World Trade Organization: Quo vadis?

Согласен с тем, что перекосы в глобализации имели место в последние годы и десятилетия. Таков отдельный вопрос для дискуссии. Однако из этого не следует, что выгоду от либерализации торговли извлекают только крупные компании. Без либерализации торговли цены на смартфоны, айпады, ноутбуки, товары ширпотреба, к примеру, на рынке США были бы в разы выше, следовательно, это прежде всего ударило бы по нижним слоям среднего класса.

Maarten Smeets

I am not sure I would frame the debate like that, and it is not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing. We did a book one year ago in honor of a famous international law professor, Peter Van den Bossche, in which we make the point that trade is insufficiently inclusive [Restoring Trust in Trade..., 2018]. Many layers in society feel that they have not benefited from trade liberalization which much resulted from globalization. To the contrary, many believe that globalization is the cause of job losses in the West, with companies relocating their economic activities to Asia (China). This has created a backlash against globalization, often referred to as “slobalization”. It explains nationalist movements in many western countries, the Gilet Jaunes in France, Brexit, as well as in many other parts of the world, like Trump's trade policies (America First), and which we read and hear about on a daily basis.

The key question is how to make trade more inclusive, and the book offers some suggestions. There should be more of a common effort to explain how we all benefited from trade liberalization in terms of consumer choice, prices, quality of products, etc. What most systems are lacking are adequate programs for re-training, re-skilling, safety nets, etc. The reality is that capital is highly mobile, and labor is not, or at least less so. Factories and production facilities can be set up and moved to other geographical locations for economic reasons, whereas family life obviously is more limited and constraint by geographical links, family ties, language, culture, etc.

How to deal with these developments and how to offer “replacement” jobs where they disappear, that is a main challenge. There is significant potential for service activities that do create jobs, particularly for MSMEs. There is huge potential also thanks to new technologies, developments in IT, etc., which means that many jobs or functions can be performed without having to physically be displaced. Hence, more and deeper thinking needs to be performed on how to offer employment to people who cannot easily relocate. How to retrain and reskill people, as more jobs are created in technology intensive production. Interestingly, many companies are now relocating their production, referred to as reshoring business activities, for different reasons, including in the US, where the Trump Administration introduced new tax laws, making it more attractive to produce in the US. This has also had major implications for the FDI flows, which declined by 13 % in 2018 [UNCTAD, 2018].

Question 4

Let's look at the issue that tends to be (at least in Russia) among top priorities for the authorities and also widely discussed by the academic community, namely the digital economy. This is the quotation from one paper published recently by Petros C. Mavrodis: “In 1998, the WTO... established a Working Group on Electronic Commerce... Almost twenty years later, the group has nothing to show in terms of achievements, other than a few papers discussing the general, potential applicability of multilateral rules on some forms of digital trade. True, even the minutes reflecting the outcome of WTO Ministerial Conferences include a few lines on `e-commerce', but this is where the buck stops” [Mavrodis, 2017, p. 1]. How could you comment on this criticism of the WTO?

Сюэлин Гуань

Я не думаю, что в этом следует винить ВТО, потому что есть много нерешенных вопросов, которые важнее цифровой экономики. В том числе вопросы торговли сельскохозяйственными товарами, доступа к несельскохозяйственным рынкам, торговли услугами, переговоры по правилам разрешение споров, защиты интеллектуальной собственности, торговли и развития, а также торговли и окружающей среды и др. Конечно, рабочая группа по электронной торговле была создана в 1998 г., что свидетельствует о том, что ВТО смотрела в будущее. Однако в то время развитие электронной коммерции только начиналось, цифровая экономика получила быстрое развитие в последние годы. Правила всегда отстают от практики. Без роста торгового протекционизма в довоенный период не было бы ГАТТ. Без появления финансовых инноваций не было бы финансового регулирования. Поэтому еще не поздно начинать работу по соответствующему вопросу.

Miroslav Jovanovic

Production, marketing, sales, distribution, and international delivery of goods and services are expanding. Services, such as professional, information technology, financial, retail, entertainment, and education are traded a lot. The annual volume of such e-commerce is in the neighborhood of 30 trln doll. E-commerce is a complex and expanding area that needs to be tackled by various international organizations, not only by the WTO. It deals with ever changing communications technology, hence the International Telecommunications Union needs to be involved, as well as the others such as the International Standards Organization. International regulatory cooperation and exchange of best practices are necessary.

