Internal crises in the countries of the soviet bloc in contexts of European security

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State Institution “Institute of World History of National Academy of Science of Ukraine”

Internal crises in the countries of the soviet bloc in contexts of European security

Dmytro Lakishyk, Ph.D. (History), Senior Research Fellow

Kyiv, Ukraine

Abstract

Keywords: Soviet bloc, Poland, the GDR, Hungarian Revolution, “Prague Spring”, Cold War.

Анотація

Дмитро Лакішик, кандидат історичних наук, ст. наук. співроб.

ДУ «Інститут всесвітньої історії НАН України», Київ, Україна

ВНУТРІШНІ КРИЗИ В КРАЇНАХ РАДЯНСЬКОГО БЛОКУ В КОНТЕКСТІ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ

У статті аналізуються внутрішні кризи, які переживали країни радянського блоку в період «холодної війни». Зазначається, що кризи розвитку суспільства у країнах Східної Європи, в яких на початку 1950-хрр. остаточно утвердилася модель державного устрою тоталітарного типу радянського зразка, виникали постійно й з плином часу розгорталися та поглиблювалися. Суспільний устрій, який був нав'язаний державам, що опинились у сфері впливу СРСР, виявився абсолютно чужорідним і населення цих країн було неготовим і відмовлялось його сприймати, що стало однією з основних причин перманентних вибухів соціального невдоволення. Криза управління в Радянському Союзі, що виникла після смерті Й. Сталіна, невизначеність та певна надія на лібералізацію суспільного життя, дали надію країнам соцтабору на демократичні реформи, які могли розпочатись з новим керівництвом в СРСР. Надзвичайний сплеск соціальної активності в країнах радянського блоку спричинив ХХ з'їзд КПРС, на якому було ухвалене рішення про різноманіття форм переходу держав до соціалізму та можуть бути створені умови для проведення мирним шляхом корінних політичних і економічних перетворень. Але подальші події засвідчили неспроможність радянського керівництва до ефективного управління соцтабором в кризові періоди, застосування військової сили, як єдино можливого методу вирішення конфліктних ситуацій, небажання реформувати систему зважаючи на виклики часу, незламний авторитаризм.

After the Second World War, some European states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the GDR) came under the influence of the Soviet Union and were forced to participate in the Cold War as part of the Socialist bloc. But very soon, namely in the 1950s, in Eastern Europe, internal instability began to grow, due to several reasons, one of which was the death of Soviet leader Stalin in 1953 and the liberalization of the political course of the region's leadership during the thaw. Another reason was the industrialization of these countries on the Soviet model, which took place in Eastern Europe and led to a significant deterioration in the financial situation, especially the peasantry, as the main investment went to industry. At the same time, the situation of workers and employees was also not much better. The economic reforms that took place during this period were practically nullified by the dogmatic intervention of the top party leadership. Internal instability in Eastern Europe was also affected by the success of Western European economic recovery in the postwar period. All this greatly intensified the dissatisfaction with the communist regimes, causing a growing crisis in the region, which manifested itself in speeches, protests, demonstrations, revolutions, the first of which was the uprising in Berlin in June 1953.

This issue is the focus of a large number of researchers who have used archival materials, testimonies of participants in these events, memoirs of the then heads of state and more. In Soviet historiography, the crises that took place in the countries of the Soviet bloc are presented in the light of the USSR's struggle to preserve the existing order, “to protect” states from revolutions and upheavals, and so on. After the collapse of the USSR, unbiased research began both within these countries and researchers from abroad. Let us single out the works of such researchers as K. Herman, J. Grenville, N. Carmichael, R. Crampton, W. Cousin, J. Navratil, R. Ritter, S. Svilas, and O. Stykalin.

Quite a lot of attention to internal crises in the Soviet bloc is paid by modern Ukrainian authors, such as M. Derzhalyuk, I. Korol, S. Motruk, R. Pylyavets, R. Postolovsky, I. Filipchuk, V. Yarovy and many others, which actualizes this issues and fills it with new facts and in-depth analysis.

The purpose of the article is to consider the causes and consequences of internal crises in the Soviet bloc countries in the 1950s and 1960s in the context of European security.

Immediately after Stalin's death in 1953, the struggle for power in the USSR began - L. Beria, M. Khrushchev, G. Malenkov and V. Molotov. During this period, the leadership of the GDR, as well as the governments of other socialist countries, expected clear instructions from the leadership of the USSR on the further plan of action, but this did not happen. The economic crisis in East Germany was deepening, which was caused by increased production standards, the export of material resources from the GDR to the USSR and heavy reparations. All this exacerbated the already tense situation in the social sphere, and in June 1953 a wave of strikes swept the country, which gradually escalated into anti-government demonstrations. There were calls for the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from Germany and even for the unification of the country (as the standard of living in West Germany grew at a considerable rate thanks to the economic and financial assistance of Western countries).

