The role and place of Iran in the US and Russian Foreign Policies

The decision to support the two rival regional pillars, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the attempt to limit Great Britain and France, is certainly a strategic choice aimed at the national interest of acquiring ever greater dominance in the area. The real change in US-Iran relations will come with the revolution: the cooperative ties between Iran with the United States were suddenly cut short, as the fundamentalist leader began to exclude the United States from Iran, causing the loss of their position in the area. The deterioration of relationships will increase significantly to a point of no return. The anti-western revolution forced the United States to develop another theory, which will bring a further change of strategy: with the Carter doctrine, there will be a real active commitment in foreign policy towards Iran, currently under the name of unilateral nationalism. This theory established that any attempt to take control of the Persian Gulf would be seen as an attack on the vital interests of the United States, and there would be an immediate use of the use of force.McDougall, W., A., The Iranian Revolution, Enciclopaediae Britannica , Enciclopaediae Britannica Inc. 9 Jan 2020 [available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/20th-century-international-relations-2085155/The-Iranian-revolution#ref305093 ][access: 12 April 2020] Carter adopts this strategy because of the strategic importance of the region, by established a military force in the area. The bloody Iran-Iraq war, which occurred in the worst period of US-Iranian relations, was a further cause for tension. The United States had now given way to an active and interventionist policy, so, despite alliances, had to take part in the conflict. The frictions with Iran, the hostage crisis and the bad management of the Carter administration, together with Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and other terrorist groups led the US to take sides with Iraq; However, in order to maintain ties with the other regional hegemon, it also sent weapons to Iran. This fact will have serious repercussions in terms of bilateral relations with Iran for the consequences that this intervention caused them: the much longer duration of the conflict, the greater number of victims and the a heavy economic and social crisis after the war. Jafarzadeh, Alireza. The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. This event deteriorated US-Iranian relations; the US, in order to reconquer the region, took advantage of Kuwait's appeals for help.

The American foreign policy in 2000 is characterized by two issues that will lead to confrontation terrorism and the nuclear issue. Both phenomena are perceived by America as attempts for Iranian supremacy in the area. For this reason, with Bush administration first and with Obama and Trump then, despite the different modes of action, US foreign policy resulted in an active and aggressive conduct, reaching the pinnacle of the Iran - US confrontation, aiming at the same, constant interest of national security. Prifti B. Putting US Foreign Policy in a Theoretical Perspective. US Foreign Policy in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 09 Feb 2017. After the events of 9/11 and the change of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, American President Bush issued a doctrine justifying the preventive use of military force to target an opponent suspected of hatching an attack on the United States. He turned to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the "Axis of Evil", the nations in favour of international terrorism and engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Despite attempts to reconcile relations with Obama and Rouhani, Iran-US have reached a point of no return.

In conclusion, although there is much evidence that the United States has changed its strategy, which would see an engagement policy in a positive key, however, there are interests and objectives that stand as an obstacle to collaboration. The US aims to be a hegemonic power in the first place and the impossibility to accept Iran as equal. This prevents coexistence, since Iran has always constituted and will always constitute the role of Middle Eastern hegemonic power. The struggle for hegemony in the area will create countless reasons for confrontation.

The policies of Trump seem to change a little bit the situation of struggle in the area, since the fact that he is trying to move the focus to internal affairs, in order to the supremacy leadership against other competitors, such as China. Prifti, Bledar. Putting US Foreign Policy in a Theoretical Perspective. US Foreign Policy in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 09 Feb 2017.

Chapter 2

2. Russian Foreign Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran

The second chapter is dedicated to the relationship between Russian Federation and Iran.

The aim of this section is to provide a complete analysis of the Russian Foreign Policies towards Iran, to discuss the current place that the Islamic Republic has in the Russian agenda and to understand the nature of their relationship. The analysis of the main factors of interests in the Middle East and Iran, the national interests and goals set by Russia and their evolutions will provide me with all the necessary elements to establish, according to the realist notion of cooperation mentioned in the previous chapter, and despite the opinion of many authors who consider Iran as important element for Russian priorities, the lack of cooperation and the definition of the Russian strategy towards Iran.

