The shifting power structure of Northeast Asia and China’s strategic choices in the 2020s

The Shifting Power Structure of Northeast Asia and China's Strategic Choices in the 2020s

Huaigao Qi Kaisheng Li

ABSTRACT

The Northeast Asian (NEA) power structure demonstrates a weakening unipolarity of the United
States (U.S.), which will evolve into a power structure with "multilateral co-opetition of two
superpowers (China and the U.S.) and three regional great powers (Russia, Japan, and South
Korea)" during the 2020s. In the context of this shifting power structure, the other five NEA states
will adjust their diplomatic policies. Japan, Russia, and South Korea, which occupy the second
tier of the NEA power structure, will pursue regional great power diplomacy and regional
interests. Russia will maintain a careful balance with China and the U.S., and will use investments
from the other NEA states pragmatically to develop its Far East region. Japan will seek to maximize
its security guarantees from the U.S. while actively obtaining economic benefits from China, and will
try to remain flexible in terms of its NEA strategic choice. South Korea will implement the so-called
"two superpowers diplomacy" in relation to the U.S. and China in order to enhance its strategic
autonomy. With relatively weak national power, North Korea and Mongolia occupy the third tier
of the NEA power structure, and they will try to ensure the survival of their respective regimes
and promote national security. China's strategic choices for NEA in the next decade are likely
to include five aspects: 1) to avoid a "new Cold War" and achieve a strategic balance with the U.S.;

2) to maintain friendly and close strategic ties with Russia; 3) to actively promote economic
cooperation with the other NEA countries; 4) to promote the establishment of a regional security
mechanism in the future that includes all the NEA states, for example, a "Northeast Asia Peace and
Cooperation Organization" (NEAPCO); and 5) to construct a collective NEA identity.

KEYWORDS

Northeast Asia (NEA), power structure, China-U.S. strategic competition, strategic choices

Introduction

Northeast Asia (NEA), which stretches west into the heart of the Eurasian continent and borders the Arctic Ocean to the north and the Pacific Island chain to the east, includes Northeast China, Russia's Far East, and Eastern Siberia, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. Although the United States (U.S.) is not geographically located in NEA, it has significant influence in this region, so the authors also regard the U.S. as an NEA state.

NEA has always been known for its special political, economic, military, and cultural complexity. Politically, the capitalist systems of the U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea, ROK) and the socialist systems of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK) coexist here. Economically, the region includes developed economies such as the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, emerging economies such as China and Russia, and North Korea, an undeveloped country. Militarily, China, the U.S., Russia are major nuclear powers, Japan has a strong navy, and North Korea claims to have nuclear power. Culturally, Confucianism, Orthodox Christianity, and Christianity collide and integrate here. The high degree of complexity has led to a number of paradoxical characteristics within the NEA region: for example, there is great room for development in terms of regional integration, but advances in this direction are difficult to achieve; the peoples of the region's countries feel a deep connection with each other, yet there is a lack of mutual trust; and the long-standing regional security issues are exacerbated by the lack of regional security mechanisms.¹

At the end of the Cold War, the power structure in NEA was "one superpower (U.S.) dominates, and three regional great powers (Russia, China, and Japan) coexist." Since the first decade of 21^st century, the national power comparison of the NEA states has begun to show characteristics of the weakening unipolarity of the U.S. This unipolarity will continue to weaken in the 2020s and will evolve into a power structure with two superpowers and three regional great powers.

The concept of "power structure" in this article can be defined as the balance of comprehensive national power among the seven NEA states. Comprehensive national power is measured by the following four indicators: population, economy, technology, and military. Population, the first indicator, is assessed based on population data of the seven NEA states, with the data taken from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). Security Cooperation Mechanism in Northeast Asia 2006, 4-6. ^{"World Population Prospects 2019," United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2019, accessed September 13, 2020,} https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/. Economy, the second indicator, is estimated using the GDP of the seven NEA states (data sources are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), "World Economic Outlook Database October 2019," IMF, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx. the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/ the-world-factbook/. and the Database of International Futures). "Database of International Futures (IFs Version 7.53)," University of Denver, accessed September 13, 2020, http://www.ifs.du.edu/ ifs/frm_MainMenu.aspx. Technology, the third indicator, is measured by the GDP per capita of the seven NEA states, with the data taken from the IMF,¹ the CIA,² and the Database of International Futures.³ Military, the fourth indicator, depends on the military expenditure of seven NEA states, with the data taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,⁴ the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report,⁵ and the Database of International Futures.⁶

In order to quantitatively measure the balance of comprehensive national power among the seven NEA states, the authors draw a "national power index of the NEA states" (see Table 1) model. The authors add the standardized values of the four indicators of "population numbers," "GDP," "GDP per capita," and "military expenditure" and calculate the average in order to obtain the national power index of a state in a given year. The formula for comprehensive national power (percentage) is Power_t=(Pop+Eco_t+Tech+Milt)+4. The "t" in this formula is a time variable. The national power index of a state ranges from 0 to 1, representing the relative national power of a state among the seven NEA countries.

