Working Norms and Practices of the Soviet Elite in Leningrad during the late Stalinist Period

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Working Norms and Practices of the Soviet Elite in Leningrad during the late Stalinist Period

A. A. Amosova

PhD in History, Associate Professor, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

The study of the history of Leningrad of Stalin's period was subjected to a rigid ideological impact, which is why, for a long time, it was examined selectively, in accordance with strict party attitudes. For the reason of the decades-long process of rehabilitation of the victims of the “Leningrad affair”, there were no approaches in the scholarship to assessing normative and extreme everyday life in the corps of Leningrad state cadres. The article aims to present the research of the Soviet elite working norms and practices in 1945-1950. The main attention is paid to the political biographies of the Chairmen of Leningrad Local Government. The research is based on the oral history and the emotionology methods, documents from St. Petersburg, Moscow and Crimean archives. The generation of Leningrad leading cadres came to the state positions in the late 1930s, after the repressions of the “Great Terror”. Members of the Soviet elite underwent testing of their professional skills during World War II and the siege of Leningrad; directed the accelerated postwar recovery of the national economy. In the late 1940s, they became the victims of the so-called “Leningrad affair” Understanding normative working routine and. and everyday life under crisis involves identifying and analyzing feelings and associated behavior. Analysis of everyday life involves identification of events and processes that recur in the personal and professional life of Soviet nomenclature workers. Understanding extreme everyday life involves identification and analysis of feelings and associated behavior in extreme conditions (such as conflicts, fabricated criminal cases, arrests, etc). Keywords: Soviet elite, late Stalinism, Leningrad, Leningrad affair, history of emotions, everyday life. soviet elite stalinism chairman

Нормы и практики служебного поведения советской элиты Ленинграда в эпоху позднего сталинизма

А. А. Амосова

канд. ист. наук, доцент, Санкт-Петербургский государственной университет, Российская Федерация, Санкт-Петербург

История Ленинграда сталинского времени испытала жесткое идеологическое воздействие, поэтому в течение долгого времени она изучалась выборочно, в соответствии со строгими партийными установками. Вследствие растянувшегося на десятилетия процесса реабилитации жертв «ленинградского дела» в научной литературе не сложилось подходов к оценке нормативной и экстремальной повседневности в корпусе ленинградских государственных кадров. Целью статьи является исследование норм и практик служебного поведения советской элиты СССР в период с 1945 по 1950 г. Основное внимание сосредоточено на изучении политических биографий председателей органов Ленинградского городского и областного советов депутатов трудящихся. Ключевыми фигурами, вошедшими в советскую правящую элиту между 1939 и 1950 г., были П. С. Попков, П. Г. Лазутин, Н. В. Соловьев, И. С. Харитонов, И. Д. Дмитриев, А. А. Кузнецов. Исследование основано на устной истории и методах эмоционологии, документах из архивов Санкт-Петербурга, Москвы и Крыма. В статье также затрагивается ряд вопросов, связанных с эпохой позднего сталинизма и аспектами кадровой политики, реализуемой коммунистической партией, «ленинградским делом». Поколение ленинградских руководящих кадров пришло на государственные посты в конце 1930-х годов после репрессий эпохи Большого террора. Представители советской элиты прошли проверку своих профессиональных навыков во время Второй мировой войны и блокады Ленинграда, руководили форсированным послевоенным восстановлением народного хозяйства. В конце 1940-х годов эти представители ленинградской элиты стали жертвами «ленинградского дела». Анализ повседневной жизни советской элиты в данной статье предполагает выявление событий и процессов, которые повторяются в личной и профессиональной жизни советских номенклатурных работников и обычно связаны со стабильностью, повторяемостью, рутиной. Понимание экстремальной повседневной жизни включает в себя выявление и анализ чувств и поведения в экстремальных условиях (таких как конфликты, фабрикация уголовного дела, аресты и т. д.).

Ключевые слова: советская элита, эпоха позднего сталинизма, Ленинград, «ленинградское дело», история эмоций повседневность.

Introduction

This study presents an analysis of the daily working reality of the Soviet elite in Leningrad and Leningrad Region in 1945-1950. This problem will be considered in terms of its political, social and emotional aspects. The political context will be used to provide more clarity as to the operation of the local governments (Soviets) during the period under question, and offer some insights into the causes of the Leningrad Affair. By analysing the social component, we will be able to deepen our understanding of the social roles and statuses of the Leningrad officials during the Stalinist period as well as the aims and nature of their working contacts. Finally, by investigating emotional norms and standards we will be able to characterise members of the Soviet elite as individuals with human virtues and human weaknesses. Many researchers believe that most feelings are socially and culturally conditioned See, for example: Rosenwein B. H. Worrying about Emotions in History // American historical Review. 2002. No. 107/3. P. 821-845. DOI: 10.1086/532498; Kelly K. Pravo na emotsii, pravil'nye emotsii: upravlenie chuvstvami v Rossii posle epokhi Prosveshcheniia // Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: Podkhody k kul'turnoi istorii emotsii / eds Ia. Plamper et al. Moscow, 2010. P 74.. This is particularly true of the elevated (“high”) emotions experienced by Soviet top officials: their boundless loyalty to “the Father of the Nations”, their love of Leningrad, their camaraderie, and their pride in work achievements. “Low” emotions, primarily fear, are less markedly modulated by social relations and can be used to explain the motives of political acts and work behaviour.