Despite the opinion of many authors, who consider Iran as an important element for Russian Foreign policy sustaining the strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran, or pragmatic relations, Putin's “ambivalent strategy” seems to have a different nature. Russia and Iran - indeed- do not have a friendship or hostile relationship simply because, despite the deep historical bond, there is an evident lack of collaboration, especially from the Russian side. Unlike the relationship between US and Iran, Russia does not consider Iran neither necessary ally nor dangerous threat Meeting between the Supreme Leader and President of Russia”, Khamenei.ir, 23 November 2015, [available at http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=31470.] [access: 11 May 2020]. There are some areas of common interests that lead them to cooperate, such the project on Iranian territory, the nuclear reactor in Bushehr, the sale of weapons, S-300 missiles, and some international issues that lead them cooperating. However, what seems evident is that Iran does not represent a priority for Russia, because she does not consider Iran a serious partner in the international arena. The interest in cooperation with Moscow is a strategic preference for Iran only. Cited in Bьlent Aras and Fatih Цzbay. ЇThe limits of the Russian-Iranian strategic alliance: its history and geopolitics, and the nuclear issue,? Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2008, 56. What really matters to Russia - which would undoubtedly justify the active role that had on nuclear issues - is the main goal set by Vladimir Putin, consisting in reobtaining its place as “great power” in the new international system. The status of “super Power” that Russia had during the Soviet era is not lost, but it has to be regained. Establishing contacts with Iran can be the way, in order to have a primary role in the negotiations for the nuclear non-proliferation.

2.1 Historical Background: confrontation or collaboration?

Russia and Iran share a much older history compared to the US. Official reports between these two states date back to the 1592, the starting date of commercial trade and wars, which formed the basis of future relationship. Iran and Russia, indeed, do not only share geographical proximity, but also historical bonds and traditional peculiarities, which lead to commonality of views in the political, economic and cultural field. Historical, cultural, religious proximity of Persia with some Russian regions, such as Tatarstan, for instance, appears clear: Just think that the Islamic religion spread there, that the Arabic-Persian alphabet and characters remained until 1926 and that still today, in the local language, there are still traces of Persian. Moreover, the proximity of the Islamic vision spread in the region, far from extremism and maximalist sectarianism, creates the possibility of positive relations between the two countries. However, despite these proximities, history recalls particularly difficult moments of confrontation, due to the invasions of the tsarist empire against Iran in the nineteenth century, which resulted in Iranian historical grievances against Russia for years of domination, loss of territory, such as the south Caucasus and the North of Aras River.; Persia`s continuing decrease of power led to a submission to an Anglo - Russian consulate in the later period of nineteenth century and resulted in Soviet-Anglo invasion in 1941, which grew dramatically Iranian hatred for the Soviet Union, powers with which Iran never had positive relations and which contributed to the legacy of hostile relations between the two countries. The period after the second world war, during the shah rule, soviet influence was limited by containment policies, since the USSR was perceived as dangerous threat.

The Revolution: hostile relationship

The arrival of the radical leader Khomeini, despite the expectations of a change due to the end of the alliance with US, resulted in a further deterioration of relations, since the fact that communist, an atheist ideology, was considered an “anathema” to the Islamic revolutionaries. Khomeini defined the USSR “the little Satan” and sustained that there must be no alignment either with the West or the East. Moreover, Soviet support for the Tudeh and other leftists against the radical Islamists during the power struggle constituted a further reason for confrontation. The Soviet Union was very concerned for the large Muslim population living in Russian borders. Barylski R., V., The Russian Federation and Islamic Crescent. Europe - Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No.3, 1994, 393. In 1979 the USSR occupied Afghanistan: this takeover represented the last Soviet international intervention before the collapse. In 1980 the Soviet Union took part to the tremendous Iran-Iraq war, providing Iran with weapons for fear of the consolidation of the Islamic Republic, further increasing Iranian mistrust for foreign powers.

Collapse of the Soviet Union: friendly relations.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war and the withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan were the first signs for building a positive cooperation, increased by the death of the Islamic leader on the one hand and the fall of Soviet communism on the other dangerous threat for Iran's national security. The attempt to establish a moderate post-revolutionary government in Iran and the restart of Russia after the Soviet regime shelved Soviet rivalries. Moreover, the dependence on Russian weapons during the Gulf war made Iran realise the importance of Russia as partner for this commercial trade and Iranian need for foreign capital to improve its economic system.

Yeltsin Era: a new restart

When Yeltsin came to power, he realised that, in order to face Russian economic and social crisis and to ensure domestic stability - in the light of the first western rapprochement of former soviet republics - he has to intervene internationally, at least with his strategic neighbours Robert V. Barylski. ЇThe Russian Federation and Islamic Crescent? Europe - Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No.3, 1994, 391. . For this reason, he tried to improve relations with Iran. The president Rafsanjani, for its part, gave importance to re-shape relations with Russia to enable trade and to go out from the revolution isolation. Although Central Asia was important for Russia in Yeltsin era, Persian Gulf was also important as Iran held a strategic position in the region. A pragmatic cooperation gradually occurred while Russia started to recover from the harsh period of adjusting. Selling arms and cooperating with Iran was firstly related to Yeltsin's project of showing how Russia could exercise independent policies towards any country on any subject, without the intervention or the influence of the U.S. Despite the beginning of this cooperation, Yeltsin cancelled the sale of uranium-enriching centrifuges to Iran by reversing the Russian Ministry for Atomic Affairs (Minatom) and signed the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, promising he would not sign any new arms deals with Iran and would complete delivery of all existing weapons orders by the end of 1999. Boese, W., Congress Levies Accusations on Gore-Chernomyrdin Deal, Arms Control Association, November 2000, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-11/iran-nuclear-briefs/congress-levies-accusations-gore-chernomyrdin-deal] access: 16 May 2020], causing Iran's angry. However, bush's withdrawal from the ABM treaty, has re-approached Iran and Russia.

