All-estate military draft and the Caucasus in the Russian government policy

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All-estate military draft and the Caucasus in the Russian government policy

S.N. Rudnik

Annotation

A universal conscription system was introduced in Russia in 1874. For thirteen years special rules regulating enrollment of Caucasian peoples had been discussed by the government. With regard to this issue, eight special committees, commissions and sub-commissions were formed in St Petersburg and Tiflis; a number of meetings were held; and numerous notes and projects were written. The article analyzes the process of discussion of this complex and understudied topic in the government circles and Caucasian administration in addition to numerous projects and proposals related to these rules. It is notable that encouraging the highlanders of Caucasia to serve in the Russian army, St Petersburg tried to achieve several goals: firstly, to use their experience as excellent soldiers in the service in Caucasia; secondly, to ease the burden of military service in the inner provinces of Russia, and, finally, to quickly incorporate the peoples of Caucasia into the Russian Empire. As it was crucial to preserve the fragile stability in the region, the government approached the problem of conscription in Caucasia with great caution, considering the factor of ethnic, religious, and socio-cultural diversity of the region; the unstable situation there; the proximity of hostile Turkey; and the population's fear of recruitment. The abovementioned discussions resulted in the special rules approved by Alexander III in 1886. Thus, the peoples of Transcaucasia, and “the alien population of the Terek and Kuban regions” were required to serve. The Muslim population of Caucasia was exempt from service which was replaced by a special tax.

Keywords: military draft, the Caucasus, charter, recruits, conscription area, family lists, armed force, benefits, military tax.

Аннотация

Всесословная воинская повинность и Кавказ в правительственной политике России

С. Н. Рудник

В 1874 г. в России была введена всесословная воинская повинность. В течение 13 лет в различных правительственных кабинетах обсуждался вопрос об особых правилах для жителей Кавказа, на основе которых они могли быть привлечены к исполнению воинской повинности. За этот период в Петербурге и Тифлисе было образовано не менее восьми специальных комитетов, комиссий и подкомиссий, проведено несколько совещаний по этому вопросу, написаны сотни страниц различных записок и проектов. В статье анализируются этапы обсуждения этого сложного и малоизученного вопроса в правительственных кругах и Кавказской администрации, а также проекты и предложения, которые были представлены в ходе многолетнего обсуждения этих правил. Отмечается, что, привлекая горцев Кавказского края к службе в русской армии, Петербург стремился достичь несколько целей: использовать их опыт отличных воинов для службы на Кавказе в привычных для них условиях; облегчить тяготы воинской повинности для населения внутренних губерний империи и, наконец, как можно быстрее инкорпорировать народы Кавказа в Российскую империю. Поскольку было важно сохранить хрупкую стабильность в крае, к решению задачи распространения воинской повинности на Кавказский край верховная власть подошла максимально осторожно. При этом принимали во внимание сразу несколько факторов: этническое, религиозное и социокультурное разнообразие региона, нестабильную обстановку в совсем недавно замиренном крае, близость враждебной Турции, а также страх населения перед рекрутчиной. Итогом многолетних дискуссий стали особые правила, утвержденные царем 28 мая 1886 г. Согласно им, народы Закавказья, «а также инородческое население Терской и Кубанской областей» стали привлекаться к отбыванию воинской повинности. При этом мусульманское население Кавказа освобождалось от поставки новобранцев в войска, для них служба в армии заменялась особым налогом.

Ключевые слова: воинская повинность, Кавказ, устав, новобранцы, призывной участок, посемейные списки, дружина, льготы, воинский налог.

The main text

conscription caucasia army war

The introduction of the universal conscription in Caucasia is one of the most complicated aspects of the military reform of 1874, which demands an intensive study of numerous documents of various government agencies from a researcher. However, the discourse on this subject has not yet taken shape. During the Soviet period there were no special publications on this topic. Some scholars in their works focused on the voluntary service of Caucasian peoples in the Russian Army and their participation in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, provided a general outline of the introduction of universal conscription in Caucasia Megrelidze Sh. V. Zakavkazie v Russko-Turetskoi voine 1877-1878. Tbilisi, 1972. P. 107-110, 123124; Sanakoev M.P. Iz istorii boevogo sodruzhestva russkogo i osetinskogo narodov (XVIII -- early XX centuries). Tskhinvali, 1987. P. 141-142.. Other research works, including such a profound treatise as “Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza (konets XVIII v. -- 1917)” (the History of the Peoples of Northern Caucasia (late XVIII c. -- 1917)) mentioned the reform of 1874 only briefly. It should be noted that noteworthy that the problem lies in the absence of special studies dedicated to the draft of Caucasian males, in other words, conscription, which from 1874 on became universal in Russia.

At the same time, there is a body of research works providing insight into the military service of the representatives of Caucasian peoples in different military corps of the Russian Empire in the XIX -- early XX century.

