Analysis of the process of identity and role construction through which Russia has obtained a specific identity and role in the Middle East

According to Lynch (2015), Russia has built an amount of respect for itself in the Middle East. He quotes Vitaly Churkin, Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2006-2017, who states “for us, if you have good relations with a country, a government, for years, for decades, then it's not so easy to ditch those politicians and those governments because of political expediency” (Lynch 2015). Lynch speculates the comment was a possible dig at the way the U.S worked with, and then helped overthrow Hussein, or had “made peace” with Gaddafi, only to help overthrow him in 2011 (ibid). As Kozhanov (2018) writes,

“the US reluctance to protect Mubarak compared with the support Moscow provided to Assad encourages regional powers to consider Russia a more reliable partner. The fast dispatch of weapons to the Iraqi authorities in 2014 when they badly needed new equipment to fight a rising ISIS (while the US-led Western states were only thinking about whether and how they should help the Iraqi army) served to demonstrate Russia's responsibility to an ally” (p. 24).

Russia's efforts at role construction continue with the advent of new regimes in the Middle East. Despite Russia's displeasure at the US invasion of Iraq, Russia has established a working relationship with the new regime in Iraq. They have, for example, united with both Iraq and Iran to deal with the Syrian conflict with the hope of resolving it with Assad remaining in power (O'Connor 2018). Egypt has also established a closer relationship with Russia in the wake of the downfall of Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has, as of 2015, “paid four visits to Moscow since taking power” (Lynch 2015). Just as importantly, Moscow has thus far refrained from picking sides on complicated issues, such as in the Yemen conflict or the Kurdish question in Iraq and Turkey (Singh 2017 pp. 10-11).

In the wider Iranian/Saudi Arabia conflict, Russia has been able to prevent itself from being dragged into the conflict. Despite increasing ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman Al Saud stated after his June 2017 meeting with Putin that “relations between Saudi Arabia and Russia are the best in history” (Legucka 2017 p. 1). Russia has supported the idea of West Jerusalem as being the capital of Israel, stating “we view West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel” while also adding, “we reaffirm our commitment to the UN-approved principles for a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, which include the status of East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state” (“Foreign Ministry” 2017). This middle-ground approach allows Moscow to argue that they remain present on both sides of the table, hosting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on February 12th 2018, and before that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on January 29th 2018 (Belenkaya 2018; “After Netanyahu” 2018).

Despite adopting a balanced approach to the region, Moscow retains certain ideas regarding the best way to deal with the Middle East. For example, Russia believes that maintaining a balance of power between the various sovereign states in the Middle East is the surest way to assure stability in the region (Singh 2017 p. 11). The Arab Spring served as a powerful narrative tool, and for both Russia and other Middle Eastern states, the instability that occurred in the wake of the overthrow of certain regimes simply confirmed their belief that regime change will foster terrorism and instability (Kozhanov 2017 p. 107). Russia's support for the existing Middle Eastern regimes also derives from its belief that the best way to counteract terrorism is through a strong central state (Singh 2017 p. 11). These beliefs are very similar to those of several Middle Eastern states and have been influential in establishing common ground for role and identity construction. Furthermore, the perceptions toward America's role in destabilizing the Middle Eastern region through what many viewed as foreign interventionism meant that Russia's historic role of supporting existing regimes, and being distrustful of regime change, leant them more credibility to the Middle Eastern states who are far more “interested in stability” (Gvosdev 2017).

Wendt's Lockean culture leads to states forming working relationships in a systemic culture, all in recognition of each other's sovereignty (Wendt 1999 p. 279-280). There are “discursive conditions” (ibid p. 135) that form a base for certain relationships in the Middle East. Years of balancing and pursing diplomatic paths have allowed Russia to develop a balancer/mediator role and to form an identity as a reasonable, balanced actor whom the Middle Eastern states see as a constructive partner. The following section more closely examines Russia's enactment of this role and identity.

