The US-Philippines cooperation in combating international terrorism: directions, results and tasks ahead

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Introduction

Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, business men and women, military and federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong.

Nowadays our perception of the world and each nation has been the supporting system of everyday life, whether it be in the socially constructed or politically shaped domains. These views find merit in the construction of modern government stability and its continued peaceful and stable existence. Here, nationalism, national image, pride and identity are shaped by recent and past events in the history of the modern society, its successes and struggles. Events that tamper the historical landmarks and the national perception of a nation tend to ruin this identity. Thus, the events of 9/11 and the destruction of the Twin Towers, the symbols of development, prosperity and strength, have not only been an attempt to interfere with lives and infrastructure of the United States of America, but it was an explicit attack on ideology, beliefs and customs, which if brought together, shape the social, cultural and even political aspect of the life of every United States citizen.

As the weeks went by and life resumed, as much as it was possible, in its normal manner, it was inevitable to realise that the war on terror became public. Surely, for many citizens this meant almost nothing. However, many authorities felt the inevitable change. For example, the new Department of Homeland Security which was created in the aftermath of the 9/11 event, moved the investigation further away from the event itself, the attackers and their accessories, but focused more towards finding out how terrorist organisations are formed, how they operate and how they find sponsors. Creating this wide network of efforts for providing security and protection to the US soil showed an awareness of the costly nature of attacks not only on their citizens' lives but also national pride. Efforts both nationally and internationally depicted US influence worldwide. In the US, security efforts ranged from identifying suspects to bringing alleged terrorists to justice. Internationally, the US government organised numerous operations and sent a great number of armed forces to allies that showed sympathy to their cause. Information analysis was the main tool for prevention. Relief measures and diplomatic activities were aimed at supporting the war on terror.

This dissertation will question the extent to which measures adopted by the US and the Philippines in combating international terrorism have succeeded or failed in achieving their overall goal - reducing the threat of terrorism on the territory of sovereign countries, in this case the Philippines, as well as worldwide. It will begin with a review of the literature which examines whether international terrorism links exist, thus questioning the legitimacy of declaring Southeast Asia the “second front” of the war on terror. The next chapter will focus on the chosen methodology.

This will be followed by a theoretical framework looking at neorealism as the US' main ideological drive in its upcoming war by discussing theories on the nature of the international system, alliances, balance of power, balance of threat and offensive capabilities.

Using the chosen theories and methodology, I will suggest “good-measure” criteria according to US' neorealism. After providing background information on the transition from national liberation to terrorism, the dissertation will conclude with a case study of US' Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) and examine whether the Operation fits the “good-measure” criteria. In the discussion part, an analysis of the suitability of such measure in the Philippines will be conducted. This will be done by looking at data on terrorist activity as well as data on the current living condition in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the Philippines as a whole.

1. Literature review

Introduction.

Contrary to a wide range of scholarly opinions, terrorism is not an issue of the 21st century. Terrorism within the United States and abroad had shaped long before the landmark events of 9/11 took place. However, prior to 9/11 terrorism was not an issue of global value. The United States, for example, treated terrorism as a criminal act prosecuted under the U.S. Constitution and within the boundaries of the U.S legal system. Terrorism itself was not the predominant national security concern for the Clinton or the Bush administrations before 9/11 (Kean & Hamilton, 2004).

After the Cold War, the disbelief in terrorism's large scale impact on US homeland security led the US government and institutions such as the CIA and the Department of Defence to disregard any terrorist threat and neglect enhancing their capabilities. Their inaction was further strengthened by a refusal to engage in direct combat with Al-Qaeda which at the beginning of the 21st century would prove to be one of US' most threatening foreign enemies (Ibid.). However, after 9/11 by naming Southeast Asia the “second front” of the war on terror, a change of strategy was shown by both the Bush administration and Arroyo's government (Gershman, 2002).

Islamic militant groups in the southern Philippines have in fact presented an issue for decades but the issue of counter-terrorism in the Philippines as well as the necessity and justification behind the “new kind of war” is scrutinised. Opinions vary but two main aspects of US motivation leave scholars dissatisfied with how issues were handled. Acharya & Acharya (2007) initially disapproves of any radicalism in the Philippines due to the different nature of Islam in the Middle East and the Philippines as well as the lack of international links between terrorist groups, but hints on a potential motive behind US policies - domination. De Castro (2009) further expands on this idea by referring to China's rise as a predominant motivation for the US' actions. However, nowadays it is unquestionable that such radicalisation exists partially caused by a conflict escalation between the Muslim Mindanaoans and the US and Philippine governments due to the increased militarisation of the islands. Both issues will be discussed in detail.

