Analysis of the process of identity and role construction through which Russia has obtained a specific identity and role in the Middle East

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Introduction

Neither Western, nor Eastern. Both oppressed, and oppressor. Oriental, and not. Russia's return to the East and revival of a Eurasian identity unearths the debate of Russia's place in the Oriental and of the countries that exist there (Cronin 2015 p. 649). Edward Said's (1978) damnation of the countries that used the discourse of the West's relation to the “Oriental” to create an identity of the “strong” and the “weak,” with the West as the strong, dominating power, never rang very loudly in Russia (p. 40; Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2014 p. 83). Schimmelpenninck van der Oye (2014) writes, “It took some time in the West for scholars to see the relevance of Edward Said to the Russian case. This was not necessarily because Slavists are particularly obtuse. But many Occidentals still see Russia itself as Oriental” (p. 83). Russia's curious identity as an amalgamation of cultures between the Orient and the West put it in contraposition to the West. Where writing about the Orient in the West was “inextricably bound up with relationships of power in which the Occident always had the upper hand,” Russia did not face the same damnation (Cronin 2015 p. 648). Polonsky (2011) argues that from Tolz's interpretation, the “contemporary postcolonial scholarship [can] be seen as a descendant of early twentieth-century Russian orientology.” She argues that Tolz further hints that in the current political space, a return to Russia's legacy as an “east-ward facing” country can be beneficial to the politicians of Russia today (ibid). This narrative identity of Russia containing a curious hint of the Oriental is especially relevant as Russia continues to forge deeper ties with the countries of the Orient, the supposed “weak” countries in Said's analysis of Western discourses. Today, these countries are part of the discursively-created Middle East. It is this term that will be used within this thesis. The Middle East, however, represents no one tangible geographical, ideological, or political make-up. However, for the purpose of this paper the author will use the concept of the Middle East that includes its three “sub-regions,” Turkey, Iran, and the Arab countries of Asia with Egypt (Isaev & Sotnichenko 2010). As will be seen throughout this paper, Russia's historical legacy and the influence of a Eurasian identity is one part of the construction of Russia's role in the Middle East.

Edward Said, influenced by the Foucauldian method, would have understood how discourse creates “truth, morality, and meaning” (Pitsoe & Letseka 2013 p. 24). However, discourse is created by those with power who wish to perpetuate a certain narrative, thus all “truth claims” (Wandel 2001, p. 379) hold power, and those who direct that power do so with a certain aim (Pitsoe & Letseka 2013 p. 24). Language serves as a tool of discourse and is “managed” by it (ibid). International politics relies on the use of discourse and language; however, there appears a severe lack of understanding for how language aids in constructing, or deconstructing, social relationships. For example, Borshchevskaya (2017) writes, “Vladimir Putin chartered Russia's return to the Middle East immediately upon assuming the presidency in May 2000. He did so in the context of zero-sum anti-Westernism - for Russia to win, the United States had to lose” (p. 1). Meanwhile, a USA Today editorial board writes that Russia is “the `evil empire' again” (“Russia the `evil empire' 2018). One need not trust Russia to be aware that language can perpetuate certain truth claims; which, according to Foucault, all hold power for a certain purpose. With perpetuations of narratives involving language such as “evil” or “zero-sum” there can be no alternative understanding of Russia's identity and role in particular regions of interest. Unlike with the West, Russia has arguably established itself as a reasonable and balanced actor in the Middle East region. The language used by the Middle Eastern states contains very different truth claims than the examples used above. How is it that the perceptions of Russia by these states are so different from the West, which consistently label Russia a destabilizing force? Recently condemned by the UK Foreign Minister as a “malign and disruptive force,” (Maza 2018), what process has led the “malignant” Russia to be viewed as a balanced and reasonable actor in the Middle East? For present-day Russia to have influence in the Middle East it must have engaged in several years of productive identity and role construction. Today, Russia endeavors to further build stronger ties with its Middle Eastern neighbors.

The author will present in this thesis a closer look at the process of identity and role construction through which Russia has obtained a specific identity and role in the Middle East. This process must be analyzed differently from its behavior in different regions of the world and should not be done in a zero-sum understanding of international politics. In undergoing this analysis, the author will attempt to answer the previously proposed questions. Furthermore, rather than analyzing power or economic interests as sole explanatory factors, this thesis will shed light on the process of societal interactions that has shaped, and still shapes, Russia's role and identity in the region. The author uses a synthetic theoretical approach utilizing Wendtian constructivism and role theory to uncover the role and identity construction and enactment Russia has undertaken in the Middle East. Thus far, this attempt has not been applied to Russia's role and identity in the Middle East. This thesis will argue that Russia's perception of its role as a balancer/mediator, along with the cooperative social structures it has created, explain Russia's effort and ability to continue maintaining constructive relationships with the Middle Eastern states.

The first chapter of this thesis will examine literature on social constructivism from a Wendtian perspective, role theory, and Russia in the Middle East. The second chapter will further develop the theoretical framework and its application to Russia. The third chapter discusses Russia's role and identity construction and enactment in the Middle East, while the fourth chapter examines the Russian-Iranian relationship specifically. The fifth chapter will offer a final discussion and analysis on why using the synthetic approach is not only valid, but also important for preventing misperceptions towards Russia's behavior in the Middle East.