Regulatory cooperation needs to include privacy, cyber security and artificial intelligence. The principal reason is to protect consumers: that online purchased goods and services comply with safety regulations, rules and standards. International cooperation is necessary to reduce differences and provide a common platform for e-commerce. In this regard, if a general agreement is not possible, then sectoral approaches and exchanges of best practices and experiences may be the first steps.

Mina Mashayekhi

The fourth industrial revolution is driven by the digital economy, technology, and innovation, Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning, Internet of Things (IoT), robotics, cloud computing, 3D printing, and e-commerce. Most developing countries are suffering from a digital divide and weaknesses in technology, innovation, and R&D. WTO Agreements already cover the digital economy and e-commerce. Particularly, GATS covers e-commerce under modes 1 and 2. Moreover, in 1998 the WTO established a Working Group on Electronic Commerce to review all relevant agreements. Unfortunately, this review work was not taken seriously. There is also the Moratorium on custom duties on electronic transmissions which will expire in December unless WTO members agree to extend it. Due to lack of clarity of its coverage relating to electronic transmission, India and South Africa are supporting a rethink of the moratorium and a clear understanding of its impact on policy space for digital industrialization. The US, EU, and some other countries support a permanent moratorium with a broad interpretation of the coverage of electronic transmission. For example, the extension of coverage to digitized products and digitized products, and to services that would cover key services sectors, e. g. wholesale and retail, business services, communication services, recreational services. Concern was also raised on how to create a level playing field in a market of digital products characterized by concentration, abuse of dominance, tax avoidance, and unfair competition.

A number of countries that are major exporters and e-commerce large platform owners with monopolistic power (Alibaba, Amazon, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, etc.) decided to start new negotiations on a stand-alone agreement. It should be noted that there are major disparities between the abovementioned dominant e-commerce platforms and smaller e-commerce entities. In January 2019, 76 WTO members representing 90 percent of world trade agreed to launch negotiations on trade-related aspects of e-commerce with the aim of concluding them by MC12 in Nur Sultan.

This resulted from the work carried out by the 71 signatories of the joint statement initiative (JSI) on e-commerce at the 2017 WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires. The focus has been on the following areas: (a) an enabling environment for e-commerce, which includes digital trade facilitation and logistics, facilitating electronic transactions, and customs duties on electronic transmissions; (b) openness of e-commerce, including market access, flow of information and non-discrimination; (c) trust in e-commerce, including business trust, consumer trust and intellectual property; and (d) cross-cutting issues, including transparency, infrastructure gaps and the digital divide, and cooperation. The majority of developing countries are not currently taking part in these plurilateral negotiations, the aim of which should be to set up an international regulatory framework that allows countries to harness the power of e-commerce for development and not to keep any possible future competition out. The facilitators of the JSI -- Singapore, Japan and Australia -- have distributed a 16 page streamlined text on trade related aspects: customs duties, access to internet and data, business trust and capacity building and legal issues.

There is the need to give consideration to the role of competition law and policy with regard to the regulation of online platforms that serve as marketplaces. Ensuring shared benefits from e-commerce for developing but also developed countries whose e-commerce markets are monopolized by dominant e-commerce platforms consumer protection, including data protection and privacy needs to be given attention. As cross-border cooperation is crucial to an e-commerce ecosystem that benefits consumers, it is important to include strong provisions that allow for effective cooperation among consumer protection agencies to deal with consumer complaints concerning e-commerce transactions.

There is also the issue of taxation that is being looked at by the OECD and other agencies. It should be noted that other organizations are better equipped to deal with ecommerce privacy, data localization, and other non-trade issues. A new governance structure is also needed for e-commerce. Should negotiations go forward in the WTO there is a need for it to be undertaken through clarifying and amending existing agreements rather than as a stand-alone agreement to ensure coherence and focus on trade related concerns. Enabling developing and least developed countries to derive effective benefits from digital transformation and e-commerce remains a critical developmental challenge.

Jean-Marie Paugam

The comment is perfectly relevant, at least up to the Buenos Aires conference: the work program on e-commerce has produced close to nothing. This is why some members, now about 80, have decided to undertake negotiations on e-commerce in the WTO. This negotiation is pretty lively and intensive today. Of course, it will become difficult at one point, since:

- there are areas of very substantial divergences between members on freedom of data flows, privacy, access to source-codes, data localization, etc.;

- in case an agreement is reached on substance, there will be a very important problem to solve about making it MFN or not.

Yet, in case of success this could also be the dawn of a new plurilateral paradigm for the WTO.