Historiography and sources

The daily working routine of the Soviet elite in Leningrad and Leningrad Region in 1945-1950 is a subject largely overlooked by historians. There are two principal reasons for this omission. Firstly, studies focusing on the Stalinist period tend to gravitate towards political rather than social history due to the complex, controversial nature of political reality of that time on the domestic and international scene. Secondly, legal, political and moral rehabilitation of the Leningrad Affair victims, which has spanned several decades, made research on the personalities as well as the state and political activities of the defendants a tacit taboo.

Studies by international researchers (primarily British and American) relating to the post-war history of Leningrad, and human resource policies of the Stalinist era appeared long before this field was first explored by Russian historians. Foreign publications were unaffected by censorship restrictions and taboos Conquest R. Power and Policy in the USSR: the Study of Soviet Dynasties. London; Macmillan; New York, 1961; Salisbury H. The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad. New York, 1969. P. 571-583; McCagg Jr. William O. Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948. Detroit, 1978; Hahn W. Postwar Soviet Politics: the Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-53. Ithaca; New York, 1982.. Although their critical assessments of Stalin's policy and the Soviet system carry the indelible stamp of the Cold War ideology, these publications were also largely free from stereotypes and personal preferences, which often confound the real picture of historical events.

Increased interest in the biographies of the politicians that ran Leningrad during World War II and the post-war period emerged in the late 1980s as part of broader research pursuits centred on the Leningrad Affair, which were initially supervised by the Communist Party Kutuzov V. A. Leningradskoe delo // Dialog. 1987. No. 18. P. 15-21; No. 19. P. 15-23.. The 1980s saw a number of newspaper publications which analysed the causes for repressions, and shared biographical data about the key defendants Afanasev A. Pobeditel' // Komsomol'skaia pravda. January, no. 15. 1988; O tak nazyvaemom “Lenin- gradskom dele” // Izvestiia TsK KPSS. 1989. No. 2. P. 128; Garmash P: 1) V Krymu // “Leningradskoe delo” / eds V. I. Demidov, V. A. Kutuzov. Leningrad, 1990. P. 241-260; 2) Zhivaia pamiat' // Krymskaia pravda. 1988. October. No. 28; 3) Sekretar' obkoma // Krymskaia pravda. 1988. August, 17; Demidov V. “Lenin-gradskoe delo”: Popytka rekonstruktsii // Zvezda. 1989. No. 1. P. 144-145; Zimarina N. “Leningradskoe delo” // Argumenty i fakty. 1988. April. No. 23. P. 6; Sidorovskii L.: 1) Chestnoe imia: zhertvy “Leningradskogo dela” -- glazami rodnykh, blizkikh, strokami dokumentov // Smena. 1988. June. No. 24; July. No. 25; 2) Ne- skol'ko stranits iz “Leningradskogo dela” // Avrora. 1989. No. 4.. Some attempts were made to provide a comprehensive picture of the activities of Leningrad government and Communist leaders in connection with the Leningrad Affair Leningradskoe delo / eds V. I. Demidov, V. A. Kutuzov. Leningrad, 1990..

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a number of studies were conducted which looked at members of the party and governmental apparatus as a social class Voslenskii M. S. Nomenklatura. Gospodstvuiushchii klass Sovetskogo Soiuza. Moscow, 1991; Pik- hoia R. G. Sovetskii Soiuz. Istoriia vlasti, 1945-1991. Moscow, 1998. P. 65-66; Pyzhikov A. V. Leningradskaia gruppa. Put' vo vlast' (1946-1949) // Svobodnaia mysl'. 2001. P. 92-96; Chistikov A. N. Partiino-gosudarst- vennaia biurokratiia Severo-Zapada sovetskoi Rossii 1920-kh godov. St. Petersburg, 2007.. Another valuable source is memoirs by the children of the top local and national government officials of the 1940s. These publications were motivated by the legitimate desire on the part of the officials' families to understand the causes of the tragic events of the past by relying on a range of sources including personal reminiscences and impressions Malenkov A. G. O moem ottse Georgii Malenkove. Moscow, 1992; Zhdanov Iu. A. Vzgliad v proshloe: Vospominaniia ochevidtsa. Rostov-on-Don, 2004; Voznesenskii L.A. Bezzakonie... “po zakonu” // Sud'by

liudei. “Leningradskoe delo” / ed. by A. M. Kulegina. St. Petersburg, 2009. P. 26-27; Vospominaniia Valeriia Filippovicha Mikheeva // Sud'by liudei: “leningradskoe delo”. St. Petersburg, 2009. P. 96-114; Mikheev V. F., Mikheev G. F “Leningradskoe delo” (po materialam sledstvennykh del) (chast' I) // Noveishaia istoriia Ros- sii. 2012. No. 3; 2013. No. 1..