1. Literature Review

1.1 Theoretical Exposition: Constructivism and Role Theory

Often juxtaposed against neorealism and neoliberalism, constructivism is a self-avowed theory about the social structures that form a mutually constitutive relationship with agents (Reus-Smit 2005 p 197). These social structures are constructed from norms, values, and beliefs (ibid p. 196). Since its introduction as a conceptual theory of International Relations (IR), constructivism has developed into a mainstream theory, with varying focuses and debates. Some constructivists lean closer to the critical side of the theory, aligning more with post-structuralists or gender theorists of IR; others lean closer to a positivist side, calling for empirically driven studies using a constructivist framework (ibid pp. 203-205).

Due to the limited nature of this thesis, this literature review will examine constructivism as outlined by Wendt. This is not done to privilege Wendt's method over other insightful constructivist studies that focus on different units of study, but rather due to the systemic analysis Wendt offers. Wendt's focus on one unit, or level, of analysis give his constructivism a more systemically (rather than individually) focused approach. Utilizing role theory in this thesis serves to “uncover” the domestic side of role identities that Wendt brackets (ibid p. 197). Wendt outlines the framework for his understanding of a systemic constructivist approach in several pieces of work, including “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” (1992) “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” (1994) “Constructing International Politics,” (1995) and Social Theory of International Politics (1999). These four works serve as an outline for Wendtian constructivism. Additionally, throughout this thesis the author will utilize Wendt's arguments to demonstrate the shortfalls of using neorealism or neoliberalism to analyze Russia's role and identity in the Middle East. Juxtaposing constructivism against these two theories highlights the importance of using a constructivist approach to fill in the theoretical gaps of neorealism and neoliberalism.

In “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” and Social Theory of International Politics Wendt most clearly outlines the shortcomings of both neorealism and neoliberalism. A chief sin of both theories is the choice to take identities and interests as existing a priori and exogenously before interactions occur on both macro and micro levels (Wendt 1992 p. 394). Furthermore, both subscribe to a rationalist frame of thinking, in which a causal way of thinking leads from an agent's desire straight to their belief about how to make that desire happen (Wendt 1999 p. 123). This causes a concern with the behavior of states, generally ignoring the “properties” of states. Assuming the properties of states have been constructed a priori to interaction means that they no longer have causal effects on the behavior of states, nor can they likewise be affected by states' behavior (ibid p. 27). According to Wendt (1999), however, the very process of identity and interest formation, especially in relation to interactions of Ego and Alter, can shape structures just as much as structures can constrain and shape the behavior of agents' interests and identities. Social structures are created through shared ideas, knowledge, and culture. Intersubjective understandings give meaning to these structures, and while agents operate within them, they do so with the understanding that Others do so as well (ibid p. 398).

Wendt also addresses the debate regarding idealism versus materialism. Wendt (1995) does not deny the existence of material realities, nor that they can exist objectively outside of the discursive meanings social contexts give to materials (p. 74). However, materiality in international politics has no meaning outside of the intersubjective understandings given to it (Adler 1997 p. 323). Thus, Russia and the US' perceptions of the same material realities in states like Iraq and Iran lead to very different reactions and foreign policy strategies based on the meaning (the ideas) behind those material realities. Of course, this does not discount the constraining effect that materiality can have on actors, even despite ideas they might have. Thus, Russia's own ability to use its material forces in the Middle East is more limited via comparison to other countries. However, the expectations that were given to Russia's material limitability proved to be inaccurate, as Russia has managed to exert influence in a region that appeared to some, beyond their material capability (Kozhanov 2017 pp. 103-104). This is due to, as Hopf (1998) argues, the concept that ideas can have just as much power as material realities (p. 177).

Wendt's argument that ideas and social structures have power at a systemic level led him to articulate the development of three forms of systems, or “cultures”, in the anarchic world. These are Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian (Wendt 1999 p. 20). To Wendt, whether a state existed in a certain system or culture depended on the role it adopted vis-à-vis the Other or Others it encounters (ibid p. 259-260). The further theorization of role construction will be addressed in the paragraphs below. For now, the author identifies three role-identities ascribed to each culture by Wendt: enemy, rival, and friend respectively (ibid p. 259). Wendt's three cultures represent the varying degree to which anarchy can be constructed based on social structures and ideas regarding the Other. The Hobbesian culture is often seen as a traditional self-help system, and thus states exist with a tremendous amount of distrust towards each other (ibid). In this system, states are constantly focused on eliminating their enemies, and recognition of the Other's right to exist is bracketed, unlike in the Lockean system (ibid pp. 260-261). In the Lockean system, states recognize each other's right to exist, and sovereignty has been created as an institution in which each state has been given legitimacy and the right to exist (ibid p. 280). Finally, there is the Kantian culture in which states have begun to see each other as friends. Collective security arrangements are formed in which states start to conceptualize fellow states as being an important part of their own self-identification (ibid pp. 298-301). According to Wendt, the Lockean system is the predominant form we see in existence today, which can be evidenced by the large number of small states that exist not out of a position of material power, but due to the strength of the idea of sovereignty and legitimacy (ibid p. 279). In Wendt's arguments, “it is easier to escape a Hobbesian world” and “harder to create a Kantian one based on deeply shared beliefs” (ibid p. 255). Thus, the perception of states existing in a Lockean system can be attributed to the salience of the belief in the efficiency of the institutions of sovereignty and legitimacy, and the difficulty in developing collective identities (ibid).

