The US-Philippines cooperation in combating international terrorism: directions, results and tasks ahead

After an unexpected attack, this operation would eventually culminate in the cold-blooded death of Malaysian Muslim soldiers. Filipinos' unwillingness was sparked by feelings of close religious connection to, what they called, fellow Muslims.

This operation was initiated by the predecessor of Ferdinand Marcos, President Diosdado Macapagal, and was later on continued by Marcos himself in order to claim the territory of Sabah of which the Philippines in the 1960s believed to be the rightful owner. This event was later on labelled the Jabidah massacre.

This unfortunate territorial dispute dates back to 1658 when, according to Philippine conventional knowledge, the territory of Sabah was awarded by the sultan of Brunei to the sultan of Sulu. Two versions of the story exist: the territory belongs to the Philippines or belongs to Malaysia (Curaming, 2017).

4.3 From Nationalism to Islamism

A large number of groups has a role in the development and the expansion of international terrorist links within the Philippines. However, due to the size constraints, this section focuses only on three in order to present the historical development of Moro society and of Islamic radicalism within the Philippines territory. Other groups were formed and different individuals took part in jihad thus choosing the path towards terrorism for various reasons such as economic hardship, discrimination, grievances, integration problems and conflicting views. These factors will be examined in more detail in the last chapter due to the importance of any potential causes behind the shift to terrorism. However, it is argued that the Jabidah massacre triggered the fight against Muslim oppression. After the Philippine government concealed the events, an unrest within the Moro community was sparked and the creation of the first Moro liberation group took place.

The MNLF lead by Nur Misuari, a former lecturer of political science, was the founding father of the rebellious future to come (Curaming, 2017, p.84). However, the Muslim struggle or the term Islam was not important before the foundation of the MILF. This split occurred in 1996 when the Government of the Philippines and the MNLF signed, but never fully implemented, a Final Peace Agreement which was later on destroyed by Indonesia and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (Vatikiotis, 2014). In the past the link between religion and the struggle was weak. Issues were connected to the Moro identity which kept the struggle on a national and liberation level, where insurgents were fighting for their rights and integration within the society, not their religion. For Hau (2005) the moment of separation of MNLF and the creation of the MILF breakaway group marked the development of the Islamic phraseology into a matter of politics (Ibid. 51).

Abu Sayyaf Group is another example of the shift from nationalism to Islamism. Highly controversial, the ASG has been the centre of attention in the Philippines for a long period of time due to its kidnap-for-ransom activities and its alleged links to Al-Qaeda and JI. As a faction of the MILF, ASG finds its own place in the US' list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations. Regardless of its ambiguous origins, according to a public proclamation issued by the founding father of the organisation, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, ASG's main goal was the creation of a purely Islamic government. Its belief was that war is necessary if the true objective of humanity, the establishment of Islamic law, is not fulfilled, therefore declaring their intent to use force in the name of their beliefs (Banlaoi, 2010) by basing their strategy on terrorism and other violent methods in order to cleanse the territory of non-Muslims (Gutoc, 2003).

The most current addition to the terrorist groups operating on Filipino soil is the Maute Group. In 2016 the MG was one of the main perpetrators in the Philippines due to their high activity and good preparation. Regardless of being a relatively newly formed group, the Maute shifted from being an extortion gang to terrorist group after its highly contested pledge to ISIS and its peculiar nature (Franco, 2017). This is due to its organisational structure called “family terrorism”. This, Banlaoi (2017) argues, eases their recruitment process and achievement of goals because it is easier to persuade close family members to adhere to the rules and follow the same ideology. As Initiated by ISIS, the result they strive for could be a strong structural organisation, greater dedication to the cause as well as increased loyalty (Ibid.).

5. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the JSOTF-P

This section aims to describe the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines as the most important operation shaping the cooperation between the US and the Philippines in combating international terrorism through addressing home-grown terrorism and insurgency on the territory of the Philippines. This operation is a clear example of the neorealist approach taken by the United States which focuses strongly on improving security by increasing the offensive and defensive military capabilities of an ally, the Philippines. Even though humanitarian operations were undertaken, their adequacy and level of development are highly contested both by policy makers and academics due to the failure to address key issues in the regions. This will also be discussed in the next sections, thus providing a foundation for a discussion on the approach adopted by both governments.