The contemporary vision of the political role played by the Leningrad leaders, a vision based on newly discovered historical sources, found its reflection in works by Russian researchers Zubkova E. Iu. Kadrovaia politika i chistki v KPSS (1945-1956) // Svobodnaia mysl'. 1999. No. 4. P. 104; Kutuzov V. A. “Leningradskoe delo”: mify i realii // Sud'ba liudei. “Leningradskoe delo” / ed. by A. M. Kulegin. St. Petersburg, 2009. P. 49; Shulgina N. I. “Leningradskoe delo”: Ne pora li snimat' kavych- ki? Mnenie arkhivista // Ekologiia. 2009. No. 1-2. P. 281-289; Boldovskii K. A.: 1) Apparat Leningradskoi gorodskoi partiinoi organizatsii i ego mesto v sisteme vlastnykh otnoshenii v SSSP, 1945-1953 gg. Avtoref. dis. ... kand. ist. nauk. St. Petersburg, 2013. 28 p.; 2) Padenie blokadnykh sekretarei: partapparat Leningrada do i posle Leningradskogo dela. St. Petersburg, 2018; Amosova A. A. Predannyi zabveniiu. Politicheskaia biografiia Petra Popkova. St. Petersburg, 2013. P. 168-189; Pavlov M. Iu.: 1) A. A. Kuznetsov i organy go- sudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: k voprosu o prichinakh vozniknoveniia “Leningradskogo dela” // Istoriches- kie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kul'turologiia i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i prak- tiki. 2015. No. 7-2 (57). P. 127-132; 2) “Leningradskaia gruppa” i narushenie stalinskikh printsipov vlasti // Nauchno-metodicheskii elektronnyi zhurnal Kontsept. 2015. No. 11. P. 111-115; Sobolev G. L., Khodja- kov M. V. Publikatsiia novykh dokumentov kak vazhnyi faktor dal'neishego izucheniia oborony i blokady Leningrada // Noveishaia istoriia Rossii. 2019. Vol. 9, no. 1. 2019. P. 8-34.. The publications analyse the functioning of the Soviet elite by looking at the activities conducted under the leadership of Leningrad governmental and party officials.

Recent works by British and American historians have identified four key approaches to the causes of the Leningrad Affair: ideological Yorlizki Y. Ordinary Stalinism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial State, 1946-1953 // The Journal of Modern History. 2002. Vol. 74. No. 4. December. P. 699-736., nationalistic (“Russian-centred”) Brandenberger D. Stalin, the Leningrad Affair, and the limits of postwar russocentrism // Russian review. 2004. Vol. 63, no. 2. April. P. 247-254., “Leningrad-centered” See, for example: Ruble Blair A.: 1) Policy Innovation and the Soviet Political Process: The Case of Socio-economic Planning in Leningrad // Canadian Slavonic Papers. Revue Canadienne des Slavistes. 1982. Vol. 24, no. 2. June. P. 161-174; 2) The Leningrad Affair and the Provincialization of Leningrad // Russian Review. 1983. Vol. 42, no. 3. July. P. 304-313. and “bureaucratic” (patron-client) See, for example: Parrish М. The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953. Westport, 1996; Tromly B. The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949-1950 // Europe-Asia Studies. 2004. Vol. 56, no. 5. July. P. 707-729..

Before finally being quenched in the early 21^st century, this “hunger for research” unfortunately gave rise to multiple low-quality publications where dramatic effect on the readers had priority over accurate historical analysis; many of these publications were founded on an extremely limited number of historical sources, sometimes grossly misinterpreted See, for example: Mironin S. S. Stalinskii poriadok. Ser. “Zagadka 37 goda”. Moscow, 2007; Prudniko- va E. A. 1953. Rokovoi god sovetskoi istorii. Moscow, 2009; Kremlev S.: 1) Imia Rossii: Stalin. Moscow, 2008; 2) SSSR -- imperiia dobra. Moscow, 2009; Rybas S. Iu. Moskovskie protiv piterskikh: Leningradskoe delo Stalina. Moscow, 2013; Kuznechevskii V. D.: 1) “Leningradskoe delo”: naivnaia popytka sozdat' etnicheski chistoe russkoe pravitel'stvo byla potoplena v krovi. Moscow, 2013; 2) Stalin i “russkii vopros” v politicheskoi istorii Sovetskogo Soiuza. 1931-1953 gg. Moscow, 2016.. Possible ideological bias, combined with hyperbolic ideas resulted in factbending claims and sensationalism The analysis of these works is presented in the article: Amosova A. A., Brandenberger D. Debates over the 1949 “Leningrad Affair” in the Contemporary Russian Popular Press // Europe-Asia Studies. 2015. Vol. 67, no. 9. P. 1487-1497. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2015.1083744..

Studies, recognizing justified repressions against the Leningrad leadership, due to violations of party ethics, were recently published Sushkov A. V. Nebol'shoe otstuplenie ot pravil ili vyzov stalinskoi sisteme vlasti? O nekotorykh as- pektakh “leningradskogo dela” // Rossiia XXI. 2018. No. 1. P. 82-107; Sushkov A. V., Bedel' A. E. “Lenin- gradskoe delo”: k voprosu o kadrovoi politike Smol'nogo v pervye poslevoennye gody // Manuskript. 2018. No. 10 (96). P 60-68.. Such articles would seem at first glance to be rather serious work by professional historians, however, most arguments presented by the authors directly contradict the facts and have been disproved Brandenberger D. O nekotorykh aspektakh “Leningradskogo dela” // Rossiya XXI. 2018. No. 2. P 66-77..

The late 20^th century saw an increasing interest in the history of everyday culture in Russia. However, research on everyday phenomena had been conducted within individual research disciplines at least since the second half of the 19 ^th century. Everyday culture receives in-depth theoretical treatment in works by M. V. Lukov See, for example: Lukov M. V. Kul'tura povsednevnosti. K istorii voprosa // Bibliotechnoe delo. 2010. No. 7 (131). P 6-13.. One of the most noteworthy studies of everyday reality of the Soviet people was undertaken by I. B. Orlov Orlov I. B. Sovetskaia povsednevnost': istoricheskii i sotsiologicheskii aspekty stanovleniia. Moscow,

2010..