The above paragraphs elaborate constructivism from a Wendtian perspective. Wendt's ideas regarding Ego-Alter interactions are significant for understanding the signals states send each other to create certain identities. Additionally, role theory expands the exposition regarding Ego-Alter, or Self-Other, interactions. The Ego (Self) of inner-role perception inevitably meets the Alter (Other) who themselves hold certain perceptions, creating a complex role construction dynamic of Ego-Alter interaction (Holsti 1970 p. 239). Through encounters of Ego-perceptions and Alter-expectations a state's role in international relations is constructed. Role theory's focus on this complex role construction deepens Wendt's analysis, hence its inclusion within this thesis. It is, as Stephen Walker (2017) states, a “conceptually rich” theory, with a broad range of terminology (p. 3). For the sake of parsimony, the author will identity key aspects of role theory that are utilized within this thesis while acknowledging the broad depth that remains unaddressed.

States face a complex constitutive relationship between the process of internal (Ego) role construction and external role contestation involving the expectations and actions of the Alter (ibid p. 8). As Adigbuo (2007) argues, the construction of roles involves role conceptions “interface[ing] with the individual, society and the international system” (p. 89). The way that states construct or adopt certain roles within the internal setting matters. Often, multiple elites within the domestic setting jockey for control over what role will be adopted. Cantir and Kaarbo (2011) acknowledge the intense contestation that can occur when elites are attempting to construct or redefine roles. This, they argue, can lead to inconstancies and abrupt turns that might puzzle analysts, but can be explained by paying closer attention to intense role contestation among elites (p. 16-17). As role contestation occurs, the state will be in a type of limbo as it attempts to find its grounding. Wehner and Thies (2014) further confirm that role conceptions are the specific construction of varying domestic contestations, some of which are not necessarily resolved even after the adoption of a specific national role conception (NRC) (p. 412). Using an interpretivist approach, they emphasize that tradition and history must be considered when analyzing the formation of role identity and role change (ibid p. 416). Furthermore, in facing dilemmas actors must adapt to the dilemma by adjusting roles or creating new ones; thus, certain traditions can “act like blueprints” to guide actors in this process (ibid p. 417). Roles, according to Wehner and Thies, are “a combination of self-conception and social recognition prescribed by Others” (ibid p. 414). States undergoing role learning may shift role conceptions as they move from more ego-dominated self-conceptualizations to more alter-dominated ones, or vice-versa (Harnisch 2012 p. 56).

Harnisch (2012) specifically addresses the concept of complex Ego-Alter interaction in the external environment. Harnisch's “as-if-role taking” argues that as actors attempt to change their roles or take up new ones, this role must be “solidified by changing corresponding social roles” or through recognition by the Alter (p. 54). Thus, roles can be either accepted or rejected by the Alter (ibid p. 48). Harnisch identifies two different ways roles can be assumed. Either via the “ego/agent” or the “alter/structure” in which the former refers to the self-construction of roles that are based on “personal traits, historical experiences, and identities,” representing the internal (domestic) construction of Ego (ibid). The latter, representing the external level, is constructed within specific institutions or via the Alter who partakes in “alter-casting” in which certain expectations and norms are cast upon the actor partaking in role assumption (ibid).

Harnisch's theory emphasizes complex role learning where roles are increasingly institutionalized in intra, inter, and supra-national institutions that all put, oftentimes competing, pressure and expectations on the various roles adopted by states (ibid p. 49). Harnisch's perspective in role theory comes from George H. Mead's concept of the “I” and the “Me,” and is often labeled as Interactionist. An Interactionist perspective on the agent-structure framework posits that the construction of roles comes through a constitutive relationship between Ego and Alter in which each other's inner and outer expectations about their own (Self) roles, as well as the Other's roles, influence the adoption of certain roles (ibid p. 52). In Mead's analysis of the concepts “Me” and “I,” the “Me” part is the socialization of the Self against the generalized and the significant Others. The “I” on the other hand is the inner part of the Self that is determined by the Self alone, “the part of subjectivity in which this appropriation and reaction to roles and its corresponding existential freedom lie” (Wendt 1992 p. 419). In role theory the “Me” part is the Self in an interactionist framework that is an active participant in the process of role learning, making, or reproducing in terms of both its own role conceptions, as well as in the assigning of role expectations to Others, or the Alter (Harnisch 2012 p. 53).

