Working Norms and Practices of the Soviet Elite in Leningrad during the late Stalinist Period

Fig. 7. Il'ia S. Kharitonov in the late 1940s. From the Kharitonov's family archive

After the war, Lazutin was granted a personal audience with Stalin Information about the joint visit of Kapustin Ya. F. and Lazutin P. G. to Stalin was obtained from their official speeches (TsGAIPD. F. 24. Op. 49. D. 5). According to Stalin's visitors log (published in: Na prieme u Stalina: tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924-1953 gg.) / ed. by A. A. Chernobaev. M., 2008. P. 495), Kapustin visited Stalin in December 10, 1947. Also in the list of visitors instead of Lazutin P. G., Lazutkin P. G. was mentioned. Apparently it should be considered as a typo.: the successes of the Leningrad industry were remarkable, the urge to showcase them too strong to re- sist Rokovoi plenum // Leningradskoe delo. 1990. P. 83.. The meeting, however, did not come up to the expectations. “Comrade Stalin said, `You are not doing enough to develop the fuel base' ”, Lazutin himself remembered. “I replied that we had issued a memorandum addressing this problem...” TsGAIPD. F. 24. Op. 49. D. 5. L. 163.

1946 also brought a promotion to Soloviev, who was elected First Secretary of the Crimean Communist Party Organization on 30-31 July 1946 in Simferopol GARK. F. 1. Op.1. D. 4285. L. 240-262. (fig. 6).

It is believed that Soloviev was nominated for this elevated position by Kuznetsov (the Central Committee secretary), with whom Soloviev had maintained close working contacts since his previous assignment in Leningrad. As Soloviev wrote in his autobiography, “From 1935 onwards, my work was personally monitored and supervised by Comrade A. A. Kuznetsov” Ibid. L. 6..

On 16 July 1946 Soloviev was succeeded as the Chairman of the Leningrad Regional Executive Committee by Ilya Kharitonov, former Secretary of the Leningrad City Committee of the Communist Party TsGAIPD. F. 1728. Op. 1. D. 311298/4. L. 25.. His daughter, Ella, describes her father as active, hardworking, kind and con- siderate Interview conducted by the author with E. I. Kharitonova. (fig. 7).

The newly appointed heads of the Leningrad City and Regional Councils had to oversee the restoration of the shattered local economy in accordance with the 4^th Five- Year Plan for 1946-1950 approved in March 1946 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS: v 3 t. T. 3. 1945-1985. Leningrad, 1985. P. 7..

Following Zhdanov's death in August 1948, the Leningrad group was deprived of its protector and patron. The rift that formed among the used-to-be associates made them even more vulnerable to political competitors like L. P. Beria and G. M. Malenkov. Hidden conflicts emerged between Popkov and A. A. Kuznetsov, between Popkov and his subordinates (Ia. F. Kapustin, I. M. Turko) undermined the cohesion of the Leningrad elite.

Zhdanov's main protйgй, Kuznetsov claimed to his patron's position as the ideological leader of the Leningrad Communist Organization. In his turn, Popkov, who had been suffering from covert sabotage at work, suggested that Nikolai Voznesensky, Head of the State Planning Committee, should be a more appropriate “unofficial leader” (chief) of Leningrad Leningradskoe delo. P. 78.. This move can be regarded as an ill-conceived attempt at political intrigue with the aim to find a new patron, instead of Zhdanov. Voznesensky rejected the proposal. As a result, Popkov “.. .began to focus on Kuznetsov again. I did not want this, but had focused on Kuznetsov completely” TsGAIPD St. Petersburg. F. 24. Op. 49. D. 4. L. 18.. Popkov's rash move received a radical interpretation in the run-up to the Leningrad Affair.

The formal cause for launching investigation as part of the Leningrad Affair was an anonymous report filed to the Central Committee shortly after the 10^th Leningrad regional and 8^th Leningrad city Party conference, held in December 1948, where the members of Committees had to be elected Zimarina N. “Leningradskoe delo” // Argumenty i fakty. 1988. No. 17.. A tally commission member informed the Central Committee that the election returns had been rigged: although the winners were declared as elected by unanimous vote, four votes in fact had been cast against Popkov, two against Lazutin, with a small number of “against” votes received by Kapustin and the Second Secretary of the region Committee G. F. Badaev (the total number of votes cast for the winning candidates exceeded one thousand) Demidov V. I., Kutuzov V. A. Poslednii udar. // Leningradskoe delo. Leningrad, 1990. P 5-174..