For example, the national power index of China in 1990 is 0.182 (see Table 1), which means China's national power accounted for 18.2% of the total power of the seven NEA states. We arrived at the number 0.182, which represents national power index of China in 1990, by performing the following calculations. In 1990, China's population was 1,176,884,000, which accounted for 0.666 of the total population of the seven NEA states (1,766,436,000). Its GDP was 398.62 billion USD (MER), which accounted for 0.039 of the total GDP of the seven NEA states (10332.45 billion USD, MER). China's GDP per capita in 1990 was 338.7 USD, which amounted to 0.005 of the total GDP per capita of the seven NEA states (62258.3 USD). Its military expenditure was 10085.1 million USD, which equaled 0.017 of the military expenditure of the seven NEA states (580331.2 million USD). Using the formula, Power_t=(Pop+Eco_t +Tech+Milt)+4, the authors concluded that the national power index of China in 1990 was 0.182 = (0.666+0.039+0.005+0.0174)^4.

The following literature was used to help develop the "national power index of the NEA states" model. Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey put forward the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) in 1972.⁷ Cline attempted to calculate national power by assigning index numbers as follows: "critical mass" (population, land, and position); "economic capability" (e.g., GNP); "military capability" (e.g., military personnel and budget); "strategic purpose" (goals and objectives); and "will" (elite and popular support for purposes) in 1977.⁸ Hu and Men summarized eight national strategic resources in 2002: economic resources, human capital, natural resources, capital resources, knowledge, and technical resources, government resources, military strength, and international resources.⁹ Rogers et al. noted four functional "attributes" "World Economic Outlook Database October 2019." ^{"World Factbook." "Database of International Futures (IFs Version 7.53)." Trends in World Military Expenditure," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), accessed September 13, 2020,} https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-Milex-data-1949-2019.xlsx. ^{"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2019," U.S. Department of State, December 2019, accessed September 13, 2020,} https://www.state.gov/world-military-expenditures-and-arms-transfers-2019/. ^{"Database of International Futures (IFs Version 7.53)." Singer} et al. 1972, 19-48. ^{Cline 1977. Hu, Men 2002, 26-41.}to audit national geopolitical capability in 2019: "national base" (national wealth, population structure, national spread, and self-sufficiency);"national structure" (economic clout, technological prowess, and cultural prestige); "national instruments" (diplomatic leverage and military might); and "national resolve" (government efficacy, economic resolve, strategic resolve, and altruistic resolve). James Rogers, "The Audit of Geopolitical Capability 2019," Henry Jackson Society, January, 2019, accessed September 14, 2020, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/HJS-2019-Audit-of-Geopolitical-Capability-Report-web.pdf.

What are the aspects of the strategic competition between China and the U.S. in the NEA region? What foreign policy adjustments will the NEA states make in light of the intensified strategic competition between China and the U.S. and the evolution of power structure in NEA? What are China's strategic choices for NEA in the next decade? This article will analyze the above three issues.

NEA Will Evolve into a Power Structure with two Superpowers
and three Regional Great Powers in the Next Decade

At the end of the Cold War, the NEA power structure was "one superpower dominates, and three regional great powers coexist." In 1990, U.S. national power accounted for 40.7% of the total power of the seven NEA states, followed by Japan (20.7%), China (18.2%), Russia (then the Soviet Union, 14.2%), South Korea (4.4%), North Korea (1.2%) and Mongolia (0.6%) (see Table 1).

Table i.