Алексей Павлович Портанский

В последние годы на международной арене идут активные дискуссии о необходимости введения мер регулирования электронной коммерции. Отдельные развитые экономики уже обладают таким опытом, и правительства многих других стран выступают за введение регулирования размещения товаров и услуг в Интернете. Причем как представители электронного бизнеса, так и покупатели электронных товаров нередко выступают против введения регуляторных мер в отношении электронной коммерции, ссылаясь на то, что такие меры создают дополнительные барьеры для торговли и снижают ее объемы. Это одна из причин, в силу которых на мировой арене пока не сформированы единые правила регулирования электронной коммерции, но данным вопросом активно занимаются такие организации, как ВТО, Группа Всемирного банка и ЮНКТАД.

Важной и перспективной инициативой явилось решение Министерской конференции ВТО в Буэнос-Айресе по электронной коммерции. Вместе с РФ решение о начале переговоров в данной сфере поддержали почти 70 стран. При этом в работе могут принять участие любые заинтересованные члены ВТО, независимо от их позиций на будущих переговорах.

В рабочую группу вошли различные по размеру и уровню развития экономики, в том числе Австралия, Япония, Сингапур, США, ЕС, Коста-Рика, Австралия и Россия. Глава российской делегации министр экономического развития Максим Орешкин выразил надежду, что инициатива, запущенная в Буэнос-Айресе, приведет к принятию еще одного многостороннего соглашения ВТО. Инициативу высоко оценил торговый представитель США Роберт Лайтхайзер, подчеркнувший, что подобные подходы могли бы играть важную роль в ВТО. Участники коалиции договорились о моратории на пошлины в рамках электронной торговли. Можно ожидать, что на предстоящей Министерской конференции в Нур-Султане итоги переговоров в рабочей группе по электронной коммерции дадут конкретный результат.

Maarten Smeets

I would ask the question in return as to why there seems to be an automatic reflex that all new phenomena, trends, trade issues, etc. should be governed by trade rules, and why one should assume that automatically new rules need to be created. Why not first address the question about key features of e-commerce? What does it involve? What rules exist already in current trade agreements and that touch upon e-commerce? I recently saw a document that basically goes through all the agreements and demonstrates that e-commerce can be found in most agreements in one way or another. Then ask the question: what are the implications of this new but not so new form of trade? Why do we need rules, what needs to be covered and if we answer that question positively, how? As I just said, first consider the question what aspects of e-commerce are already covered under the GATT, GATS, TRIPS Agreements. If you look carefully at the GATS, it can easily be argued that many aspects of e-commerce aspects are already covered.

Where I agree with the statement by my dear friend Petros, is that the process of engaging in this thinking process has been slow. There seems to be a hesitation to enter uncharted waters, not knowing what this leads to. This is exactly where academics can play a very useful role analyzing the issues and coming up with suggestions. I am currently doing a book with the Chairs on a related issue, i. e. on digital trade. Our friends and the Chair from St Petersburg, including the Chairman is contributing to the book.

It is true that the moratorium has been extended for 20 years, and it is only recently that some members are engaging in more analytical and policy discussions on the implications of the moratorium for (forgone) tariff revenues, data protection, job creation vs.

losses, competitiveness, transfer of technology, etc. Here again we see widely differing positions between those who see the merits of making the moratorium permanent and those who don't and especially so among developing countries, including more technology-advanced amongst them. So it is hard at this stage to know what the future will bring and if the moratorium will become permanent and what will happen with taxes, tariffs and other measures that could potentially affect e-commerce trade.

Question 5

Let's focus the concluding part of our Panel on prospects for the WTO. What should be done to make the organization really effective and relevant? Taking for granted basically 100 % agreement that “something substantial should be done”, we have two largely alternative options. In parallel with possible ways to transform the EU as suggested by Joseph Stiglitz in one of his latest books (either more Europe, or less Europe) [Stiglitz,

, one could name them “either More WTO or Less WTO”. In the case of the former, we strive for more comprehensive and binding multilateralism. In the case of the latter, in particular as advocated by Dani Rodrik on the basis of his famous notion of the “globalization paradox” [Rodrik, 2011; 2019], the international trading system has to provide more flexibility in general, more freedom for national governments to promote and protect their interests. Which of these two options -- either more WTO or less WTO -- would you prefer?

Сюэлин Гуань

Отвечая на поставленный вопрос, хочу сказать следующее.

