The shifting power structure of Northeast Asia and China’s strategic choices in the 2020s

Kim Jong-un visited China four times between March 2018 and January 2019 (he visited in March, May, and June of 2018 and then in January 2019), which resulted in closer ties between the two nations. Relations improved dramatically after the North Korean and Chinese leaders met three times over the course of 2018. In April 2018, Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un met in Panmunjom and signed the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, announcing that the two parties would work towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the conversion of the suspension mechanism. "Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit," White House, June 12, 2018, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un- democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/. ^{"Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, April 27, 2018, accessed September 13, 2020,} https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchF r=&amp%3BsrchTo=&amp%3BsrchWord=&amp%3BsrchTp=&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_ seq_2=0&amp%3Bcompany_cd=&amp%3Bcompany_nm=&page=1&titleNm=.

Despite the significant easing of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, tensions between North Korea and the U.S. and between North and South Korea are unlikely to be resolved soon. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 22 resolutions concerning North Korea between July 2006 and March 2020, condemning North Korea's nuclear missile tests and imposing sanctions against the country. "UN Documents for DPRK (North Korea): Security Council Resolutions," Security Council Report, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/page/1?ctype=DPRK+%28North+Korea %29&cbtype=dprk-north-korea#038;cbtype=dprk-north-korea. Moving forward, North Korea will continue to develop ties with China and Russia, establish a new model of relations with the U.S., and lobby the U.S. to lift the sanctions.

Mongolia's Foreign Policy Adjustment: Developing with “Third Neighbors”

Mongolia's NEA strategy is to prioritize relations with Russia and China, and proactively develop its relations with so-called "third neighbors." Strengthening its relationship with its two immediate neighbors, Russia and China, does not mean that it will be aligned with either of them or indeed with any third power. Instead, Mongolia aims to promote, to the extent possible, a balanced relationship with both its neighbors. Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan, "Mongolian Foreign Policy: A Small State with Big Aspirations," East Asia Forum, April 2, 2014, accessed September 13, 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/02/mongolian-foreign-policy-a-small-state-with-big-aspirations/. Beyond China and Russia, Mongolia is also diversifying its foreign relations through its "third neighbor" policy.

"Third neighbor" countries include not only the states such as the U.S., Germany, and Japan, but also international organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.), the European Union (E.U.), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).¹ Through the "third neighbors" policy, Mongolia strives to align its interests with those of developed countries and international organizations. The overarching goal of the policy is to create a political, economic, and legal environment where Mongolia's economy, national security, and prosperity depend not only on its two immediate neighbors, but also on the strategic interests and interdependence of third neighbors. Ibid. ^{Ulambayar 2013, 49.} As far as Mongolia's diplomatic practice is concerned, the U.S. is the most important "third neighbor" country. One reason for this is that the U.S. is the only country that has enough power to balance China and Russia. Japan and South Korea also fall under the "third neighbor" banner, and Mongolia is focusing on developing relations with these two countries in the NEA region, and may play a role in the NEA multilateral framework in the future. Mongolia may be a small country, but it has lofty diplomatic ambitions.

China's Strategic Choices for NEA in the Next Decade

At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 2017, the CPC put forward a plan to make China a great modern socialist country by the middle of the 21^st century. According to the new plan, China's development goal is to implement socialist modernization between 2020 and 2035. "Full text of Xi Jinping's Report at 19th CPC National Congress," Xinhua net., November 3, 2017, accessed September 13, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm. Maintaining long-term stability in NEA is an important external environmental guarantee for China to be a great modern socialist country. China's strategic choices for NEA in the next decade include the following:

First, China will try to avoid a "new Cold War" and achieve a strategic balance with the U.S. in the NEA region. At present, military competition between China and the U.S. in NEA revolves primarily around the development of next-generation missile technology, and each country has its own advantages in this area. China is closing in on the U.S. in terms of its national power, and the two states are forming a strategic balance. In order to ensure superiority in the strategic competition with China, the U.S. will continue to focus on the development of the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral relationship in the next decade. China will develop bilateral relations with the other NEA countries and establish an NEA partnership network. To avoid confrontation and conflict with the U.S., the authors argue that China can apply an institutional balancing strategy toward the U.S. Such a strategy suggests that the deepening economic interdependence creates conditions under which the countries are more likely to adopt a realistic balancing strategy to counter each other and pursue security through international institutions. At the same time, China will also strive to create opportunities for cooperation with the U.S. in the NEA region, which include combating infectious diseases (such as COVID-19, etc.), preventing financial crises, responding to climate change, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Second, China will always maintain a friendly and close strategic partnership with Russia. Developing friendly relations with Russia is not a whim for China, but a long-term strategic choice. China and Russia share common interests in resisting American unipolar hegemony as well as support each other in events involving their respective national interests. China did not condemn Russia for its actions during the Russo- Georgian War of 2008 or the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Russia, in turn, has never criticized China's assertiveness in the South China Sea and elsewhere.¹ However, China and Russia do have certain problems and differences at the regional level. The two countries are rivals in a number of geopolitical areas, as both have attempted to expand the scope of their respective regional influence: for example, Russia's policies toward Vietnam, the disagreements between the two countries in Central Asia, and their behavior in the Arctic. Korolev 2016, 389. ^{Ibid., 390-391.} In Central Asia, China has been one of Russia's biggest trade partners and investors within the BRI. However, Russia regards Central Asia as a top priority region that is within the area of its geopolitical interests. China will take into account Russia's concerns as much as possible when developing relations with Central Asian countries. For example, China actively promotes the joining of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the Eurasian Economic Union, welcomes Russia's "Greater Eurasian Partnership Initiative," and promotes the country's participation in the China-Kyrgyzstan-Ukraine railway extension projects. In short, China will respect Russia's geopolitical interests in Eurasia.

Third, China will actively promote economic cooperation with the other NEA states. China will combine its Revitalizing Northeast Strategy with participation in the development of the Russian Far East, and actively implement the Sino-Russian Cooperation and Development Plan in Russia's Far East Region (2018-2024). Beijing will also activelypromote the construction ofthe China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the docking of the "Silk Road Economic Belt," and the joint EAEU-Mongolia "Prairie Road Program." In addition, China will accelerate negotiations on the China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Zone and promote "China-Japan-South Korea + X" cooperation. North Korea will also be encouraged to integrate into the economic cooperation process in NEA, thereby creating new investment opportunities in the region.

Fourth, China will promote the establishment of a regional security mechanism that includes all the NEA states. It will regard the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue as a breakthrough and promote the signing of the proposed Peace Treaty on the Korean Peninsula in the near future. When promoting the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue, China would prefer a package resolution by putting the concerns of all NEA parties in the negotiations on the Korean Peninsula peace mechanism. A durable peace regime in NEA should be a multilateral construction, one that includes China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Russia, and the U.S. The authors argue that the NEA sates can discuss the possibility of establishing a "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Organization" (NEAPCO) The authors refer to Georgy Toloraya's innovative thoughts on the establishment of a "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Organization" (NEAPCO). See: Georgy Toloraya, "Russia and North-East Asian Security & Cooperation," CSCAP-Russia, December 2013, accessed September 13, 2020, http://www. cscap.org/uploads/docs/Related%20Resea rch/9GCRussiaAndNEASec&Coop- GeorgyToloraya.pdf. in the future.

Fifth, China may promote the construction of a collective NEA identity. China can advocate "harmonious but different" concepts in NEA to reduce strategic suspicion among the countries in the region. The authors believe that, since most NEA states have been profoundly influenced throughout their history by Confucian culture, China can combine the essence of Chinese Confucianism, such as "datong shijie" ("a world of grand unity"), "tianren heyi" ("the unity of heaven and humanity"), "rendao zhuyi" (humanitarianism), and "heping zhuyi" (pacifism), with the development of NEA in the 21^st century. China needs to learn from its traditional philosophy and propose the new concepts of regional collective identity that can be embraced by many of the NEA states. Maybe the "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind" expounded by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017 can also be viewed as an approach to constructing collective NEA identity. ЈФЯААйт+Л&ФЯ«*ХЈ±іШ© (Secure

a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Xi Jinping Delivers at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017)," Xinhua net., October 27, 2017, accessed September 13, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm.

Conclusion

In the 2020s, the NEA will continue the power structure of the "weakening unipolarity ofthe U.S." that began in the first decade of21st century and has evolved into a power structure with "two superpowers and three regional great powers." According to the "national power index of the NEA states" model constructed by the authors (see Table 1), China's national power will continue to rise and, according to forecasts, it will reach the same national power level as the U.S. around 2024 (see Figure 2). In the 2020s, China and the U.S. will occupy the first tier of the NEA power structure. Russia, Japan, and South Korea will be in the second tier, while North Korea and Mongolia will hold the third tier. Looking forward to 2024-2030, the NEA power structure will likely be divided into two superpowers (China and the U.S.) and three regional great powers (Russia, Japan, and South Korea).