Before moving on, the author acknowledges the first formulation of role theory in the context of international politics by Holsti (1970) in “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”. Holsti's work on national role conceptions led him to the conclusion that states adopt multiple role conceptions, often leading to different role identities and actions in different regions and with different relationships (p. 253-254). Holsti identifies seventeen role conceptions with his analysis of 972 government documents, interviews, and foreign policy statements from seventy-one different countries. Holsit's analysis led him to conclude that states hold different role conceptions depending on where/who they are interacting with, leading to different types of behaviors with different actors or in different regions (ibid; p. 303). This is important for analyzing the various role conceptions Russia can hold and will be raised in the following chapter.

Thies and Breuning (2012) argue for a synthesis of role theory with wider theories of IR, as role theory offers a unique insight for the domestic and external levels of role construction (p. 3). The idea that role theory can contribute to wider IR theories is one shared among Holsti, Adigbuo, Cantir and Kaarbo. Wendt's systemic construction is criticized for the very fact that he brackets domestic factors to focus on the systemic structures that have effects on a state's identity (Reus-Smit 2005 p. 199). However, it is the very process of role contestation both externally and internally that has impacted Russia's role and identity in the Middle East. To bracket this domestic role contestation is to miss out on an important constitutive process occurring for Russia's role, identity, and interests in the Middle East.

1.2 Russia and the Middle East

To best analyze Russia's behavior in the Middle East, several books, policy papers, newspaper and journal articles were consulted. Most of the sources drawn from are secondary sources, such as several policy papers from the Washington Institute, analyzing Russia's foreign policy and behavior in the Middle East. A limited number of primary sources including statements and interviews given by President Putin and various Russian diplomats were also consulted. These works will be used throughout the thesis to draw specific examples of Russia's perceptions and interactions with the various Middle Eastern countries. Throughout consulting these various works, a pattern was seen in which Russia's role and identity in the Middle East were either examined through a narrow lens originating from analyses based on its behavior in other regions, or were examined from a neorealist/neoliberalist perspective. Very few utilized a theoretical framework to examine Russia's position in the Middle East, and still fewer utilized constructivism. None utilized the combination of Wendtian constructivism with role theory. The closest was Andrei Kreutz's (2007) work Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?

While only written up to 2007, a large amount of data regarding Russia's historic ties with the Middle East, as well as Russia's relations in the 1990s with the Middle East, will be drawn from Kreutz's work. Kreutz acknowledges the domestic contestation behind Russia's identity and role that led to certain foreign policy strategies and had a large influence on Russia's role in the Middle East (Kreutz 2007). In this manner, Kreutz provides information that is insightful when examining the process of Russia's changing relationship with the Middle East. Much of his focus is on the foreign policy strategies that came from the contestation of Russia's three main “schools of foreign policy thinking,” those being Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationist (ibid p. 4). Kreutz leans on social constructivism to examine Russia's identity and interest formation, stating “the role of the international system is in assisting states in their socialization and understanding of interests in world politics. The international environment constructs state actions and interests” (ibid p. 14). Thus, Kreutz correctly identifies the role that the international system has on the formation of Russia's identity and interests. Kreutz spends a majority of his work analyzing the internal domestic contestation between the three schools, as well as the role that the West and Europe played as the significant Other in Russia's identity formation (Kreutz 2007). He focuses largely on identity formation, but doesn't make use of role theory to analyze how the perception of Russia's role could also have a large influence on Russia's behavior, in the Middle Eastern region. Additionally, Kreutz's work remains out-of-date with current events.

Nikolay Kozhanov's work comes closest to providing a look at the constitutive relationship between Russia and the Middle Eastern states' role perceptions of each other, and how those perceptions provide Russia with a very specific regional role and identity. Indeed, having been written in 2017 and 2018, Kozhanov's work also provides the most up-to-date information on Russia's role in the Middle East. Thus, Kozhanov provides the author with data and analysis that will be utilized within this thesis. While Kozhanov approaches Russia's role in the region in an analytical way, he does not specifically utilize constructivism or role theory to analyze the influence Russia has in the region. The information provided presents Russia as a balancer in the region, without an explanation for how this role identity came about. In general, Kozhanov also brackets the domestic role contestation that was important in Russia's role construction and enactment.

Both Kreutz and Kozhanov's works are heavily utilized and built upon within this thesis. Additionally, various policy-papers, research publications, newspaper and journal articles and books were consulted in the research process. Mark Katz, Anna Borshchevskaya, Andrei Tsygankov, Ellie Geranmayeh and Kadri Liik, and Robert Freedman are among the key authors cited. While none analyzed Russia's role and identity in the Middle East from a constructivist perspective, their work provides enlightening data and examples used throughout this thesis.

2. Theoretical Application to Russia

2.1 Introduction

The theoretical framework used within this essay has already been discussed in the literature review above. This chapter focuses on the application of the theory to Russia in general. The purpose of combining a Wendtian constructivist approach with role theory is to give due credence to the shaping of a Russian national role conception both internally and externally. Role theory allows one to examine the construction of Russia's perceptions of its role, and the way those perceptions are shaped, and in turn shape, the social structures of the region. Once a role is adopted, the state can enact that role within the region, and that role can be either accepted or rejected. The first section of this chapter discusses Russia, and its place in the Middle East, from a constructivist perspective utilizing Wendt's constructivism as outlined in the first chapter. The second section of this chapter examines role theory in relation to Russia more closely. This allows one to examine Russia as a state with certain role and identity conceptions existing in a dynamic societal system in the Middle East.