1.1 Is the “second front” justified?

terrorism militant islamic international

As mentioned, Acharya et al (2007) critiques the interpretation of the issues by both governments and further challenges the feasibility and necessity of calling Southeast Asia the “second front” in the war on terror. Their main arguments are firstly, there are no conceptual and operational links between Southeast Asia and the Middle East; secondly, the Islam of Southeast Asian countries is more moderate in nature due to India's influence; finally, the labelling of Southeast Asia is a move towards Washington's entrenchment of military and economic supremacy on a regional and international scale (Ibid. p.86). These issues make us reconsider the justification behind and especially the feasibility of the mutual efforts of the United States and the Philippines on countering international terrorism; whether those were explicitly made in order to provide the cooperation needed to combat this widespread phenomenon. If we consider the above argument as logical, it could easily be concluded that counter-terrorism cooperation between the US and the Philippines is unnecessary due to the lack of connection between the Filipino insurgency and international terrorist groups. However, a stronger case is made proving the contrary.

First of all, contrary to Acharya et al (2007), many scholars believe that Southeast Asia in general and precisely US-Philippines relations and their efforts to counter terrorism are important. This is a result of past operational links between the guerrilla group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) with the internationally recognised terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Currently, such links exist between the ASG, Maute Group (MG) and ISIS, the most imminent threat to US homeland security. Such links, Lee (2009) argues, were seen not only in the military training provided by Al-Qaeda but also in the financial support awarded to the terrorist organisation in the past. Nowadays, constant pledges to ISIS show its indisputable influence in the Southeast Asian region.

Gunaratna (2016) strongly believes that in present day ISIS (a.k.a Daesh) is robustly looking towards Southeast Asia and the Philippine islands, especially Mindanao, as a possible epicentre of Daesh activity and the proclamation of wilayat, a Daesh satellite state. This event was followed by an announcement in January 2016 by Daesh through its official channel Al-Naba on the official unification of its groups of God's fighters “mujahidin” where four established groups would be led by Isnilon Hapilon - the leader of the ASG in Basilan and the future Islamic State in the Philippines (Samuel, 2016). The growing links between the national and international terrorist groups are the main reason the US-Philippine cooperation in the fight against international terrorism should hone in on home-grown terrorism. This should be done by reducing radicalisation and increasing economic opportunities in Mindanao and other Philippine Islands. Even though in the past links between Philippine and Middle Eastern organisations were difficult to establish, nowadays, public pledges were made by terrorist groups in the name of ISIS (Blanchard & Humud, 2017).

Secondly, it is controversial whether Islam practiced in Southeast Asia is radical or more moderate. Even though in the past Southeast Asia tended to be secular, nowadays changes could be seen due to the emergence of fundamentalism in the region through the Salafiyyah movement (Salafi movement) and especially the neo-Salafists who seek to return Islam to its purest form, dating back to Prophet Mohammad. Their main argument was that an ideational threat to Islam exists in Christianity, Zionism and secularism (Ramakrishna, 2003).

Unlike in Malaysia and Indonesia in the past, extremism in the Philippines did not have such widespread links. Rather than linked to religious ideology, Moro's fight was sparked by the poor economic conditions in the region, ethnic separation, and discrimination (Helfstein, 2009). This radicalism-free nature of Moro ideology marked the uniqueness of the issues observed in the Philippines. However, with the emergence of ASG, extremist jihadist ideology entered the territory of the Philippines through Janjulani's connection to Osama Bin Laden, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayaaf, and Ramzi Yousef who introduced jihad to the former and created training camps of the Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the southern islands. As Helfstein (2009) argues links between jihad and insurgent groups were easily established once international terrorist group leaders realised how intensifying and abusing local grievances could drive the appeal for an Islamic state, strengthen Islamic Ideology and ease its legitimation throughout the young Filipino generation (Samuel, 2016).

Finally, it is contested whether the US was genuinely interested in providing support to the Philippines in the war on terror or whether it was a pretext to increase the power that had been lost during the previous decade. In the past, both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, as well as their governments, recognised the stabilising role rather than the dominating manner of the US presence in Southeast Asia. This is realised through the assistance it gives in fighting radicals through training cooperation, intelligence provision and financing. The behaviour of the US has not created any anti-US coalitions within Southeast Asia and within any of its Islamic states (Capie, 2004). However, questions occur as to why development of radicalism in the Philippines is still observed. De Castro (2009) considers that the US-Philippine relationship is exemplary of how a security assistance of a strong state can influence the internal and external politics of a weaker state. A more striking issue to consider is Washington's agenda on the accumulation of power against its enemies. Both Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu (2001) and De Castro (2009) argue, the increase in military training and deployment in the Philippines was a facade, intended to mask its initial purpose - countering China. This militarisation left the issues of Muslim insurgency to shift towards radicalism due to measure inadequacy, insecurity and peace process failure.