Demonstrations in the GDR were quickly suppressed by Soviet troops. Eventually, the East German government, whose resignations were demanded by the demonstrators, only strengthened after the events of June 1953. Those ministers who sympathized with the protesters' demands had to resign. By July 1, 1953, the situation in the GDR had stabilized and martial law was lifted in Berlin.

Immediately after the events of 1953, with the active help of the Soviet Union, the National People's Army (NPA) of the GDR was created. In 1954, the occupation functions of Soviet troops in Germany were abolished. The legal basis for the presence of Group of Soviet troops in East Germany was the Treaty of Relations between the GDR and the USSR of September 20, 1955 and the Agreement on the Temporary Deployment of Soviet Troops in the GDR, signed on March 12, 1957. In 1957, the protection of the GDR state border was completely transferred to the German border troops. It was only after these events that the USSR began to provide economic assistance to the GDR, resulting in a significant improvement (the highest rate among socialist states) of standard of living in the GDR by the end of the 1960s. 33 large German enterprises that became Soviet property were returned to the GDR government [6].

It should be noted that after the difficult process of condemning Stalinism in the socialist countries, the ruling Communist Parties of these states began to have political differences that corresponded to the internal struggle in Moscow's collective leadership. But unlike the USSR, the removal of Beria had more serious consequences in other countries, as the former interior minister was the head of the “invisible network” of Soviet control over the people's democracies. It consisted not only of “advisers” to various governments, but also of an extensive network that penetrated the party itself to gather information and monitor its leadership. This mechanism was destroyed together with the apparatus of L. Beria [16, p. 283].

Due to the easing of external pressure, party members began to talk about their so-called legal rights, but they could not find acceptable solutions at the time. In an effort to make the political leadership more collegial, senior party, government, and state posts were divided in each country. This was a consequence of the political struggle, which took place differently in different parties. It took its most tragic forms in Hungary, where an irreconcilable clash between two leaders, M. Rakosi and I. Nagy, had serious consequences.

The process of transformation in different countries of the socialist bloc had common features and certain differences. Common was the desire to change economic goals: to reduce investment to increase consumption; it is preferable to develop light rather than heavy industry; to reduce the pressure on the peasants during collectivization; pay more attention to living standards. The most tangible contradictions took place in other areas. While many political prisoners were rehabilitated in Poland in 1954 and the almighty Ministry of State Security was abolished, Czechoslovakia was still suing former party leaders. These repressions could no longer be explained by Soviet pressure, and the reasons for them should be sought in the internal struggle.

Soviet leaders took certain steps to improve the structure of the socialist camp that remained after Stalin's leadership. The Stalinist system was greatly influenced by the echoes of the war and the first postwar agreements. However, when Soviet leaders, focusing on the partition of Germany, began to turn the GDR into a reliable ally (as well as the United States - West Germany), it became clear that these agreements were not enough. The unrest in Berlin in June 1953 accelerated events. Changes in relations with the Germans led to a change in relations with other countries, which marked the beginning of a review of the legacy of the war. Despite attempts to coordinate national development plans, the Mutual Economic Assistance Council was still a weak organization, which potential opened up later. In general, economic relations between the states remained bilateral.

However, the updated structure of the socialist bloc was built not only in the economic sphere. On May 14, 1955, the Military-Political Union of Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (also known as the Warsaw Pact), was signed in the Polish capital. In addition to the USSR, it was signed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. The treaty provided for mutual assistance to the signatories in the event that one of them is attacked by another state or group of countries. Allied Armed Forces were placed under a single command, the first commander of which was appointed Marshal I. Konev [4]. war soviet european

The Warsaw Pact has always been considered a response to the creation of NATO, a copy of which it was largely, and a response to the decision to admit West Germany into the Alliance. Such was the view of Soviet historiography. They believed that the objective reason for the creation of such a union of Eastern European countries was the fear of a German threat that could be revived. However, the new alliance, which was formed seven years after the Atlantic, was of enormous importance. It legally justified the presence of Soviet troops in Germany and other countries where they were stationed in the same way as American troops in Western Europe. It made it almost automatic for the USSR to provide military assistance to its allies against any outside attack, thus clarifying its responsibilities. Finally, it corresponded to the new Soviet strategy, which attached great importance to nuclear weapons and the factor of surprise [9, c. 254].