The rise of Vladimir Putin: antagonist friendship

As soon as Putin came to power, he made some relevant changes: on October 2000 he repudiated the Gore Chernomyrd and restarted selling arms to Teheran as well as a renewed Russian commitment to completing the Bushehr reactor Mark N. Katz, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Putin Era," Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 10, no.1 (Winter 2002): 71. New conflicts between Russia and Iran emerged in relations to Caspian Sea and its division between the 5 countries involved, a still on-going geopolitical issue. Putin, however, was concerned about a possible rapprochement between the US and Khatami, fearing that it would have meant less Russian influence in Iran. Parker, John W. Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran since the Fall of the Shah, Potomac Books, 15 Jan 2009, p.162-4. In October 2007 Putin visit to Tehran, an important event that demonstrated a possibility for new cooperation. He developed the defence sector and its exportation. Russia finally delivered the enriched uranium needed for starting up the plant. Russian officials stated that this delivery would enable the Bushehr reactor to be up and running by the end of 2008. However, they kept postponing this activation until 2011.

With Medvedev, Russia had the same behaviour: On December 17, 2008, RIA Novosti reported the almost realization of the supply of S-300s to Iran, Katz M., Russia and Iran., Academic Journal , Middle East Policy Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2012. but the fact has been denied by Russian authorities.

Ahmadinejad and Russian contradictions.

Moscow congratulated Ahmadinejad, despite the difference political positions, on the re-election in June 2009, hoping that his anti-American views would avoid a restoration of harmony with the US. Moscow feared that a possible "colour revolution" in Iran would bring to power a pro-American, anti-Russian government and knew about the bad opinion Iranians had on Russia. Darya Yuryeva, "Corridor for Ahmadinejad," Rossiyskaya gazeta Online, Moscow, 17 June 2009. Putin made offers for enrich uranium for commercial grade, hoping that it would have put an end to the nuclear crisis. On the other side the US and Western powers, together with the UN Security council, decided to impose sanctions against Iran, approved form Moscow. This made Iran furious, since the fact that they sustained they could have vetoed them. Tehran was especially upset when in 2010 then President Medvedev cancelled the agreement to sell S-300 air defence missile systems to Iran.

Current relations.

The election of Rouhani resulted in the beginning of negotiation effort between Iran and the other powers regarding most important concern of our time, the nuclear issue. Moreover, confrontation between West and Russia increased, especially because of Crimea. Freire, Maria, R., Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, The Return of the 'Great Game'

Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 20 October 2010. [Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kentuk/detail.action?docID=652410#] [access: 13 April 2020]. This event influenced Russia-Iran relations, in the sense that it might result in an alliance between Teheran and the US; however, in the light of the future of current facts occurring between this two countries, the opposite interests and the mistrust related to historical events, it is not a concrete problem. Indeed, Moscow's 2015 announcement that it would permit the sale of S-300 air defence missiles to Iran. Even exports between Iran and Moscow increased. Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms export agency, Atomstroyexport, the Russian atomic energy power equipment exporter, Gazprom, and the Russian petroleum industry are clear signs of Putin's will to develop a strategy towards Iran.

2.2 Factors and interests driving Russian Policy towards Iran: no significant changes.

The location of Iran in the Middle East and his importance in the area mean that the Tsarist empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation have always seen the area as interesting. Their closeness and their being neighbours in themselves introduce the issue of national security, stability of the borders and external threats. However, I will discuss each of main objectives and factors that have and are driving Russian Foreign Policy towards Iran and Middle East, important geostrategic region.

Caspian Sea

Russia and Iran share the Caspian Sea, the largest inland body of water. The huge quantity of gas and oil reserves present in the seabed makes this basin one of the major source of wealth and richness and a point of interest for the energetic strategy. Alam, Shah. ЇPipeline Politics in the Caspian Sea Basin, Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, Vol. 26, No. 1, January - March 2002. In this relevant body of water, moreover, Russia wants from this basin is an access to the warm sea because, even if Russia is the predominant resident power on the Eurasian continent, geographical disadvantages due to land-locked and ice-locked access made sea-communications very hard. The collapse of the Soviet Union revived a perpetual conflict for the Sea, disputed area between Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, never solved because of problems related to the lack the legal status of the basin that brought consequences event today. Nicolosi. M. Il problema del regime politico del Mar Caspio. Geopolitical Rewiev, Alpha Institute. 31 October 2016, [Available at: https://geopoliticalreview.alphainstitute.it/2016/10/31/problema-del-regime-giuridico-del-mar-caspio/] (accessed: 17 May 2020) Translation: The problem of the political regime of Caspian Sea, Geopolitical Rewiev, Alpha Institute. It caused serious disputes, ranging from economic and political issues, to environmental and ecological concerns. Despite many negotiations, they didn't manage to reach a compromise yet.

