitarian intervention, and the principles of R2P make it easier to conduct as it was done in the case of Libya, where NATO used it as a tool to conduct regime change. Therefore, the right to ban decisions under the system of the UNSC, enables Russia to block any initiatives related to the ideas of rule-based order highly criticized by Russia.

Russian frequent use of veto is not the only way it conducts its diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the UN. Russia has initiated several draft resolutions seven of which failed to gain the threshold of nine votes or were either blocked by vetoes of permanent members. Approaching the Syrian crisis was not easy and effective on the basis of the UN Security Council as permanent Russian representative Vasiliy Nebenzia pointed out at the session of the UNSC in 2020, the majority of unscheduled sessions were gathered every time by the US initiative when the opposition groups and terrorists experienced problems associated with Syrian government regaining control over its territories that before were seized by terrorists. Thus, it proves the failure of the UN to provide forum for Syrian crisis management.

Moreover, it not only missed the capacity to bring changes, but also led to the worsening of the humanitarian conditions for the people of Syria. As it has not succeeded to agree on ceasefire and provoked the increase in civilian casualties. This concern was expressed by the UK ambassador to the UN, Matthew Rycroft, when the UNSC failed to produce result on the negotiations concerning the military flights over Aleppo sponsored by Spain and France in their draft resolution S/2016/847. He stated at the Security Council, that Russian vetoes grab responsibility for the deaths of the civil population in Syria due to its reluctance to stop the joint bombing of Aleppo along with Syrian forces. At the same time, the draft resolution S/2016/847 tabled by Russia concerning the same issue has not been adopted due to nine votes against, three of which are vetoes of permanent members. Russian Mission at the UN expressed an opinion that this initiative explained by the rapid rise of civilian casualties in Aleppo distorts the real facts and does not present the actual situation in Syria. According to Churkin (2016), the adoption of the resolution on the ban of the bombing will only strengthen the positions of terrorist groups such as Jabhat-al-Nusra

Opposing and conflicting approaches to the settlement of the Syrian civil war and the constant negotiations were doomed to get to the deadlock. The single factor that to a little extent united the permanent five (Russia, China, the US, the UK, and France) was the fight against terrorism, but still was not an easy task to find consensus on that issue.

Russian desire to shift focus from the limited format of the UN is consequently quite logical. Since gaining more voice in the conflict after conducting the requested intervention in 2015, Moscow felt the necessity to construct platforms independent from the UN and have a chance to protect its interests further in the settlement of the Syrian Civil War with all necessary parties involved on the negotiation table.

United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura's Geneva peace negotiations for resolving the ongoing Civil War between Syrian official government and Syrian opposition reached a point of deadlock, attempts to reach consensus between parties proved ineffective and were concluded on the 3rd of March with a little success due to the reluctance of opposing partners to negotiate.Russian joint initiative along with Iran and Turkey to launch the Astana process was described by Sergey Lavrov during his statement at the UN General Assembly in 2018 as being held in full respect for the adopted resolution of the security council 2254 (2015) and the demand to gain success in achieving consensus between all conflicting parties in Syria.

It was a perfect chance for Moscow to initiate a unique format of negotiations which acts outside of the UN, moreover, it enabled Russia and other actors involved in the conflict, such as Iran and Turkey to negotiate the preferred settlement with Syrian government and opposition. What is more, it enabled them to act as guarantors of the agreements and as a result to gain more chances to protect their interests and satisfy them.

Apart from that, Russian initiative to invite Iran in the negotiation of peace process in Astana as one of the mediators, was a strategic decision as Russia and Iran share similar view on the future of Assad's regime. The last time, when Russia invited Iran to take part in the Vienna Peace Talks for Syria 2015 which in total had 20 state participants and international organizations as EU and UN, was met with hostility by the US. Therefore, the negotiations hosted by Astana, fundamentally strengthened Russian view on the future of Syria.

The previous efforts to produce consensus on Syria were substantially complicated by the presence of two power blocs Russia and the US due to the opposing views on the political future of the Syrian Republic. The US insisted that Assad should lay down his authority, whereas Russia completely rejects any possibility of the regime change.

According to Thepaut (2020), the creation of the Astana format was one of the major achievements of Russian policies in Syria as it definitely served it vital interests in the region and managed to go beyond the UN-led peace efforts and limit the US. He added that, by collecting all conflicting fronts and engaging stakeholders like Iran into diplomatic negotiations, Russia facilitated its overarching objective to maintain President's Assad regime.

Russia also succeeded to meet support from the UN and therefore legalised the diplomatic efforts conducted in the Astana Format. The UNSC Resolution 2336 (2016) expressed its support for Russia and Turkey towards the efforts of administration of Syrian crisis. It also approved Russia and Turkey initiative for the new meeting in Astana between official Syrian government and opposition forces. Security Council Press Statement SC/12701 on 31 January 2017 also welcomed such efforts.