1.2 China's rise as a motive

Historically since independence, the relationship between the Philippines and the US has been stable, leading to the ratification of treaties intended on strengthening the influence of the US in the region, providing regional security and enhancing Philippine Armed Forces' (AFP) capabilities. Such was the short term positioning of two US military bases: The Clark Air Base and the Subic Naval Base. Regardless of the agreed time period, the closure of those bases in 1991 led to deterioration of relations and the decrease in military assistance linked to Philippines' lack of strategic importance without the bases. The end of the Cold War and the decline of terrorist incidents after 1991(Muhlhausen & McNeill, 2011) marked the presumed unnecessary military intervention and forces enlargement in Southeast Asia, which would end the “American-led-security network in Asia” (Baylis, 2008).

However, at the end of the 20th century US-Philippine alliance reassessment followed after speculations about the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific emerged, thus leading the two allies to predominantly focus efforts on counter-balancing China in the region (De Castro, 2009). The Indo-Pacific or the Asia-Pacific, in general, was considered one of the richest resources for international trade, economic development, and influence (Rahman, 2011). The rise of China and its territorial claims in the South China Sea were perceived as a threat to US domination in Asia and the obstruction of peace due to Chinese threats to use force (Ibid. 3). Those issues are best explained by Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu (2001) who argue that even though Chinese domination in the region could not have ensured enormous political and economic gains, the actual use of force in securing its position could have been a violation of the principle of non-use of force and international law (Ibid. 70). Considering the US' adherence to such principles, it is not surprising that a potential threat was perceived.

Furthermore, during this period, the Philippine government glanced over the issue of improving its military in order to protect its territories if such disputes would arise. Even though there have been many issues and signs of Chinese encroachment in the Spartly Islands, the efforts of the government fell short of providing the necessary security. This, Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu (2001) argue, is due to the low military expenditure, which, regardless of the budget enlargement, was not enough to secure Philippines' military domination over the Chinese marines. In fact, if looked in PHP, the expenditure has risen, but in USD, in 1998 the expenditure fell from $1.5 billion to $1.2 billion in just two years. Those obstacles had left the Philippines at that time lacking in modern military facilities, capable of independently defending Philippine waters around the Spartly islands (Ibid. 49-50). The US used the portrayal of a war on terror to justify their actions, for extra deployment in the region, arm transfers and greater involvement in strengthening military capabilities in Southeast Asia and especially the Philippines. This regional instability and jurisdictional issues in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines were heavily presented as a potential security threat. Furthermore, an indirect link to the spread of terrorism and the decrease of maritime security was created due to inability to conduct naval operations in pursuit of maritime criminals and terrorists (Goddard, 2011, p. 26).

1.3 Quantity vs. Quality of measures

Regardless of their motives, the US and the Philippines have worked together both on a military and humanitarian level. Various military exercises, regulations and agreements were conducted since the inauguration of the former Filipino president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. However, bilateral measures possess both quantitative and qualitative value.

In terms of quantity, the operations themselves should have been able to fulfil their intended purpose due to the frequency of expansion, development and support of the military capabilities. For example, annual Balikatan military training exercises under Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines were developed in order to not only eliminate indigenous terrorists but to also prevent the Philippines from becoming terrorists' safe haven (Banlaoi, 2010). This training which saw its end in recent years, aimed at providing Philippines military with the necessary skills and training to fight both Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In February 2002, 600 US troops were sent to the Philippines for the exercises but by April, the number increased to over 6000 troops. This in itself led to the creation of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF-P) which was situated on the island of Basilan where the ASG was allegedly holding captive several US citizens (RAND, 2016) and then transferred to more parts of the Philippines including Manila (Ryan, 2011). JSOTF-P was responsible for the undertaking of the Operation and a special Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATFF) reporting was created due to growing concerns of any potential links between terrorism and piracy, which could lead to disastrous attacks (Tan, 2011).