3.3 Russia's Enactment of the Balancer/Mediator Role

With the beginning of Yeltsin's turn towards the West and the efforts of Westernists within Russia to form a cooperative, integrative relationship with the West, some saw Russia as simply acceding to US demands regarding the Middle East, such as in Iraq (Kozhnov 2017 p. 103). Kozyrev as Moscow's foreign minister seemed to give his assent to US policies in Iraq, including bombings undertaken by the US and Britain (Tsygankov 2010 p. 73). This passive acceptance of US policies in the region wouldn't continue forever, however, as elites pointed to the heavy economic toll the sanctions on Iraq had for Moscow since Iraq owed Russia $7 billion from their old Soviet debts (ibid). In 1993, as internal contestation within Russia caused a shift towards Statist thinking, Russia became more assertive in their interests towards Iraq. In the fall of 1994, Kozyrev visited Baghdad twice trying to pressure Iraq to recognize Kuwait as a sovereign nation (Kreutz 2007 p. 85). In September 1996 when the US launched air strikes against Iraq in retaliation for military incursions into Kurdish territory, Moscow attempted once again to mediate, only to have US launch attacks without giving Russia the adequate negotiation time to settle the issue. Russia resented the attack, believing it to be unnecessary (ibid p. 86). Diplomatic attempts by Russia would continue throughout the rest of the 1990s, to only a limited degree of success (ibid p. 87-89).

US policy in Iraq was puzzling to many states, including those in Europe. There appeared to be special antagonism towards Iraq, based on a strange type of moral credence, which made their actions at times seem excessive and unbalanced (Rouleau 1995). In Iraq, US bombings and sanctions seemed to take an increasingly heavy humanitarian toll on the people living there (ibid pp. 60-61). Many interpreted the US as skirting international law in their dealings in Iraq, motivated by their own unilateral interests (Nizameddin 1999 p. 206). Russia's continued diplomatic efforts in Iraq contrasted against this image of the US, and their opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 supported the narrative of Moscow as the “defender of Iraq in the international arena” (Kreutz 2007 p. 7). Initially coming from a place of material insufficiency, meaning that diplomacy was the best route for Moscow to maintain influence in certain issues, it has been a role that has continued to today even as Russia has regained some of its material strength (Kreutz 2007 p. 4; Tsygankov 2010 p. 236). Russia's role in Iraq in the 1990s supported the role identity of mediator/balancer it saw for itself, despite the limited success it had against the US. Their actions in Iraq foreshadowed the recurrent way Russia is often viewed in the Middle East counter to the US role and identity in the region.

Moscow's role conception as balancer/mediator is demonstrated by how it has developed relations between various countries in the Middle East, positioning it to be one of the “few countries that can simultaneously sustain positive relations with Iran, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel [making] Russia a perfect candidate to be a mediator in the region” (Kozhanov 2018 pp. 23-24). During periods of the Syrian conflict Russia has attempted to mediate between competing sides. For example, they intervened to prevent Western intervention in Syria after the Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons, leading to a negotiated settlement and an agreement by the Assad regime to hand over their foreign weapons, a huge ideological win for Russia (Har-Zvi 2016 p. 11). With perhaps a tad too much enthusiasm, Dmitry Suslov (2014) called this diplomatic mediation “one of the most brilliant and smart acts of diplomacy in recent history” (p. 12). As will be discussed in the next chapter, Moscow was also instrumental in the negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear deal (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 8).

Moscow's relationship with Hamas meant that when it won the Palestine parliamentary elections in 2006, it was “in a unique position of influence” (Kreutz 2007 p. 77). Russia has attempted to be a mediating force between Hamas and other actors since then (Freedman 2010 p. 31). For example, Russia acted as a mediator in the attempts to help Fatah and Hamas form a “unity government” (Younes 2017). They hosted talks between the two sides in January 2017, helping pave the road for a reconciliation agreement in October 2017 (ibid; “Palestinian Factions” 2017). While Israel has never been happy with Moscow's connection to Hamas, it has been useful at times. Har-Zvi (2016) admits that Moscow can serve as a tie between Israel and what he labels the “radical axis” (p. 26). Katz argues that in light of President Trump's decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, the Palestinian side may be less willing to deal with the US as a mediator between the two sides (Katz 2017b p. 134). Katz (2017b) states, “Interestingly, Russia seems to have suggested a compromise solution on this issue by recognizing West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.” Suggesting a diplomatic path reinforces Russia's role as a mediator in the region, and it comes as a counter-force to what Simons (2016) labels “Western excesses” (p. 162). Despite Russia's ties to Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran; Russia has formed strong ties with Israel, a beneficial relationship for both sides. Russia “wants to be seen as an honest broker--more impartial than the United States--between the Israelis and the Arabs” (Trenin 2010 p. 8). This has led to a deepening of personal ties between Putin and Israeli PM Netanyahu, often leading to constructive dialogue. Israel and Russia have also coordinated their actions in Syria and maintain dialogue about Israel's chief concerns with Hezbollah and the border region of the Golan Heights, and the establishment of Iranian forces in Syria (Marcus 2017).