In the context of the evolution of this power structure, the main conflict in the 2020s will be the strategic competition between China and the U.S. The U.S. regards NEA as a key region for maintaining its hegemony and regards China as its main strategic competitor. China has further developed partnerships with the other NEA states and has strived to narrow the power gap with the U.S. There are essentially three aspects to the China-U.S. strategic competition in the NEA region: military competition, the competition between multilateral systems and bilateral alliances, and the competition between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Facing the China-U.S. strategic competition in the next decade, the NEA countries at the second and third tiers will make respective policy adjustments. At the second tier of the NEA power structure, Russia, Japan, and South Korea will pursue regional great power diplomacy and to further their regional interests. Russia will work to maintain a balance between China and the U.S. and use the investments from the other NEA states pragmatically to develop its Far East region. Japan will seek to maximize its security guarantees from the U.S. while actively obtaining economic benefits from China, and will try to remain flexible in terms of its NEA strategic choice. South Korea will stick to the "two superpowers diplomacy" in its relations with the U.S. and China in order to strengthen its own strategic autonomy. With relatively weak national power, North Korea and Mongolia occupy the third tier of the NEA power structure. North Korea will struggle to ensure its regime security and will establish a new model of relations with the U.S. and continue to develop ties with China and Russia. Mongolia will likely prioritize relations with its two immediate neighbors, China and Russia, and proactively develop its relations with "third neighbors" on the basis of balancing the influence of China and Russia.

Maintaining long-term stability of the NEA is an important external environmental guarantee for China to become a great modern socialist country. China's strategic choices for NEA in the next decade are likely to include five aspects: 1) to avoid a "new Cold War" and achieve a strategic balance with the U.S.; 2) to maintain friendly and close strategic ties with Russia; 3) to actively promote economic cooperation with the other NEA countries; 4) to promote the future establishment of a regional security mechanism that includes all the NEA states, for example, a "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Organization" (NEAPCO); and 5) to construct a collective NEA identity.

СПИСОК ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ / REFERENCES

Cline, Ray S. World Power Assessment 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.

Hu, Angang, and Honghua Men.

"Comparison of Tangible Strategic Resources among China, the U.S., Japan, Russia, and India." Strategy and Management, no. 2 (2002): 26-41.

Korolev, Alexander. "Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations." The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 4 (2016): 375-97.

Qi, Huaigao. "Seventy Years of China's Multilateral Diplomacy toward Neighboring Countries: Developing

Processes, Main Characters and Challenges," World Economics and Politics, no. 6 (|une 2019) (b): 43-64.

Security Cooperation Mechanism in Northeast Asia. Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2006.

Singer, David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In Peace, War, and Numbers, edited by Bruce Russet, 19-48. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972.

Ulambayar, D. "Northeast Asian Security Issues and Mongolia's 'Third Neighbor' Policy," ERINA Report, no. 114 (November 2013): 47-50.

Меняющаяся властная иерархия
Северо-Восточной Азии и стратегические
интересы Китая в 2020-е годы

АННОТАЦИЯ

Расклад сил в Северо-Восточной Азии (СВА) демонстрирует ослабление однополярности
во главе с Соединенными Штатами (США), что приведет к появлению структуры с
«многосторонним взаимодействием двух сверхдержав (Китая и США) и трёх региональных
великих держав (Россия, Япония и Южная Корея)» в третьем десятилетии XXI века. В контексте
изменения соотношения сил другие пять стран СВА будут менять дипломатическую политику.
Япония, Россия и Южная Корея, занимающие второе место в раскладе сил СВА, будут
стремиться преследовать региональные интересы. Россия будет бережно поддерживать
равновесие в отношениях с Китаем и США и прагматично использовать инвестиции других
стран СВА для развития своего дальневосточного региона. Япония будет стремиться
получить от США максимальную гарантию безопасности, в то же время активно получая
экономические выгоды от Китая, и постарается сохранить высокую гибкость в стратегическом
выборе СВА. Южная Корея будет осуществлять «дипломатию двух сверхдержав» в
отношении США и Китая для усиления своей стратегической автономии. Северная Корея и
Монголия, занимающие третье место из-за их относительно слабой национальной мощи,
будут стремиться к выживанию в режиме и национальной безопасности. Ожидается, что
перечень стратегических выборов Китая для СВА в следующем десятилетии, вероятно, будет
включать пять аспектов: во-первых, избежание «новой холодной войны» и достижение
стратегического баланса с США; во-вторых, постоянное поддержание дружеского и тесного
стратегического партнерства с Россией; в-третьих, активное содействие экономическому
сотрудничеству с другими странами СВА; в-четвертых, содействие созданию регионального
механизма безопасности, включающего все государства СВА, например, создание в будущем
«Организации мира и сотрудничества в Северо-Восточной Азии»; в-пятых, построение
коллективной идентичности в СВА.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА

Северо-Восточная Азия (СВА), властная иерархия,
стратегическая конкуренция КНР и США, стратегические решения