Such new decisions, in turn, could not go unanswered. After Stalin's death, little is known about discussions among Soviet leaders. The Warsaw Pact gave the Socialist Coalition a clearer structure that was more in line with the classical provisions of international law than those previously proposed by the disbanded Cominform or provided for bilateral treaties.

In 1955, another important event took place that had a direct impact on relations between the socialist countries - the reconciliation of the USSR with Yugoslavia. A difficult legacy left by J. Stalin was the conflict with J. Broz Tito. Until the death of J. Stalin, the parties held talks only in the language of sharp controversy. Stalin's successors began to behave more cautiously, stopping attacks by the Soviet press and making a few friendly gestures toward Yugoslavia. In August 1953, G. Malenkov announced the normalization of relations with Belgrade in the context of detente. It was a small step, given the severity of the conflict and the years that separated both countries and parties. The Yugoslav leaders took note of such friendly signs, but did not fully believe in the sincerity of the intentions of the Soviet leaders. Moreover, it was not easy for Moscow to take decisive steps, as “all bridges were burned” under Stalin. The socialist allies and the entire communist movement were involved in a sharp controversy with J. Broz Tito.

In 1954, the USSR began to reconsider carefully its position, for which a commission was set up to objectively study the internal situation in Yugoslavia. Despite the bias, the commission concluded that the Yugoslav regime had not “restored capitalism”, as propaganda claimed, but that the state was moving toward socialism in its own way. In mid-1954, Soviet leaders began to prepare for the rapprochement of J. Broz Tito with Soviet allies and major Communist parties. This was done in the form of a closed letter and an oral speech by Khrushchev to foreign delegates who arrived in Prague for the congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [1].

Already from the first contacts between Moscow and Belgrade behind closed doors, Soviet leaders, at least some of them, acknowledged that the old accusation of the Cominform was unfair. By the end of the year, the first signs of possible reconciliation had emerged the presence of top Soviet leaders at a reception at the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow, more objective articles in the press, and optimistic statements by J. Broz Tito. However, the new policy was still being discussed at the top of Moscow. In February 1955, V. Molotov stated that the improvement of relations depended on Yugoslavia no less than on the USSR, and thus made it clear that Yugoslavia must change its position. Tito's reaction to Molotov's words was quite restrained.

The last doubts were dispelled by Khrushchev, who arrived in Belgrade at the head of a representative Soviet delegation. In his sensational speech, he blamed the conflict on his country, accusing Beria of this deliberate crime. He expressed not only remorse but also a wish for better relations between the two governments and between the two parties, proposing to turn some pages of the past and return to the old post-war alliance [6]. Of course, the years of mutual resentment and brutal struggle were not so easy to erase, and the Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations were not easy, as serious political and psychological obstacles had to be overcome. Finally, the agreement reached gained special importance. First of all, it was the victory of J. Broz Tito, because it recognized the value of the ideas he defended before J. Stalin. However, as in 1948, the discussion was not limited to the USSR and Yugoslavia. The 1955 agreement was of particular importance because it raised the issue of Stalinism's exports to people's democracies. It not only recognized the right of Yugoslavs to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies, to seek friends in the East and in the West, and to be equal interlocutors. Relations between the two countries were governed not only by the principles of sovereignty, independence and equality, but also by the principles of peaceful coexistence of all states. Particular emphasis was placed on mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs for any reason - economic, political or ideological - because the internal order, differences in social systems and the diversity of specific forms of socialism is “the business of peoples”. This was the first recognition of the diversity of paths to socialism proclaimed at the XX Congress of Soviet Communists.

It should be noted that during the XX Congress the Cominform ceased to exist, although its dissolution was officially announced only on April 18, 1956. Its latest decisions were made by participating delegations (or part of them) during the congress without formally convening the organization. The cessation of its activities was calmer than the dissolution of the Comintern. The Cominform, paralyzed by the death of J. Stalin, had a hard time surviving the changes that took place in the lives of individual parties and in their relations. Reconciliation with Yugoslavia, even without its formal participation, was the last step in its dissolution [12].

The dissolution of the Cominform was only a faint manifestation of the deep general crisis that struck the entire communist movement in 1956. Stalin's undeniable authority was linked to the glorious pages of the past, especially the victory in World War II. Therefore, his conviction could not help but cause serious shocks. The new statements made by Moscow differed significantly from the dogmas imposed during the Stalinist years, and their understanding was a serious test. Khrushchev's “secret report” caught all parties by surprise - there were no previous consultations. The text of the report was read at party meetings in some people's democracies. The publication of the document in the USA was also a surprise. It should be noted that for the US Communist Party, weakened by police repression in the McCarthy era and unable to offer a solution to the problems of American society, the Moscow events meant almost collapse.

