Regional integration projects in Venezuela’s foreign policy under the presidency of Nicolas Maduro (2013-2018)

As a result, in 2018-2019, the organization was withdrawn by Colombia in August 2018, Ecuador in March 2018, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay in April 2019, and Uruguay in March 2020. In March 2019, the Forum for the Progress of South America (Foro para el Progreso de Amйrica del Sur, PROSUR) was established at the initiative of Colombia and Chile to strengthen regional ties. The organizers of the new association did not invite N. Maduro, and J. Guaido considered his participation premature65. Since most member countries stopped making contributions, the organization's headquarters was closed and the general secretariat was dissolved66. However, the organization officially continues to exist consisting of four states - Bolivia, Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname.

According to V. Mijares and D. Nolte67, the UNASUR crisis is evidence of the destruction of South America. In addition to the predictable hegemonic lurches of policy, the processes of greater or lesser cohesion in the region related to geopolitical macro trends intensified as a result of government changes in recent years. The organization's weak institutional structure, which served so well to build its initial consensus, ultimately undermined its unity by failing to create a supranational institutional framework capable of transcending temporary government projects. National autonomies had the final say, which exceeded the regional autonomy, since the decisions made by the organization's bodies were not always implemented at the state level.

In addition, the Venezuelan problem, which could not be resolved within the regional organization, was a key catalyst for the dissolution of UNASUR. For many countries, the best option was not to meet with the other governments within UNASUR and not to take decisions on Venezuela. UNASUR was no longer seen as an instrument to strengthen the member states' autonomy within the international system, but as a burden that negatively affected South America's foreign perception. UNASUR had become a regional organization, which for most member countries only produced costs but no benefits. Venezuela, according to V. Mijares and D. Nolte, “became part of the broader power game played on the global stage”68.

CONCLUSIONS

Taking into consideration the theoretical and ideological foundations of Venezuela's foreign policy, the conclusion can be made that the regional vector of foreign policy has remained one of the focal points for President Nicolas Maduro. In this vector, Venezuela actively developed both bilateral partnership relations and practiced multilateral diplomacy within the framework of integration associations.

Thanks to its resources and ideological dominance, the country could rightfully claim regional leadership, as it united the countries of the region on the wave of anti- Americanism, initiated many integration movements, and made most countries in the region dependent on its energy supplies and credits.

`Pockets of resistance' to US expansion in Latin America and regional integration were concentrated in three organizations where Venezuela was one of the founders or key players: ALBA, CELAC, and UNASUR.

The economic and political crisis that hit Venezuela sharply raised the question of the continuity of the `Bolivarian Project,' which affected the change in the state's priorities, including in the international arena. The decline in the growth of social and economic indicators in the country (especially the reduction of oil and its derivatives prices69) led to a weakening of the country's `soft power', and the international position of N. Maduro's government as well. If in the years of prosperity for the Bolivarians, the main focus of foreign policy was on the idea of regional unity and strengthening the position of Caracas in Latin America, then during the crisis, the internal problems became of main priority for the Venezuelan government.

In the regional integration policy of Venezuela during N. Maduro's first term of office, we can distinguish two qualitative periods: 1. 2013-2015, the time of relatively successful implementation of the regional integration course, and, 2. 2016-2018, the decline and actual collapse of the regional vector of Venezuela's foreign policy. It was just the loss of democratic tendencies in Maduro's domestic policy that led to the loss of regional leadership and global stature.

The three integration projects analyzed by the authors began to lose their credibility and effectiveness during 2013-2018, which happened mostly due to the crisis in Venezuela. Overlapping with the complex international situation and changes in political regimes in the partner states, regional integration in Latin America began to collapse. CELAC and UNASUR, on which H. Chбvez put high hopes of turning Venezuela into a regional leader, de facto ceased their activities. The only instrument of

N. Maduro's regional influence remained ALBA, whose key players were not only close to Venezuela ideologically and politically but also continued to draw dividends in the form of preferential supplies of Venezuelan oil.

At the same time, it is difficult to disagree with political expert Victor M. Mijares, who just in 2015 noted that `Maduro's doctrine' is a survival from the Chavista political regime under adverse conditions, for it assumes a defensive configuration, instead of an offensive one, it retracts instead of being assertive, submitting itself to its real possibilities in a post-charismatic and falling oil incomes phase70. And N. Maduro's foreign policy defeats in the regional vector only confirm the stated point of view.

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