2.2 Constructivism's Application to Russia

Firstly, it is worth noting the failure of certain theories in explaining key attributes of Russia's behavior in the Middle East. A common theory used in IR is neorealism; however, viewing Russia's behavior in the Middle East through a neorealist lens leads one to ignore the process involved for Russia in constructing an identity and role in the region. According to Wendt (1992), neorealism's reliance on assuming we live in an anarchic world with no full idea of how another state may act - leading to a constant state of distrust and the creation of a “self-help” system - fails to grasp the full picture (p. 394). Neoliberalism, another common theory of IR, also fails to consider the social structures that affect the identity and interests of states and the constitutive effects that they have on each other (Wendt 1999 p. 4). The failure to examine the process of state identity and interest formation means that the social construction of ideas and identities is omitted when explaining the behavior of states towards each other (ibid). Constructivism, however, examines the process where ideas, the social context in which materiality lies, and the interaction of agents and structure form identities and interest (Checkel 1998 pp. 325-326).

The intersubjective understandings constructed between Russia and the Middle Eastern states have led to a social structure of balance and mutual recognition of each other's interests and identity. Russia has carefully constructed a role and identity for itself in the Middle East through its interactions with Others in the region by crafting social structures, which then feed back into influencing Russia and the Others' behavior. According to constructivists, the actions that actors take solidify or weaken institutions and structures (Hopf 1998 p. 180). Russia and Middle Eastern states have gone through several years of signaling that has led to the formation of certain ideas about each other and the strengthening of certain institutions. They have also created structures where their intersubjective knowledge about each other has led to an assigning of certain ideas regarding each other's material reality and power (Adler 1997 p. 322). This does not mean that all social structures built will be of the cooperative kind. Wendt acknowledges that social structures can be both conflictual and cooperative, and how these structures shape a state's identity, interests, and perceptions are a result of the social understandings within these structures (Wendt 1994 p. 385-386). Thus, the structure of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is still formed in a social setting of interaction.

In Russia, one can see the variance in cooperation and conflict with varying states based on the social structures and collective knowledge of the “Other”. China's relationship with Russia in Central Asia, for example, is far different from its relationship with the US in the region. In an area where Russia should be quite wary of China's influence, as China is Central Asia's largest trading partner, they are instead cooperative and Russia does not view China as a threating force in the region (Laruelle et al. 2010 p. 4; Putz 2017; Stronski & Ng 2018 p. 4). However, Russia has viewed any activity in the Central Asian region by the US to be very threatening to their interests. Despite cooperation in the region in 2001, Russia has for the most part pressured their Central Asian neighbors to keep the US out of the region (Tsygankov 2010 p. 188). This can be seen in 2014 when the US were forced to leave the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan, a move Russia had made known it wished to see happen (Pillalamarri 2014). While China has always striven to reassure Russia, and the two have managed to forge a strong relationship over the last few years, the US and Russia have continued their conflictual, if at times strategic, relationship. China and Russia operate on a similar narrative discourse that allows for the reduction of misperceptions in their signals and the creation of certain identities to each other; the US and Russia, however, have a long history of misinterpreting each other (Krebs 2010 p. 29).

Russia has, most notably since Putin's assumption of the Presidency, presented its identity in the Middle East as one of a reliable and rational actor who can cooperate with all the major players (Gvosdev 2017). This allows them to act as a potential mediator between parties, more easily accomplished by having good relations with all the states in the Middle East, a balancing act many didn't see as being a viable or effective strategy (Kozhanov 2018 pp. 23-24). While some see Russia's presentation as a reliable alternative for Middle Eastern states simply as a strategy for siphoning influence away from the US, this is not the full picture (Belbagi 2018). Belbagi's statement “…pragmatic Russian policies have produced great strategic gain and…the Kremlin's designs on the region should not go unchecked,” fails to account for the balancing and mediating role Russia has played in the region as it has constructed social structures, which has been more appreciated in the region than the more destabilizing actions taken by other actors in the region (ibid). Matthews (2017) comments on Turkey being “the Kremlin's unlikely new best friend;” however, this relationship between Russia and Turkey is not so sudden as Matthews assumes. Rather, Turkey and Russia have been forming closer ties for several years, most notably beginning in 2000 with Russian Prime Minister (PM) Mikhail Khasyanov's visit to Turkey where he stated, “Our main mutual conclusion is that Russia and Turkey are not rivals but partners, and our governments will from now on proceed from this understanding” (Freedman 2010 p. 25). The Jordanian King, a traditional Western-aligned leader, stated in the early 2000s that “Jordan and its neighbors consider the [Russian] role to be the voice of rightful reason” and the Jordan Times wrote “it is undeniable that when it comes to crucial Middle East issues such as Iraq and the Peace Process, Jordan and the Arab world in general have been sharing identical views with Russia over the past few years” (Kreutz 2007 p. 42-43).