Neighbourhood and Security Issues

Iran and the Middle East represent a geo-strategical neighbourhood for Russia.

This opens to obvious security issues, related to control of legitimate trade and commerce and security in the sense that national interests are protected from external threat. Russia's concern is related to the presence of Islamic populations in the area and to the non-intervention policies in Russian Islamic neighbourhood; Cleveland W. and Bunton M. “A history of the modern Middle East,” Routledge, New York, Sixth Edition. the rise of Islamic population with the revolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran increased the possibility of threats and raised the need to protect them. Moreover, there is the need to mention another country belonging to Russia neighbourhood, which has always been a reason for confrontation with Iran, which is Iraq. The Russian Federation thought it was more important to have an engagement than a limitation of cooperation, not only for its own security, but for the stability of the region in the light of the past and future conflicts with all other region, in the light of past conflicts and future collaboration.

Anti-American force

The Middle East has always represented a crucial theatre of confrontation for the US and Russia, especially during the Cold War, where each step was made by a power, it resulted in one step in the opposite direction for the other one. There is a deep mistrust between the Washington and Moscow, increased with the creation of a new unipolar world order driven by the US. In this sense, Iran might represent for Russia an ally against US influence in the area.

Common oil business and commercial interests

Iran and the Middle East represent an important partner for trade and commerce for Russia. The huge reserve of oil and gas and the upheaval in global energy markets made Middle East region very important in the energy sector and defence industry and have led to the forging of stronger commercial and political bonds. Teheran's necessity to improve its internal economic situation let the increase of oil production on the global market for the growth of market share and guaranteed Russia's preference for investment, providing Russian firms with important offshore rig contracts, laying new rail for the North-South Transport Corridor, and selecting the two bigger Russian corporations, Lukoil and Gazprom, for the engagement of greenfield oil and gas development projects. Wheeler, E., Desai M., Iran and Russia: A Partnership in the making. Middle East Institute, 12 September 2016, [available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-russia-partnership-making] [access: 11 May 2020] Large corporations, indeed, plays an important role in the Russian Foreign Policy towards Iran. Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms export agency and Atomstroyexport, the atomic energy power equipment export, occupy fundamental role, especially with the development of Putin's plan based on the improvement of defence sector.

Syria: strategic position in the Middle East geopolitics

Syria occupies a special role in Russian agenda, especially with President Putin; He is extremely sensitive to Syrian events, to the historical alliance with Moscow and to the privileged relationship with Damascus, the Baath party and Bashar Al-Assad. Syria represent a pivot state of the Middle East for all the three countries under investigation, Russia, Iran and the US. As the Syrian war moved from national uprising to international power struggle, Russia, together with the other two powers, obtained one of the defining influences in the conflict. Moscow, indeed, has established itself as the principal negotiator of the warfare, as able to engage with Israel and Iran through policies of “Soft Power”, succeeding in obtaining the key role in the negotiations of the peace process. Speakman Cordall, S. Russian soft power places Moscow at the centre of Syria's chaos, Middle East Online, The Arab Weekly, 18 October 2018 [available at: https://middle-east-online.com/en/russian-soft-power-places-moscow-centre-syria's-chaos] [access: 24 May 2020] On the 30th September 2015 Russia intervened with military assistance and air forces only to the legitimate army of President Assad in accordance with the statute of the United Nations, as explained by Vladimir Putin in an interview for the American TV channel CBS1.Putin V. V. Speech at the meeting of ambassadors and permanent representatives of the Russian Federation. - President of Russia. Official site. July 9, 2012. [Access: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15902] [access on: 20 May 2020]

Syrian territory represents another area where US-Russian hostility emerges; the struggle regards the legality of the US intervention under International Law. Cantwell, D., The ETF and the Legality of U.S. Intervention in Syria under International Law. International Law: LOAC. Lawfare. 28 March 2016,[available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/etf-and-legality-us-intervention-syria-under-international-law] [access: 29 May 2020] Many authors perceive this intervention as a violation of the article 8(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibit the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”, and debate about the legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention, sustaining that the real reason is related to US desire to govern the world, resulted by American hegemonic aspirations. Other authors, on the other side, justify American intervention as necessary right and obligation for international security issues and for humanitarian reasons. Despite very different opinions on the issues, the consequences between American intervention and Russian intervention, who, succeeded in making ISIS and Al Nusra back-away and in providing the beginning for a peace process between involved parties, seems to sustain the argumentation of the American intervention as consequence of interventionism aims.