NATIONAL POWER INDEX OF THE NEA STATES FROM 1990 TO 2030 (SELECTED YEARS)
ИНДЕКС НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ МОЩИ ГОСУДАРСТВ СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ
С 1990 ПО 2030 г. (ПРИВЕДЕНЫ ИЗБРАННЫЕ ГОДА)

Sources: [1] The source of population data for the seven NEA states is UN DESA. See: "World Population Prospects 2019." [2] The source of GDP data for the six NEA states minus North Korea is the IMF. See: "World Economic Outlook database October 2019." GDP data for North Korea is taken from the CIA. See: "World Factbook." The 2019-2030 GDP data for the seven NEA states is taken from the University of Denver. See: "Database of International Futures (I.F.s Version 7.53)." [3] The source of military expenditure data for the seven NEA states is primarily SIPRI. See: "Trends in World Military Expenditure." Parts of the missing data are from U.S. Department of State. See: "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report," U.S. Department of Defense,

June 1,2019, accessed September 13, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF- DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF. The 2019-2030 military expenditure data for the seven NEA states is taken from the University of Denver. See: "Database of International Futures (I.F.s Version 7.53)."

In the 2000s, the national power comparison of the seven NEA states demonstrated a weakening unipolarity of the U.S. After peaking at 49.4% in 2002, the proportion of U.S. national power in seven NEA states declined to 41.2% in 2018. Meanwhile, the proportion of China's national power in the seven NEA states increased from 20.3% in 2000 to 32.2% in 2018. Before the turn of the century, the gap between China and the U.S. in terms of relative national power was large, with China never reaching half of the relative national power of the U.S. However, China's rapid economic growth and increased military spending since the 2000s has meant that the gap between its relative national power and that of the U.S. has been gradually narrowing.

In 1995, Japan's national power accounted for 26.4% of the total power of the seven NEA states, but this proportion dropped to 11.6% in 2018. Russia's national power in NEA dropped significantly in the initial days following the collapse of the Soviet Union, from 14.2% in 1990 to 3.0% in 1992. After 1992, Russia's national power began to recover slowly. From 2000 to 2018, its national power increased slightly, but has never exceeded 10% of the total national power of the seven NEA states.

The relative national power of South Korea increased steadily from 1990 to 2018, with its share in the seven NEA states increasing from 4.4% in 1990 to 7.8% in 2018. North Korea's national power is relatively weak, and its relative national power decreased from 1.2% in 1990 to 0.6% in 2018. Mongolia's national power is also relatively weak. From 1990 to 2018, its national power accounted for 0.2% to 0.8% of the seven NEA states (see Table and Figure 1).

Sources: Ibid.

Figure 1.

NATIONAL POWER OF THE SEVEN NEA STATES (1990-2018) НАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ МОЩЬ СЕМИ ГОСУДАРСТВ СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ (1990-2018)

The data in Table 1 and Figure 1 shows that China is rapidly approaching the U.S. in terms of national power. The original U.S. "one superpower" structure in the NEA region is changing. It was around the year 2000 that China's national power surpassed that of Japan, after which the national power gap between the two countries gradually widened, with Japan falling into the second tier in the NEA power structure. Although Russia's relative national power increased slightly from 1992 to 2018, it is still a long way behind China, and the U.S. South Korea's national power increased significantly from 1990 to 2018, and it has become a second-tier regional middle power. North Korea and Mongolia belong in the third tier of the NEA power structure due to their underdeveloped economies and weak national strength (see Table 2).

Table 2.

RANK OF SEVEN NEA STATES' NATIONAL POWER IN 2018 РЕЙТИНГ СЕМИ ГОСУДАРСТВ СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ В 2018 г.

Sources: Ibid.

Figure 2.

According to the predictive analysis in Figure 2, the national power comparison of the seven NEA states will continue the previous "weakening of U.S. unipolarity" process in the 2020s. From 2020 to 2030, China and the U.S. will continue to occupy the first tier of the NEA power structure. The relative national power of the U.S. is expected to decline from 36.9% in 2020 to 32.0% in 2030, while that of China will grow from 33.2% in 2020 to 40.1% in 2030. According to forecasts, China will reach the same national power level as the U.S. around 2024. From 2020 to 2030, Russia, Japan and South Korea will occupy the second tier, with Russia's relative share in seven NEA states projected to be between 6% and 7%, Japan's between 12% and 14%, and South Korea's around 7%. North Korea and Mongolia will be in the third tier of the NEA power structure, with North Korea's relative share of national power in the seven NEA states expected to be between 0.5% and 0.6%, while Mongolia's will be between 0.9% and 1.1% (see Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 3). By 2024, China and the U.S. are expected to have a significantly higher level of national power than the other NEA states (see Figure 2 and Tables 1 and3). Looking forward to 2024-2030, the NEA power structure will likely be divided into two superpowers (China and the U.S.) and three regional great powers (Japan, Russia, and South Korea).