The situation began to change at the turn of the century when alongside with the studies outlining the military topic in the Caucasus and featuring various aspects of the formation of voluntary national corps in the Russian army, irregular and militia forces, and the service of the representatives of Caucasian peoples and certain clans For example: Prokudin K.A. Gorskie narody Severnogo Kavkaza na gosudarstennoi sluzhbe v Rossiiskoi imperii (XIX century): diss.... kand. ist. nauk. Rostov-on-Don, 2013. P. 275; Bratsun E. V. Gortsy

Severo-Zapadnogo Kavkaza na voinskoi sluzhbe Rossii (late XVIII -- XIX centuries): diss.... kand. ist. nauk. Krasnodar, 2014. P. 26; Egorova V. P. Uchastie dagestanskikh polkov vo vneshnepoliticheskikh aktsiiakh Rossii v Srednei Azii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka (po materialam E. I. Kozubskogo) // Narody Severnogo Kavkaza na gosudarstvennoi sluzhbe Rossii: istoriia i sovremennost. Makhachkala, 2018. P. 106-113. in them, especially during the last Russo-Turkish war, the articles dwelling on the introduction of conscription in Caucasia appeared.

V. V. Lapin, a well-known expert in military history and the Caucasian war, was the first to address this issue in his review article, having summarized the problems faced by the authorities in the Caucasus region. Of these, the most significant one was determined by a “general anti-imperial trend” demonstrated by the region, by Caucasians' negative attitudes towards the draft, which they considered to be something “much more frightening” than other taxes and obligations,and by the fact that the “reasons which induced Caucasian people to fly to arms (self-defense, revenge for a kinsman, the improvement of social status, the seizure of booty, the role of a friend or a liegeman, the sacred war with the infidels) didn't accord with the principles which formed the basis of the regular army” Lapin V. V. Vvedenie vsesoslovnoi voinskoi povinnosti na Kavkaze (konets XIX -- nachalo XX vv.) // Vlast', obshchestvo i reformy v Rossii: istoriia, istochniki, istoriografiia. St Petersburg, 2007. P 505.. M. S. Arsanukaeva in her works covers the state-legal aspects of North Caucasian mountain peoples' eligibility for enlistment, especially in the Kuban and Terskaia provinces. She also places high emphasis on the military tax and the fee, paid by Caucasian Muslims to avoid “actual” military service Arsanukaeva M. S.: 1) Proekty vvedeniia voinskoi povinnosti na Severnom Kavkaze (70-80-e gg. XIX veka) // Aktualnye problemy rossiiskogo prava. 2009. No. 2. P 91-98; 2) Otbyvanie voinskoi povinnosti gortsami Severnogo Kavkaza (vtoraia polovina XIX -- nachalo XX vv.) // Pravo i gosudarstvo: teoriia i praktika. 2015. No. 12 (132). P 16-19..

To sum up, the introduction of conscription in Caucasia still remains a largely unexplored topic, as is the history of the universal conscription in the Russian Empire in general. Various aspects of its regional and national peculiarities, including Caucasia, require an in-depth study, careful reading of numerous reports and suggestions (“concerns” in the official jargon of the XIX century) and discussions on these issues at different levels of the imperial hierarchy of power. This is especially important as some works contain inaccuracies and mistakes. For example, it is claimed that according to the Manifesto of January 1, 1874, “the military service regulations applied to all the peoples of Caucasia without exception” Alieva S. I., Asker A. Voinskoe delo i musulmanskie narody Severnogo Kavkaza // Sovremennaia nauchnaia mysl'. 2013. No. 3. P. 26.. In actual fact, under the Ukase to the Ruling (Supreme) Senate of January 1, 1874, the new Charter of military service did not apply to some areas and “population groups”, including Transcaucasia and the “alien population of Northern Caucasia” Ustav o voinskoi povinnosti 1874 goda. S izmeneniiami, dopolneniiami, raz'iasneniiami i nastavleniiami k nemu po 1-e ianvaria 1879 goda. Moscow, 1879. P 7.. Another study argues that “in 1882, carrying out the order of Emperor Alexander III about an urgent need to subject the local population of Caucasia to proper military service,” Adjutant General prince A. I. Dondukov-Korsakov, the Caucasian military district commander, set up regional and provincial commissions to deal with this matter Arsanukaeva M. S. Proekty vvedeniia voinskoi povinnosti na Severnom Kavkaze (70-80-e gg. XIX veka). P. 93.. In reality, such commissions came into service only in 1883.

The prospected draft of the population of Northern Caucasia and Transcaucasia into the Russian army had been under the consideration of Petersburg authorities since the period of the “taming” of Northern Caucasia and the wars with Turkey and Persia. The government used the resources of local population both to achieve “military ends” and to “ensure internal security” O poriadke primeneiia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaziia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA). F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 65.. V. V. Lapin points out that “of all types of cooperation between the local population and the tsarist authorities the most widespread was the formation of national irregular military units in accordance with the terms of the treaties, which granted Russian citizenship to princes and free communities” Lapin V. V. Armiia Rossii v Kavkazskoi voine XVIII-XIX vekov. St Petersburg, 2008. P. 337.. During the wars with Persia and Turkey emergency voluntary corps, composed of the citizens of Transcaucasia (Georgian and Armenian squads), provided great assistance to the Russian Army. Moreover, the squads of Ossetins, Azerbaijanis, Kabardinians, Chechens, Ingushs, and all the peoples of Dagestan were also part of these auxiliary troops. In official documents such troops, made up of indigenous people, were referred to as militia. At the height of the Crimean War the overall strength of the Caucasian militia amounted to 30 000 people Ibid. P. 341..