2.3 Russian Foreign policy goals towards Iran: reacquisition of role of Great Power in a multi-polar International System

The Russian interests in the area showed a sort of continuity between the main goals of the soviet and Russian agenda. The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought a critical economic, political situation in the new Russia, which caused a significant loss of status and power in terms of prestige in the international relations world order. Moreover, the nuclear issue concerning the whole world was creasing and growing its relevance. The president Vladimir Putin, for this reason, decided to keep negotiations with both Iran and US/UN security council on sanctions, missile armament and nuclear bombs. He managed to maintain good relationship with both parties, in order to be considered the mediator of the nuclear arbitration. Freedman R. O.. “Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Under Putin: The Impact of 9/11 and The War in Iraq”, Alternatives, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2003, [available at: http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/putin.htm] [accessed on 12 March 2008] He took this strategy because he realised that Russia's main goal was to reacquire the role of great power in a new multipolar world where no states had the hegemony or superiority over the other great powers. The wanted to change the order established by one power only, the US. For this reason, the adopted the strategy according to which he had to move to the Middle East, its neighbourhood, where the US were having an active role and facing Iranian's hegemony. Russia had the chance to intervene in Iran and to engage a better relationship with the Islamic Republic, limiting US attempt to prevail. Its intervention in Iran, however, represent a way to limit also Iranian hegemony, even if not considered a dangerous threat and even if it not one of the main power in the international system. The alliance with Israel is an example that explain Russian will to limit Iran, especially concerning nuclear issues. Through strategic alliances in the Middle East Putin would have obtained the goal of being considered a new Great power in a multipolar international system and could have reached international stability and security, the two other important issues.

2.4 Russian Foreign Policy towards Iran

What clearly emerges from Russian conduct in the Middle East and in Iran in particular is the very different behaviour that Russia had compared to the American one. The Middle East has always been a crucial area for Russian foreign projection, with the Ottoman Empire first, the tsarist empire later and with the Soviet Union in the in the twentieth century, period that period that saw intense collisions for the export of their values, respectively communist and liberal. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the following crisis involving the country, Russia has changed from a disengagement that lasted until the 2000 to a rapprochement to the area. Safdari, C. “Iran Needs Nuclear Energy, Not Weapons”, Le Monde Diplomatique, 2 November 2005, [available at: http://mondediplo.com/2005/11/02iran] [access: 16 May 2020] With Putin, indeed, the Middle East and Iran were the key point for reaching his important goal, the reconquer of the status of great power and resume credibility and international role. His primary task was to close the gap between Russia's ambitious self-image and how it had been perceived and treated by other states and international organizations. A position in the centre of Eurasia and the Middle East would have affirmed the presence appropriate to the status of great power, showing his active returned on the world stage. In this regard Putin adopt an "ambiguous diplomacy" program. He realized that the issue of nuclear disarmament would be the most important issue. In this regard, he took steps to forge ties with Iran for national objectives: he began to reopen the flow of armaments, resumed the project for the construction of a nuclear reactor on Iranian territory, the Busheher nuclear reactor and the agree for the sale of S-300 missile defence system. This ambiguous diplomacy has a reason: Iran is not considered an important issue for Russia and it not a threat. It is simply important for the reaching national Russian goals. Evidences of the lack of engagement in an authentic collaboration from Russia can be seen with the “ambivalent diplomacy” adopted by Russia during the past few years, especially in relation to a nuclear Iran: Russia at first appeared against new sanctions towards Iran to approve, later, the UN security council resolutions. Again, she sold S-300 missiles and arms to Iran but after that she cancelled the agreement and shed denied the fact in 2010. These events clearly demonstrate the fact that Iran does not represent a key point in Russian agenda.

However, despite this Iran's non-priority position, there are some areas where they cooperate, such as the completion of Soviet project in Iran's territory, or the sale of arms. They collaborated also on national and international issues, such as to the opposition of Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the 1990s and, together with China, they tried to weaken and delay US-western sanctions on Iran for nuclear violations. There are also some areas of interest divergence which can be identified, such as Israel. Israel, indeed, is considered an ally from Russian side, as State internationally recognised, where over one million citizens from the former Soviet Union live. It has the right to defence itself, regardless of the problem of Palestine and of the current apartheid regime. Iran, on the contrary, does not consider Iran as a recognized state, but an illegitimate entity that occupies Palestine, oppressing his historic inhabitants; this is a fair reason for Iran to fight against it. Dinpajouh M., Russian Foreign Policy Towards Iran Under Vladimir Putin: 2000-2008, Master Dissertation, July 2009 p. 45.