The fight against both Al-Qaeda and ISIS has not been linear. Therefore, scholarly opinions on the quality of the operations vary. The success of the recruitment and the military strength of the terrorist groups could be seen as failure in the mutual efforts of the US and the Philippines in the fight against terrorism and the gaps in their mutual efforts. However, the weakening of organisations such as the one observed in the case of ASG and the MG could be presumed a success. For example, scholars conclude that the increase in number of military operations, training and deployment have in fact been successful due to a slowdown in the number of attacks in the case of ASG and Al-Qaeda (Lum & Niksch, 2007). However, this does not mean that the issue has been resolved. In this case, only the surface has been trimmed but the roots are still rotting. An estimate from 2012 shows that the number of returning Southeast Asian foreign fighters recruited, which were trained in Syria and Afghanistan in spreading propaganda, is not decreasing. (Gunaratna, 2016).

1.4 Identifying the weaknesses of the literature

Although between 2001-2015 a large variety of descriptive literature exists speculating the motives behind US-Philippine engagement in the war on terror and making general assessments, almost nothing had been written on evaluating the quality and the success of those operations since the end of OEF-P in 2015. This literature gap needs to be addressed by a variety of scholarly work looking at the current state of the Islands after 10 years of involvement and providing systematic changes or structured alternatives to the US' approach. Regardless of the importance of the motives, it is vital to assess the effect of the Operation on society and terrorist activity in order to determine whether such operations should be deployed in the Philippines or in different locations in the future.

Ambiguity still remains. Do the increase in military operations and the dispersion of groups lead to success? Does the actual possibility of recruitment yet again pose a threat by potentially strengthening the “dispersed” organisation? Due to the fact that sometimes military success can be obstructed by economic hardships, success is a combination between counter-terrorism and the development of the affected parts of the islands. This shift from military to non-military actions or the balance between both could potentially achieve weaker operational links due to the lack of recruitment opportunities for terrorist organisations. By addressing some of the causal factors that drive Philippine insurgents towards radicalisation and abandoning their initial beliefs, the links could be severed. However, it is important to examine whether such success was achieved after the termination of the OEF-P.

2. Hypothesis and Methodology

2.1 Hypothesis

With regards to this research question, the hypotheses under consideration are:

Hypothesis 1: The measures adopted by both the US and the Philippines in combating international terrorism are mostly offensive. Therefore, they fit the neorealist perspective of what governments need to do when posed with a threat. However, in practice they are incompatible with the root causes of terrorism in the Republic of the Philippines which predisposes the creation of home-grown terrorist groups and their affiliation with international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.

Hypothesis 2: More programs and funding linked to the economic, educational and cultural development of the Moro regions would obstruct recruitment paths for organisations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS due to an increase in economic opportunities for the inhabitants. This would decrease the need to explore alternative ways of financial support.

2.2 Methodology

The two methods to be applied in this dissertation are case study and process tracing. These methods will be used in order to fully comprehend both the historical background and the development in the cooperation between the US and the Philippines in combating terrorism. Therefore, the four main objectives are:

1. Identify the most vital measures or operations already adopted by both governments throughout the Arroyo, Aquino III and Duterte administrations and their nature which shape the direction of US-Philippines policy.

2. Critically evaluate the aims and objectives as well as the proportionality to the nature of the societal concerns in the Philippines in light of the theoretical framework of this paper.

3. Examine any visible issues and changes, or the lack of, in the administrations concerning the war on terror.

4. Develop recommendations and determine the tasks ahead on any alternative route that could be adopted in the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

A valuable part for the success of this research is associated with objective 2 and 3: firstly, examining the historical background of the issues and the theoretical framework will enable me to provide a systematic outline of the main issues that surround those measures and their proportionality. Secondly, the opportunity to examine any visible changes, or the lack of, will enable me to propose recommendations later. The case study method is inevitably the most reliable way for gathering necessary information for evaluation by focusing on “why” and “how” (Yin, 2014, p.11). Even though a historical background of the development of the Moro ethnicity and the most important international groups is provided, this will be done briefly. The main sources are the texts of Cesar Abid Majul, a Filipino historian who has focused his work on the history of Islam in the Philippines, and other scholars who trace the development of insurgent and terrorist groups in the Philippines. The paper will focus on the historical background only as a tool for providing a clearer idea of the nature and development of the fundamental issues of the Moro society. Furthermore, as mentioned in the literature review section terrorism is not just an issue of the 21st century it dates back beyond September 11th, 2001. However, due to an intensification of relations between both countries observed after 9/11, this paper will consider 2001 as the starting point of the case study. I intend to provide a better understanding of the directions of US-Philippines cooperation, the issues and the potential enhancement of their cooperation through different types of measures.