Russia has thus spent years constructing cooperative relations and open dialogue in the Middle East, and the signals sent through the years has meant that Russia's position as a reliable, rational, and mediative actor in the region is not something that has suddenly developed, but rather has been part of a longer process. This does not mean that all of Russia's ties in the region have led to friendly, Kantian collective identities. Russia has established a Lockean system in the Middle East where Russia does not treat any of the Middle Eastern states as enemies, nor does it treat them with enmity. Indeed, they have constructed a system in which cooperation occurs based on the social structures Russia has helped build, as well as the similar ideas it has with other Middle Eastern states. For example, Russia is firmly opposed to forced regime change, it takes a firm stance against terrorism, and wishes to maintain stability in the Middle Eastern region (Kozhanov 218 p. 24). Russia also restrains itself from criticizing the internal policies of Middle Eastern states, and additionally has refrained from overtly choosing sides in conflicts between the various states (Singh 2017 pp. 10-11). These views towards the region align well with the interests of the Middle Eastern states. Thus, even in areas where conflict occurs between Russia and a Middle Eastern state, dialogue between the two states continues and cooperation in other areas can even deepen, as seen with the current strong state of relations between Moscow and Tehran (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 pp. 1-2).

In conclusion, using a constructivist framework allows one to observe the process of signaling and interactions that have produced a Lockean social system in which Russia and Middle Eastern states are able to cooperate and maintain dialogue outside of an enmity framework. Neorealism and neoliberalism both fail to explain certain elements of Russia's position in the Middle East due to their bracketing of identity and role formation. Constructivism offers a different lens to examine the social structures, the process of identity and role formation, and the signaling that leads to those social structures. All these elements have an impact on Russia's role and identity in the region.

2.3 Role Construction in Russia

Before examining the application of role theory to Russia, the author acknowledges the blurring in definition that can occur between the terms “role” and “identity.” Wendt himself uses language involving roles in his book Social Theory of International Politics. However, for the purpose of this thesis the author distinguishes between the two using Wehner and Thies' (2014) definition. They state, “identity lacks agency since it is not a concept that has an action-driven meaning at its heart. Thus, the way to link identity and action through motivational dispositions is through roles. In this sense, roles become a via media between identity and actions - correcting the assumption that identity alone determines the interests a state pursues in the international system - without action defined as a conceptual property of identity” (p. 418).

The construction of Russia's identity in the Middle East allows for the possibility of enacting its role perception as a balancer/mediator. This role perception, in turn, is shaped through internal and external contestation. In the following paragraphs the author will briefly examine the internal contestation of role identity from the end of the USSR to the establishment of pragmatic Statism under President Putin. The author will then examine the impact this has had on the shaping of Russia's role and identity internally and externally. Finally, the author will examine the construction of Russia's role conception in the Middle East.

Upon the breakup of the USSR, Russia underwent the difficult process of constructing a new role and identity. Throughout the period of the 1990s several competing factions attempted to gain control of the narrative regarding what Russia's new identity and role should be, and the effects of this role contestation can be seen domestically and externally. When role contestation is occurring within a state, an amount of inconsistency will be demonstrated as a certain narrative and role takes the lead, only to be scuttled in favor of an alternative one (Cantir & Kaarbo 2011 p.16-17). With the end of the Soviet Union and the beginning of a new Russian state, the policies amongst the Russian elite guiding foreign policy were explicitly Westernist (Belopolsky 2009 p. 14). Yeltsin and Kozyrev attempted to establish strong ties with the West based on an integrative policy (ibid p. 17). However, the policies of the Westernizers faced heavy contestation from other elites within Russia who had different visions of what Russia's identity and foreign policy should be. Chief among these were the Statists, who had their interests better represented once Yevgeny Primakov became Foreign Minister in 1996 (Clunan 2009 p. 127). As Russia oscillated from an approach that heavily emphasized cooperation and integration with the West, to one that regarded Russia's values as distinctly different from the West's, their role externally in the Middle East also began to shift (Tsygankov 2010). Significantly, the role shift in the 1990s came not from a place of changing material capabilities, as Russia's economy would not begin its upward path until the late 1990s, several years after Westernist policies had already begun to be abandoned (ibid p. 99). Rather, the shift was due to constitutive role learning as Russia's internal contestations interacted with its external Alter.

Russia's attempt to adopt an integrative partnership with the West failed, among other reasons, due to a heavy amount of misconceptions regarding what Russia's true role would be in the post-Soviet world. Russia's idea of an integrative security collective in Europe, one in which it would be an equal partner and have an equal vote, ultimately proved to be a false ideal (Belopolsky 2009 p. 20). Furthermore, the expansion of NATO would have severe repercussions in Russia and the West, as the expansion was considered by Russia as proof that the West would view them not as an equal partner, and certainly not as a friend, but still as a threat to be contained (Tsygankov 2010 p. 94). While Russia was picturing a role in which it would be part of a new European security framework, the West was sending signals that Russia interpreted as meaning that they would not be part of a new, equal security partnership. Rather, Russia felt that its views would rarely be taken into consideration on issues important to them (Belopolsky 2009 p. 25). The material insufficiency in Russia was a large reason for mitigating Russia to a lesser role; however, this slight of Russia would be remembered with bitterness within Russia as they began to rebuild and regain some of its former strength (Stent 2014 p. 14).