Strategic Cooperation

Many authors sustain the nature of a strategic cooperation, based on the assumption that the relationship was based on strategic objectives of US containment and limitation of his hegemony and on commercial relations related to the exportation of arms and Russian technology. Although it is true that there is an intent to limit the US, however, as various analysts will argue, the economic interests of the conduct towards Iran are not pivotal for Russia and exports to the Islamic Republic, although significantly increased in the last decade, constitute only a small part of global export for Russia. Finally, trade relations with Iran have contributed negligibly to the achievement of modernization, the military system and integration into the global market. Mariya Y. Omelicheva (2012): Russia's Foreign Policy toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14:3, 331-344 If we think that their major areas of cooperation are the economic and commercial ones, we understand the reason why this definition is not suitable. It is clearer to think of their relation as tactical and pragmatic, a primarily a short-term cooperation based on short-term mutual, often in pursuit of an objective that serves a larger foreign policy goal of a state.

Other authors believe that Iran can be considered as an important country, as it is ready to start engage with it on a wide range of issues, both on a regional level and on a global scale, such as trade, energy sector and security. They sustain that, whatever administration Iran has, it will always have a fundamental relationship, as neighbours. Moreover, the Syrian issue make the two countries strategic allies. However, again, the relevance of Iran is not because of the country itself; Iran represent the strategic means for Russia to reach other goals.

Lack of cooperation.

Putin's intent is there, and it is obviously strategic and opportunistic.Nikolay Kozhanov, “The Limits of Russian-Iranian Cooperation”, Carnegie Moscow Center, 27 November 2015, [available at http://carnegie.ru/] [accessed: 21 May 2020.] What is really missing is cooperation as, Russia is a global power with a wider range of interests and commitments, while Iran is regional power with a more narrow political focus. Nathan L. Burns and Houman A. Sadri. “Russia, Iran, and Strategic Cooperation in the Caspian Region,” Paper presented to the 49th Annual ISA Convention San Francisco, 28 March 2008. [Available at: http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/3/9/0/pages253904/p253904- 1.php ][accessed on 16 May 2020] There is a strategic cooperation, but it is a strategic preference of IranAras B., and Цzbay Faith., The limits of the Russian-Iranian strategic alliance: its history and geopolitics, and the nuclear issue,? Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2008, 56. . This is because Moscow does not consider Iran as an essential ally, which is why it allows itself to risk losing it, siding with the western powers as regards sanctions, export of weapons and missiles, and for which it allows promised programs, such as the installation of the atomic reactor, which took place in 2012.

Conclusion

Russia has therefore developed a very different foreign policy compared to the US. The main difference is that Iran is not perceived as a threat or a fundamental issue; in fact, the collaboration with Iran and the foreign policy developed by Putin have the objective of regaining a status of great power that disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. To do this, they focus on conduct that is ambiguous, but which clearly shows the Russian strategy: making decisions on immediate interests that change according to the evolution of international events. This makes Russian politics extremely dynamic. Iran does not constitute an immediate interest but a means, through the mediation of the nuclear negotiations, to achieve long-term goals.

Chapter 3

3. US and Russian Foreign Policies towards IRAN: can they be matched?

In the first two chapters we observed that the two countries, because of different historical and political reasons and diverse national interests, conduct divergent strategies.

The analysis of the US foreign policy in Iran led to the conclusion that the US and Iran are in a relationship of serious confrontation; a confrontation initially due to the American status of “great power”, that pushed for an increasingly significant influence in the Middle East and then fuelled to the highest levels with the Iranian revolution and its attempt to emerge more and more as regional hegemony. This aggressiveness of American foreign policy has increased significantly after the 9/11, event that has led the US to perceive Iran as a threat; threat in light of the new priorities established by the Bush administration to the Trump one, namely national security, on the war on terrorism and on all alliances and financiers of terrorist organisations and nuclear disarmament. In case Iran possesses nuclear armaments, together with the support terrorist organisations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the fact that it is a growing nation eager to be hegemonic power in the Middle East, this would represent a real danger in the US's eyes.

The analysis of Russian Foreign policy in Iran, on the other hand, led to the conclusion that Russia and Iran are not in a relationship of cooperation or confrontation, because what is really missing is the cooperation itself: Russian strategy shows an ambiguous diplomacy towards Iran, in particular regarding nuclear issues. This ambiguity is related to the fact that Iran is not considered neither a threat nor an essential country for Russian goals, but it simply occupies a secondary role. On the other hand, Russia is considered an Iranian priority, since the fact that it can limit American and US allies influence and provides Iran with military armament. The Russian Foreign policy towards Iran, however, rises to the first place with Yeltsin and Putin; this because Russian strategy consists in aiming for short-term interests, such as sell weapons to Iran and improve commercial relations with him or the limitation of US influence, in order to reach long-term interests, namely to reconquer the status of “great power” and prestige in a multi-lateral international world. The nuclear issue could be the perfect opportunity to reach this goal.