5.1 Formation and development

The process of operation formation in the Philippines regardless of its intent and history has not been easy. As mentioned earlier, nationalistic incentives and the old colonial past brought back old sentiments dictating the behaviour of Filipino nationals. This created unrest which made the population strengthen their unwillingness to allow US forces to engage in hostile acts on the territory of the Philippines, thus deeming it unconstitutional (Proctor, 2012, p.176).

This in fact obscured and delayed the formation of any military operations, especially the 2001 Balikatan exercise, which was part of the OEF-P under the command of the JSOTF-P. Initially, the Balikatan exercise was to last for six months, and it was to target the ASG on Basilan as well as advising, assisting and training military personnel in Zamboanga and Cebu (RAND, 2016, p.23).

However, the US SOF's 14-year engagement in OEF-P provides a clear example of US' support of a partner nation's security capabilities due to their important strategic relationship (Robinson, 2016). The initial reason for their cooperation was the alliance between the ASG and Al-Qaeda which further increased the threat towards the US due to the potential creation of a terrorist network which is hard to trace and even harder to disband. Therefore, the JTF-500 was precisely focused on the ASG throughout the first stage of the campaign (Ibid. 153). Due to these links and the transnational terrorist character of the ASG and the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah, the initial authorisation of the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines was awarded (Ibid.). By learning from JTF-510, in 2008 JSOTF-P expanded its horizon to include Mindanao at a tactical level which was followed by an increase of JSOTF-P's influence before the initial transition stage was concluded with the withdrawal of its forces in 2015.

5.2 Objectives

Two events that took place in 2001 sparked the change of US objective. Prior to 9/11 US citizens were taken hostage by the ASG which led the US to consider their citizen's wellbeing vital to any combat in the Philippines. As argued in this paper, most of US' tactical response was the use of violence and direct military operations as well as capability enhancement in order to fight terrorism.

The initial US idea was to conduct an offensive operation which could rescue their citizens. Even at USPACOM, Admiral Blair claims that many of the propositions were linked to undertaking of a clearing mission which will allow the US to get rid of terrorist groups in Basilan. However, it was later revealed that the highly neorealistic offensive tactics could only provide a short term solution to the issues due to the lack of capacity to eradicate the whole terrorist group with one attack. The remaining members could easily retaliate after physical contact between terrorists and the special forces, thus looking for open recruitment links throughout the affected islands where poor economic conditions and social injustices were still present (Niksch, 2002).

Therefore, the long-term objective of the OEF-P and the JSOTF-P were aimed at providing support to the Philippines in combating transnational terrorism by developing its military and intelligence capacity. They aimed to fulfil this objective by providing a wide array of services and assets in support of the Philippine operations. This was done after undertaking a wide range of surveys intended to find the areas of weakness of the AFP. The surveys included not only command in Manila but also units in areas from the APF's Southern Command headquarters in Zamboanga to JTF Comet and tactical units in Basilan. However, those were not enough and the personnel lacked vital knowledge about the region. Humanitarian missions were also conducted.

5.3 Strategies

In order to correctly discuss the activity undertaken by the AFP and the success of the operations, it is important to remember that its success was not linear. Therefore, the period of 2001-2015 will be broken down into sub-periods.

In the early stages of the OEF-P between 2001-2008, the main strategy of the US SOF was conducting extensive assessments to obtain a precise and detailed understanding of the environment, the enemy and the population on Basilan and other Islands (RAND, 2016). These included civil-military operations, information operations training, advice and assistance in the core of the foreign internal defence provided by the Civil Affairs Units, Military Information Support Operations units (MISO) and Special Forces (Robinson, 2016, p.153). However, the most important part throughout these was the enlargement of military offensive power and the successful undertaking of hostage-rescue operations. The successful displacement of the ASG and JI sanctuaries and the degradation of its leadership showed that the military exercises and training were appropriate. The number of incidents further decreased between 2001-2004 (Figure 1.), showing the reduced threat in some areas, which led to the return of a large number of displaced civilians and the re-initiation of public activities such as celebrations and graduations (Ibid. 42). This success operated on tactical and operational levels. This means that the focus was on military skills, combat patrols and marksmanship which was meant to provide AFP with the necessary skills to track and destroy the ASG.