Another episode closely associated with the Leningrad Affair was the National Trade Fair organized by the Leningrad City Executive Committee on 10-20 January 1949. Attended by representatives of Kazakhstan, Georgia, the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and Be- lorussia, the National Trade Fair event was held in compliance with the Resolution of the Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers “On Measures for Improving Trade” issued on 11 November 1948, which contained no provisions restricting participation of Union constituent and autonomous republics, national districts, krais or oblasts O tak nazyvaemom “Leningradskom dele”. P C 127..

The fabrication of the criminal “case” had started before 1949: “The politicians who were in the list of defendants felt that their work problems were carefully organized by someone.” Afanasev A. Pobeditel' // Reabilitirovan posmertno. Moscow, 1988. P 461. According to Popkov's colleague, who met him in Smolny shortly before Popkov was dismissed from his office, “The person seated at the desk where Kirov and Kuznetsov used to work looked like a very sick person. I was particularly struck by his shifty eyes and pathetic smile of a lost man pleading for condescension” Ibid. P 463..

I. S. Kharitonov was the first to be removed from his post: in December 1948. Since that moment and until his arrest in November 1949, Kharitonov attended a course at the School for Secretaries of Regional VKP(b) Committees and Chairpersons of Regional Executive Committees. Referrals to such schools were frequently issued with the sole aim to sever and isolate the accused from their environment, and ultimately, to facilitate their arrest.

In 1948, Kharitonov was succeeded as the Chairman of Regional Executive Committee by Ivan Dmitriev, who used to be a school teacher in Luga prior to his party career Ibid..

During the war, Dmitriev had headed the local VKP(b) Committee and coordinated the partisan movement in the Luzhsky District.

On 15 February 1949 the Politburo issued the resolution “On Removal from Office of

A. A. Kuznetsov, M. I. Rodionov, and P. S. Popkov” Postanovlenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) o sniatii s dolzhnostei A. A. Kuznetsova, M. I. Rodionova, P S. Popkova 15 fevralia 1949 g. // Sud'by liudei: “leningradskoe delo”. P 50-51.. The names of the accused featured in the document without the prefix “comrades”. Popkov was charged with anti-governmental activities relating to the National Trade Fair PGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. Ch. 2. D. 1520. L. 125., and with failing to ensure contacts between the Central Committee and Leningrad Party organization, bypassing the Central Committee and engaging in “profiteering schemes” facilitated by self-proclaimed Leningrad chiefs.

On 22 February 1949, Popkov addressed the joint plenum of the Leningrad Regional and City VKP(b) Committees held with the aim to discuss the Politburo resolution. In keeping with the self-criticism principle, Popkov admitted supporting the plans to create a Communist Party of Russia in a bid to assist the Central Committee in its hard work Kutuzov V. A. Tak nazyvaemoe “Leningradskoe delo” // Voprosy istorii KPSS. 1989. No. 3. P 56.. Popkov faint-heartedly shifted the responsibility for the 1949 National Trade Fair to his ex-deputy: “All the talks were conducted by Comrade Lazutin behind the backs of the City Party Committee, and I knew nothing of what was going on” TsGAIPD St. Petersburg. F. 24. Op. 49. D. 4. L. 12..

Popkov also made a number of unpleasant comments targeted at Iakov Kapustin, mentioning his abuse of alcohol. Having completed his speech, Leningrad's highest- ranking politician, utterly demoralized and discredited in his colleagues' eyes, stepped awkwardly off the stage and took his seat among the audience rather than returning to the Presidium. The joint plenum released Popkov from his position and gave him a reprimand. Like many other demoted “Leningraders”, he was sent to Party Courses run by the Central Committee.

The Politburo Resolution was disseminated among other Communist Party organizations. V. Simarzin, the Head of the Special Unit of the Crimean Regional Party Committee, describes Soloviev's reaction to the Resolution:

“Soloviev opened the records of the Decree... the moment he got to the paragraph about the anti-Communist behaviour of Kuznetsov, Popkov, and Rodionov, he turned pale, became stiff and looked positively disorientated. he was agitated; he mentioned that he had had several conflicts with Kuznetsov back in Leningrad and heard Kuznetsov make rather indecent comments targeted at Beria; Soloviev also pointed out that he had been amazed to receive the news about Popkov's appointment to the post of the Leningrad City and Regional Committees. it was the first time I had seen Soloviev so unsettled” GARK. F. P-1. Op. 1. D. 3008. L. 264..