“The storm hit us”- as noted in Italy, P. Togliatti, and, in fact, reflected the overall impression of the event. Even before the “secret report” became known, P. Togliatti stressed that the hegemonic position of the CPSU in the communist movement “is beginning to change” [1].

The political wave that arose after the XX congress marked the beginning of a general debate that had long since ceased in the communist movement. More accurate historical research has been called for on all sides. However, no one knew how to do it, because both in the USSR and abroad, the delay in researching the post-revolutionary development of Soviet society made them impossible. When turning to historical assessments, criticism of Khrushchev and the CPSU immediately acquired political significance. Much more often, there were calls to re-evaluate not only the activities of J. Stalin, but also the method of government itself, which the CPSU used for 40 years. The resonance from the XX congress was strong in every party. In Czechoslovakia, an emergency congress was demanded, and in Bulgaria, V. Chervenkov, the main representative of the post-Dimitrov course, was removed from office.

Everywhere the communist movement rejected the model of Stalinist socialism, demanding independence and democracy. However, the crisis was most severe in two countries - Poland and Hungary - where national alienation from the USSR was the deepest. Crises erupted in 1956 and developed in different ways. The Soviet government faced similar problems in both countries and was forced to make difficult decisions. In both Poland and Hungary, it proved unprepared for broad popular movements based on hostility to Soviet policy and intervention. In both cases, the Soviet leaders, who did not have a common opinion, did not react systematically and belatedly.

In Poland, the first signs of the crisis were the unrest of workers in Poznan in June 1956, suppressed by troops. They were not provoked from the outside, as indicated at the beginning, but caused by public discontent. These riots reflected in the sharpest form the political sentiments that raged for several months in enterprises and among intellectuals and did not stop all summer. They manifested themselves in deep differences within the party: a wing that advocated a political turn, ideologically based on W. Gomulka, who suffered from Stalinist repressions, and on his old conceptions of the Polish path to socialism. In October 1956, as the crisis deepened, most of the party's leadership approached him, proposing the post of First Secretary. However, it was because of his heightened sense of patriotism that he was viewed with distrust in Moscow, where no one could predict his intentions. Before the plenum of the Central Committee, which was to put him at the head of the party, the movement of Soviet troops in the country and on its borders posed a threat of armed intervention. In Warsaw, factories and schools were preparing for resistance [2, c. 157].

During the plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, on October 19, a Soviet delegation consisting of representatives of two groups arrived unexpectedly and uninvited to Warsaw: N. Khrushchev and A. Mikoyan, on the one hand, V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, on the other. The Poles were forced to interrupt the debate in order to allow the Polish leadership and W. Gomulka to meet with Soviet leaders. The meetings lasted day and night. These were “sincere, difficult and bitter negotiations, accompanied by mutual accusations” [7]. W. Gomulka and his colleagues managed to convince their interlocutors that the expected changes in leadership and program changes are necessary to strengthen socialism in Poland and that the nature of Soviet-Polish relations should be changed - this was the main topic of discussion - to establish true friendship between the two countries. The next day, the Soviet leaders left, and W. Gomulka was elected First Secretary and presented the country with a plan of reforms focused on the concept of Polish socialism. A few weeks later, government talks took place in which W. Gomulka confirmed that he remained faithful to the union with the USSR, which, in his opinion, was in the national interests of the country. He also managed to revise a number of unfair agreements (for example, the abolition of low prices paid by the USSR for imported coal). Marshal K. Rokossovskyi left the post of commander in chief of the Polish army and returned to the USSR.

What was avoided in Poland happened in Hungary. Internal divisions and uncertain policies of the USSR intensified the national tragedy. In Hungary, the internal struggle between the Communists was fiercer than anywhere else, and the Soviet Union was more involved than in Poland or elsewhere. Of all the leaders who remained in power in Eastern Europe in 1956, M. Rakosi was more involved in the export of Stalinism. He retained his power after a brutal struggle against I. Nagy, an old opponent of his policies who became a supporter of “national” communism and “non-alignment” on the Yugoslav model. The Soviet leaders, who were often referred to as arbitrators, could not and did not want to obtain the necessary reshuffles and political changes from the Hungarian Communist Party. Only in the summer of 1956, under joint pressure from Moscow and Belgrade, M. Rakosi was forced to leave. However, even this did not lead to real changes in either the government's policy or its composition.

The driving force of the Hungarian Revolution were political circles, opposition parties that pursued political goals: the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the dismantling of the totalitarian regime of Rakosi as a kind of Stalinist model of socialism, the restoration of full sovereignty and independence of Hungary, the formation of a democratic system. They became a unifying platform both for the political forces within the National Popular Front and for the progressive political forces of the country led by the national government of I. Nagy, which initiated the unification of opposition movements of all directions.