The second method would provide the best results in identifying the success rate of the mutual measures. In order to do this, process tracing will be applied as a “systemic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator. Process tracing can contribute decisively both to describing political and social phenomena and to evaluating causal claims” (Collier, 2011, p. 823).

Regardless of its initial creation for the field of historical research, process tracing can nowadays be used in political and social sciences as well. It attempts to “go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys)” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013) and “attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bernett, 2005, p. 206-7). Therefore, what it tries to answer is the question, “How did we get here?” (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 314). In this paper and in the case study, X will be the measures adopted by the governments such as military measures and non-military/humanitarian measures. Y will be their proportionality, success or failure in combating international terrorism.

After being challenged with the selection of the theory which will examine whether X causes Y in Z circumstances (Mahoney, 2012), the theory must be tested and process tracing is the most suitable method due to its qualitative character. In order to conduct a successful process tracing I have focused on a specific theoretical school and its explanation of different issues relating to security and state behaviour such as balance of power, security dilemma and offensive capabilities.

Due to its historical heritage, process tracing requires a considerable amount of knowledge and understanding of key historical events. Therefore, in order to adequately test the constructed theory, the researcher needs to follow all events chronologically. In order to accomplish this concise understanding, different books, journals, reports and documents were drawn upon most of which refer to the disproportionality of counter-terrorism measures due to the lack of account for the economic, political and religious nature of the issue in question. However, regardless of the variety of literature on the historical development and some periodic accounts, there is a lack of sources on the OEF-P after its termination. One of the main sources that I base my analysis and discussion on is the official 2016 RAND report by Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston and Gillian S. Oak (RAND, 2016) which focuses on evaluating OEF-P's success. The report mostly criticises the disproportionality between the adopted military and humanitarian measures as well as the lack of coordination between different units, part of the JSOT-P. However, greater issues exist. Therefore, I compare its strategies, goals, objectives and findings to different material on the terrorist groups' activity as well as data on the current economic and political situation in the ARMM. This will provide a deeper insight on any issues and potential ways of enhancing bilateral cooperation which will consider not only military, but also societal hardships.

3. Theoretical Framework

The following will provide an understanding of the theoretical basis of the formation, development and future of the US-Philippine relationship and their struggle to combat international terrorism. Different aspects of this relationship need to be examined, e.g. the structure of the international system and states' main objectives, alliance formation and balance of power.

There are various theories that seek to explain state behaviour in the face of a threat. However, none of them are absolute due to their incomplete nature, the potential gap between theory and practice, and complex state behaviour. The above-mentioned issues are closely intertwined and best explained by Waltz's defensive neorealism and Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism. Those theories perfectly explain US' behaviour towards potential adversaries and when faced with a security threat. Furthermore, both emanate from a scarce number of theories that try to encompass wide variety of issues such as the nature of the international system when theorising state behaviour.

These theories will only provide a base for understanding the US approach towards the Philippines and the measures adopted when faced with the challenge of international terrorism. They will be of assistance when creating an evaluation criterion for what constitutes a good counter-terrorism measure. The applicability of this criterion to the measures adopted by the US will be discussed and their suitability will be assessed in the discussion section.

3.1 Neorealism and the International system

This section will focus on one of the most important pieces in international relations theory and neorealism in general - Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) and its implications for the nature of the international system for state interaction and state behaviour. It is important to firstly examine the international system and the role it awards states and their adversaries by looking at issues such as sovereignty and self-help. This will be done in order to clearly identify the link between state behaviour and state measures adopted in the fight against international terrorism.

According to Waltz, the two most important features of the international system are its anarchical nature and its structure-like form developed by the coaction of its units. Waltz holds that within a system or structure, the theory could help us in tracking reoccurrences and repetitions; they help us in explaining some important and continuous patterns (Waltz, 1979, p.60). Regardless of the lack of intent for the creation of this structure, the unavoidable state coexistence leads to its emergence. Thus, the international system, unlike other structures, is spontaneously generated and unintended, which leaves it unaccountable for the existence, prosperity or extinction of its units. Waltz does not intend to argue that states are the only actors in the international arena. However, he is bold in declaring that a structure of a system is not defined by all the actors involved in the system but only the major ones - in this case states (Waltz, 1979, p.93). This leaves states as the main actors to care alone for their own survival thus adhering to the system of self-help (Ibid. 91).