The past two decades have seen an upsurge in research projects focusing on the everyday life of the Soviet people, their work and leisure (E. Iu. Zubkova, N. B. Lebina,

A. N. Chistikov, V. L. Piankevich, F. K. Iarmolich) Iarmolich F. K.: 1) Organizatsiia intellektual'nogo dosuga zhitelei gor. Leningrada v kontse 1940-kh -- nachale 1950-kh gg. // Vestnik LGU im. A. S. Pushkina. Vol. 4, no. 2. Istoriia. 2012. P 145-153; 2) Kul'turno-prosvetitel'skaia organizatsiia dosuga leningradtsev v kontse 1940-kh -- nachale 1950-kh gg. // Sovetskoe obshchestvo i sovetskii chelovek: mify i real'nost' // Sbornik dokladov mezhdunarodnoi nauch- no-prakticheskoi konferentsii. Kazan'. 2012. P 158-163; Lebina N. B.: 1) Entsiklopediia banal'nostei: sovets- kaia povsednevnost': kontury, simvoly, znaki. St. Petersburg, 2008; 2) Sovetskaia povsednevnost': normy i anomalii. Moscow, 2015; Zubkova E. Iu. Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo: politika i povsednevnost. 1945-1953 gg. Moscow, 2000..

A valuable contribution to our knowledge of domestic and work reality of the Soviet elite between the 1930s and early 1950s was made by T. N. Nikanorova Nikonorova T. N.: 1) Konstruiruia Roskosh': Bytovoe prostranstvo sovetskoi nomenklatury, 1940-1952 gody // The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review. 2016. No. 43. P 219-242; 2) Dokumenty Komissii partiino- go kontrolia pri TsK VKP(b) (1934-1952 gg.) kak istochnik izucheniia ekonomicheskoi prestupnosti v srede partiinoi nomenklatury. Dis. ... kand. ist. nauk. Moscow, 2018.. Following the approaches practiced by British and American historians, her dissertation refers to a set of documents issued by the disciplinary Communist Party Control Commission (KPK) -- an agency the author boldly compares with the closed “class court”. The cases of Communists that had lost political trust were first heard by the KPK, which was entitled to decide whether formal prosecution was required. T. N. Nikanorova focuses much of her work on KPK documents, often reading them as decent but not fully reliable sources Ibid. P 201..

The dissertation includes a section focusing specifically on the “Leningrad affair”. T. N. Nikonorova points to possible economic abuses on the part of the leadership of Leningrad as the major reasons for fabricating “the Leningrad Affair”. To confirm her hypothesis, she provides statistical data on the non-targeted expenses in 1946-1949: on banquets, gifts, furniture Ibid. P 176-178.. However, as a result of a detailed analysis, the researcher comes to the conclusion that although certain abuses did take place, their interpretation by investigators and KPK supervisors was biased and opportunistic Ibid. P. 183..

History of emotions, or emotiology, is considered to have emerged in the 20^th century although trends of the “inward turn” were visible in academic discourse in the mid-19^th century or even earlier. International publications that appeared over the past 35-plus years have shaped history of emotions as an independent area of historical research Passions in Context: International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions. 2010. No. 1; Plamper J. Istoriia emotsii. Moscow, 2018.. Nevertheless, emotiological studies of Soviet history remain quite scarce Thematic issue of the journal: Slavic Review (Emotional turn? Feelings in Russian History and Culture / ed. by J. Plamper // Slavic Review. 2009. Vol. 68. No. 2. P. 229-334; Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: podkhody k kul'turnoi istorii emotsii / eds J. Palmer et al. Moscow, 2010; Delaloi M. Emotsii v mikromire Stalina: sluchai Nikolaia Bukharina (1937-1937). Tipy bol'shevistskoi muzhestvennosti i praktika emotsii // Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: Podkhody k kul'turnoi istorii emotsii / eds J. Plamper et al. Moscow, 2010. P. 455; Ivantsov I. G. Povsednevnost' provintsial'nogo goroda 1920-1930-kh godov, kul'turnaia istoriia emotsii v dokumentakh organov partiino-gosudarstvennogo kontrolia VKP(b) // Kul'turnaia zhizn' Iuga Rossii. 2014. Vol. 2. No. 53. P. 68-72; Piankevich V. L. Liudi zhili slukhami. Neformal'noe kommunikativnoe prostranstvo blokadnogo Leningrada. St. Petersburg, 2014..

The majority of studied personalities did not have the opportunity to write memoirs due to the political repressions of late Stalinism. That is why, the autobiographies from archive personal files, public speeches and communiques are used as ego-documents in the article. However, “.. .today the history of emotions uses almost all kinds of sources that historians have at their disposal.. .” Plamper J. Istoriia emotsii. Moscow, 2018. P. 56.. For this reason, the source base has been expanded by normative documents and institutional records supplemented by sources of personal origin, including oral narratives (based on interviews given by relatives), audio records and photographs from archives in St. Petersburg, Moscow and the Crimean Republic.

Norms of work behaviour

Sociocultural norms are standards of socially approved and expected behaviour which help to ensure social stability of a given cultural or political system. Norms are commonly classified into two varieties: formal (“written”), set out in regulatory documents, and informal (“unwritten”), grounded in traditions and customs. Compliance with formal norms is ensured through the law enforcement system; adherence to unwritten norms is regulated by social practices (approval or disapproval).

Formalized norms of working behaviour for top Soviet officials and Communist Party members in the USSR over the 1930s and 1940s were determined by the 1936 Constitution Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi zakon) Soiuza Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, 1936 // Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. Moscow, 1956. P. 3-17., the Programme and Charter of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the Soviet Union (VKP(b)), the Short Course on party history and regulatory documents issued by the VKP (b) Central Committee Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b) ot 2 avgusta 1946 g. “O podgotovke i perepodgotovke rukovodiashchikh partiinykh i sovetskikh rabotnikov” // Partiinaia zhizn. 1946. No. 1. P. 476-484..