Dozens of underground nationalist and patriotic organizations (Hungarian Community, Union of Hungarian Homeland, Union of Political Prisoners, Christian Organizations and Fronts, Clerical Youth Organizations, White Guerrilla Organizations, National Resistance and Faith Movement, National Unity Organizations) had illegal branches in many regions of the country. Former military and former regime officials, clergy, intellectuals, former activists and supporters of the bourgeois parties, and thousands of people released from prisons and concentration camps played a significant role in their work. They owned a network at the Hungarian and local levels, creating bases in important centers of the country. They professed extreme forms of struggle against the Rakosi regime: armed struggle, terror against state security agencies, party figures, activists of socialist transformations (nationalization, expropriation of private property, collectivization, deportation to forced labor camps). The underground activities of these thousands of groups and organizations instantly joined the struggle against the communist government in Hungary and against the interference of Soviet troops in internal affairs, for a free and independent Hungary [3, c. 122].

The difficult situation lasted until in October, during the Polish events, even a belated appeal to M. Rakosi's opponents - I. Nagy and J. Kadar - could not fix anything. There was a social explosion in the country. The passive intervention of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary on the side of the new leaders only provoked anger. The soldiers were suddenly withdrawn from Budapest. At that time, the USSR had to take into account the anti-Soviet and anti-socialist uprisings. There was a danger for the USSR that the idea of rejecting Eastern Europe would materialize - first Hungary, then other countries from the “Soviet embrace”. All Warsaw Pact countries could have been involved in these events, as Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal, expressed his intention to abandon its orientation to the USSR, and to begin large-scale economic cooperation with Western countries. Instead of communist administrations, new authorities were created - councils. The Hungarian crisis, which coincided with the Anglo-French military conflict in Egypt, put the international situation on the brink of disaster.

After the Warsaw lesson, in Moscow they could not dare to act for a long time. A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov arrived in insurgent Budapest in late October, hoping to use the last opportunities for compromise. On October 30, the Soviet government issued a declaration acknowledging past inequalities between socialist countries and a willingness to reconsider economic relations, the presence of advisers, and the deployment of troops with all countries concerned. Finally, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in Moscow, it was decided to suppress the uprising with the help of Soviet troops.

Prior to the armed intervention, Soviet leaders did what was not done during the Polish events: they demanded the consent of their allies, including the Poles and the Yugoslavs. After the first temporary withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest, many feared that the Soviet Union had decided to leave Hungary to its own devices. “Disobedient” new Polish leaders also approved the use of force. J. Broz Tito did the same, despite the sympathies that I. Nagy enjoyed in Yugoslavia. He considered the intervention a lesser evil, as events had gone too far [5]. Eventually, the uprising was suppressed by Soviet troops, and the whole operation was reduced to a few days of fighting in the streets of Budapest. The leadership of the Hungarian government was taken over by J. Kadar, a communist who suffered from the rule of M. Rakosi. At first, he was an ally of I. Nagy, then their worldviews diverged and J. Kadar asked for help of the USSR. The events in Hungary in 1956 were the result of the collapse of Stalin's model of socialism.

Following the events in Poland and Hungary, the leadership of Eastern Europe had to change its policy to address the root causes of discontent. Mass repressions were stopped and their victims were partially rehabilitated. There was liberalization in the field of culture, ideology, education, contacts with Western countries expanded.

Attempts were made to carry out economic reforms in most countries of the region in the early 1960s. Without abandoning the cornerstones of the economic system of socialism (the priority of the state in the economy, planning and administrative system of management and distribution of material goods, etc.), it was planned to provide enterprises with relative economic independence. However, while retaining state property, the party-bureaucratic nomenklatura ensured the possibility of full subordination of all spheres of life to their interests.

The main event of the arms race and the Cold War of this period in Europe was the Berlin Crisis of 1961. Unlike Stalin, for whom the GDR was for a long time only a springboard for strengthening Soviet influence throughout Germany and Europe as a whole, Khrushchev sought from the West the recognition of the GDR, postwar borders in Europe and on this basis - the transition from confrontation to detente and reduce the levels of military confrontation on the continent.

Full stabilization of the GDR after the suppression of the uprising of 1953 could not be achieved, there was a mass exodus through Berlin to Germany, mostly intellectuals, and even skilled workers (it was not only better financial security in Germany, but also in political Socialist Unity Party of Germany (in German -SED) course, which suppressed the prestige of the intelligentsia in the GDR). The GDR understood that the open western border inflicted considerable economic losses on the country [6].