As the peoples of Caucasia proved themselves to be excellent soldiers, the authorities spared no efforts to engage them in the military service. Thus, on April 5, 1864, Alexander II approved a Statute of the Caucasian committee “on the rights of the indigenous people of Caucasia who have voluntarily joined the regular army”. It was emphasized that the above-mentioned rules were introduced “only for a trial and applied to those indigenous people who” might have wished to serve the Empire outside the Caucasus region Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe Polozhenie o pravakh Kavkazskikh tuzemtsev, postupaiushchikh po dobrovolnomu zhelaniiu na sluzhbu v reguliarnye voiska. Polozhenie Kavkazskogo Komiteta, Vysochaishe utverzhdennoe 5 aprelia 1864 goda, ob'iavlennoe Senatu Voennym Ministrom // Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii (PSZ). Coll. 2. Vol. 39. Sect. 1. 1864. No. 40743. St Petersburg, 1867. P. 306-307..

On November 4, 1870, it was followed by the imperial command of Alexander II “on the extension of conscription to all estates in the state” Ob uchrezhdenii pri Voennom Ministerstve Kommissii dlia razrabotki i sostavleniia Polozhenii o lichnoi voennoi povinnosti v Imperii i Tsarstve Polskom i o zapasnykh, mestnykh i rezervnykh voiskakh i Gosudarstvennom opolchenii // PSZ. Coll. 2. Vol. 45. Sect. 2. 1870. No. 48871. St Petersburg, 1874. P. 420.. From that moment on, the plans of the authorities to introduce a universal conscription in Russia were made public. In October 1871, governor-general of Caucasia and commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Army Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich summoned senior army leaders of the region to Tiflis to discuss this issue and suggested that all of them had to submit in writing the ideas raised at the meeting Chernovik dokladnoi zapiski Loris-Melikova namestniku na Kavkaze po voprosu primeneiia k naseleniiu Kavkazskogo namestnichestva poveleniia ot 4/XI-1870 goda “O rasprostranenii priamogo uchastiia v voennoi povinnosti na vse sosloviia gosudarstva” // RGIA. F. 866. Op. 1. D. 56. L. 1..

In early January 1872, commander of the Terskaia province Adjutant General M. T. Loris-Melikov submitted such a report to the grand duke having expressed his concerns in it and pointing out that the introduction of conscription in the “Caucasian region among indigenous tribes would be... a measure hardly advisable and for the time being perhaps not even safe”. According to him, the first thing to be done was to decide whether to pursue the reform straight away or to pave the way for it, “subtly” accustoming the “population to the new idea of the army service”. M. T. Loris-Melikov's arguments stemmed from the certainty that the government would have to deal with masses of “unruly and still uncivilized people” Ibid. L. 2-4 ob., who, besides, were afraid of recruitment and hated it. He claimed that it was the hatred of the locals towards the draft that triggered the successful propagation of Muridism in Northern Caucasia. Despite the intertribal and religious animosity, the attempt of forcible recruitment could have resulted in the highlanders' joining forces against imperial authorities, in defense of the “privilege they particularly valued” promised by various senior officials. The implications of such a “universal movement” of Caucasian peoples against recruitment were difficult to foresee. Although M. T. Loris-Melikov was sure that Russia would never lose any of its acquisitions in Caucasia, “obtained at the cost of many sacrifices made in the course of 70 years”, he deeply feared the external implications of the resistance of mountain peoples, “substantial difficulties”, as he called them which “could have been exploited by unfriendly European powers”. Thus, the author of the paper believed that the success of the reform largely depended on the peaceful atmosphere for a few years (“at least five years”), both inside and outside the region, as in the case of a war most of the Caucasian army, which was unable to guarantee safety in the area, would have to be transferred to the borders of the Empire.

As for the intended results of the reforms, a “drastic and ill-timed measure”, M. T. Loris-Melikov was openly skeptical about it and believed that “the game was not worth the candle”, as the preliminary estimates of the Ministry of War indicated that Christian and Muslim populations of Caucasia taken together could not amount to more that 4000 recruits. He had no doubts that Caucasian recruits, scattered over different army units, unaccustomed to the new climate and unusual way of life and, what is more, consumed with hatred towards the service in the regular military forces, “in moral terms... would make up the most unreliable segment of the army” and, in addition, increased the number of fugitives Ibid. L. 3-7..