NATIONAL POWER OF THE SEVEN NEA STATES (2019-2030)
НАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ МОЩЬ СЕМИ ГОСУДАРСТВ
СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ (2019-2030)

Table 3.

NATIONAL POWER OF THE SEVEN NEA STATES IN 2024
НАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ МОЩЬ СЕМИ ГОСУДАРСТВ
СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ В 2024 г.

Source: Ibid.

China-U.S. Strategic Competition in NEA in the Next Decade

In the 2020s, the NEA power structure will evolve into "two superpowers and three regional great powers." The U.S. will try to maintain its hegemony in the NEA region, but its capabilities and confidence will be weakened. China will strive to maintain the upward momentum of its comprehensive national power and reduce the negative effects imposed by the strategic competition with the U.S. The narrowing power gap between China and the U.S. and the emerging power shift have led the U.S. to regard China as its primary strategic competitor in NEA and the world. There are essentially three aspects to the China- U.S. strategic competition in the NEA region: military competition, the competition between multilateral systems and bilateral alliances, and the competition between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

China-U.S. Military Competition in Northeast Asia

The military competition between China and the U.S. revolves primarily around the development of next-generation missile technology, and this competition is extremely fierce. In order to gain a strategic advantage in NEA, China and the U.S. have actively developed various medium-range missiles and hypersonic weapon systems in recent years that are aimed at each other (see Table 4).¹ The U.S. has been developing its DeepStrike missile with a range of 700 km, as well as its Strategic Strike Cannon Artillery (1600 km), and strategic fire missiles that can reach as far as 2500 km. The Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the INF Treaty in February 2019. Since then, the U.S. has been looking for a country in the NEA region where it can deploy its medium-range missiles. Kang Choi, Beomchul Shin, and Jae-Kwang Kang, "The Shifting Environment in Northeast Asia and Our Responses," The Asian Institute for Policy Studies, September 30, 2019, accessed September 13, 2020, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/the-shifting- environment-in-northeast-asia-and-our-responses/. ^Ibid. In March 2017, the U.S. started deployment of its THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea. The THAAD radar system will likely be able to detect a missile launch by China, should that happen.

In recent years, China has diversified its arsenal to promote its Anti-Access/ Area Denial strategy (A2/AD). The Chinese army has fielded an DF-21D anti-vessel ballistic missile with a range of 1800-3000 km and DF-26 missiles with a range of 5000 km. China opposes the deployment by the U.S. of medium-range missiles in the Asia- Pacific region and hopes that countries such as South Korea and Japan will not allow medium-range missiles to be deployed in their respective territories. "Fu Cong, Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Held a Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Media on INF Treaty and other Arms Control Issues," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, August 6, 2019, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/ t1686559.shtml.

Table 4.

HYPERSONIC WEAPONS FROM CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ГИПЕРЗВУКОВОЕ ОРУЖИЕ КНР И США

Source: Min Seok Kim, "Active Development of Hypersonic Weapons among the U.S., Russia, and China," JoongAng Daily, July 19, 2019, accessed September 13, 2020, https://news.joins.com/article/23529570. Updates and translation have been made by the authors.

China-U.S. Competition: Multilateral Systems and Bilateral Alliances

The multilateral cooperation system advocated by China and the bilateral alliance system led by the U.S. exist at the same time within NEA. There are significant differences between the advocating (leading) and participating countries in these systems, as well as in their theoretical underpinnings (see Table 5). Tensions exist between the multilateral cooperation system and the bilateral alliance system, which is manifested as multilateral vs. unilateral, multipolar vs. unipolar, and economic and trade means vs. military means.¹

Table 5.

COMPARISON OF THE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION SYSTEM AND THE BILATERAL

ALLIANCE SYSTEM IN NEA

СРАВНЕНИЕ МНОГОСТОРОННИХ СИСТЕМ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ И ДВУСТОРОННИХ
СОЮЗОВ В СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ

Source: Qi, Huaigao. "Seventy Years of China's Multilateral Diplomacy toward Neighboring Countries: Developing Processes, Main Characters and Challenges," World Economics and Politics, no. 6 (|une 2019): 58. The authors have made some updates of the form.

China actively promotes multilateral cooperation in the NEA region. It aims to the negotiations on a China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Zone, calls for the resumption of the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, and promotes the replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. China and the other NEA states have reached a series of multilateral institutional arrangements in various fields such as politics, security, economy, environment, disease control, combating transnational crime, and cyberspace (see Table 6). Qi 2019, 57. ^{Ibid., 48.}

Table 6.