The trio of Russia, Iran and Turkey or so-called “Astana trio” have significantly improved the dialogue towards the settlement of the Syrian issue. The Astana Format, which is conducted out of the UN framework and Geneva Talks, successfully engaged conflicting parties into the negotiation table.

Russian argumentation and justification of its approach

Russian strategy and legal argumentation in Syria is also based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249, which states that the members of the United Nations should take "all necessary measures" to undermine and weaken the positions of terrorist groups on territories of the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq that are occupied by these groups (UNSCR 2249,2015).The rise of terrorist groups allowed Russia to build its argumentation on the necessity to fight against terrorism on the territory of Syria. Therefore, one of the main excuses for the presence of Russia was officially justified as a goal to liberate Syrian territories from terrorist groups, most notably, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

However, the west and the majority of the international community showed their critics and concerns. They expressed a view that Russia's appeal to the UN Security Council Resolution 2249 is an excuse to directly target the positions of the FSA to back Assad's position. Nevertheless, Moscow keeps persuading that its airstrikes do not go beyond the provisions listed in the resolution.

As a key to the problem, Russia used another tool to justify its intervention and show it in a different light from the interventions conducted by NATO and the US.Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov frequently highlighted the difference in the brutal interventions conducted by NATO in Iraq 2003 and the supply of military aid from Russia by the request of Syrian government. Assad's request for the provision of aid was the solution that went beyond the ramification of the UNSC resolutions. Russian intervention is de-facto respective to the sovereign right of Syria as they were conducted under the will of the legitimate Syrian government. It shows that Russia explicitly separates its operation in Syria from other humanitarian interventions that have not been authorized by the United Nations.

Conclusion

Taking everything stated above into account, Russian Foreign Policy strategy is to a certain extent inconsistent, highly pragmatic and to a greater extent relies on the Russia's national interests rather than on the international law. As it has a complex understanding of the principles it endorses. Most notably, its perception of the international law, to be more precise, such principles as state sovereignty and non-interference. Russia tends to switch between the meanings of sovereigntywhen it deals with its spheres of influence, precisely, the Post-Soviet space. When a conflict poses a considerable threat to Russian status and perception as a great power, it leans towards more decisive approaches and breach of the international law. Nevertheless, Russia conducts all attempts to justify its actions and completely denies any violations.

The paper also found that there is a correlation between Russian assertive foreign policy approaches and the frequency of the use of veto at the UNSC. For instance, Russian regular use of veto was one of the main obstacles in conducting peace processes not only concerning the Ukraine Crisis, but also in the Syrian conflict. Russia appealed to its veto right 14 times, creating serious concerns about the legitimacy and efficiency of the UNSC system.

It was found during the comparative analysis of the three cases, that the higher is the influence of Russia in a certain international conflict, the more contradicting and unilateral its politics are. Russian strategy significantly depends on the internal and external contexts. For instance, Russia considers its status and influence in the conflict when constructing its foreign policy strategy. Apart from that, Russia usually appeals to the mechanisms of the United Nations, when its position in a certain international conflict is relatively low. This is explicitly shown by the example of Russian approach towards North Korea. Taking into account its limited power, Russia actively engaged in the work towards the resolution of crisis under the auspices of the UN. Moreover, it is also evident by the use of veto in relation to the North Korean issue. In sharp contrast to the Ukraine case, taking into account all factors listed above, such as the significance of Ukraine to the Russian international prestige, security importance and great influence, Russian strategy in the managing of the Ukrainian crisis was first and foremost based on its national interests and the necessity to secure its position in the Post-Soviet space and demanded fast, smart and decisive actions not to lose strategically important positions. Besides, from the realist perspective, the threat of the shift of balance of power in the region in favor of the US-led alliance had a grave impact on the foreign policy strategy of Russia in the Ukraine crisis.Controversial policies conducted following Russian vital national interests in the Crimean Peninsula, which at first sight appear as the direct violation of International Law, definitely do not fill in with the core principles of the United Nations and therefore, becomes the least preferred platform for further settlement of the conflict for Russia. The series of veto imposed by Russia in the UNSC as a response to the initiatives of other countries to bring the violation of human rights and violation of territorial integrity in Ukraine to the agenda indicates the inefficiency of such mechanisms to achieve any resolution. Apart from that, the General Assembly voting records on the integrity of Ukraine depicted the overwhelming opposition to Russian policy in Ukraine.The role of the UN in the resolution of the conflict was somewhat limited and served as a part of Kremlin's strategy to legalize the decisions produced outside of the UN. Such as Minsk Protocols negotiated in the Normandy Four format with the relevant parties involved, excluding other powers from having voice and influence over the future of Russian most critical sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Therefore, giving Moscow more opportunities to promote resolutions in its most preferred terms avoiding pressure from other power blocs. By doing so, Moscow managed to endorse its peace efforts towards the resolution of the Ukraine crisis and ongoing military clash inside the country and adopt a UNSC Resolution 2202 (2015) which ratifies the set of agreed measures and provisions towards the adaptation of the Minsk Protocols and decisions of Normandy Four Summits.