While many more examples of Russia's mediator/balancer role can be given, the above examples demonstrate very briefly the way Russia can enact their role conception in the region. This chapter has analyzed Russia's wider role in the Middle East, adopting both role theory and constructivist arguments to examine Russia's role, identity, and use of signaling in the Middle East. The following section will more deeply examine Russian-Iranian relations as a case study to further validate the synthetic theoretical approach.

4. Russia and Iran

4.1 Introduction

The current close relationship between Iran and Russia served as an impetus for choosing Iran as a case study. This development seems counter-intuitive at times, and thus the author hoped that investigating the relationship utilizing the synthetic theoretical approach would uncover a new perspective on the relationship.

It is insufficient to analyze Russia's relationship with Iran from a neorealist or zero-sum perspective, as they provide an insufficient explanation for the differing perspectives of Russia and the US on the nuclearization of Iran (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 7). While Moscow did not want Iran to gain nuclear weapons, their concerns behind the nuclearization of Iran were distinct from the US. A neorealist who doesn't take into consideration the process of identity and interest formation via a significant Other (as Constructivist do) would view the acquisition of power by other states as a threat to their own state's interests. However, despite the threat that a more powerful Iran could pose to Moscow, the path they took towards negotiating was one of cooperation, and some argued they even played a large part in “developing Iran's nuclear program and military capability” (Freedman 2010 p. 44).

While Russia did agree to sanctions against Iran, they often fought to water-down these sanctions, and Russia's interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons had more to do with their interest in maintaining regional balance between the various Middle Eastern states than out of concern of what Iran's nuclear weapons could to do Russia itself (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 7). Geranmayeh and Liik (2016) quote one Russian expert as saying, “Both we and the US are concerned at the prospect of a nuclear Iran - but we are concerned in different ways” (p. 7). This disparity comes from the divergence in discursive understandings developed between the states, as Moscow's relationship with Iran in the societal sphere has created certain Self-Other understandings.

Moscow's relationship with Iran also further solidified its own role conception in the Middle East. We see evidence for this in the way that Moscow's role as balancer/mediator has allowed actors like Netanyahu to come to Moscow to discuss Israel's concern about Iran (“After Netanyahu” 2018). Another example of tremendous importance for Russia is their role as a chief actor in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Russia's role in the negotiations was important enough for President Obama to call Putin “to thank him for Russia's role in reaching the P5+1 agreement with Iran” (Kozhanov 2018 p. 6). The process that led to Russia being an important actor in this issue will be more closely examined in the second section of this chapter.

4.2 Building a Constructive Relationship

neoliberalism international political

Over the years Russia and Iran have formed an understanding, a perception of each other that comes through societal interactions. Part of their shared understanding comes from their shared view of the systemic system they reside in (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 2). The juxtaposition of Russia's actions against some of Iran's significant Others lends Russia more credibility. The section below will examine several interactions between Russia and Iran that have led to a certain constructive understanding between the two states. This has allowed them, despite conflict, to continue building a strategic relationship.

In the 1990s when Russian and Iranian relations were most strained due to its Westernist swing, Moscow and Tehran still found common ground. The most important signal for Russia was Iran's restraint on the Chechen issue, as they shielded Russia from criticism during their presidency of the OIC. Iran's “rather sympathetic” stance towards Russia on the issue “convinced the Kremlin that they [were] dealing in Tehran with a rational, calculating, geopolitically savvy leadership, not a rogue regime” (Trenin 2010 p. 13). In addition, the two states cooperated to end the civil war in Tajikistan, a largely Muslim populated state residing in Central Asia, a place Russia “considers its domain” (ibid). While Iran has had a long history of conflict with the West and their attempts to engage the ideological foundation of the Iranian state, Moscow has steered away from this issue (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 2). Thus, while the US labels Iran part of the “axis of evil”, Russia has never “been viewed as attempting to target the ideological basis of the Islamic Republic” (ibid pp. 2, 8). In 2012 Putin even labelled Iran Russia's “old traditional partner” (ibid p. 7). In 2016, Geranmayeh and Liik quoted a senior Iranian expert as saying that “despite Russia's limitations and areas for distrust, `it has advanced Iranian interests in the most sensitive areas'” (p. 10).