3.1 Comparison of the goals and interests: controversial

Comparing these two foreign policies and the main interests and objectives, we can make two interesting considerations: The first one is that the US strategy towards Iran, with policies directly against the Islamic Republic, such as its limitation as hegemonic power, or the encouragement for a regime change, is more aggressive than the one established by the Russian Federation; Russian objectives, such as neighbourhood security issues or oil business relations with Iran, are pursued in a less aggressive way, establishing a more trustful relationship.

The second consideration is that this aggressiveness caused an increase in Iran's insecurity and hostility towards the US, significantly reducing the possibility of positive cooperation. For Russia, on the contrary, Iran represents an opportunity to reach its national goals; by not adopting such oppressive and threatening policies, but providing military armaments and establishing commercial relations, Russia makes Iran absolutely dependent on her, a necessary strategic partner, increasing the possibility for a good relationship. Despite the fact that after the revolution Iran restored the country's sovereignty against great powers, such as the US and Soviet Union, the Russian Federation does not represent an uninvited imperial power as it used to. As a result of Yeltsin and Putin policies and thanks to the status of significant strategic partner, Iran even allowed Russian military troops to operate from Iranian soil. Trenin, D., Russia and Iran: Historic mistrust and Contemporary Partnership. Carnagie Moscow Center 18 August 2016, [available at: https://carnegie.ru/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership-pub-64365] [accessed: 21 May 2020]

The analysis of this two politics and of their controversial interests lead me to the last point of my research. Despite all the differences, can the two foreign policies towards Iran be matched? Do Russia and US have some common areas in their national interests coincide in the hope of future cooperation in relation to Iran?

3.2 Common areas between US and Russian Foreign Policies towards Iran

Russian and American foreign policies towards Iran have different goals, interests and mode of actions, however, they share some mutual objectives of their current agenda. The analysis of the main goals of the two powers of the 21st century allow us to identify some mutual issues: war on international terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons and intervention in Syria to end the crisis. Despite that, the interminable ideological, cultural and political hostility between the US and Russia, make cooperation event on the same issues very complicated. The fight against international terrorism, for instance, is an important goal for both of them, reason for finding a common solution. However, because of different perception of the issue, they could not reach that goal. Hamas and Hezbollah, organisations fund by Iran, are considered by the US to be terrorist groups, while Russia does not consider them as such. Despite the communalities, they never managed to find a mutual strategy.

JCPOA: convergence point.

Russia and the US, however, managed to find a convergence point between their foreign policies towards Iran with an agreement on an issue that has always led them to be enemies, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The hostilities on nuclear issues that Moscow and Washington have always developed due to the opposite perception of Iran as dangerous threat has been temporarily put aside by the Obama Deal, an agreement aimed at limiting Iranian enrichment of uranium up to a level for peaceful uses. This agreement resulted as a successful initiative, put forward by the American president Barack Obama in 2015, who considered a cooperation on that issue extremely necessary. The JCPOA represented the apex of years of dispute and negotiations surrounding Iran's nuclear program. A History of Iran's Nuclear Program, Iran Watch, 9 August 2016 [available at: https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program#1b] [access: 21 May 2020]

Importance of the agreement: US and Russia.

The nuclear issue is a very much debated issue that saw the US and the Soviet Union competing for many decades. Although it represents a fundamental point of their agendas, the Russian Federation and the United States still conceive it very differently, especially towards Iran. Their conduct can be explained by two different approaches of International Relations theories.

The US consider nuclear disarmament a priority as a threat to national security and to world order peace, as theorised by the organisation theory; Cimbala, S. J. “Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century: Realism, Rationality, or Uncertainty?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 1, 2017, pp. 129-146. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26271593. Accessed 22 May 2020. in particular, in relation to Iran, a potential nuclear power is an extremely dangerous risk for regional stability. For this reason, it takes a very tough stance towards nuclear Iran, imposing sanctions against the development of nuclear weapons. Russia, on the other hand, has an intermediate position, as already explained with the ambiguous diplomacy of the president Putin. Russia, indeed, does not see Iran as a threat, not even on a nuclear level. A justification of the provision of arms, missiles and construction of nuclear reactors, can be find in the mix between realist approach and rational deterrence theory on nuclear issues. According to authors belonging to these schools, Slow spread of nuclear weapons could be made compatible with international peace and stability. Ibidem This would perfectly explain Russian hesitation on Iranian sanctions. The other reason why the US want to limit nuclear weapons is because they want to keep their leadership and undisputed superiority in the region. Another nuclear power would destabilize the region. Russia, on the other side, sees this agreement as an opportunity to regain power, by moderating the negotiation on a such relevant and important deal.