M. T. Loris-Melikov, who did not question the obligation of the population of Caucasia to protect the state “against the enemies and perform military service in times of peace”, came up with his own solution to this problem making reference to the already existing units -- the Dagestanskii and Kutaisskii (Dagestan and Kutaisi) irregular cavalry regiments and the Georgian infantry squad. In a nut shell, M. T. Loris-Melikov's suggestions came down to the following: to form Caucasian irregular cavalry and infantry units taking into consideration the “nature and propensities” of the population; to teach them the art of war in the same manner as in Cossack units uttering all the drill commands in the Russian language; to recruit “both native and Russian officers”; to maintain the same order of promoting to military ranks and awarding pensions and decorations as in other military units Ibid. L. 7 ob. -- 9 ob..

The commander of the Terskaia province calculated that after 15 years of the operation of the new Charter there would be 20 000 Caucasians serving in the army and about 40 000 transferred to the reserve. He adhered to the opinion that in times of peace, native army forces were to be used for protecting “message deliveries, guard maintenance, escorting of mail and transport when necessary, guard maintenance in prisons, and, finally, transfer of prisoners” Ibid. L. 11..

The paper of Loris-Melikov provided the basis for the report by governor-general of Caucasia Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich to the minister of war. The governor-general suggested putting off the introduction of conscription until lasting peace and stability were established in the region and recommended starting a gradual military training of the citizens of Caucasia to prepare them for the service in the regular army. One of the advocates of such a cautious incremental approach to this task was popular publicist R. A. Fadeev Lapin V. V. Vvedenie vsesoslovnoi voinskoi povinnosti na Kavkaze (konets XIX -- nachalo XX vv.). P. 506..

Historical literature holds an opinion that minister of war D. A. Miliutin “was a staunch supporter of the standardization of the service rules for all the imperial subjects since he considered the army to be a means of education and russification of the population” Ibid. P. 504.. Meanwhile, this position needs clarification. As an officer who had fought in Caucasia for more than 10 years D. A. Miliutin was well aware of the customs of highlanders and allowed for the possibility of their service in special local army units, in accordance with their “natural tendencies” Megrelidze Sh. V. Zakavkaze v Russko-Turetskoi voine 1877-1878. P. 108.. In the course of time his view on this issue underwent certain changes. This can be confirmed by an entry in his diary. In May 1883, D. A. Miliutin, who had already retired, had a rendezvous with Emperor Alexander III. During their twenty-minute conversation they touched upon the “sensitive issue of the implementation of the Statute of conscription with regard to the local population”. The former minister of war wrote in his diary that he “had drawn the attention of His Majesty to the risks of excessively harsh manner [measures] of handling this issue in favor of gradual approach” Miliutin D. A. Dnevnik. 1882-1890. Moscow, 2010. P. 84..

On January 1, a new Charter of military service was approved. As it has already been mentioned, the Charter did not apply -- temporarily or permanently -- to the peoples of Northern Caucasia and Transcaucasia, central Asia, and the north of Siberia due to their small numbers. From that moment on, the authorities engaged in the practical task of the compilation of the Statute of the subjection of Caucasian local population to universal conscription. To achieve this, it was necessary to consider the following basic factors: Caucasia was the home to two million males, of these -- 800 000 were of Georgian and Armenian origin, practiced Christianity, and for more than 50 years had had strong connections with Russia not through “the force of arms, but through voluntary submission”. The authorities believed it was possible to recruit around 600 000 Caucasian Muslims, albeit belonging to Sunni and Shia denominations and “separated by irreconcilable sectarian strife”, on the same terms as the Muslims of the Crimea, Volga region, and Ural, who had already joined the Russian army. Finally, half a million of Muslim highlanders were of “great value for the army due to their militant disposition, recent experience of warfare, and aggressiveness”, but at the same time -- the least reliable “politically”, “having a low level of civic consciousness and culture” O privlechenii k voinskoi povinnosti naseleniia Kavkazskogo kraia // RGIA. F. 573. Op. 6. D. 7277. L. 3-3 ob..

The first move was made in September 1874, when the authorities of Caucasia presented their “preliminary considerations”. Colonel of the General Stuff Kraevich collected relevant information and prepared a report, which by the order of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich was referred to minister of war Miliutin and “the governors of different areas of the region”. The representatives of local administration did not agree on this issue. With regard to conscription some of them suggested acting decisively, “adopting effective measures”. Others, on the opposite, taking into account negative attitudes of mountain-dwellers towards regular military service, called for caution and advocated “considerable deviation” from the Charter O poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaz'ia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 66.. In order to discuss the arising differences and develop a general view on the situation Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich summoned all the representatives of the Caucasian administration and a member of the Council of State, Adjutant General Prince G. D. Orbeliani. The outcome of the discussion was passed on to minister of war D. A. Miliutin, who in turn submitted his “ideas” to the emperor.

On September 3, 1875, the emperor granted his approval, having supported the champions of moderate and gradual approach, and pointed out that the implementation of the “universal conscription” had to be harmonized with the specificities and diverse interests of each people of Caucasia and their attitudes to military service in order “to avoid, if possible, any upheaval and disturbance of peace in the region”. The draft of local population into military service had to be carried out within the “native military units formed on permanent or temporary basis”. These special rules were of “provisional nature”, meant to allow for a gradual transition to the general rules of military service established in the empire. Finally, for reasons of economy, the emperor emphasized that the implementation of the Charter in Caucasia was expected “not to entail” any further expenses Ibid. L. 1..