The documents listed above formed a normative framework for the job conduct of top governmental officials and delimited their duties, which included adherence to occupational and governmental discipline, Programma i ustav VKP(b). Moscow, 1937. P 42.observance of the principles of democratic centralism Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii bol'shevikov: Kratkii Kurs / pod red. komissii TsK VKP(b). Moscow, 1938., criticism and self-criticism Ibid. P 345. as well as close contact with the working masses Ibid. P. 345-346..

Occupational and governmental discipline encompassed (“sobliudenie trudovoi i gosu- darstvennoi distsipliny”), firstly, compliance with the established institutional regulations and continual professional growth, and secondly, the ability to resolve key issues of local economic and cultural development accurately and on a timely basis Konstitutsiia, 1936. P. 13. as well as to duly implement the Communist Party's policy and the resolutions made by the party bodies Programma i ustav VKP(b). P 42.. The seniority principle governing relations between officials was a mandatory expression of occupational and governmental discipline.

Respect for seniority was also required by the principle of democratic centralism (“printsip demokraticheskogo tsentralizma”) from heads of municipal and district councils; it involved executing resolutions of the USSR Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers, as well as compliance with the 1936 Constitution Konstitutsiia, 1936. P 6-9..

Criticism and self-criticism (“kritika i samokritika”), regarded as the most important instrument for improving the quality of party and governmental work, implied the detection of errors and deficiencies in the work of institutions, organizations or individuals leading to corrective measures and problem elimination Samokritika // Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia. Vol. 50. Moscow, 1944. P 189-190.; any mistakes had to be openly and honestly admitted by the culprits Kratkii Kurs. 1938. P. 345.. Criticism and self-criticism served as an instrument of control over the work of the party and political elite as well as over the whole Soviet people. Critique by one's colleagues at party meetings could lead to tragic consequences: the person so criticized could lose their job or party membership and often face trial, not to mention moral distress during the collective discussion of their “mistakes”. The accused would normally resort to self-criticism: they were expected to show remorse, “come clean”, explain the causes of their moral degradation, and promise to atone for their misdemeanour.

In keeping with the principle of contact with the working masses (“printsip sviazi s trudiashchimisia massami”), governmental officials were expected to listen to workers, identify their needs, educate the working class and learn from it Ibid. P 345..Soviet officials had to be extremely open and approachable, without a “veneer of bureaucracy” Ibid. P 346..

Let us now pause to consider the unwritten norms applicable to the ruling elite of the Soviet period. The political system that formed in the USSR shortly before World War II (in the late 1930s) operated under the sole leadership of Joseph Stalin, who remained Secretary of the VKP (b) Central Committee in 1934-1952. Historians have described this power structure as authoritarian or neopatrimonial Gorlizki Y. Ordinary Stalinism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial State, 1946-1953 // The Journal of Modern History. 2002. Vol. 74, no. 4. P 699-736..The terms interchangeably denote a system created by Stalin towards the end of 1930s where all key political decisions on the national level remained his personal prerogative. Apart from official documents, Stalin's “political will”, which set the standards for work behaviour among the top governmental officials, was articulated through dictums, notes and even toasts.

Stalin himself was seen as a role model for holders of governmental and party offices. His outward modesty and asceticism remained one of the principal unwritten behavioural norms which mirrored Stalin's own way of life with its disapproval of luxury and extravagance. Stalin imposed irregular work schedules on his subordinates: “This lifestyle, which was not particularly healthy and often involved work at night hours... was forced on almost the whole of the Communist and governmental apparatus across the country...” Nasledniki // Leningradskoe delo. 1990. P. 25. Soviet officials were supposed to stand by for a responsible governmental assignment at all times, even in their country houses (dachas) telephone sets (vertushki) for the secure government communication were installed Interview conducted by the author with G. F. Mikheev, 8 August, 2018. St. Petersburg..

Governmental and Communist Party officials received considerable material privileges and incentives from the state, enjoying a higher level of comfort compared to rank- and-file Soviet citizens: they could take advantage of spacious apartments and cosy country houses filled with well-designed furniture (paid for by the state) in addition to having access to better food supplies and medical services. Officials were entitled to one or more chauffeured cars; many had household staff such as a cook or a housekeeper.

After Stalin's cult of personality was firmly established, party comradeship emerged as a social norm in the USSR: the very term “comrade” (tovarishch), once used to refer to party associates and fellow-thinkers, became a universal form of address to any non-im- prisoned person irrespective of their social standing. The absence of this prefix from official documents or newspaper publications usually signalled that the person in question had fallen outside of the Soviet normative field and been politically discredited Postanovlenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) o sniatii s dolzhnostei A. A. Kuznetsova, M. I. Rodionova, P. S. Popkova. February, 15, 1949 // Sud'by liudei. “Leningradskoe delo”. St. Petersburg, 2009. P. 61..

Unwritten norms also included love of comrade Stalin as well as faith in his infallibility, wisdom and justice.

Work-related practices

The Leningrad City Council and the Leningrad Region Council were the supreme bodies of the Soviet power in Leningrad and Leningrad Region. Within the framework of the Soviet system, these two institutions were both typical and exceptional: local government maintained direct links with the RSFSR Council of Ministers in Moscow. In practice, it meant that Leningrad had considerable advantages in industrial development, housing construction and public utility improvement as well as in a number of other areas Cattell D. T. Leningrad: Case Study of Soviet Local Government // The Western Political Quarterly. 1964. Vol. 17, no. 2. June. P. 189.. In terms of status, Leningrad governmental and party institutions were more similar to their Moscow counterparts than to regional organizations. Following an unwritten arrangement, governmental agencies invariably played a subordinate role to party structures: the Soviets handed over a significant part of their powers to the Communist Party, limiting themselves to economic and managerial functions.