Figure 1. Enemy- Initiated Incidents in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi- Tawi, 2000-2004

Between 2005-2007 complications occurred. The wide range of terrorist activities spread, reaching Jolo. The Basilan tactics were adopted in the Jolo Islands, decreasing the threat. In Jolo, the AFP with the help of JSOTF-P managed to disrupt ASG leadership by killing both Abu Solaiman and Khadaffy Janjalani (Ibid. 60). The AFP developed new skills and executed complex joint operations as well as civil-military operations. By providing economic funding and development plans to regions affected by the ASG, freedom of movement and support for the organisation decreased (Ibid. 60). Regardless of this, some parts of the Philippines, such as Mindanao, continued as a safe haven for transnational groups (Ibid. 77). Training continued being one of the main tasks of the JSOTF-P, which increased the chances of successful displacement of ASG leadership and the weakening of the organisations.

The period of 2008-2015 marked the transition before the end of the OEF-P and the takeover of security activities under the national authority with a slight involvement of the US personnel. An issue posed during this transition was the successful withdrawal of US troops and military personnel without putting at risk the overall success of the military training and the decrease in ASG activity.

5.4 Overall Outcome

Before the official end of the operation in 2015, an official assessment was conducted according to which after more than a decade-long work, the ASG was in fact still in operation - enjoying mobility and links with other terrorist groups. This means that the high militarisation as well as the tactics, operations and strategies did not provide the intended results (RAND, 2016).

In her commentary, Lisa Robinson (2016), one of the authors of this report, contends that the operation was in fact a success which came with a few limitations. She awards the success to primary importance of the decrease by 56% of attacks between 2000 and 2012, sovereignty was preserved and operations were initiated by the AFP. Some of the limitations she suggests were the heavy emphasis on the tactical-level training, the incompatibility of some measures with the aim of countering terrorism and its campaign as well as the current limited capability of the AFP which holds that the tactical, force generation and training model introduced by the US was in fact ineffective (Ibid. 160). However, the most important factor that obstructed the successful termination of the operation and still poses a threat to the Philippine government due to the enlargement of terrorist groups networks is the ease of recruitment and the unaddressed socioeconomic grievances which provide a base for expansion. Even though organisations are dispersed, the ease of recruitment can provide an easy access to resources and a way to reconvene and strengthen after a potential weakening. (Ibid.)

This prompts the question: Was US presence only linked to power maximisation within the region reinforced by the lack of training of US military personnel? This lack of training could leave the Philippine government willing to extend the Operation thus establishing a more decisive presence of the US on the territory of the Philippines. In the next chapter, more attention will be given to the issues of high militarisation and tactical gaps, which could be filled by the new governments of President Duterte, in order to avoid the highly faulty neorealist methods adopted from the US.

6. Discussion and Analysis

The struggle with terrorism in the Philippines and its relationship with the US is a unique case for several reasons. Philippine history is one of them. The Philippines is one of the few strongly Catholic countries with a high number of Islamic minority population. Also, regardless of its important links to international organisations, the issue of terrorism in the Philippines is not explored on the same level as it is with other terrorism-affected countries. Lastly, the issue in the Philippines is a case of a human mistake and poor governance which managed to strain the already difficult co-habitation between Christians and Muslims that in turn eased the penetration of Islamic radicalism. Vital to remember is that the poor execution of Marcos' integration model for the Muslims in the southern islands such as Mindanao left the indigenous population feeling threatened for their own survival. Therefore, it is important to discuss whether the highly militaristic measures adopted by the US and the Philippines were successful or not. If they were, this would mean that this approach needs to be followed until the threat is weakened. But if not, change must be initiated and the possibility of an alternative cooperation, such as with ASEAN, needs to be examined.

Depending on the perspective, the OEF-P could be both considered a success and failure. Confining the analysis to the period of 2001-2015 when the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines had taken place, neorealists would agree that the operation had succeeded. Due to the reduction of military and operational power seen in the ASG following the death of some important figures, the decrease in enemy initiated attacks, the satisfaction with the Philippine government increased. Thus, the Philippines and the US managed to form an alliance and achieve a good balance of power and balance of threat which was in fact leaning in their favour. There was an increase in both offensive and defensive military capabilities, improving Philippines' overall chances of tackling any potential issues in the future. This was due to the advice, supervision and cooperation provided by the JSOTF-P.