Во-первых, предназначение ВТО заключается в создании равных условий для развития мировой торговли. Данная цель не была реализована в полной мере в последнее десятилетие: мы добились определенного прогресса в развитии глобальной многосторонней торговой системы, основанной на правилах, но эти достижения по сравнению с тем, что было 20 лет назад, незначительны, и даже возникли некоторые осложнения.

Во-вторых, то, что должно быть изменено: необходимо, чтобы развитые страны смирились с быстрым развитием и усилением стран с формирующимся рынком, они должны следовать принципу открытости и инклюзивности мировой экономики, исходить из принципов взаимовыгодного обмена и сотрудничества в целях процветания международной торговли и обеспечения устойчивого роста мировой экономики.

В-третьих, заслуживает внимания точка зрения Дэни Родрика. В своем труде «Парадокс глобализации», проводя различия между высокой и умеренной глобализацией, он говорит о «трилемме глобализации», т. е. невозможности сосуществования трех целей политики на уровне национального государства: демократии, суверенитета государств и экономической глобализации. Мы знаем, что суверенитет любой страны неоспорим, поэтому нам необходимо найти компромисс между демократией и высокой степенью глобализации. В то же время Родрик считает, что «трилемма глобализации» не означает, что мы не можем одновременно иметь умеренную глобализацию, демократию и национальный суверенитет, что является именно недостающим звеном в учебниках. Экономика -- это наука о компромиссах. Мы исходим из ограничений, которые показывают нам, в какой степени глобализация не будет достигнута за счет демократии и национального суверенитета. Мы не глобализируемся ради самой глобализации. Мы хотим глобализации, которая может способствовать экономическому развитию наших стран.

Если говорить об изменениях в принципах регулирования ВТО, то после формирования глобальных цепочек добавленной стоимости регулирование торговли постепенно переместилось от пограничных мер к регулированию внутренней политики стран, включая инвестиционную политику. Что касается содействия развитию, то оно должно основываться на принципах, которых придерживаются развивающиеся страны. Развитие достигается в результате реализации промышленной политики. Правила ВТО требуют, чтобы политика стран-членов была открытой и прозрачной, но экономическая мощь развивающихся стран недостаточна, и они находятся в невыгодном положении в конкурентной рыночной борьбе, поэтому им необходимо использовать инструменты, которые защищают отечественные молодые отрасли. Из правил ВТО существует множество исключений. В прошлом развивающиеся страны могли использовать исключения из правил, теперь США категорически против такой практики. Это не вопрос регулирующих правил ВТО, а проблема США. По данной причине нам необходимо сфокусироваться на обсуждении оправданности использования развивающимися странами исключений из правил ВТО в целях развития промышленного потенциала.

В-четвертых, если вести речь о том, нужно «больше ВТО» или «меньше ВТО», то лично я полагаю, что лучше «меньше ВТО». Почему? Со времени Уругвайского раунда в ВТО возникли проблемы, Дохийскийраунд также не достиг существенного прогресса. Многие западные ученые считают, что ВТО давно существует только номинально, не говоря уже о том, что США в настоящее время выходят из многих международных организаций. Членов ВТО много, и их интересы сильно различаются, соотношение сил между развитыми и развивающимися членами изменилось, достичь компромисса стало сложнее. Более того, нынешняя мировая экономика находится в состоянии спада, распространен торговый протекционизм и отсутствует поддержка со стороны ведущих стран мира. Авторитет и эффективность ВТО крайне низки. В этом случае можно формально установить более жесткие правила, но на практике их будет невозможно реализовать. Иными словами, более свободный формат позволяет легче достигать консенсуса и выполнять обещания.

Miroslav Jovanovic

Let me first of all quote Charles de Gaulle, who said: “Treaties are like roses and young girls. They last while they last” [Charles de Gaulle Quotes].

As for the choice between more or less WTO, I prefer neither of the two. I prefer a different WTO or WTO version 2.0. In order to avoid the malign neglect of the WTO, the 2.0 version needs to be founded on three “golden rules”. The problem is that nobody knows what those three rules are!

Still, the WTO may and needs to serve as the global forum and platform for handling international trade issues. Let me propose topics that the WTO 2.0 needs to consider and include, together with those that I referred to in the e-commerce segment:

-т transparency, accountability, and legitimacy need to be increased;

- the Appellate Body needs to be more efficient;

- endless negotiations and slow decisions need to be improved and made more efficient;

- IPR, subsidies, and state-owned enterprises need to be tackled in a more effective way;

- privacy issues need special attention;

- statistics, especially trade in value added, needs to be available because of global value chains. Cooperation in this matter with the OECD may be welcome;

- are special rights given to LDCs a good or a bad option? If these countries are given lax rules or prolonged time to apply rules, then they may not fit in current global value chains.