On 16 June 1949 Lazutin, too, was relieved from his duties by the Politburo Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1076. L. 58.. After removal from office, he did not lose heart, and said that he hoped to be given a new appointment in his home city of Alma-Ata Petr G. Lazutin was born not far from Almaty, in the Petropavlovsk town.. The optimism he showed to his family and friends may have been less than genuine; Lazutin struggled to conceal his distress from his wife and daughter. A shrewd, experienced politician of the Stalinist school, Lazutin may have foreseen what lay ahead. The new chairman of the Leningrad City Executive

Committee, Andrei Kuznetsov (appointed in June 1949) remained in this position for just over a year until July 1950 TsGAIPD St. Petersburg. F. 25. Op. 93. D. 865. L. 2..

On 5 August 1949 Soloviev was summoned to Moscow, where he was officially removed from his post Garmash P V Krymu // “Leningradskoe delo” / eds V. I. Demidov, V. A. Kutuzov. Leningrad, 1990. P. 242.. As his wife Vera remembered later, “on 4 August Nikolai unexpectedly called from Simferopol. He sounded nervous: `I have been urgently summoned to the Central Committee. I am flying out tomorrow. How about meeting in Moscow?' Not suspecting anything serious, I said, `I can't go right now: Clara [our daughter] has an exam in just a few days. Call me from Moscow, please.' `All right...' This was our last conversation” Garmash P Zhizn' i sud'ba // Vetluzhskii krai. 2003. April. No. 18..

In summer and autumn 1949, most officials accused as part of the Leningrad Affair were arrested; their apartments, where the families of the suspects still lived, were searched. A question haunting both popular and academic publications is whether the Leningrad leaders of the 1940s had really committed abuse of power, participated in corruption schemes? Were any of the repressions conducted during the Leningrad Affair justified, at least with regard to economic mismanagement? In struggling to answer this question, one should bear in mind that the sentence passed on 30 September 1950 by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court to the core group of the Leningrad Affair defendants Prigovor Voennoi kollegii Verkhovnogo suda SSSR tsentral'noi gruppe obviniaemykh po “Leningradskomu delu” ot 30 sentiabria 1950 g. // Sud'by liudei. “Leningradskoe delo”. P. 59-62. did not refer to any articles relating to economic crimes.

Although this issue remains outside the scope of our study, we need to acknowledge that banquets and gift-giving in Stalin's time used to be (and still remain) an unwritten norm of work practice, serving team-building and networking purposes. On the legislative level, Decree No.11 “On Prohibiting Allocation of Funds for Banquets” issued on 2 January 1945 by USSR Soviet of People's Commissars was aimed at restricting the banqueting campaign; however, dinner receptions held in Moscow by the USSR Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1946-1949 sent an unequivocal message to Regional Communist organizations that banquets continued to remain the tacit norm Nikonorova T.N. Dokumenty Komissii partiinogo kontrolia pri TsK VKP(b) (1934-1952 gg.)... Moscow, 2018. P 179..

There is information about gift-giving and taking among the Leningrad state officials in 1946-1949. For example, when the First Secretary of the Leningrad City and Region Party Committees Popkov visited Pskov in 1949, “a celebratory dinner was given in his honour; he was also presented with two chests of apples and one chest of smelt at the expense of the local executive committee” Ibid. P 183.. However, there is no reason to suggest the significant scale of economic abuse during the postwar period. Such behavior was kind of unwritten norm throughout party organizations across the USSR.

Children of the Leningrad ruling elite frequently mentioned that they had grown in modest living conditions Interview conducted by the author with G. F. Mikheev and T. A. Mikheeva; Interview conducted by the author with E. I. Kharitonova; Interview conducted by the author with N. P Sivtsova (Lazutina).. Investigators conducting searches in the defendants' apartments found that nearly all property items were with inventory numbers printed on them; personal belongings were mainly limited to books and state decorations.