In the long run, however, it can be noted that these decade-long measures did not produce the desired result. Surprisingly, even though being the target of a high volume of funding and effort by the US, many non-military issues were not addressed. These issues show the Operation's failure.

Firstly, demobilisation is not enough for rebel zones and not all operational links have been severed. Regardless of the fact that ASG is demobilised and weakened, and nowadays Al-Qaeda is dispersed, other international terrorist organisations tend to find their way onto the islands. An example is the ISIS pledged MG, a family terrorist organisation, and the 2016-2017 Battle of Marawi. However, here it is important to remember that MG consists of former MILF guerrillas and foreign fighters and is led by Abdullah Maute, an ISIS pledged militant. This expresses the links between old grievances and the inability of both the Philippine government and its allies to address the issues in the ARMM. Therefore, if easily assembled, organisations could yet again focus on recruitment.

Secondly, nowadays, organisations such as ISIS tend to possess even greater influence than organisations that operated in the past. Recruitment is relatively easy due to poor conditions of living in the Southern Philippines. Even though a slight increase can be observed in the overall human development of the Philippines (Figure 2.), most of the affected parts are still highly underdeveloped. Some of the humanitarian efforts by the USAID have not been appropriate and logical in light of the whole situation. Many schools and development centres were created near a combat zone or in places where these have already been present, thus showing the spontaneity and lack of discussion. Even though a high emphasis was put on the Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and gaining the support of the population, most of the measures were undertaken with a superficial intent to show interest and concern (RAND, 2016, p.88).

Figure 2. Human Development Index - Philippines (1990-2015)

Lack of coordination and an operative distance between USAID and JSOTF-P are visible. The 2016 RAND report suggests that the relationship was strengthened only after 2010 when the command had been changed. This chain of events implies the low productivity and skill of both services (Ibid. 83), considering that a decade was necessary for those institutions to realise that coordination is essential for cooperation. Frequent communication and USAID safe zones provided by JSOTF-P could have strengthened the bond between USAID workers and the population sooner and provided more viable conditions to enhance this. On one hand, the USAID Arms to Farms program where MILF and MNLF fighters were offered to give up their weapons for land is a clear example of lack of coordination due to constant difficulties in the execution of the operation (RAND, 2016, p.69). It seems like an attempt of bribing the population for information or retreat. JSOTF-P, on the other hand, lacked the cultural and historical knowledge of the issues in the Philippines. A RAND study (2012) held that only three out of the 19 JSOTF-P interviewees showed knowledge of any political, economic or cultural grievances, whereas five out of eight of the Muslim interviewees referred to past grievances (RAND, 2012, p.75). These findings are surprising and very controversial considering JSOTF-P's fieldwork and explorations discussed in the 2016 RAND report. This lack of fundamental knowledge could be an impediment for finding a proper solution and the adoption of any type of measure. It could bring unstable results if dissatisfaction with the lack of cultural awareness arises.

Furthermore, the “cultural despair, economic decline, political oppression and spiritual turmoil” that Gutoc (2003) observed in the beginning of the century are still present (Ibid. 70). The consistently high poverty rate elevates those issues. Economic development still falls behind which eases the recruitment of fighters. In the Philippines, the national capital region remains the wealthiest region with 36% of the GDP and 13% of the country's population. However, the ARMM is the poorest accounting only for 1.3% of the GDP and a population of a third of the Capital Region (Mendoza, Olfindo & Maala, 2017, p.24). In 2012, when the Philippine economy grew by 6.8 %, the ARMM's gross domestic product fell behind with only 1.1% and contributed to the overall input by only 0.8% (Lim, 2015).