Mina Mashayekhi

The rule-based multilateral trading system of WTO and its enforcement has come under pressure as a result of a lack of trust and respect for the rules based system, polarization, unilateral actions, protectionism, countermeasures, trade disputes, and bilateral trade deals focusing on short-term interests and circumventing multilateral processes. This is happening at a time when trade, and the multilateral trading system, is expected to play a key role in achieving Sustainable Development Goals. Countries are placing increasing emphasis on national socioeconomic outcomes particularly employment rather than on multilateral trade and development cooperation.

There is need for pursuing binding multilateralism in core trade issues, but I agree with Dani Roderick that the international trading system has to provide more flexibility in general, more freedom for national governments to promote and protect their interests, as there is no one size fits all. Given diversity of countries, there would be need for the weakest among them. Multilateral agreements should be negotiated and adopted only when countries have undertaken a full assessment of their socio-economic and sustainable and inclusive development impact. New agreements should be fully coherent with the SDGs and make concrete and verifiable contribution to their implementation.

Jean-Marie Paugam

I think that this question covers the deepest current dividing line amongst WTO members. The division is no longer “North” and “South” or “East versus West”. The real opposition now lies between those who believe that multilateral rules and cooperation are good for their economic development, and those who believe that they are bad because they reduce their “policy space”, that is, the autonomy of their economic policies.

To face this question, I would like to build on a parallel between the WTO and the EU by using a key concept from the EU for my answer. And this concept is “subsidiarity”: that means “let us operate at the level which seems most relevant to solve the problem. If the appropriate governance level is national, let's go national; if it's European, let's go European; and if it's global let's go global or multilateral”.

So in which case could we need more WTO? I think we need it each and every time that a credible solution can only be multilateral, and this involves all the cases where there can be no free-riding tolerated if we want to achieve the stated public policy objective. The best candidate for this is the issue of subsidies: most of the time it is worthless to discipline subsidies at national or regional levels if their impact is global. Take as an example, now negotiated in the WTO, of fisheries subsidies reform: we want to eliminate subsidies as a

cause for overfishing or illegal fishing that is destroying life in the oceans. You can try to do that at national or regional levels, but the problem is that, by definition, the fish itself cannot understand whether it is going to swim close to a subsidized boat or unsubsidized boat, or if it is entering in anyone's Special Economic Zone... So the solution can only be global. Take the example of fossil fuel subsidies reform that several WTO members are trying to promote on the agenda of the WTO -- the same problem. If you want to reduce fossil fuel emissions by reducing the subsidies, it is inefficient to do alone while your neighbor does not do it.

So in a nutshell: more WTO is needed where only multilateral cooperation can solve the problem.

Алексей Павлович Портанский

Как представляется, проблему не следует упрощать, сводя ее к формуле «Больше ВТО или меньше ВТО». Напомню, что в последних решениях Министерских конференций ВТО и G20 неизменно подчеркивается решающая роль организации в регулировании международной торговли. В текстах всех последних межрегиональных торговых соглашений, в частности вступивших в силу Всеобъемлющего и прогрессивного соглашения о Транстихоокеанском партнерстве (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership -- CPTPP), Всеобъемлющего экономического и торгового соглашения (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement -- CETA, а также находящегося в стадии переговоров Всестороннего регионального экономического партнерства (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership -- RCEP), подчеркнута основополагающая роль ВТО.

В то же время следует признать, что с учетом существующих проблем в многосторонней торговой системе, ввиду вероятности нового мирового кризиса нельзя полностью исключать появление негативного сценария, когда на смену сложившейся в послевоенный период Rules-based system может прийти Power-based system. От подобного отката назад, безусловно, в конечном счете проиграют все государства. Как не допустить подобного развития событий? Одним из путей противодействия ему является реформирование ВТО, о необходимости которого идет речь по меньшей мере в течение последних 15 лет. Представляется, что окончательным толчком к началу активных дебатов на сей счет и выдвижению конкретных инициатив отдельными странами стали активизировавшиеся после 2017 г. в мире торговые войны.