The criminal investigation lasted for nearly a year, during which the accused were tortured, severely beaten, and subjected to extreme psychological coercion. On 30 September 1950 the main defendants including Popkov and Lazutin were sentenced to death, among the main six defendants, executed in Leningrad. Soloviev, Kharitonov and a number of other officials were shot down in Moscow between 28 and 31 October 1950. All of them had been sentenced to capital punishment under Article 58 of the USSR Criminal Code as traitors of the motherland, spies, and subversives. In November 1950, I. V. Dmitriev was also convicted during the Leningrad Affair and sentenced to 3,5 years of imprisonment.

Out of six top officials that ran Leningrad and Region in 1945-1950, Andrei Kuznetsov was the only one to avoid repressions. This may have been due to the fact that he did not maintain any close working contacts with the Leningrad ruling elite, remaining the director of the Izhora Works until 1949; alternatively, he may have been forced to cut a deal with the investigators... In 1950 he was given “a severe reprimand and warning” by the Central Control Commission, yet never had to stand trial.

Following Stalin's death, on 30 April 1954 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court revoked the sentence passed on the Leningrad Affair as based on false accusations; the top governmental and Communist leaders featured in the case were rehabilitated, some of them posthumously.

Conclusions

The political context introduced in the study has enabled us to highlight and analyse the social and emotional aspects of the working routine of the Soviet elite. Candidates to responsible positions in the government and party structures in Leningrad, as in the whole USSR as well, were selected in strict compliance with the established requirements relating to the social background, party membership, track record, etc. Some of the appointments, however, were a matter of chance: one such example was the rise of Andrei Zhdanov, who had no trust in the older Leningrad cadre and preferred to build his team around young Communists with regional backgrounds.

The working practices of the government officials during the late Stalinist period did not always conform to rigid institutionalized norms. In some instances legally prohibited activities (e.g. banquets) were unofficially regarded as a norm. Although the list of “written” and “unwritten” norms presented in our study may be extended, it reflects the key requirements for top governmental officials which existed under the Stalinist system.

Adherence to established norms of work conduct was a standard associated with the social role of a Soviet official; some manifestations of this adherence could be partly performative (love of Stalin, enthusiasm), others -- sincere (love of Leningrad). The “low” emotions associated with the work reality of the Soviet elite were dramatically manifested during the Leningrad Affair, and included fear of demotion and of loss of job and Party membership, fear for one's life and the wellbeing of one's family; apathy; enmity towards ex-colleagues; cowardice and treason. The study focuses on the emotional life of the Soviet elite both as part of the normal working routine and under crisis.

Can the Leningraders be said to have suffered for their post-war transgressions against the Stalinist norms of state discipline and respect for seniority? Hardly. The Leningrad Affair arose from the nation-wide power struggle. Some relatives of the Leningrad Affair victims are convinced that the case was primarily targeted against Alexei Kuznetsov, whom Stalin had named as his successor Interview conducted by the author with G. F. Mikheev, 8 August, 2018.. Howe ver, the close interaction and support that existed between Leningraders who later filled positions in local governments across the country were seen by Stalin's entourage as a threat to its might and influence as the national leader. It is possible that Kuznetsov's colleagues from Leningrad were prosecuted to inflate the political importance of the Leningrad Affair. The case had to send a clear signal to all party organizations nationwide: no political initiative ever goes unpunished Ibid..

Despite Zhdanov's many personal shortcomings (including weakness, cowardice often ascribed to him, as well as his loss of contact with the common people), he succeeded in consolidating the Leningrad elite and became an indisputable authority. The working relations built under his leadership among the ruling elite of Leningrad during the dramatic times of World War II and the siege were based on trust, friendship and emotional bonds. By contrast, Kuznetsov failed to gain as much influence as Zhdanov among his Leningrad colleagues despite all his experience and achievements, not to mention Stalin's support. Other top officials valued his work qualities, yet refused to see him as an equal to their previous patron: “In their private conversations [governmental and Communist officials] could refer to `Kuznetsov' or `Popkov', but they always said `Comrade Zhdanov'; Zhdanov remained an unchallenged figure” Interview conducted by the author with G. F. Mikheev and T. A. Mikheeva.. After further career promotions and, more importantly, after Zhdanov's death, the personal ties among the former wartime comrades gradually waned due to undercover working and personal conflicts, and ultimately accelerated the fabrication of the Leningrad Affair, which had tragic consequences not only for the defendants and also for the whole Leningrad.

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