The framework of self-help and “like units”, Waltz later on defends by making it synonymous to the concept of sovereignty. However, this concept he distances from the general understanding of freedom of action but rather linking it to the notion of freedom to choose a form of governance and create its international ties in a most suitable manner. This means that “[s]tates develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they develop” (Ibid. 96). They are in their “sovereign” right to decide whether they will seek foreign help in a time of emergency or develop their course of action; whether they will be constrained by another state's demands or will see the commitment as beneficial (Ibid.). Here rationality and anarchy clash where states sometimes act on their emotions and fears towards a threat, thus misusing their sovereignty and disregarding any consequences.

The importance of survival reaffirms state sovereignty and the importance of the structure. Units, which conform with the guidelines set by the structure, possess better prospects for establishing and strengthening their position within the system as well as protecting their sovereignty. The structure elects those who abide by its principles and the ones who do not, e.g. international terrorist groups, are in effect punished. However, survival as Waltz argues is a prerequisite for achieving any goals where the security of the state cannot be guaranteed by international system. This will in fact push states to act regardless of their own knowledge or wisdom in order to tackle security issues (Ibid. 92). The international system is a system formed by states which develop a strong structure, governed by set rules and exchanges, in turn creating its stability.

However, international terrorism and its main actors - international terrorist organisations, are phenomena which can alter the strength of the international system, the great powers and the units within it. Therefore, it is accepted as a threat and excluded from the boundaries of this structure. When faced with an immense threat, a common practice of states is to seek cooperation from other strategically important, if not always militarily capable, states. Depending on their capabilities, they adopt a variety of measures. Before examining the nature of the US-Philippine cooperation, it is important to look at the alliances formation neorealist theory. This could be done by examining the concept of balance of power and its alteration balance of threat.

3.2 Balance of power, balance of threat and alliance formation

Balance of power is one of the foundations of neorealist theory aiming at explaining alliance formation. Alliances play an important role in international relations because they are vital in successfully managing state affairs. According to Waltz in his Theory of International Politics (1979) anarchy exists “among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz, 1979, p.102). Every state must be ready to use violence or use the capabilities of a militarily advanced state. For the balancing of power to exist only two conditions must be fulfilled. First of all, the anarchical system should be present and secondly, the system should be formed by units, in our case states pursuing survival as their main goal (Ibid. 121). If the latter exists, due to the explicit nature of the system, states would generally be urged to co-act. This anarchical system and its ambiguity affects state behaviour and pushes them towards considering survival as their ultimate objective (Ibid. 111). There are instances where states decide to focus their efforts on providing protection to another actor whose well-being they consider vital for their own survival.

This balance of power could be created only through either internal or external balancing. In the case of internal balancing, a state uses its efforts to either increase economic stability, develop innovative strategies and, most often, increase military capabilities. External balancing, on the other hand, is developed when states seek external initiative or actions to increase their securities by either forming alliances or strengthening old ones (Ibid. 118).

A further development of the balance of power theory is Walt's contribution to the neorealist theoretical discussion, namely the transition from balance of power to balance of threat, it could be argued, applies more to modern day politics. In order to explain balance of threat, Walt argues, one should not disregard the balance of power theory and the distribution of power. Other factors that find a place within the theory such as “geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions” (Walt, 1987, p. 5) should also be considered. In his previous work, Walt provides a detailed explanation of those factors thus strengthening his position on the importance of balancing (Walt, 1985).

Walt claims that states use the balancing mechanism as a way of forming alliances against potential adversaries. He argues that the issue is not the power, but the potential security threat created. Sometimes threats come from weak actors that are ready to sacrifice everything (Walt, 1987, p.17). Therefore, contrary to many general perceptions, states may balance by allying with strong states, if a weaker power exists which could be of higher danger for a different reason (Walt, 1985, p.9). The increased mutual threat could lead states to forge alliances defined by Walt as a “formal or informal arrangement of security cooperation” (Walt 1987, p.12-13). This is evidenced by the creation of plans for both internal and external cooperation. According to Walt, different levels of cooperation can be present, as states are reluctant to sign binding treaties or formal agreements. However, the nature of the cooperation formation has no bearing on the quality of the practical cooperation. Thus, informal cooperation could also prove to be as vital and beneficial as a formal one.

Therefore, it could be argued that states adopt the approach to balance power and threat as a way of dealing with adversaries. Both approaches award higher security by creating an equal level of cooperation.