These external signals sent from the West were influential in contributing to the shifting of policies in Russia even as domestic role contestation simultaneously allowed for a different set of elites to control the foreign policy. With the beginning of Primakov's time as foreign minister the new Statist mindset, with a hint of Eurasianism, began to be explicitly evident. While not anti-Western per se, Statists emphasized the importance of Russia developing its own identity and values based on its own unique history and culture (Clunan 2009 p. 79). Primakov's Statism would carry over to Putin's terms as President, albeit with Putin's adaptation. Putin tends to charter a more middle-ground, pragmatic approach, slightly more than Primakov used during his tenure (Mankoff 2012 p. 36). With the adoption of Statism in the mid-1990s, and the continuation of Statism mixed with pragmatism under Putin and Medvedev, Russia's role contestation stabilized. This process of role contestation and role identity adoption was not easy for Russia, and arguably Russia still faces an identity crisis. However, the stress of this identity crisis has been greatly mitigated under Putin as he himself has taken on the symbolic representation of stability within Russia (Smyth 2014 p. 570).

As Russia faced domestic contestation over the construction of its role identity, it also faced external pressure from the Alter, or the significant Others it encountered. At times this pressure comes from misperceptions regarding the role Russia did/does adopt. As discussed per Wehner and Thies (2014), the role a state adopts can be rejected or accepted by significant Others who hold certain perceptions about a state and might perceive a very different role for that state (p. 418). Actions that are taken through the lens of this particular role will be analyzed in a certain way. If a state is perceived by the significant Others as an aggressor, any actions taken in the international scene by that actor will be colored by that perception. The danger of this is that this may lead to misperceptions and incorrect conclusions. For example, Russia's role conception in the post-Soviet space is very different from its conception in the Middle East region. When a RAND report in 2017 states, “Russia may present itself as a conservative power in the Middle East, but in its near abroad, Russia is a disruptive power” they are creating a perception that Russia's role in the near abroad will be exactly the same as in the Middle East (Sladden et al 2017 p. 4). This is an insufficient linkage to make, as according to Holsti, states hold different NRCs about themselves. For example, take one of Holsti's (1970) role conceptions, that of “regional leader,” in which the state takes an active role in the policies of a certain region since it considers itself a natural leader for the region. This could be applied to Russia's perception of its role in Central Asia (p. 261). However, this role perception cannot be transferred to Russia's role in the Middle Eastern region. Rather, it is perhaps more accurate to use Holsti's role of “mediator-integrator” (ibid p. 262, 265). Indeed, in the following chapters the author will use the term mediator/balancer to refer to Russia's role in the region.

Acknowledging the simple conclusion that Russia's role conception in the Middle Eastern region is distinct from other roles it perceives for itself, such as in the Post-Soviet space or vis-à-vis the US, allows for a new perspective for analyzing Russia's interests, role, and strategy in the Middle Eastern region. To demonstrate the validity of this approach further, the next chapter will examine further the construction and enactment of Russia's role and identity internally and externally in the Middle East.

3. Russia and the Middle East

3.1 Introduction

Kreutz (2007) argues that Russia's “moral credentials” have often been higher than other Western states (p. 2). Historically, while Western states divided the Middle East into spheres of influence following World War I, Russia stayed out of the region (ibid). The Soviet's legacy in the Middle East was not one free of conflict, but at times the Soviets were a capable counter-weight to the US. Kozhanov (2017) states, “In general, the Soviet legacy was one of balance among the various Middle Eastern countries. They had warm relations with several Middle Eastern states in general, and more neutral relations with others” and, “By the fall of the USSR in 1991, Soviet authorities had created a solid foundation for the development of fruitful cooperation with the Arab world and Iran” (p. 102). With the collapse of the USSR Russia witnessed a retraction of its active role in the Middle East, and some felt that the Russian Middle Eastern strategy was one of “tacitly [accepting] American predominance” (Kreutz 2007 p. 3). This retraction was counter to interests of the Arab states, according to Primakov. Rather, as Primakov argued, no Arab state had wished for the end of the Soviet Union (ibid). Regardless, the Soviet Union did end, leaving its successor state the task of establishing a new role and identity in the Middle East. Briefly, the next section will address the internal and external role contestation in Russia that affected their role in the Middle East. The application of the synthetic theoretical approach will demonstrate the solidification of Russia's balancer/mediator role through Russia's juxtaposition to the US, their ability to act as mediator between various actors, and the recognition of this role by significant Others.