Berlin played a special role in the competition between the two German political and economic systems. Being in the position of an enclave near East Germany, but at the same time closely integrated into the West German economy, West Berlin embodied economic prosperity and political freedoms, which contrasted even more with the realities of the GDR. In 1957-1958, the GDR took a number of measures to increase labor productivity in agriculture and industry, which, however, did not lead to tangible results. Stagnation in the East German economy was compounded by the aggravation of military and political realities around it.

After the GDR and FRG became members of opposing military-political blocs - the Warsaw Pact and NATO, respectively - accelerated rearmament of both German states began. This was contrary to the restrictions set out in the Potsdam Conference. Tensions in the interstate relations between the GDR and FRG soon acquired crisis features. Tensions within the socialist bloc, meanwhile, were growing, with a number of Eastern European countries, most notably Poland, reluctant to artificially curb their economic ties with Germany and West Berlin.

In the end, Khrushchev chose the following course of action regarding West Berlin. Instead of suffocating the city with a blockade, it was planned to gradually reorient its economy to eastern markets, to integrate it into the system of cooperation of the socialist countries, while maintaining its “special” status. Khrushchev also did not plan any military-political actions against West Berlin, but was not against keeping the West in suspense. He relied on the fact that Western countries would not start a war because of the city and would eventually negotiate on the German question [10, c. 149].

The danger was that from the very beginning of the conflict, the leader of the GDR, W. Ulbricht, did not hide that he did not believe in the possibility of free city status for West Berlin. The issue of the peaceful integration of West Berlin into the

GDR was not even studied in essence by the East German leadership. The bet was finally made on the “separation” of West Berlin from Germany not by economic but by administrative and military methods. It was assumed that Moscow would provide all necessary assistance. From this point of view, the risk of a direct collision of systems increased, the situation became increasingly threatening [17, p. 82].

Finally, in September 1959, at a meeting with Khrushchev at Camp David, Eisenhower succeeded in convincing the Soviet leader that additional negotiations should be held on the Berlin question. After the meeting of the two leaders, the differences over Berlin lost the features of an acute crisis and took the form of a slow confrontation for a year and a half.

In early 1961, the new US administration, led by Kennedy, made it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States was well ahead of the Soviet Union in armaments. Rising tensions eventually led to aggravation of relations and another Berlin crisis. However, Khrushchev received information that Kennedy's entourage had not yet decided what to do with the “German question”. Some statements by the US administration could be seen as a search for compromises.

Finally, in the summer of 1961, a meeting took place between Khrushchev and Kennedy, at which the parties clearly substantiated their positions on the “German question” and it became clear that neither side was seeking a compromise solution. This was followed by an increase in the military potential of both states, and W. Ulbricht noted the possibility of building a wall to isolate West Berlin. Then, however, this statement went virtually unnoticed. But in early August 1961, Khrushchev supported the idea of the head of the GDR, when the situation around Berlin could be the beginning of a military escalation.

Despite the tactical success of the lightning construction of the Berlin Wall, which the West was unprepared for, it was a strategic loss. In his memoirs, Khrushchev noted that the wall helped him to restore the status quo in Germany and that J. Kennedy was “defeated” in Berlin [13]. However, the documents show that no one in the Soviet leadership regarded the outcome of the Berlin crisis as a victory.

The Berlin Wall lasted until 1990 and became a symbol of the confrontation between the two German states, the division of Europe, the Cold War and the final establishment of a bipolar world.

In the second half of the 1960s, the reserves that provided opportunities for extensive development in Eastern Europe were significantly depleted, which led to a decrease in profits and a slowdown in the economic development of the region.

The greatest crisis of this period in Eastern Europe was the events in Czechoslovakia (1968-1969), known as the “Prague Spring”. The leader of this country in the 1960's was A. Novotny. The pace of economic development in Czechoslovakia has declined significantly, the opportunities for extensive industrial development have been exhausted, corruption and abuse of power have flourished, and party and state bureaucracies have grown. A society with democratic traditions did not accept the authoritarian, almost dictatorial style of leadership of A. Novotny. In January 1968, he was dismissed from the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (leaving the post of President). A. Dubcek was elected the new leader.

It should be noted that at the first stage of development of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia, as in 1956 in Hungary, there was no goal to transform the political system in the country, but the dynamics of events inevitably brought reformists closer to this decision [15, p. 270].

The Czechoslovak reform movement began with an obvious and constructive criticism of the government for its incompetence and inability to catch up and overtake the industrialized countries of the West. This strategic goal was declared in the program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. As a way out of the stalemate, it was proposed to restore much of what had been lost with the Communists' assertion of their monopoly on power.