Non-members of the Communist Party had no chance of ever occupying leading positions in the government during the Stalinist period. Party membership was awarded at the suggestion of the party cell and always required an extensive approval process. Candidate members had to go through a lengthy trial period during which the candidate's ideological and moral qualities were carefully assessed, and references were sought from their previous employers.

The Party membership card opened many doors for social, professional and personal growth: “If you want to be a boss, you have to become a Communist” Interview conducted by the author with G. F. Mikheev and T. A. Mikheeva, 10 October, St. Peters-burg.. Party members were given priority treatment when it came to education, including tertiary-level: the best universities in the country had to keep slots open for Communists. Young people that previously had no opportunity to complete a course of secondary education could prepare for the higher education institution by enrolling at so-called workers' faculties Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia / ed. by A. M. Prokhorov. Vol. 21. Moscow, 1975. P 308.. Young Communists with university degrees were regarded as highly eligible for top governmental positions and were given a fast track up the career ladder.

Despite the proclaimed transparency and democratic character of the Soviet election system, a reputable Communist had to be put forward for a responsible position by influential senior officials. Ranging from direct appointments to recommendations and approvals, the nomination practice (vydvizhenie) became widespread from the 1920s onwards and remained the single most important condition in the recruitment of governmental and Communist cadre Chistikov A. N. Partiino-gosudarstvennaia biurokratiia Severo-Zapada sovetskoi Rossii 1920-kh godov. P 169., The choice of the candidacy depended on a number of factors, including family background (working class or peasant), ideology (hesitancies in following the party line, involvement in political opposition or repressions, military cap- tivity Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv istoriko-politicheskikh dokumentov Sankt-Peterburga. F. 1728. Op. 1. D. 196640. L. 3-4.), and political activities (track record; prior elected offices).

Following the assassination of Sergei Kirov in 1934 and the subsequent mass repressions, many leading positions in Leningrad fell vacant. Kirov was succeeded as the First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional and City Party Committees by Andrei Zhdanov, a politician nurtured by Stalin. Having been transferred to Leningrad from Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod), he “... had no knowledge of the human resources available in Leningrad at that time” Demidov V. I., Kutuzov V. A., Kutuzov A. V. Andrei Zhdanov. Ocherki politicheskoi biografii. St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskaia akademiia Sledstvennogo komiteta. 2017. P 66. and created his team from young Communists with working class or peasant backgrounds and low-level management experience, who had originated from other regions across the USSR. “.It often happened in those days; some people were reluctant even to accept those appointments. However, refusing was not an option. there were factories to develop. there was a real need in experts.. .” Interview conducted by the author with A. Ia. Kapustin and G. F. Mikheev, 15 November, 2013, St. Petersburg.

Some of the key figures that joined the Soviet ruling elite during that period were: P. S. Popkov, born near Vladimir (Chairman of the Leninsky District Council in Leningrad since 1937 Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sankt-Peterburga. F. 7384. Op. 34. D. 1783. L. 4.); P. G. Lazutin, born in the Akmolinsk province in Kazakhstan (Head of the

Trade Department at the Leningrad City VKP(b) Committee since 1937 TsGAIPD St. Petersburg. F. 1728. Op. 1. D. 196640. L. 1.); N. V. Soloviev, from Nizhny Novgorod (Secretary of the Leningrad Regional VKP(b) Committee since 193 7 TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 7179. Op. 13. D. 1128. L. 4.); I. S. Kharitonov, born in the Tver Governorate (the First Secretary of Primorsky District VKP(b) Committee in the 1930s Kratkie biograficheskie svedeniia o litsakh, repressirovannykh po “Leningradskomu delu” // Sud'by liudei. “Leningradskoe delo”. P 144.); I. D. Dmitriev (from Leningrad Region) was appointed Secretary of the Luzhsky District VKP(b) Committee in 193 9 Ibid. P 150.. In November 1941, Andrei Kuznetsov, a young Communist born near Tambov, became the new director of the industrial giant Izhora Works in the environs of Leningrad TsGAIPD SPb. F. 25. Op. 93. D. 865. L. 1-2.. The new appointees would head the governmental structures in Leningrad and Leningrad Region between 1939 and 1950. “The Leningrad team created by Zhdanov in 1936-1939 would bear on its shoulders all the hardships of World War II and the 872 days of the Leningrad siege...” Volynets A. Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh liudei: Zhdanov. Moscow, 2013. P 223.

In the wake of the war, the Leningrad government faced the difficult task of ensuring fast recovery of the devastated local economy. The Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Council was headed by Petr Popkov, appointed its Chairman in 1939. Nicknamed “the Gypsy” Interview conducted by the author with E. I. Kharitonova, 19 October, 2018, St. Petersburg; Kapitsa P. Eto bylo tak // Neva. Leningrad, 1988. No. 5. P. 139. by other Lengorsoviet members because of his dark hair and skin, Popkov was frequently described as an outgoing, friendly, and democratic person with an upbeat sense of humour See, for example: Shumilov N. D. V blokade. Moscow, 1977. P. 156; Mashanskii F. I. Surovyi ekza- men // Listki blokadnogo kalendaria. 1988. Iss. 1. P 60..

The graphological analysis Hereinafter the article presents excerpts from detailed graphological analysis, carried by Bulakho-va A. D. of Popkov's signature shows him to be a thorough and determined individual; the letters slant markedly to the right, which is commonly seen in extroverted and outgoing natures; the broad horizontal lines are typical of enthusiastic people, while the sharp angles indicate an ambitious character (fig.1).