To develop a detailed reform project in accordance with the imperial orders Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich summoned to the city of Tiflis a special committee composed of representatives of local administration and senior officers in the autumn of 1876. The decision was made to announce publicly the main principles of conscription in Caucasia to reassure the native population and to stop the spread of various “false rumors and groundless fears” Ibid. L. 66 ob.. However, the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 forced them to suspend the work on the project. During the war numerous militia (irregular) cavalry and infantry units were formed from Caucasian residents on a voluntary basis. Recruitment to irregular cavalry regiments, divisions, and infantry squads in general were regarded sympathetically. Thus, Dagestan, where it was planned to form only one regiment, happened to provide enough volunteers to fill three regiments. A large number of people also volunteered for the army in Georgia and Terskaia province Megrelidze Sh. V. Zakavkaze v Russko-Turetskoi voine 1877-1878. P. 112.. In total, during the war 251 cavalry and infantry hundreds (military units) were formed from the natives of Caucasia, all together more than 39 000 people O poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaz'ia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 65 ob.. All in all, according to the estimations of Soviet and pre-Revolutionary scholars, who used to study this issue, around 42 000 citizens of Caucasia and Transcaucasia participated in the war of 1877-1878 years Akiev Kh. A. Narody Severnogo Kavkaza v russko-turetskoi voine 1877-1878. Magas, 2009. P. 54..

A lot of sources focus on the fighting merits of Caucasian soldiers, their service to the Tsar and fatherland Ibid; Sanakoev M. P Iz istorii boevogo sodruzhestva russkogo i osetinskogo narodov (XVIII -- early XX); Idrisov M. M., Magomeddadaev A. M. Dagestantsy na sluzhbe Rossii v Russko-turetskoi voine 1877-1878 // Narody Severnogo Kavkaza na gosudarstvennoi sluzhbe Rossii: istoriia i sovremennost. Makhachkala, 2018. P. 114-120.. However, in the spring of 1877 a revolt broke out in Dagestan and Chechnia. It was so powerful that some Russian garrisons in Dagestan were besieged. By the autumn of 1877 the forces who had come to their rescue scattered the rebels over the villages and defeated them in quick succession Tkachenko D. S., Kolosovskaia T. A. Voenno-politicheskaia istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza XVI-XIX: fakty, sobytiia, liudi. Stavropol, 2009. P. 266-267..

The mutiny of the mountain peoples forced the authorities of St Petersburg to adjust their policies on the issue. On the conclusion of hostilities Governor-General Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich acknowledged that it would be more important first to “draft a new plan of the organization of the native forces” and only after its approval -- to establish commissions in the districts and provinces of Caucasia to develop regulations on conscription, “in accordance with the specific features of each of the native tribes” O poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaziia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 1 ob..

In early 1879, Major-General M. Ia. Shalikov asked local authorities whether it was reasonable to recruit “Russian or other non-native” people to the regular forces of Transcaucasia on the same basis and under the same rules as had been set for the indigenous population of the region. This also applied to the service in militia forces. Having obtained the data he needed, Shalikov wrote a note with detailed information on the number and composition of the native troops, “the order of staffing and the related costs” Ibid. L. 67.. In the January of 1889, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich submitted a special report to the minister of war based on the above-mentioned figures. According to it, it was proposed to form 11 infantry squads and 12 cavalry hundreds from the citizens of Transcaucasia and the highlanders of Northern Caucasia, totaling 6060 people. In times of peace, these forces were expected to serve “as cadres to furnish cavalry and infantry militia regiments in wartime”. These were to be reinforced by “hunters” (volunteers), aged 17-30 years, as well as by recruits drafted by lot to the active service for the term of two years. Other draftees were to be summoned annually for month-long military training organized by the above-mentioned units. Taking into account local conditions, the “multi-tribal” and “diverse” composition of the population of Caucasia, the grand prince suggested “considerable deviations from the general rules of the Charter”, granting additional concessions and deferments due to financial situation, education, and occupation. Alongside with other measures, it was proposed to offer local communities the freedom of choice with regard to “who would serve and who would go into reserves”; and to let the draftees draw lots not in the administrative centres but “in their own communities” Ibid. L. 1 ob. -- 2..