3.3 Offensive capabilities

Continuing from the previous discussion of the nature of the international system and the balancing of power, it is important to take into account the manner in which states, whose survival or integrity is threatened, respond to potential adversaries. The best approach for explaining this phenomenon is looking at Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism, defined in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). His theory finds its basis in Waltz's balance of power but is later modified to look at power in a different way. Rather than looking at power itself, it focuses on the amount needed for power maximisation so as to enable states to fulfil their aggressive intentions (Ibid. 21).

Military power, Mearsheimer argues, is the most important type of power a state can posses due to states' primacy (Ibid.). Therefore, great-power antagonism has not yet ended and great powers such as the US will always strive to possess a substantial amount of power. In order for states like the US to be able to secure their survival and integrity, they need to utilise their power on a global scale to overpower their adversaries (Ibid. 33).

States are prompted to acknowledge power maximisation as an “objective imperative and observable and potentially threatening condition” (Kolodziej, 2005, p.130). However, if a potential hegemon or great power has already come under attack, it could be assumed that the pressure to retaliate and improve security increases. Thus Mearsheimer (2001) contends that what a potential hegemon should be able to do is fight each opponent alone through different means (Ibid. 45). And the way to do this Glaser (1992) holds is through a reactive state offence. Glaser argues that if the adversary continues to deploy offences, the defender could potentially use a reactive offence in order to “make clear that [he], the defender is exercising restraint by following a conditional offensive policy that will continue only as long as the adversary pursues offensive advantages” (Ibid. 532). This diverges from Waltz's idea and turns towards the accumulation of power that a state needs to posses for its security (2001, p.31-32). Therefore, great powers are urged to expand their range of military sources, adopt new strategies, create new alliances to sustain their competitive position.

As observed, offensive realism does not exclude state cooperation. In fact, cooperation between states is highly important for offensive neorealists, for it yet again shows cooperation as a concept that strengthens the principle of self-help. Mearsheimer argues that when states cooperate, they take into account the absolute and relative gains such as profit maximisation (2001, p.51). But in order to exploit these relative gains, states need to make sure that they examine both their own and their adversaries' military power. For example, if the army is the main means for defence and the adversaries include rebel groups and guerrillas, a state needs to examine all types of capabilities such as “1) the number of soldiers, 2) the quality of the soldiers, 3) the number of weapons, 4) the quality of the weaponry, and 5) how those soldiers and weapons are organized for war” (Ibid. 134). And states do take these issues into account because many of them consider aggression and military action from their side or through allies to be the only way to make the state secure (Taliaferro, 2001, p.129).

The reasons why neorealism best explains the nature of US-Philippines cooperation are clear. Both the US and the Philippines use their alliance to balance power with the potential rise of China. Considering that both US and the Philippines would not benefit from China's rise in Asia, they consider the benefits of allying under a different pretext such as international terrorism. In this way, their alliance could both serve the purpose of restraining China and fighting terrorism. Furthermore, US considers terrorism a threat for both the territorial integrity and values of its nation. Therefore, it chooses to balance this threat by allying with the Philippines. While providing military support in the fight against home-grown terrorism, it can eradicate international terrorist groups. This is a clear example of Waltz's balance of power theory applied in practice where the US uses its alliance with the Philippines as a self-help. By increasing AFP's military capabilities through training and military equipment, intended to protect and prevent any further attacks, the US indirectly increases the chances of securing its own survival. The rash measures and the panic seen after 9/11 show a change in US policy from defence to offence thus acquiring straightforward justification of any actions, regardless of their scope, intensity or proportionality. Due to the unknown nature of the offender, the US itself decides to cross territorial boundaries in order to tackle the issue. It does that by considering the offensive nature of its actions with regards to geographical proximity, offensive capabilities and intentions as per Waltz (1987). In the case of terrorism, these three terms are relative and highly flexible which make them even more vital for the success of any type of operation and more fatal if overstepped. Due to the trans-national nature of terrorism as well as the increasing capabilities and tactical enhancement of terrorist groups, the US was inclined to believe that their own capabilities would be increased if placed in regions with observed high terrorist activity. Therefore, the only adequate solution was deploying a high number of military personnel on the islands intended to provide training and equipment to the AFP hoping to increase their chances to win their war on terror.