3.3 Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran started its program back in the mid1960s. In the 1970, with the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), Iran joined, obtaining the authorisation at a non-nuclear weapon state, earning the right "to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), April 22,?1970, [available at: https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty] [access: 13 May 2020] However, despite this treaty, Iran developed concerns and insecurities related to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, to the US expansion and to the strengthen of its links with its allies in the region, afraid that they could be a dangerous threat to its security. For these reasons Iran, with assistance from Russia, China and Pakistan, revived its nuclear program. In 1995, Iran established a collaboration with Russia to terminate the creation of the reactor at Bushehr and to provide an apparatus for the enrichment of uranium. Mikhailov V. N. and Amrollah, R. Protocol of Negotiations, 1January, 1995, Iran Watch, [available at: /library/government/russia/russia-protocol-negotiation-between-iran-and-russia.] [access: 11 May 2020] In 2001 started constructing Nantanz, its primary nuclear enrichment facility. In 2002-2003 Iran was suspected of having violated the conditions established by the treaties and, once violations were confirmed by IAEA, it had to reveal its work and research, developed and ready for the production of nuclear weapons. A History of Iran's Nuclear Program, Iran Watch, 9 August 2016 [available at: https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program#1b] [access: 21 May 2020] In 2003, Iran agreed to halt its enrichment program after being persuaded by Britain, France, and Germany (the EU3). When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president in 2005, the EU3-Iran agreement ended. In 2005, Iran indicated that it was restarting uranium conversion activities. According to the IAEA, in December 2011, Iran started enriching uranium at its Fordow facility. Fordow was considered a troubling choice for this work. It consists of a series of chambers built into a mountain and fortified against air attack. The plant was built secretly and its existence was only revealed by President Obama in 2009. Under the JCPOA, Fordow will be converted into a nuclear research centre, and no uranium enrichment or enrichment-related research and development will be permitted in the facility for the first 15 years of the agreement.

Nature of the JCPOA

JCPOA is an agreement proposed by the US president Barack Obama on July 15, 2015, with the goal of finding a solution to the nuclear issues. It is a historic agreement with 6 major world powers, (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, the United States and China) designed to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful and for energy needs in return for UN, EU and US nuclear-related sanctions relief. According to the agreement, Iran had to demolish thousands of centrifuges that enriched uranium and to reconfigure new ones used to extract plutonium in order to generate less quantity of that chemical element, the other material that can be transformed for the production of nuclear weapons.JCPOA Implementation , US Department of the Treasury 14 July 2015, [available at: http://vsudw.artistpalace.icu/hyllkjit/463af8b0/?n=1373583488] [access: 23 April 2020] The sanctions imposed to Iran were lifted on the 16th of January 2016, the day of the implementation of the agreement. Under Trump administration, however, the president criticized Iran's performance of the JCPOA and, in the light of the nonbinding political commitment of the Obama deal - which was based on “voluntary measures” instead of blinding obligations, on the 8th May 2018 he announced the U.S. withdraw from the deal, without prohibition from the International Law. He also reintroduced the secondary sanctions imposed on Iran, which caused the deterioration of relations between them. Mehdi, Fakheri. Iran nuclear deal: from nationalism to diplomacy, Asian Education and Development Studies, Academic Journal, 2017, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 2-16. [Access: 6 April 2020]

3.4 Consequences of the “Obama Deal”

Despite US withdraw, the agreement represents, according to the European Union, a “key element for the global regime of non-proliferation” and it is crucial for the security of the region, of Europe and of the whole world. We can say this because it had many positive effects on a critical and extremely debated issue. This agreement, first of all, managed to have Iran's nuclear program close monitored and completely checked by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), something that had never been done before, or at least not so carefully and systematically. Prior to this agreement, a political confusion dominated the international community, and it was unlikely to assume that Iran would stop its enrichment programme altogether. Fadaie S., Contending theories: realism and liberalism in the nuclear twenty-first century, International Relations Theory, 5 December 2018 [available at:https://blogs.ubc.ca/shakiba/2018/12/05/contending-theories-realism-and-liberalism-in-the-nuclear-twenty-first-century/ ] [access: 23 May 2020] Secondly, the lift of sanctions, even for a short period, caused an improvement of Iranian economy and Iran resumed shipping oil to Europe. ibidem But most of all, even if this deal was related to nuclear issues, it represented a possibility for a further dialogue with Teheran, hoping for a collaboration and especially for a dialogue between Russia and the US, a real “success story for multilateralism”. Iran nuclear deal: from nationalism to diplomacy, Asian Education and Development Studies, Academic Journal, 2017, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 2-16. [Access: 6 April 2020]