The suggestions of the governor-general of Caucasia were also considered at the Main Department of the Cossack troops and approved with minor revisions. On May 31, 1880, the emperor approved the “ideas” of the Caucasian authorities, taking into account the opinion and comments of the minister of war. In particular, D. A. Miliutin objected to the fact that the Statute of conscription in the region would be approved by the governor-general of Caucasia, as it ran contrary to the “common spirit” of legislation and the order of consideration and adoptions of additions to the Charter of 1874. In early 1881, Grand Prince Mikhail Nikolaevich with the purpose of the “comprehensive development of the project” ordered to establish a special committee, composed of nine different senior officials of the region and chaired by his assistant Adjutant General Prince L. I. Melikov, in Tiflis. At the first meeting of the committee a three-member sub-commission was established. Later in the same year it conducted several sessions. The second meeting of the committee took place on January 29, 1882. By that time the posts of the governor-general of Caucasia and the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army had been abolished. Instead of these two, new posts were introduced on November 22, 1881: those of the head of the civil administration of Caucasia and of the commander of the Caucasian military district. On January 1, 1882, by the imperial order Adjutant General Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Dondukov-Korsakov was appointed to both posts. Within 5 days after his appointment, the Ministry of war sought his assessment of this matter “as of a person with experience and a Caucasian veteran” Volkonskii N. A. Biografiia general-adiutanta, generala ot kavalerii, kniazia Aleksandra Mikhailovicha Dondukova-Korsakova. Tiflis, 1883. P. 1., accentuating a “pressing need for drafting the local population to a proper military service” O poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaziia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 67 ob..

After six months on August 14, 1882, Prince A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov submitted a special note to the minister of war, in which he had given a detailed account of his view on the matter, which differed markedly from the plan presented by Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich. Thus, instead of regular infantry squads and cavalry hundreds the new governor of the Caucasian region suggested the formation of native squads and cavalry regiments “as parts ofplastun (patrol and intelligence) battalions and cavalry regiments of the Terskaia Cossack army”. These units were expected to join “cavalry and infantry divisions located in Caucasia, the Caucasian rifle brigade, and the Terskaia and Kuban Cossack brigades”. Anticipating that the service rules for Christians and Muslims would differ, Prince A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov believed that it would be “utterly uncomfortable” for them to serve in one military unit and came up with the idea of forming separate units for the representatives of these religions in Caucasia. Moreover, he recommended creating a special cavalry regiment composed of the non-native population of the region (mostly of Russian sect members and German colonists) which could serve as reserve forces for the guard cordon at the border with Persia in Lenkoranskii district. The term of active service in regular militia units for those recruited by lot had to be extended to three years. According to Dondukov-Korsakov, that was the minimum period sufficient for the militiamen to receive necessary military training and learn the Russian language. A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov suggested establishing local commissions aimed at developing the reform. In order to “reassure the native population and to avoid the spread of various false rumors and groundless fears” governors and heads of provinces were recommended to announce to rules of the military service to the population Ibid. L. 2-2 ob..

Once again extensive correspondence was started between the regional administration and St Petersburg. In March 1883, Prince A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov received a “humble” report of the General Stuff “About the application of the rules of the Charter of military service to the population of the Caucasian and Transcaucasian regions”. The document included the suggestions of A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, and the opinion of the General Stuff. The military department emphasized the significance of universal conscription as a “binding element” of the “political unity of the State”. According to the General Stuff, the release (in the text “exemption”) of some “segment of the population” from this “universal sacred duty” would legitimize separatism, grant preferential treatment to the native population, and “jeopardize the amalgamation of different nationalities into one”. Realizing that “such exemption” from conscription would inevitably result in the “increasing pressure on the rest of the population of Russia”, the military department feared reasonable “complaints” from the residents of central provinces of the Empire.

In addition to the intended enhancement of the army by fresh “excellent forces”, their military enrolment had “important political implications”. Recruiting a “considerable number of mountain-dwellers” into the army, the authorities planned to clear them out of the most unstable areas of the region, thus, securing peace and tranquility in Northern Caucasia. Moreover, such a measure was likely to give an opportunity to reduce the number of regular troops accommodated there by using the spare military units “against the external enemy”.

The General Stuff expected all this to “help strengthen the imperial power and law and order in Northern Caucasia” as well as to “merge Caucasia with the rest of the country and bring the aliens of Caucasia to the level of the indigenous Russian population”. The establishment of a “separate native army” and allowing preferential treatment to the highlanders with regard to the military service, by contrast, could have adverse effect: “to intensify the isolation of this remote area” from the rest of Russia. Thus, being politically motivated, the General Stuff made a conclusion: the closer the rules of conscription in Caucasia would be to those applied all over Russia, “the sooner Caucasia would become a Russian territory not only by name”. It was expected that the transition to common “rules and provisions” of the military service would be gradual, and the adherence to special rules -- temporary O poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaziia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 4 ob..

For example, the military department found it appropriate not to form new units composed of native citizens, but to enroll them “in the existing regular troops on general grounds”. Although the department agreed with the arguments of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich and A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov, it believed such a step to be untimely due to the “cultural background” of Caucasian tribes, “different language, religion, food, clothes, and a very low level of civic development” and also expressed concerns about a prospective “undisguised resistance” of highlanders, particularly, the Muslims. For the same reasons (difference with the “Russian population in customs, language, food, and clothes”), the General Stuff suggested the draft of Transcaucasian Christians (the Georgians, the Imeritins, the Mingrelians, the Ghurians, and the Armenians) into special military units. Their allocation to ordinary regular troops was considered also “inappropriate” because they were supposed to serve for three years, while most of their counterparts “of the lowest ranks born in the inland areas of Russia” had to slog for five years. Such a situation would definitely breach a principle of justice pertaining to equal terms of service for all the people in the empire.