NEA MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH CHINA PARTICIPATES
МНОГОСТОРОННИЕ ИНСТИТУТЫ СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ
С КИТАЙСКИМ ПРИСУТСТВИЕМ

Source: Compiled by the authors using information from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: "Countries and regions," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, accessed Sep-tember 13, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/.

Japan and South Korea are critical of the NEA strategy of the U.S. Both the U.S.- Japan alliance and the U.S.-South Korea alliance are over 60 years old, with extensive economic and security cooperation agendas. Japan and South Korea continue to host the bulk of the forward deployed U.S. forces in the NEA region. The U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea aim not only to deter the North Korean threat, but also to balance China. Based on this strategy, the U.S. has spent significant efforts in recent years, strengthening trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea. However, a number of signs point to the debilitating nature of this cooperation, which is primarily due to the recent developments in each nation's domestic affairs, including the Trump administration's "America First" policy, the historical revisionism in Japan, and the focus on North Korea under the Moon administration.¹ The U.S. is expected to continue to adhere to its bilateral alliance policy in the next decade. And it will keep a cautious eye on the development of regionalism within NEA, suspicious of a multilateral framework that may push it to the sidelines.Competition between the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Silk Road Economic Belt was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2013. One month later, he put forward the idea of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Together, the two are now referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹ In May 2015, the Chinese and Russian leaders signed the Joint Statement of China and Russia on Cooperation in the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union. According to the joint statement, the two sides would work to connect the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the development of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to strengthen regional economic integration. "Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China's Contribution," Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative 2017, accessed September 14, 2020, https://www.followingthemoney.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017_Leading- Group-for-the-BRI_Building-the-Belt-and-Road_E.pdf. "t^A(Joint Statement

of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union, signed on May 8, 2015)," Xinhua net., accessed September 13, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet. com//world/2015-05/09/c_127780866.htm. In June 2016, China, Mongolia, and Russia developed the Outline of the Construction of the China- Mongolia-Russia EconomicCorridor. The construction ofthis economic corridor will promote regional economic integration, as well as the integration of the respective development strategies of the countries involved, and lay a solid foundation for interconnecting their respective infrastructures. (Outline of Construction of China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, signed on June 23, 2016)," NDRC, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/201609/t20160912_962194.html. In June 2017, China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State Oceanic Administration (SOC) released its Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. The Vision proposes the joint construction of a blue economic passage leading to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. (Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative)," NDRC and SOC, June 19, 2017, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/201711/W020190905503558343819.pdf. This blue economic passage connects the ports along the NEA states (South Korea, Japan, and Russia) and docks with Russia's Northern Sea Route.

Japan and South Korea (the allies of the U.S. in the NEA region) have also participated in the BRI. In June 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that Japan would join China in the funding of BRI projects if certain conditions were met. "'Asia's Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia'-Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 23rd International Conference on The Future of Asia," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, June 5, 2017, accessed September 13, 2020, https:// japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201706/1222768_11579.html. In May 2018, China and Japan signed a memorandum on third-party market cooperation between the enterprises of the two countries. South Korea's Moon Jae-in government actively participates in the construction of the BRI. In January 2020, the President said that South Korea would continue to accelerate the pace of docking and advance its New Southern and Northern policies with the BRI. (Moo Jae-in: Moon: to Speed up South Korea's Strategic Development Plan to Dock with the Belt and Road Initiative)," Xinhua net, January 14, 2020, accessed September 13, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet. com/2020-01/14/c_1125461650.htm.

In the U.S., the Trump administration is actively promoting its Indo-Pacific Strategy as a counterbalance to the BRI. In November 2017, President Trump proposed the advancement of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" during an official visit to Southeast Asia. "Remarks by President Trump on His Trip to Asia," The White House, November 15, 2017, accessed September 13, 2020, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-trip-asia/. The U.S. Department of Defense released its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report in June 2019, which singled out China, Russia, and North Korea as potential threats, saying that China is a revisionist power that specializes in a "predatory economy".¹ The Report emphasizes that the U.S .-Japan Alliance is "the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo- Pacific," the U.S.-ROK Alliance "the linchpin of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia," and the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral partnership "critical to peace and security in the Indo- Pacific region." Meanwhile, Mongolia is regarded as an important Indo-Pacific partner. "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report." ^{Ibid., 21-46.} In January 2020, an assessment report submitted by the Center for a New American Security to the U.S. Congress pointed out that the U.S. criticizes China for driving a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, which would undermine vital U.S. interests. Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, et al., "Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific," Center for a New American Security, January 28, 2020, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/ publications/reports/rising-to-the-china-challenge.