While there is a “general consensus among Iran's leadership” that a relationship with Russia is in their best interests and has been valuable, it is worth acknowledging that there are still splits among the political elite on the issue (ibid p. 8). This can be evidenced by three “camps,” those of the “Russia-leaners”, the “re-balancers” and those of the “middle-way” (ibid pp. 9-10). The re-balancers are concerned that an over-reliance on Russia will mean that Iran will miss out on opportunities to deepen ties with other countries, including in the West (ibid p. 9). They thus encourage policy to shift away from deepening ties with Russia, as the Russia-leaners wish to do. As implied by the name, those of the middle-way seek to find a compromise between the two sides (ibid p. 10). It is recognized in this approach that Iran has a special relationship with Russia; however, this does not mean Iran will disengage from working with other actors (ibid). It is this middle-way approach that Geranmayeh and Liik believe the re-balancers will work towards.

It is notable for the development of the Iranian-Russian relationship, and for the Russia-leaners position, that several issues between the two states in the 2000s have been resolved. For example, the Bushehr nuclear plant reached full capacity in 2012 under Russian supervision, despite the long road that led to its construction, laying to rest one contentious issue between the two states (Financial Tribune 2017). Further expansion of the Bushehr plant and capacity have been agreed on between the two states, and the Bushehr-2 project has begun construction in tandem between Russia and Iran (ibid). Another contentious issue was the delayed delivery of the S-300 air defense system which had been agreed on in 2007. In 2016 delivery of the system to Iran began (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 7). Because of the delay, Russia delivered the S-300PMU2 system, which is an update from the previously agreed air-defense system (ibid). In Syria, Iran and Russia have united in their efforts to bring an end to the conflict. In 2016 Iran allowed Russia to use the Hamadan airbase to support their bombing campaign in Syria - an unprecedented sign of trust (Borschchevskaya 2017 p. 3). Their cooperation in Syria led to a deepening of their relationship, “despite many predictions of a split due to their historic rivalry” (Borshchevskaya 2018). In the construction of a ceasefire and peace agreement within Syria, the two countries have not only cooperated, but Russia has also been able to coordinate having both Iran and Turkey at the negotiating table (O'Connor 2017). Recently, Russia has even taken steps “to establish a free-trade zone between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union” (O'Connor 2018).

Russia's relationship with Iran is just one example of the wider role that it plays in the Middle East. The signals Russia has sent through the years have not been one of judgement or conflict, but rather ones which communicate that Russia wishes to build a constructive relationship with Iran. Thus, despite the presence of contentious issues, the two states have navigated their differences to continue building a strategic relationship.

Russia's perception of its role as mediator/balancer has also influenced its behavior towards Iran, as it is within the confines of Russia's role to be able to talk with every legitimate actor in the Middle East (Kozhanov 2018 p. 23). No matter how much Russia perceives itself as a balancer/mediator, unless that role is confirmed by a significant Other, then that role will have to eventually be abandoned (Harnisch 2012 p. 54).

Thus, Russia's role in the negotiation process for the JCPOA solidified Russia's role perception. It is this specific issue the author examines now.

4.3 The Nuclear Issue

In the early 1990s as Moscow was on a more Westernist path, Russia's relationship with Iran was minimized (Kreutz 2007 p. 4). Russia faced a tremendous amount of pressure from the US when it came to its relationship with Iran (Orlov & Vinnikov 2005 p. 52). Indeed, many analysts attribute the waxing and waning of their relationship to each state's relationship to the US (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 6). However, despite the pressure from the US, and the at times up-and-down relationship with Iran, Russia still tended to maintain an independence from the US in its interactions with Iran (Kreutz 2007 p. 52). This can be evidenced in the way Russia has approached the nuclear issue. While Russia has maintained its own views towards Iran and has resisted US pressure to limit their Iranian relationship, it has approached the issue in-line with the “general internationally agreed principles of non-proliferation” (Dannreuther 2012 p. 545). Therefore, though it sought to “water down” sanctions against Iran, it did not resist them completely when Iran refused to cooperate with the international resolutions or was found to violate the principles of non-proliferation (Freedman 2010 p. 29; Katz 2010 pp. 213-214). Moscow's support of Tehran in the nuclear energy departments continued despite, at times, deep frustrations with Iran's nuclear policies. Even after the discovery that Iran had been undertaking clandestine nuclear research for many years, making their knowledge on how to construct a nuclear weapon much deeper than Russia had anticipated, Moscow chose to continue deepening their strategic partnership with Iran (Dannreuther 2012 pp. 54, 56).