Maarten Smeets

I am not convinced one should address the question in a black or white frame. It is clear that the WTO needs further reform. Interestingly, the WTO was created 25 years ago precisely because the world and trade patterns were changing rapidly due to the forces of globalization. Members at the time thought that by bringing under one umbrella services and TRIPS and following a similar model for rules applicable to goods, they had performed the magic trick to cover all aspects of trade, to only find out shortly afterwards that the world is more complicated. Nobody at that time could expect the revolution caused by the new technologies, including IT, and what today often is referred to as the fourth industrial revolution, which completely transformed and is transforming our lives, way of thinking, acting, purchasing goods and services, communicating etc. etc. Nobody saw the fourth industrial revolution coming and we don't know what the future will bring in terms of new features that will affect further our ways of life. Even today we don't fully understand the ways in which it will affect our societies in the next ten years.

One should not forget that GATT was initially designed mainly to lower tariffs, which after World War II were around 50 % for industrial products. NTMs hardly played a role, agriculture was basically not covered. Services and IP were unknown at the time. Goods and products were wholly manufactured in countries, there was little outsourcing and FDI, which only started in the 1960s with the rise of MNEs, etc. Hence, the core business of the GATT and initially the WTO has completely changed, and the ways trade is conducted has undergone a radical change. From addressing tariffs, then NTBs. One can easily say that Ricardo got it right with his notion of comparative advantage, with specialization having been driven to the extreme, the rapid movement of capital, availability of technology, the very drastic cut of transport costs, the opening of markets, the integration of the world economy (global village idea). The reality also is that some two-third of world trade is not, I repeat not conducted on MFN terms, but preferential trade. This includes RTAs, and bilateral trade agreements, which have led to a further and more deeply integrated world economy.

You can't now reverse the trend, and instead we must cope with the new economic realities. How can we best cooperate between nations to generate economic welfare and ensure inclusive growth? What rules are required in pursuing those goals? As history has shown, rules always are created with a certain time lag, so what can be done to ensure that rules are addressing the right issues at the right time and in workable manners? The question therefore is not whether we need more or less WTO, as undoubtedly the WTO multilateral trading system has proven its relevance, we need to ensure that rule-making is only performed where strictly needed. The rest should be left to the market. But in short, we need multilateral trade rules to ensure stability, transparency, predictability and security. These are the critical conditions for business to invest, produce and flourish, much to the benefit of the consumer.

Question 6

At last, but definitely not least, let's look at specific plans of WTO reforms elaborated by member-states and their coalitions. Could you: a) comment on the content of these plans; and b) assess the chances to find an acceptable compromise between different positions and implement this compromise in reality?

Сюэлин Гуань

США предлагают четыре рекомендации по реформе ВТО. Первая из них касается определения статуса стран с нерыночной экономикой, вторая подчеркивает необходимость уважения суверенного политического выбора членов, третья гласит о необходимости соблюдения странами-членами обязательств по уведомлению о проводимой ими торговой политике. В соответствии с четвертой рекомендацией предлагается провести реформу статуса развивающихся стран. По сути это является главной целью США в сфере реформирования ВТО.

В феврале текущего года торговый представитель США предложил ВТО четыре критерия для идентификации развитых стран: членство в ОЭСР; членство в G20; принадлежность к группе стран с высоким доходом по классификации Всемирного банка; доля в мировой торговле товарами, не менее 0,5 %. Способ разделения членов ВТО в зависимости от принадлежности к международным организациям не имеет смысла. Например, возьмем критерий принадлежности страны к G20. Эта группа включает США и другие страны «Большой семерки». Финансовый кризис в Юго-Восточной Азии 1997 г. заставил «Большую семерку» признать важность укрепления диалога между развитыми и развивающимися странами, трансформировав таким образом «Большую семерку» в «Большую двадцатку». Возникает вопрос: каким образом развивающиеся страны, входящие в «Большую двадцатку», вдруг стали развитыми?

Другой проблемой США является игнорирование проблем развития. Суть вопроса заключается не в том, желают ли развивающиеся страны внести больший вклад в будущие переговоры, а в том, могут ли они получить равную переговорную силу. Некоторые видят только то, что объем обязательств стран-членов неодинаков, однако не усматривают дисбаланса в структуре многосторонних торговых переговоров. Специальный и дифференцированный подход в отношении развивающихся членов является частью многосторонней торговой системы и ее правил. Разрыв в экономическом и социальном развитии между развивающимися и развитыми членами организации остается значительным. Отсутствие у них возможности полноценно участвовать в многосторонней торговой системе еще не устранено.