3.2 A Russian Identity in the Middle East: Role Construction

It is first worth acknowledging that Russia is often depicted as having an underlying and unshakable belief in its identity and role as a great power. These underlying beliefs about their identity can be briefly summarized by Mankoff (2012) when he writes that elites in Russia are “united by a shared belief that Russia should play a pivotal role in world affairs, that it should maintain a sphere of influence around its borders, and that a relationship of equals with the other large powers (especially the US) provides the basic foundation for the country's international behavior” (p. 65). Russia holds a core identity of being a great power, and Putin has maintained this idea as an integral part of Russia's identity (Tsygankov 2010 p. 161). In his August 16, 1999 speech before the State Duma for his confirmation as Prime Minister, the then unknown Vladimir Putin stated that “Russia has been a great power for centuries, and remains so” (“Vladimir Putin” 2014). His stated goals became one of stabilizing and restoring Russia's power both internally and externally (ibid). Acknowledging this core identity is important, as Wehner and Thies (2014) argue, a “role” becomes the “via media between identity and actions” (p. 418). This identity also influences Russia's implicit assumptions regarding their ability to be an influential actor in the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia's peculiar history as an eastward-facing country influences the narrative behind their identity in the Middle East and the role they play there, especially in relation to Iran. Despite the ultimate path towards Statism, elements of Eurasianism, a historical Russian narrative that has seen a revival in recent years, remain present in Russia (Cronin 2015 p. 649). The Civilizationist school of thought within the Russian elite retains some of the ideals of the original Eurasianists, and the influence of the Civilizationists could be seen in statesmen like Primakov, who was influential in reviving Russia's interest in the Middle East (Kreutz 2007 p. 4; Tsygankov 2010 p. 20; Borshchevskaya 2016a p. 24).

In 2010, Katz (2010) wrote, “in short, Russia now has good relations with every major actor in the Arab-Israeli arena, both pro-Western and anti-Western” (p. 9). In 2017 he confirmed that Russia has maintained that careful balance of good relations (Katz 2017a). Russia's balancing act means that is has open dialogue with countries in the Middle East who all exist on, what is at times drastically, separate poles. It maintains friendly relations with Israel and Egypt, and yet supports Hamas and Hezbollah as legitimately elected factions (Katz 2010 p. 10). It has pursued economic cooperation with the Gulf States, even hosting Saudi Arabia's King Salman in Moscow in October 2017 (Meredith 2018). And yet it has long historical ties with Iran, who is considered Saudi Arabia's rival in the Middle East. It has supported Syria's Assad regime militarily, while pushing for both Turkey and Iran to be members of the negotiating team for a resolution of the Syrian conflict despite their opposing views on the Assad regime (Wintour 2017). With military intervention in Syria, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to protect its interests in the region, as well as its ability to act as a key player (Lynch 2015). As mentioned previously, Russia's domestic contestations led to varying policies towards the Middle East. However, as Russia's internal identity and role contestation has stabilized under Putin, Russia has continued to pursue a balanced and mediating approach towards the Middle East focused on pragmatism and non-ideological grounds (Kozhanov 2017 p. 108). As Simons (2016) writes, “Putin positions Russia as the voice of reason and counterbalance to the Western excesses and interference in the region and their poor faith toward Russia” (p. 162). In a 2016 interview with Bloomberg Putin stated, “we have never meddled in the domestic affairs of any state and we never will” (Micklethwait 2016). He elaborated further by stating “we do want Russia to have stronger and more tangible influence, but we want it to be absolutely peaceful and positive. What we have in mind is economic and humanitarian influence, which implies developing equal cooperation with our neighbors” (ibid). The acceptance of this narrative by all actors is not universal, but it displays the attempts by Putin to project a certain narrative image.

The process of Russia's identity and role formation in the Middle East has involved years of signaling. As was stated by a Russian diplomat, the role Russia played in the Middle East “was based on prestige accumulated over many years and traditional ties, not on the spending of money” (Kreutz 2007 p. 60). Russia yields noteworthy diplomatic power, especially since the beginning of Putin's tenure as President (Matthews 2017). In the early and mid-2000s Putin underwent a series of visits to the Middle East and hosted several “high-level officials” in return (ibid). In 2000 Putin “unilaterally abrogated” the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, and hosted the Iranian president Mohamed Khatami in March 2001 (Freedman 2010 p. 15). Gafarli (2012) writes, “Khatami's visit to Moscow was so successful that Primakov called it `the most significant event in the history of relations between Moscow and Tehran'” (p. 144). In 2000 Russian-Turkish relations also improved as they signed a number of agreements, causing Russian Prime Minister Khasyanov to state, “Russia and Turkey are not rivals but partners” (Freedman 2010 p. 25). Putin's personal visits to the Middle East included “Turkey, Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian territories in the December 2004-April 2005 period, to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Iran in 2007, to Libya in 2008, and to Turkey in 2009” (ibid p. 43). Putin became “the first Russian leader to visit Israel and the UAE” (Belbagi 2018), the first to visit Egypt in over forty years, and the first Russian or Soviet leader to ever visit Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Borshchevskaya 2017 p. 3). Russia also gained observer status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2005 (Freedman 2010 p. 44).