Fig. 1. The signature of P. S. Popkov. January 1946 [Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF). F. 7523. Op. 48. D. 44. L. 8]

The years of running the besieged, war-stricken city transformed the young nominee into a strict and competent professional; the brisk, critical manner in which Popkov presided over the sessions of the Lengorsoviet's Executive Committee makes a good point in case See, for example: Stenogrammy zasedanii ispolkoma Leningradskogo gorodskogo Soveta. Zapisi obsuzhdenii, zamechanii k proektam, resheniia, noiabr' 1941-- dekabr' 1942 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov. St. Petersburg, 2017. 439 p.. However, despite his superior position and vast experience of public presentations, Popkov sometimes failed to express his thoughts clearly -- a feature Zhdanov caustically described as “definitely not it” (“tipichnoe ne to”) Leningradskoe delo / eds V. I. Demidov, V. A. Kutuzov. Leningrad, 1990. P. 41..

Fig. 2. Mrs. C. Churchill and P. S. Popkov at the map. April 9, 1945, Leningrad [Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv kinofotofonodokumentov Sankt-Peterburga]

According to an implicit arrangement, Popkov represented Leningrad at formal events and functions during that period Vruchenie ordena Lenina predstaviteliam goroda Leningrada // Leningradskaia pravda. 1945. January. No. 28.; his imposing and pleasant appearance (“Popkov was very good-looking” Interview conducted by the author with E. I. Kharitonova.) may have had as much a role to play here as his high official status (fig. 2).

Popkov's official postwar speeches are full of pride in Leningrad and the economic successes achieved under his control (“tangible positive outcomes”, “successfully and ahead of schedule”, “considerable achievements” Popkov P S. Predsedatel' ispolkoma Leningradskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia // Leningradskaia pravda. 1946. January. No. 27.). His love of Leningrad also manifests itself in his reports: “Our city's streets and avenues are growing more beautiful and convenient by the day” Ibid., “.. .labour towards a better life in Leningrad.. .” Popkov P S. O vosstanovlenii i razvitii gorodskogo khoziaistva Leningrada // Propaganda i agitatsiia. 1945. No. 14-15 (July -- August). P. 27.. Local patriotism was typical among the Leningrad wartime governmental and party elite: “During the war, local patriotism was promoted by Moscow nationwide. In Leningrad, however, it developed on a more fertile soil, shaping the core of regional identity” Smirnov A. P “Leningradskoe delo”: portret pokoleniia // Sud'by liudei. “Leningradskoe delo”. P. 15.; this very attitude was used as a basis for allegations of separatism during the Leningrad Affair.

In 1944, Petr Lazutin was appointed Deputy Chair of the Leningrad City Executive Committee; unlike his boss, Lazutin was unsmiling, modest, serious and taciturn, always absorbed in his work Interview conducted by the author with N. P. Sivtsova (Lazutina). 27 October 2018. Moscow. (fig. 3).

According to their contemporaries, the Chairman and his deputy maintained a good working relationship and even visited each other's homes together with their families Ibid.. Their colleagues and relatives jocularly nicknamed them Peter I and Peter II Ibid., like Russian emperors of the 18^th century. Lazutin's signature betrays a perfectionist and determined character. The austere, balanced geometry of his handwriting signals psychological balance and strong willpower. The vertical lines predominating in the signature are mainly typical of introverted personalities avoiding excessive display of emotions (fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Signature of Petr Lazutin, 1946. [TsGAIPD St. Petersburg. F. 1728. Op. 1. D. 196640. L. 6 (turnover)]

Fig. 3. Petr G. Lazutin, the early 1940s. From the archive of Lazutin -- Sivtsov family

In 1938, the post of the Chairman of the Leningrad Regional Executive Committee was entrusted to Nikolai Soloviev, a blunt, decisive man, who demanded a lot from the others and even more from himself From the personal conversation of Garmash P. with M. M. Maksimenko (1947-1952 -- the Head of the Culture Department of the Crimean Regional Executive Committee) in: Garmash P. Zhizn' i sud'ba // Vetluzhskii krai. 2003. April. No. 18. P. 3.. Soloviev ranked as the third most important official in Leningrad after the First Secretaries of the Leningrad Oblast and Leningrad City Party Committees (after Kuznetsov and Popkov).

The national government highly valued Soloviev's contribution to the revival of local agriculture. In February 1946, the chairman of the Leningrad Oblast Executive Committee received a Traveling Red Banner from the Sovnarkom in recognition of the excellent performance of Leningrad Oblast in the 1945 agricultural competition among the oblasts, krais and republics of the Soviet Union Leningradskoi oblasti vrucheno perekhodiashchee Krasnoe Znamia Sovnarkoma SSSR // Leningradskaia pravda. 1946. February, 3..

Soloviev also presented a detailed analysis of the goals of post-war economic recovery and the development of agriculture in a series of reports See, for example: Solov'ev N. Vozrozhdenie khoziaistva Leningradskoi oblasti // Propaganda i agitatsiia. 1945. No. 1. P. 17-22..