China is skeptical of the potential risks that the Indo-Pacific Strategy may contain. In July 2019, China's State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed his views on the Indo- Pacific concept. He believes that regional cooperation initiatives and designs should follow the following three principles: "Firstly, focusing on East Asia and Asia, without affecting the existing cooperation mechanisms and achievements in the region; secondly, focusing on cooperation and consensus, without engaging in geographic confrontation and games; thirdly, focusing on openness and inclusiveness, without forming factions or seeking small cliques." "Wang Yi talks about the Indo-Pacific Concept," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, July 31,2019, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1685652.shtml. Japanese scholar Yamazaki Amane believes that China views the Indo-Pacific Strategy as an example of Washington's power politics, which are intended to impede Beijing's relationship with neighboring countries. "The PRC's Cautious Stance on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy," News Brake, February 28, 2020, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.newsbreak.com/news/1517838243723/the-prcs-cautious-stance-on-the-us-indo-pacific-strategy. If the U.S. uses the Indo-Pacific Strategy as a tool to interfere with BRI and even contain China, China will firmly oppose it.

The Foreign Policy Adjustment of NEA States
Facing China-U.S. Strategic Competition

Facing the China-U.S. strategic competition in the next decade, the NEA states at the second and third tiers will make corresponding policy adjustments. Although they are all subject to the "two superpowers and three regional great powers" structure in the next decade, the second-tier states will have more room for strategic choice than the third-tier states. At the second tier of the NEA power structure, Russia, Japan, and South Korea will pursue regional great power diplomacy and to further their regional interests. North Korea and Mongolia, ranking at the third tier of the NEA power structure, will concentrate on ensuring the survival of their regimes and on national security.

Russia's Foreign Policy Adjustment: Balancing between China and the U.S.

Russia has traditionally focused its diplomatic efforts on Europe. However, in 2010, it announced its "turn to the East" foreign policy. The profile of the NEA region in Russian foreign policy has risen considerably since 2010. In Bobo Lo's opinion, Russia's fundamental objectives in NEA include undermining U.S. strategic dominance; an abiding faith in the balance of power; and the reliance on traditional strengths such as military might, geopolitical reach, and the energy sector.¹ Although becoming less "West-centric" is a very long process, the essential truth is that Russia's long-term future depends on a much more substantial and effective engagement with the NEA region. In the next decade, Russia's foreign policy priorities in NEA are expected to include the following:

First, it will likely maintain a maximum balance in the China-U.S. strategic competition. China has become a key economic, financial, and technological partner for Russia. Russia will continue to develop its strategic partnership with China, which is certainly in Moscow's best interests, while trying to maintain a certain balance in their relations at the same time. Bobo Lo, "The Return: Russia and the Security Landscape of Northeast Asia," Ifri, March 2020, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/return-russia-and-security-landscape-northeast-asia. ^{Dmitri Trenin, "How Russia Can Maintain Equilibrium in the Post-Pandemic Bipolar World," Carnegie Moscow Center, May 1,2020, accessed September 13, 2020,} https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81702. Considering that the U.S. regards China as its main rival, Russia will try to restart relations with the U.S. However, this is easier said than done, since the hostility of the U.S. political elites towards Russia has not disappeared or diminished. In addition, Russia will work hard to develop relations with E.U. countries, as well as with India and Japan in order to ensure a geopolitical balance in Eurasia. The most important principle is that Russia will carefully maintain a balance within the strategic competition between China and the U.S.

Second, Russia will actively promote economic cooperation in NEA and use the investments from other NEA states to develop its Far East region. Russia launched the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in 2015, which aims to support the economic development of Russia's Far East and expand international cooperation in the Asia- Pacific. As of September 2019, Russia had hosted five EEFs. Over 1,780 new investment projects worth over RUB 3.8 trillion and 230 new enterprises have appeared in Russia's Far East during the last five years. Yury Trutnev, "Address of the Chair of the Organizing Committee, 2015," Eastern Economic Forum, accessed September 13, 2020, https://forumvostok.ru/en/about-the-forum/. Investment from China has accounted for 71 percent of the total direct ...