Moreover, ISIS is not afraid to use different ways of recruitment. The unfavourable economic conditions ease this process. Schools tend to be one of the places where ISIS uses the tactic of promising future remuneration to coerce students into joining the group (Petty, 2017). Another point of radicalisation and recruitment was the youth itself as reported in 2016 where the MILF confirmed an ISIS initiated recruitment process which targeted ARMM youth (Panorama, 2016). Radicalisation can occur not only amongst students but Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). According to Samuel (2016) there is a high probability and chance of exposure of overseas workers to radicalisation. According to a survey conducted in the 2014 Survey on Overseas Filipinos, there are 2.2 million Philippine citizens who could potentially be exposed to ISIS radicalisation, being lured by promises for wealth and benefits (Ibid. 95). A similar comparison can be drawn to the conditions of employment in the Philippines and the need for further economic development, which could potentially provide work to those 2.2 million externally displaced group of the population. If hypothetically, out of the 2.2 million, a quarter are prone to radicalisation, by providing good working conditions, this quarter could be easily integrated into the society which will diminish the forces of terrorist groups and especially ISIS by roughly 250,000 potential recruits. Therefore, tackling the issues from their roots and preventing radicalisation is as important as increasing military capabilities, which could mean utilising the financial support not solely in military operations but economic development.

Poverty requires desperate measures. Nowadays, whilst ASG has already pledged their allegiance to ISIS thus adopting their radical views, of issue remains the radicalisation and recruitment of young Muslims who are potentially exposed to “virulent ideas, indoctrinated in the extremist tradition of returning Afghan fighters, and trained in guerrilla warfare” (Joaquin, 2015, p.16). Those vulnerable groups, the potential “mujahidin”, possessing a potential for change in ideology could become a target for deployment. If grievances themselves are not addressed to provide these men with an alternative to joining terrorist groups, their grievances will neither be soothed, nor healed (Ibid.). This is an issue surrounding Al-Qaeda and still continues to affect its offspring ISIS due to the fact that both require new recruiters to join their forces; for ISIS it is mostly due to their urge to increase offences in Iraq and Syria (Joaquin, 2015).

According to Juan (2007) there is a failure of the Filipino government to guarantee not only peace and security but also a stable government with functioning institutions which are able to provide corruption-free military, organisations and elected office. He criticizes the military situation and the agreements between Arroyo and Bush at that time, arguing that they have only worsened the situation due to their focus on the surface rather than the roots of the problem. This corruption, Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau &Piggott (2009), argues has also affected US defence aid and support funds and suggests that higher transparency and accountability needs to be required by the US as to how those funds are used (Ibid.). Tan (2011) and Ramswell (2014) adopt a similar outlook agreeing with the inchoateness of these measures which, in addition to unaddressed grievances - political, economic and societal, assisted in shaping the limited nature of the operations. Government instability issues such as corruption, lack of resources and accountability for US funds further obstructed the utilisation of all available means.

When US security measures and developmental plans fail to deliver the wanted results, it is necessary to try and find an alternative solution to the crisis that is still taking place in the Philippines. Everyone considers that political and cultural similarity could be the best breeding ground for success thus placing their hopes on ASEAN as regional organisation. However, regardless of its nature, ASEAN is not capable of providing the answers or assistance desired by the Philippine government, which shows that issue resolution is highly dependent on the strength of the Philippine government.

Firstly, the principle of non-interference is seen as the main factor that prevents ASEAN from being a useful regional stabilising force (Chau, 2008). This soft law approach, emphasising state sovereignty and slow adoption of any counter-terrorism treaties on an organisational and regional level, Tan & Nasu (2016) credits to complex interstate relations in Southeast Asia. Thus, according to ASEAN principles each state is responsible for their own security and preservation of national integrity. This soft regionalism, Heydarian (2015) argues, is mostly focused on “confidence-building and preventive diplomacy rather than conflict resolution/management” (Ibid. 114). Rather than security measures, what ASEAN offers is strengthening only the informal processes of interaction and development (Emmers, 2009, p.162). This in itself is not enough to facilitate any deep cooperation due to the technological development seen in the equipment of terrorists such as the one observed in the attack in Indonesia in August 2016 when it was speculated that the rockets used were in fact intended to target Singapore (Jerard, 2016, p.91).