Рекомендации ЕС включают: во-первых, усиление надзора за «нарушением добросовестной конкуренции»; во-вторых, пересмотр критериев и режима в отношении развивающихся стран; в-третьих, внедрение «гибкого многостороннего подхода» для проведения многосторонних переговоров; в-четвертых, повышение эффективности и прозрачности механизма разрешения споров.

В совместном заявлении 12 государств-членов, включая Канаду, Японию и страны Европейского союза, указывались вопросы, которые требуют первоочередного внимания с точки зрения реформирования ВТО: сохранение и укрепление системы разрешения споров; усиление переговорной функции ВТО; а также усиление надзора и прозрачности торговой политики. Предложения по реформе, представленные США, ЕС и Японией, в основном включают повышение прозрачности торговой политики и соблюдение обязательств по уведомлению об изменениях в ней, введение наказаний за «нарушение правил торговли» и применение промышленных субсидий, наконец, пересмотр статуса и классификации развивающихся стран. Помимо этого, данная группа стран предлагает разработать правила электронной торговли и улучшить механизм разрешения споров.

Китай также выступил со своим видением реформы ВТО. 13 мая 2019 г. Китай официально представил организации «Предложение по реформе Китая в ВТО» [China's Proposal on WTO Reform..., 2019]. В документе отмечается, что ВТО не является идеальной организацией, но это наилучший канал для достижения либерализации и упрощения торговли и инвестиций в глобальном масштабе. В то же время Китай признает, что в настоящее время ВТО находится в состоянии беспрецедентного кризиса.

Китайская сторона придерживается трех основных принципов реформы ВТО. Во-первых, ВТО должна защищать два базовых принципа -- недискриминации и открытости многосторонней торговой системы. Во-вторых, организация должна защищать интересы развивающихся стран -- членов, корректировать сложившийся в правилах ВТО дефицит внимания к вопросам развития, способствовать разрешению трудностей, возникающих у развивающихся членов при интеграции в процесс экономической глобализации, и помогать достижению целей ООН в области устойчивого развития на период до 2030 г. В-третьих, правила должны быть сформулированы совместно всем международным сообществом; они не могут устанавливаться несколькими членами или небольшим кругом участников.

Китай предлагает решать проблемы в четырех областях: во-первых, по выделению ключевых и неотложных вопросов, которые угрожают выживанию ВТО; во-вторых, по повышению значимости ВТО в глобальном экономическом управлении; в-третьих, по обеспечению роста эффективности функционирования ВТО; в-четвертых, по усилению инклюзивности многосторонней торговой системы.

Для Китая вопрос принадлежности к группе развивающихся стран является принципиальным. Статус развивающейся страны предоставляет возможность для проведения внутренних экономических реформ и повышения открытости рынков и тем самым благоприятствует достижению целей ВТО. При определении того, является ли страна развивающейся, нельзя рассматривать отдельные показатели, следует учитывать ряд комплексных характеристик, включая душевой доход населения, структуру промышленности, инновационный потенциал и распределение национального дохода. Применительно к Китаю, независимо от того, какие показатели используются, почти везде мы имеем высокие общие стоимостные индикаторы и относительно невысокие душевые показатели. Например, общий объем производства в Китае достигает почти 14 трлндолл США, но душевой доход составляет менее 10 тыс. долл. США, что ниже среднемирового уровня и не превышает 1/б от аналогичного показателя США. Кроме того, внутреннее развитие Китая по-прежнему неравномерно: здесь есть не только современные города, такие как Пекин и Шанхай, но и имеется более 500 бедных округов и свыше 16 млн человек, которые оказались за чертой бедности. По данным причинам Китай не откажется от статуса развивающийся страны.

Что касается возможности формирования компромисса между различными предложениями, то здесь чрезвычайно важными предпосылками являются желание стран -- их инициаторов договариваться друг с другом и идти на взаимные уступки. Поиск компромиссного варианта на основе различных предложений предполагает проведение переговоров между странами. Поскольку это переговоры, то каждая страна получает какую-то выгоду от соглашения, одновременно идя на некоторые уступки, таким образом достигая компромисса. Если мы продолжим идею игры с нулевой суммой, то компромисса не будет.

Miroslav Jovanovic

Economists normally “sell” worries for a living and are not optimists. Those “economists” who have a Panglossian (super-optimistic) view of the world are either politicians (who can say or promise whatever they want), or are paid lobbyists, or need to reduce their consumption of cocaine.