This became a recurring theme as Iran faced further sanctions. In 2006, when Russia refrained from preventing the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that led to sanctions against Iran, many in Iran “felt betrayed,” but could also “understand the rationale,” and ultimately believed that Moscow remained “as the main obstacle to a Western or Israeli-led military strikes on its nuclear facilities” (Geranmayeh & Liik 2016 p. 2). Moscow's resistance to sanctions against Iran did not mean they wished for a nuclear Iran, as this could disrupt the balance of power in the region and lead to destabilization (ibid p. 7). However, their relationship with Iran meant they had reasons to support Tehran on the international scene.

Paulraj (2015) argues that due to Russia's aid in developing Iran's nuclear program, they played a key role during the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal negotiations (p. 103). According to Putin, “The Russian negotiating team and nuclear experts have made a significant...contribution to the drafting of the comprehensive arrangements, which made it possible to align the different, often opposing views” (Borshchevskaya 2016). With President Trump's decision to pull out of the JCPOA, Russia will once again be in the middle of mediations involving the nuclear issue. As Al-Monitor observes, Trump's decision may mean that Putin is “the best bet, or last man standing, to offer a diplomatic off-ramp for Israel and Iran to avoid war” (“Putin's stock rises” 2018). As Wright (2018) points out, this is one more reason for Putin to drive home, especially to Iran, that compared to the US and their perceived fickleness, “you can trust us” (Wright 2018). It remains to be seen what will happen in the aftermath of Trump's decision; however, the years of support for Iran that positioned Russia in 2015 to perfectly enact the role of mediator/balancer they perceived for themselves, and was in turn recognized by significant Others, will continue to be valuable in this issue.

5. Discussion and Final Analysis

5.1 The Danger of Using One Narrative Lens

Analyzing the evidence presented in chapters three and four using a synthetic theoretical approach allows for a deeper analysis than neorealism and neoliberalism can give us. Claims of Russia's strategic choices in the Middle East being conducted through the lens of a zero-sum game, and with concern over the accumulation of power, becomes a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy - something Wendt himself warns of (Wendt 1999 p. 263). For example, analysts like Borshchevskaya (2018) will see Russian gains coming at the expense of the US or when the US insufficiently stood up to Russia (pp. 12-13). Her response is for the US to counter Russia by securing its own interests in the region. This creates an image of “two-boxers in a ring” (Meyer and Abu-Nasr 2017). An image such as that simply perpetuates a narrative of conflict in the region. As Wendt (1999) writes, “the role of enemy is symmetric, constituted by actors being in the same position simultaneously. Self mirrors Other, becomes its enemy, in order to survive. This of course will confirm whatever hostile intentions the Other had attributed to the Self, forcing it to engage in realpolitik of its own, which will in turn reinforce the Self's perception of the Other, and so on. Realpolitik, in short, is a self-fulfilling prophecy: its beliefs generate actions that confirm those beliefs” (p. 263).

Katz (2017b), who is not a social constructivist, acknowledges that “the lack of cooperation between Russia and the West will only serve to exacerbate the ongoing problems of the Middle East” (p. 135).

By viewing Russia's identity and role in this region through one narrative lens, the default is to view Russia distrustfully and to take specific action that forces Russia out of the region. This is an insufficient response, as it misconceives Russia's attempts to create constructive ties with the various parties in the Middle East. Adopting strategic choices against Russia will lead to destabilization, as their current role conception in the region is as a regional mediator/balancer. Forcing Russia to reject this role could lead to destabilization as they seek out different roles for themselves. To adequately understand Russia's position in the Middle East, one must consider the process Russia has undertaken to construct a certain role and identity for itself. Otherwise, there will simply be a perpetuation of conflict based on misperception and mistrust.