Secondly, ASEAN's inaction, Emmers (2009), links to ASEAN's views of terrorism in parts of the region as a national issue linked to corruption, poverty and economic instability rather than regional due to the lack of terrorist activities in some parts of the region (Ibid. 174). The lack of emergency perception within all states leaves the affected ones in a desperate situation while the consensus decision-making process is taking place. This is seen in the long period of time required for the adoption of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism signed in 2007 but was in fact fully ratified in 2013 (Jerard, 2016, p.91). However, this convention mostly focuses on the criminal rather than political aspect of terrorism itself, thus looking more at aircraft seizure, financing and the disruption of maritime navigation (Chau, 2009). This depoliticisation and “ASEANisation”, Gerstl (2010) argues, is a deliberate act by ASEAN members which could enable them to cooperate on a technical level (Ibid. 51) However, this could not be the appropriate solution due to the nature of issues in the Philippines. This leaves the Philippines in a poor condition due to the lack of ability to precisely depict those issues. As we mentioned above grievances such as poverty, economic underdevelopment and high corruption affect not only the ARMM but the Philippines as a whole. Regardless of the pledge of both Arroyo and subsequent governments to help improve the economy and reduce the poverty rate in the Philippines, those are still an issue. Even though GDP has increased since 2001, its increase has not been linear (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Philippines GDP growth (annual %)

This is linked to the still dominating corruption within the country. According to Transparency international's CPI index, the Philippines has not improved substantially since 2001 ranking 111 out of 180 countries. The 2017 CPI in comparison to 2001 has only improved with 0.5 points thus coming to 3.4 (2017) from 2.9 (2001) (Figure 4).

Figure 4. CPI Index Philippines (2001-2017)

Many consider the most viable solution to be seeking ASEAN's cooperation as an organisation most closely connected both culturally and politically to the Philippines. However, as we have seen in order to address terrorism, national issues should be tackled by the government first. A lot needs to be done but accurate steps have already been seen in the development plans undertaken by President Duterte. Dealing with all aspects of the issues with measures such as President Duterte's Development Support and Security Plan (DSSP), which encompasses military as well as the social side rather than just focusing on the militant would further diminish grievances, tackle radicalisation and promote change in ideology.

Conclusion

This dissertation seeks to go beyond simply describing the development of terrorism in the Philippines and its relations to the US through the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines under the command of the JSOTF-P. Its main aim is to identify and discuss whether the operation has been successful in both a military and humanitarian manner. The results indicate that the operation was a success and a failure in certain respects. The Operation succeed in applying US neorealist ideology by increasing offensive and defensive capabilities of the AFP thus trying to balance power and threat with the help of stronger alliances which led to the weakening of terrorist organisations and severing operational links. However, the humanitarian aspect of the OEF-P is believed to have failed judged by the poor conditions still present in the ARMM. Poverty is still an issue; discrimination is definitely present and economic development, even though on the rise, is not enough to improve the living conditions of the population. More was done to provide the US with information, rather than to improve living conditions and reduce recruitment opportunities. This shows the disregard of historical roots of the problem and the lack of coordination between the military forces and USAID.

Based on the research, some recommendations could be made for the prompt resolution of international terrorism issues which do not rely only on military capabilities. First, more positive government involvement should be present in the ARMM. This will support the development of the region and the integration of the region into the country. Secondly, the US and the Philippines should look at the long-term implications of a decade-long military operation on the development of the region and how military action could affect people's belief in the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Furthermore, there were some limitations while conducting the research. Since the termination of the OEF-P in 2015, not many works have been done discussing its effectiveness. I hope this paper will be one of the many to come which will attempt to understand and analyse further the issues of military measures in the unstable Filipino society in order to provide better future for the affected parts and Philippines as a whole. Secondly, most reports or articles were produced by Western academics or organisations. Due to the direct links of the reports to the United States of America, a degree of bias could be observed. Therefore, this paper is intended to aspire and encourage independent researchers to engage with this region and its issues. Furthermore, there is a limited number or almost no views expressed on this issue from the ARMM. This is a limitation which could potentially be overcome by conducting field research and interviews within the ARMM.

In general, the measures failed to provide both the security and the prosperity of the Southern Philippines, but it succeeded in increasing US' influence on the islands and increasing the military capabilities of an ally. People in the ARMM and the affected regions still struggle with poverty and inequality. The threat posed by the old decentralised organisations and the newly formed terrorist groups is still present. Changes in policy and strategy are needed to fulfil the desire for long-term prosperity and security.

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