Rebuilding the local economy, severely affected by the war, was a daunting task: the pressure for a faster pace of economic growth as well as the tight control on the part of the USSR government and the VKP(b) Central Committee created a tense working atmosphere. The children of Soviet and Communist officials often described their fathers as extremely busy: “I rarely saw my father -- he didn't come home until very late” Interview conducted by the author with E. I. Kharitonova., “.. .the only way I remember him is at work... he was always busy writing something, even at weekends; his study was completely crowded with papers; he smoked a lot. he never took any holidays” Interview conducted by the author with N. P. Sivtsova (Lazutina).. One would be justified in thinking that this lifestyle offered a surepath towards emotional burnout The concept of “staffburn-out”, implying a growing emotional exhaustion, was introduced into psychology in 1974, by the American scientist G. Freidenberger.. However, children of the Leningrad governmental officials remember them as active and passionately committed to their work From the author's personal conversations with N. P. Sivtsova (Lazutina), K. N. Solovyova, E. I. Kharitonova -- the daughters of Leningrad leaders of 1940s..

The Leningrad leaders were not in the slightest degree armchair politicians. Active involvement in solving work problems, some of them highly complex, became de rigueur among the Leningrad government during World War II and the siege. Leningrad leaders of the post-war period undertook numerous public duties, attending countless official events and meeting with workers. In 1945-1946, Popkov successfully performed representative functions in keeping with the Stalinist principle of contact with the working masses. Lazutin's daughter, Natalia, provides the following account of her father's work in the aftermath of the war: “My dad loved Leningrad and its residents; he wanted to do as much as possible to revive the city and its industry as well as to improve the quality of life here ...” Interview conducted by the author with N. P. Sivtsova (Lazutina). (fig. 5).

Fig. 5. Petr Lazutin on the tab of the memorial plaque at the base of the monument to N. G. Chernyshevsky, from the personal archive of Lazutin -- Sivtsov family

Soloviev's daughter, Clara, remembered that after his new appointment to Crimea her father never used a car to travel to work; he would always go on foot and resented spending too much time in his office -- a habit he acquired in Leningrad From the author's personal conversations with K. N. Solovyova..

In the years following World War II, many of Leningrad's top officials were promoted in recognition of their selfless labour during the war and siege. In 1946, Popkov and Soloviev were elected deputies of the 2^nd Supreme Soviet (Soviet of the Union); Lazutin joined the Soviet of Nationalities in 1947 TsGAIPD. F. 25. Op. 5. D. 1214..

In March 1946, Popkov (at Zhdanov's insistence) was appointed From the personal conversations of the authors with I. M. Turko in Leningradskoe delo / eds V. I. Demidov, V. A. Kutuzov. P. 41. the First Secretary of the Leningrad City and Region VKP(b) Committees, becoming a new Communist

Party leader of Leningrad. He had to compete for the position with Ia. F. Kapustin (the Second Secretary of the Leningrad City VKP(b) Committee) and I. M. Turko (the Second Secretary of the Leningrad Region VKP(b) Committee), both of whom were Kuznetsov's ex-deputies and vied for the appointment following the established practice of that time.

Popkov's less successful colleagues often doubted his management capabilities and continued to seek consultancy from their ex-boss Kuznetsov, who was appointed head of the Communist Party Personnel Directorate in Central Committee structures in 1946. “...I was repeatedly bypassed as they thought I had no knowledge of party work. Then they would report to me saying `Comrade Kuznetsov recommends it',” Popkov remembered bitterly TsGAIPD St. Petersburg. F. 24. Op. 49. D. 4. L. 19-20..

On 26 February 1946 Lazutin was appointed Chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee Ibid. F. 1728. Op. 1. D. 196640. L. 1.. He accepted his new appointment with satisfaction Interview conducted by the author with N. P Sivtsova (Lazutina)., seeing it as a well-deserved reward for his achievements and professional qualities. Rumour had it that Lazutin's candidacy was even considered for the position of the Minister of Food Indus- try Ibid.; however, the appointment never materialized -- much to the delight of Lazutin, who was unwilling to relocate to Moscow.

In 1947, Lazutin delivered a speech at a rally held in commemoration of Moscow's 800^th anniversary Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv fonodokumentov // RGAF. F. 1. Op. 1. Ed. khr. 81(5).. The surviving audio record provides some useful material for the analysis of his rhetorical skills and emotional state during the address. The opening part of his speech is deliberately reserved and business-like. However, several slips of the tongue and the gradually rising volume of his voice betray the speaker's intensity of feeling. Lazutin's speech emphasizes the contribution Russians made to the country's history and is punctuated by phrases “Russian people”, “Russian lands” and “the Russian nation” Ibid..

References to Russianness and the Russian people were a common vein in speeches made by Leningrad politicians of the post-war period, who may have been inspired by Stalin's famous toast (pronounced during the celebratory reception held in the Kremlin in May 1945) praising the outstanding historical significance of the Russian nation in the development of the country. The “Leningraders” may have interpreted this statement as a new vector of the Stalinist ideological policy. The post-war years also saw Zhdanov initiate a discussion among the official circles concerning the possible opening of a RSFSR bureau of the VKP(b) Central Committee, with headquarters in Leningrad. The project rested on a solid foundation: Russia was the only constituent republic of the USSR which had no party organization of its own.

Lazutin concludes his speech with a peroration: “Long live great Stalin, the leader and teacher of the Soviet people” Ibid.. The public exhibition of love for Stalin was more than just an accepted norm -- it was required by the political system. This love was in fact a symbiosis of reverence and fear of losing Stalin's political trust; the latter could have far-reaching consequences ranging from a “warning” to the suspension of party membership For more information about the hierarchy of USSR Party punishment see: Cohn E. The high title of a communist: Postwar Party discipline and the values of the soviet regime. Dekalb, 2015. P 33-41..

Fig. 6. Nikolai Solov'ev, photo from the personal file, 1946 [Gosudarstvennyi arkh- iv Respubliki Krym (GARK). F. P-1. Op. 2. D. 3761. L. 11]