3.4 Good counter-terrorism measures

For the purpose of developing this paper and taking into account the discussion on the nature of the international system and its anarchical structure, a good counter terrorism measure according to neorealism should include a bilateral strategy between the US and the Philippines of power maximisation through military maximisation. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the anarchical structure of the international community requires self-help developed through the enhancement of personal state capabilities. However, self-help could be potentially favourable through the sovereign decision to form alliances, which could provide a double offensive capability, giving the US a strategic position that is beneficial in the fight against international terrorism. The two different sides of self-help are commonly fulfilled through the enhancement of offensive and defensive capabilities of both the leading state and the ally. This helps in balancing power and threat seen in the eyes of different international terrorist organisations and the success of these could be measured by the terrorist attacks prevented and terrorists dead.

4. Context

Introduction.

In order to fully grasp the issues surrounding the development of terrorist groups and the radicalisation of Filipino Muslims, a historical account will be provided. It is important to not only look back to the period of Muslim oppression but to explore the introduction of Islam to the Philippines. Following this section, the discussion will focus on one of the most crucial events in Philippine history - the Jabidah Massacre and its implication for the future of the country. Its effect on the formation of nationalistic groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) will be explored in the third section. This overview will provide vital details about the religious ideology as well as the cultural discrimination of Muslims in the Philippines. To begin, a brief historical overview of the introduction of Islam in the Philippines will be given.

4.1 Islam and Jihad in Southeast Asia and the Philippines

The spread of Islam in Southeast Asia can be traced back to the end of the 9th century. Accounts show that many Muslims, usually Arab or Persian merchants, were banished from China following an atrocious massacre of Muslims and later on settled in the Malay Peninsula (Majul, 1976, p.36). Trade developed and the Muslim population increased which lead to the creation of the first Muslim municipality in the 13th century.

One of the most important events that contributed towards the spread of Islam was the creation of the Malacca settlement around 1400. The chief of the area embraced Islam by marriage which led the Brunei ruler to adopt Islam and for Sulu to become one of the main centres for Islam and its missionaries. This event took place after the creation of a principality in the region and later on the Sulu sultanate was established by Sayyid Abu Bakr. The sequence of events repeated itself in other parts of Southeast Asia - merchants arrived and settle; married within the community; teachers strengthened the Muslim religion and cultural education, thus creating a stronger community (Ibid. 3-4).

However, of significance to the Philippines was the 16th century when the Portuguese reached and captured Malacca in attempts to jeopardise the spread of the Muslim primacy. However, their attempts failed. The roots of Islam had already spread in the aristocracy of many of the principalities which stood strongly against the foreign invasion. Furthermore, Brunei established itself as a great power and trade giant in the region thus aiming at expanding its trade to the Philippines. After the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese, some of its sultans moved to Mindanao and found a principality and, by marriage again, introduced Islam in Mindanao (Ibid. 5).

The Spanish and American occupation also played a major role in the development and the establishment of a stronger Muslim identity. Whereas the Spanish chose a more offensive approach towards the Muslims, waging wars against them in search of total domination, the Americans brought better societal development in the form of better sanitation, more job opportunities and better education but did not do anything to resolve the old disputes and historical prejudice between both religious groups. While still following their principle of religious independence and freedom of religion, the Americans did not object to the territorial occupation of Christian missionaries in the Muslim occupied areas. The land of Muslims was declared public land due to the lack of titles or legal deeds over it. (Majul, 1971, p.55).

The struggle for religious independence is not a new concept in Moros' eyes. In fact, the concept of jihad has been inherent for the Moros since the early colonisation period to present day. However, two types of jihad exist and the difference between then is crucial for understanding how fighters strategise (Tawagon, 2008). Jihad al asghar, the “struggle” or the “lesser jihad”, and jihad al akbar, the “holy war” also known as “greater jihad”, mostly associated with radical Islam, find different level of importance in religious ideology. As Tawagon (2008) argues, the former - the lesser jihad, is less important than the greater jihad and implies “patience, self-control or discipline for or against something or someone” (Ibid. 105). However, it was the lesser jihad that was the most important until a certain point of history. This shows, but does not explain, the reasons why such a shift in ideology occurred.

4.2 The Jabidah Massacre and Marcos' administration

The discrimination, land occupation and disregard of the values of the Muslim community not only strengthened the unrest within the Muslim society but also drove Muslim leaders to compete against both Christians and some of their own. While trying to make the situation better for their fellow Muslim citizens, the traditional leaders started instead competing with one another. Consequently, the newly educated Muslim population bred new influential persons who aspired to create greater opportunities, better education and an increase in the minority groups' participation in the political process (Majul, 1971, p.56).

This progress was ruined by the events that took place in 1968 when an unknown number of Filipino Muslim soldiers were massacred by the Marcos administration. The reason was their unwillingness to participate in a sabotage mission called “Operation Merdeka”.