At the same time, the General Stuff placed high emphasis “on the imperative need” that the special units where Caucasians had to serve “at the beginning” had nothing to do with the “native army” and “remained Russian regular units”, as many others.

However, in contrast to the Caucasian authorities, the officials of St Petersburg believed that it was impossible to form such units simply by merging “native units into brigades, divisions, and corps together with the Russian forces and under one commander”. Russian non-commissioned officers, lance corporals, and representatives of lower ranks were expected to serve in the special units together with Caucasians. Thus, “the Russian cadre” could become a kind of an “interlink” between the natives and the army, an “intermediary” for them with regard to “all the aspects of military training and the Russian language”. In such units the ratio between Russian and Caucasian soldiers depended on the civic consciousness of the latter and the “level of their loyalty and allegiance to the government Ibid. L. 5 ob. -- 6..

Apart from this, the General Stuff considered it fair to extend “similar privileges and concessions” to the “non-native population” as well. As the document states, “otherwise, if on the same territories some people were allowed to enjoy privileges and some -- were not, such an order would be abnormal” Ibid. L. 5..

Eventually, on the basis of all the above-mentioned “considerations” the General Stuff presented its opinion consisting of 18 paragraphs. Caucasian population was intended to be recruited from 1884 with all the exemptions, deferments and privileges with the exception of the residents of Karskaia and Batumskaia provinces, the Black Sea district and Sukhumi district, who “had not yet recovered from the bitter consequences of the Turkish war”. They had been exempted from the military service until January 1, 1887. It was agreed not to recruit “until further notice” the citizens of the region beyond the Caspian Sea “who had recently been incorporated into Russia”. In order to draw up the provisions on the “privileges and exemptions from the common rules of the Charter” of 1874 the administrative centers of the Caucasian region had to establish the commissions “as soon as possible” including in them, if necessary, some local residents. As it has already been mentioned, Caucasian recruits were assigned to serve for three years. This point did not require any amendments to the Charter as it had already been provided for the right of the military department to “transfer to reserve the representatives of the lower ranks” before the termination date of service set earlier (article 21) Ustav o voinskoi povinnosti Vysochaishe utverzhdennyi 1 ianvaria 1874 // Reformy Aleksandra II. Moscow, 1998. P. 340.. One more concession to the citizens of Transcaucasia and Northern Caucasia was the decision to halve the annual number of draftees. Finally, the General Stuff proposed to assign Caucasian draftees to the troops of the Caucasian military region so that they could serve close to home “enlisting them, if possible, into the units located in the same provinces and areas where they came from O poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaziia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 9-9 ob..

Emperor Alexander III approved of the suggestions of the General Stuff as temporary, transitional solutions and entrusted the commanders of the troops of the Caucasian military region with the tusk of drafting the rules on the extension of the universal conscription law to the population of Caucasia by December 1, 1883 Ibid. L. 1.. In this regard, the authorities of Caucasia ordered to issue a special announcement which had to be translated into the languages of the native tribes, to be printed and made public. Special commissions, chaired by the governors of provinces and heads of territories were established to discuss all the relevant issues: in Tiflis (for Tiflis and Kutaisi provinces, Sukhumi region and Zakatalskii region), Elizavetpol (for Elizavetpol and Baku provinces), Erivani, TemirKhan-Shure, Vladikavkaz, and Stavropol O poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkaziia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 191. L. 68.. The commissions were obliged to inform the General Stuff about their work every month.

In April 1883, head of the administration of Caucasia Prince A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov set up a special commission “for preliminary consultations” chaired by the head of the central administration Lieutenant-General D. S. Staroselskii. The Commission (among whose members were Lieutenant-General V. N. Trotskii, the head of the Transcaucasian military region, his assistant Major-General M. M. Tomilov, senior officials and governors of Caucasia) conducted four meetings and the conclusions drawn by it formed the framework for further discussion which took place on April 28 at the Committee led by Prince A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov himself. The highest echelon of the military, all the governors and senior officials of the region took part in it -- all together 16 people. А. М. Dondukov-Korsakov “gave them all a chance to speak out”. The records of the discussion were handed over to local commissions for further consideration. Contrary to the previous instructions, the members of the Committee, as the members of the consultative Commissions before them, did not dare inform the population about the conscription. This step was considered untimely due to the concerns about the “hyper-emotional” “native population” of Caucasia, which allegedly could easily fall prey to “malicious” provocateurs “who could spread rumors, stir up discontent and fear, thus giving rise to “undesirable, disastrous consequences” Ibid. L. 68 ob..