Unlike Hungary, the reformists in Prague did not reject the revolution from above, which, according to the leaders of the movement, was to protect them from Soviet intervention and the recurrence of the tragic consequences of the Hungarian uprising. To this end, special emphasis was placed on gradual, evolutionary changes in political institutions to ensure stability in the country and irreversibility of change. The main ideas of the transformation were the expansion of democracy, the liberation of public and economic bodies from the party's vices, and the development of their own initiative.

Nevertheless, even this option of finding a way out of the stalemate of the stagnant stage of socialism proved premature for the socialist camp (with the exception of Poland and Hungary to some extent). Coinciding in time with the difficult, ambiguous processes in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, it could not cause them ideological and political rejection.

A. Dubcek's candidacy, which was considered pro-Soviet, suited Moscow. A. Dubcek seemed to Soviet leaders “a fairly neutral personality, weak and insecure. He was perceived as a transitional and controlled figure and not the worst option” [20].

The Czechoslovak leadership, led by A. Dubcek, began to build “socialism with a human face”, trying to connect the foundations of socialist society with a market economy, pluralism, and democracy. It was proposed to reduce the state apparatus, to reform the economic mechanism and to separate it from political and state bodies. The media, which operated relatively freely in the country, played a significant role in promoting these ideas. Liberalization in public life was reflected in the emergence of new political organizations, the intensification of democratic parties, which lasted until August 1968, when the Warsaw Pact troops were introduced into the country.

It should be noted that the troops of the Soviet Union since the beginning of the summer of 1968 were on the territory of Czechoslovakia under the guise of military exercises. British researcher D. Floyd believes that in total “the Russians managed to stretch an army of about 50 thousand soldiers with the latest weapons, in addition, not allowing speculation that they invaded or occupied the country. These June 1968 maneuvers were in fact a mini-occupation with a military presence on such a scale that it took little political success to allow the Russians to turn back the clock” [6]. But Czechoslovak leaders refused to believe in the possibility of a “Hungarian” scenario. They were convinced that the Russians, under pressure from international public opinion, would sooner or later have to come to terms with the Prague experiment. At the same time, another tendency was growing inside the country, which was of great concern to the Soviet leadership: there were growing voices at the top of the Czechoslovak army for the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. This prompted the Soviet leadership to use a forceful scenario of “bringing order” to Czechoslovakia.

In general, the reasons that led the Soviet leadership to use force against a sovereign state can be divided into two groups: geopolitical (military-strategic) and political-ideological. The vulnerability or loss of one of the Warsaw Pact partners was perceived by the Kremlin elite as something like a breakthrough in the “outer ring” of the socialist camp. It is one thing for A. Dubcek to defend democratic principles and even a “humane” version of socialism within the socialist system, and quite another to bring the Czechoslovak armed forces out of Soviet control.

However, political and ideological reasons played a decisive role in Moscow's final decision to send troops to Czechoslovakia: fears of democratization spreading to neighboring socialist countries. The erosion of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia could be the beginning of the end of Soviet hegemony in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

In an attempt to justify interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign state, the CPSU and other fraternal parties used the thesis that later became the cornerstone of the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine”: the current crisis is not an internal problem of Czechoslovakia. It is about the place of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the socialist camp and the international communist movement. The possible withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the agreed line would disrupt the “balance of power in Europe and could exacerbate international tensions”.

The generally favorable position of other Warsaw Pact countries played an equally important role in resolving the Czechoslovak crisis by force. Also, note that the United States has confirmed its intention not to interfere in the situation in the Czechoslovak Republic under any circumstances.

The success of the military operation contrasted with the political improvisation that followed: the main task was to unite pro-Soviet forces and form a “shadow government” that recognized the legitimacy of any Allied action did not succeed. Romania also reacted rather harshly to the events in the Czechoslovak Republic, saying that the invasion of troops was a violation of the Warsaw Pact and called for their immediate withdrawal. The same was stated by Yugoslavia. Both countries expressed support for the Czechoslovak reformers on every occasion. J. Broz Tito feared that Romania might be next to Czechoslovakia, and then Soviet divisions would be deployed on two sections of the Yugoslav border at once - on the Hungarian and Romanian routes. Apart from Romania and Yugoslavia, Albania and China also condemned the “military intervention of the five states”. However, all these protests were “purely declarative” and could no longer affect the “balance of power in the international arena”. However, Moscow was forced to admit that the military operation did not bring the expected political results [18, p. 267].

On October 16, the USSR and Czechoslovak governments signed an agreement on the conditions of temporary stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops participating in the invasion remained in Czechoslovakia “to ensure the security of the socialist community”. The signing of the agreement was one of the main military and political results of the action of the troops of the five states.