5.2 Historical Narrative Dissonance

In the period 1808-09 British newspapers expressed their view of Russian world power by depicting the Russian bear as an animal cowed by Napoleon Bonaparte. They showed cartoons of the “the Russian bear being ridden by a tiny Napoleon, licking his boots, being led by a chain attached to its nose, muzzled while blowing a French horn” and so on (Anderson 1956 p. 411). Nations and races have often had animal affiliations attached to them, and while many of them have gone out of fashion (think of the association of the Japanese as macaques), Lazari and Riabov (2010) argue that the image of the Russian bear has persisted (p. 318). This symbol, they argue, was largely attributed to Russia to demonstrate their backwardness and inferiority (ibid p. 319). The bear is meant to portray aggressiveness, and throughout history people like Winston Churchill have warned people to beware the “the murderous paws of the Russian Bear” (ibid p. 320). The narrative construction of the brutish Russian bear clashes against Russian's own use of the symbolic image. In the 1980 Olympics the Russians did indeed use a bear as their mascot, but not as a fearsome animal to inspire, but rather as a cute, plush, smiling bear nicknamed Misha (Alpert 2014). The author begs forgiveness for this lengthy metaphor, but the narrative dissonance displayed in the representation of the two Russian bears interestingly represents the wider dissonance that occurs when regarding Russia's role and identity in the Middle East (Monaghan 2016 pp. 8-9). When heralding the return of the Russian bear to the Middle East, can one say which bear is being discussed? To understand the role Russia plays in the Middle East, policymakers must be aware of the narrative discourses they rely on. As seen with the divergent understandings of Orientalism, there is often variance in the understandings of certain narratives between Russia and the West. Just as one must consider the process of role and identity creation, one should also be aware of multiple narratives and the divergent paths they can take. These narratives, after all, are a part of the constitutive formation of roles and identities.

Conclusion

By using the synthetic theoretical approach, the author has demonstrated that Russia's role conception in the Middle East influences its behavior and leads to a certain role enactment. Differing conceptions of Russia can exist, often in contradiction. However, the way that role conceptions can vary depending on the region or relationship should be acknowledged to prevent misperceptions of Russia and their behavior. Additionally, by viewing Russia's behavior in the Middle East from a constructivist perspective, the author has shown that Russia's relationship with the Middle Eastern states has been formed in a constitutive way in which their identity as an actor within the social structures is shaped by those social structures, even as they further construct them. Russia's role conception and identity continues to be solidified as they partake in negotiations and mediations on issues in the Middle East, such as the Syria conflict.

Due to the limited scope of this essay, a full analysis of Russia's relationship with all the actors in the Middle East cannot be conducted. However, the case study has allowed a more detailed analysis of how Russia has striven to establish a cooperative, working relationship with Iran despite the existence of conflictual issues. The synthetic theoretical approach used for this undertaking can be further utilized to analyze Russia's relationship vis-а-vis other states and regions of the world. While cooperative social structures may not always be created, this is not to the detriment of the theoretical approach. Wendt is careful to specify that both cooperative and conflictual structures can be created through the process of interaction, hence why Russia's position in the Middle East is very different from its position in Central Asia or with the US. Further analysis can also be conducted using further primary sources from the various Middle Eastern states, as well as from Russia. Specific statements from heads of states, interviews, and foreign policy publications can be more deeply utilized to further enlighten the perception of Russia's role and identity in the region. Due to linguistic barriers, the author was unable to undertake a more extensive type of primary-source analysis.

Contemporary events continue to highlight the important position Russia has obtained in the Middle East. It holds a high amount of diplomatic power, as seen recently by its role in the Iranian nuclear deal and in the discussion of the aftermath of Trump's decision to pull out of it, its position as a mediator between Israel and Iran, and the Palestinian's reluctance to mediate with the US following the move of their embassy to Jerusalem. Thus, it is in the interests of all states to acknowledge the role identity Russia has created and enacted in the region, rather than attempting to force Russia out of a region it has spent years forming social structures within. This thesis has endeavored to demonstrate the validity of using a synthetic theoretical approach to uncover an alternative view of Russia's role and identity in the Middle East. In doing so, it has recognized the multiple narratives and discourses regarding Russia's presence in the region, each with their own truth claims worth acknowledging and exploring.

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