In the early May of 1883, Commander-in-chief of Caucasia Prince A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov in his “special secret letters” attracted the attention of governors and heads of the territories of the region, who supervised the commissions, to the political aspect of the issue. The prince appealed to their prudence and asked them not to conduct a population census of any kind in order to estimate the number of draftees, to “store in the utmost secrecy” a copy of the report of the General Stuff and to inform him candidly and “as often as possible” about the local population's response (“especially about the reaction of Muslims”) to the forthcoming conscription during the commissions. Wishing to have precise and detailed information about the “attitudes of the people”, A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov provided instructions to his subordinates: “Both in style and presentation your reports should look like private letters, but strictly confidential and addressed to me, marked: “to be delivered in person” Ibid. L. 68 ob. -- 69..

All the proposals sent to the central Committee by local commissions were put together into one “collection of documents”. In order to study it and prepare the draft version of the law on conscription in Caucasia Prince A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov established a sub-commission on the basis of the Central Committee headed by commander of the native troops of the Caucasian military region Major-General V. V. Gurchin the first.

The next stage of the development and preparation of the law were two special meetings in Tiflis on September 28 and 30, 1883. At the end of the same year, A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov set up a special central committee “aimed at the thorough review of the work of local commissions”. He presided over all the meetings, among whose participants were the administrative elites of Caucasia and the military district, namely: assistant of the Head of the civil administration in Caucasia Adjutant-General S. A. Sheremetev, commander of the Caucasian military district headquarters Lieutenant-General V. N. Trotskii, various officials, governors of provinces and cities, corps commanders, division commanders, brigade commanders as well as several honorary mountain dwellers of the Terskaia province -- all together 28 people. In October 1883, Major-General Nikolai Ivanovich Petrov, a recently appointed governor of Astrakhan and a nakaznoi (appointed by the authorities) ataman of the Astrakhan Cossack army, was seconded to the central Committee by the Ministry of War. In the military circles he had a reputation of an experienced professional, a connoisseur of the Charter of 1874, as well as of all the amendments and supplements to it, a person who was directly involved in the extension of the conscription to the alien population of different territories of Russia Po otnosheniiu voennogo ministra o poriadke primeneniia pravil ustava o voinskoi povinnosti k naseleniiu Zakavkazia i k inorodtsam Severnogo Kavkaza // RGIA. F. 1292. Op. 4. D. 190. L. 1 ob. -- 2 ob..

On November 18, 1883, the invited “officers, mountain dwellers renowned for their service in the Russian Army and commitment to the government, namely: Major-General Kaisum Anzorov (a Kabardinian), Aru Chermoev (a Chechen) and Prince Gamzaev (a Kumyk)”, spoke at the meeting in Tiflis. M. S. Arsanukaeva in her article, drawing on the documents from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, gave a detailed account of their view on the application of the Charter of military service to the Muslim population of Terskaia province. They generally agreed on the following: mountain dwellers “except in a few cases” were not ready to perform military service in accordance with the prospective Statute since after the Caucasian war “within just twenty years or so they have had to undergo unprecedented reforms which usually need centuries of preparation”. “Give us some time, -- claimed General Anzorov, -- for our people to get used to all this, to get settled, and after that they will be able to accept calmly all the newly introduced obligations and even the most hateful one, the conscription. The general pointed out that at the time the mountain peoples “could not put up with the idea of the compulsory rather than voluntary conscription”, with the idea of a service, “modeled on a regular troops pattern <...> on a par with other subjects of the empire”. There was also a warning that highlanders “concerned about their identity” might choose to relocate to Turkey.

Generals Anzorov and Chermoev and Major Gamzaev believed that in order to introduce the conscription successfully in Terskaia province it was necessary to let all those who wished it (“the restless ones”) move to Turkey and to extend the conscription to other mountain peoples without “any temporary exemptions from the Charter” Arsanukaeva M. S. Proekty vvedeniia voinskoi povinnosti na Severnom Kavkaze (70-80-e gg. XIX veka). P. 94-95..

The generals touched upon a very sensitive issue for both the mountain dwellers and the central authority -- the problem of hijra -- the relocation of some peoples of Northern Caucasia outside the country, above all, to Turkey. The topic of hijra has been the focus of many studies of the researchers of Caucasus For example: Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia borba narodov Severnogo Kavkaza i problemy mukhadzhirstva. Materialy Vsesoiuznoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii, 24-26 October, 1990. Nalchik, 1994; Ibragimova Z. Kh. Emigratsiia chechentsev v Turtsiiu (60-70 gg. XIX v.). Moscow, 2000.. This problem was first faced by the Russian authorities after the conquest of the North Caucasus in the 1850s-1860s. “The reasons for this exodus of the mountain dwellers to Turkey were numerous and intricately intertwined; these included some external and internal political interests of the Russian government, the specific features of the development of mountain dwellers' communities, religious discontent etc" The authorities were eager to “dispose” of the unruly persons and repopulate the vacated lands with the Cossacks and Russian settlers. The Turkish authorities, in turn, actively campaigned for the relocation among the highlanders of Caucasia: spreading leaflets, calling for “Muslim brotherhood”, promising various benefits and privileges, and threatening the remaining people with serfdom, forced Christianization, and recruitment Tkachenko D. S., Kolosovskaia T. A. Voenno-politicheskaia istoriia Severnogo Kavkaza XVI-XIX vv. P. 251-253..