In addition, the Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovak Republic led to an increase in the grouping of NATO troops near the Czechoslovak border, the creation of a “European group” within NATO. The Czechoslovak crisis has finally shattered the widespread illusion in the West since the Caribbean that interest in political and strategic stability, as well as closer ties with the West, will help transform real socialism into a more pluralistic society that respects pluralism.

The phased withdrawal of allied troops from the country began on October 17 and was completed by mid-November. Seven months after the occupation, A. Dubcek was removed from the post of First Secretary of the CPC. At the April 1969 Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, G. Husak was elected First Secretary. A few years later, the political atmosphere in Czechoslovakia no longer differed from orthodox socialist regimes [14, p. 176].

Considering the internal crises that took place in the socialist bloc countries during this period, it is impossible to ignore the reaction of the United Nations to them. On October 28, 1956, at the suggestion of the United States, Great Britain, and France, a meeting of the UN Security Council was convened to discuss the situation in Hungary. Contrary to the Soviet position, the Security Council decided to convene an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly on Hungary, setting a date of November 4, but an emergency session was convened on November 1 in connection with the start of the war against Egypt. The delegations of the countries of the socialist camp actively advocated an end to the aggression against Egypt and against the discussion of the “Hungarian question”. The US representative H. Lodge stated that he was unable to accept the defeat of I. Nagy, called on the “Hungarian anti-socialist elements” not to submit to the government of J. Kadar. The United States was supported by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Spain. Representatives of the USSR or the socialist bloc noted that discussing the issue at the UN was an attempt to divert public attention from armed aggression against Egypt and the need to remove the “Hungarian question” from the debate, which was interpreted as illegal interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign socialist state. However, the Austrian resolution on the inclusion of the “Hungarian question” on the agenda of the regular session of the UN General Assembly, which opened on November 12, 1956 and lasted until March 8, 1957, was adopted by a majority of votes [8, c. 490]. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy G. Martino compared the events in Hungary with the capture of Czechoslovakia by Hitler in 1939. Representatives of Peru, Cuba and Ecuador also spoke out against anti-Soviet positions. Indian diplomat K. Menon insisted that the Soviet government influence the Hungarian government to invite UN Secretary-General D. Hammarskjцld to visit the country immediately. On 15 November, the Cuban delegation introduced a draft resolution accusing the USSR of deporting Hungarians to Siberia in violation of the Genocide Convention; the majority adopted this resolution. On December 1, 1956, the United States, Cuba, Ireland, and Belgium ultimately demanded the admission of UN observers to Hungary and neighboring countries (including Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria), which was also accepted by a majority. On December 9, a U.S. delegation introduced another draft resolution condemning the Soviet Union for violating the UN Charter in connection with interfering in Hungarian events, as well as demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops under UNmajority supervision, which received a majority of votes. India, Burma and Ceylon did not, as a rule, support American resolutions, but abstained. The diplomacy of these states proposed two resolutions on the “Hungarian question”, in which the main emphasis was placed on the need to withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. A total of 13 resolutions were adopted on the “Hungarian question”. They demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the admission of UN observers to the country, the holding of UN-controlled elections, the cessation of deportations of Hungarian citizens, and so on. Until January 1, 1957, the “Hungarian question” was raised three times, and the last, fourth discussion in plenary took place on January 910, 1957. It ended with the adoption of a resolution establishing a special committee consisting of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, which was instructed to “conduct indirect monitoring in Hungary and elsewhere”.

Soviet diplomacy paid special attention to characterizing the position of Moscow's allies at the UN It was emphasized that Poland, although it voted against the American resolutions, “behaved passively” during the discussion of the “Hungarian question”. On the issue of US interference in the internal affairs of people's democracies, the Polish representative spoke against “any interference”, without mentioning Washington. At the meetings of the delegat ions of the people's democracies, the Poles held “somewhat apart”, although in general, they did not occupy negative positions, and they had the closest relations with the Yugoslav delegation. The Yugoslavs abstained from voting on the “Hungarian question”, but their speeches often gave “Westerners” additional reasons for “anti-Sovietism”.

The XII session of the UN General Assembly (September 17-December 14, 1957) began to work in more favorable international circumstances. At the end of the session, the US delegation tried to re-launch the discussion on the “Hungarian issue” in connection with the report of the UN Special Representative Prince Wan Waithayakon (Thailand). The latter said that he had failed to do anything to implement the resolution of the XII session of the Assembly on the “Hungarian question” in connection with the Soviet and Hungarian position of boycott [11].