Donald Trump told the UN on 24 September 2019 that “the future belongs to patriots, not globalists” [Remarks by President Trump...]. With this in mind, one needs to try to continue to “sell,” as much as possible, the idea of openness and multilateral system. It will not be easy. De-globalization will stay as an important international development. Bilateral solutions of problems in trade, rather than multilateral ones within the WTO, would continue to be important for quite some time in the future. Examples include bilateral US negotiations with China and the US dialogue with the EU.

Because of sanctions that are an instrument of disintegration, Russia was forced to look to internal resources and revived its domestic potential in agricultural production. The result was that Russia both transformed form a food importer to an important global food exporter and that Russia earns more from exports of food than from exports of military equipment. One more word about economic sanctions. They are introduced and kept without any principle. For instance, Turkey occupies a third of an EU member country. This action by Turkey was “rewarded” by the EU accession negotiations. Elsewhere, when Crimea reunited with Russia, the EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia.

Imminent Brexit will change the EU beyond recognition. Britain and Germany were the principal and strong EU forces that argued and worked in favor of a liberal economy. With Britain out, it is Germany that will be the EU's liberalization champion. However, France and its strong intervention leanings will be supported by many like-minded EU states. In the new EU structure, France would be able to muster wide support in the EU, and France would be able to sway EU decisions and policies towards intervention and away from liberal policies. Would liberal Germany, as the principal European economy, like to live and operate in this type of EU structure and environment? As for Britain, this country is regaining its freedom from the EU, and Britain joins a world that is much more prosperous and dynamic than is that in the EU. Economic slowdown, certain closing of several important global economies and the potential breakup of the eurozone vanity project are unfriendly with globally liberal trading and investment system.

One needs to prepare stand-by strategies for unfavorable developments such as posteurozone EU and post-EU Europe.

Mina Mashayekhi

The United States continues to withdraw from its role as the leader of the international trading system and globalization. At the same time China is being proactive in putting forward proposals to push its own economic interests and is the new champion of globalization. China's trade practices, however, will impact negatively their credential as the guardian of the trading system. Under the threat of the MTS becoming irrelevant, major initiatives have been put forward that, according to their proponents, are aimed at reforming and modernizing the WTO. The WTO and the MTS are facing a crisis of confidence, fragmentation and polarization as a result of the US-China Trade War and non- MFN plurilateral initiatives. Building trust, transparency and good faith implementation and respect for the rules is key to rebuild the credibility and legitimacy of the MTS. The reform proposals include the following.

Trade negotiation and rulemaking, and the use of plurilaterals.

Developed countries have stressed the need to update the WTO rulebook in order to address some measures highlighted in trade tensions and considered to distort trade, competitive conditions and the level playing field, including industrial subsidies, behavior of State-owned enterprises, the forced transfer of technology, TRIPs compliance and local content and investment measures. Investment facilitation is an issue which should have been taken up multilaterally in the context of GATS and Mode 3 commercial presence and services facilitation as proposed by India but rather countries such as China, Brazil, and Russia are pursuing it separately in the plurilaterals. Oher organizations such as UNCTAD, OECD, and the World Bank are better equipped to deal with investment facilitation, as they have long experience with different aspects of investment, including facilitation, promotion, and taxation. There is also services domestic regulation being negotiated as additional commitments to be scheduled instead of a multilateral agreement under GATS Article VI on Domestic Regulation. The modification of existing rules and the introduction of new rules would require consensus for negotiations in the WTO. It is highly doubtful that consensus would be achieved on any of the non-MFN plurilaterals as a WTO Agreement given trade and economic tensions and security concerns.

Special and Differential Treatment.

Development flexibilities that may be granted on the basis of the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries have increasingly been under attack reflecting the long-standing concerns of developed countries over the current special and differential treatment architecture. It should be noted that the SDT provisions had already been significantly weakened in the WTO Agreements. The reform of the existing principles of special and differential treatment includes the proposed graduation and differentiation of developing countries. With the spectacular expansion of the share of emerging economies particularly China and the South East Asian countries in world trade in the 2000s, developed countries became increasingly concerned at the lack of reciprocity from large and competitive developing countries that enjoy special and differential treatment and “less-than-full reciprocity” in negotiations. They found it unjustified to treat large developing countries with strong export competitiveness such as China on an equal footing with other smaller and more vulnerable developing countries including the LDCs.

The US proposal provides for eliminating the current practice of self- declaration of developing country status in the WTO and automatic availability of special and differential treatment for all self-declared developing countries. The proposal that special and differential treatment eligibility would not apply to developing countries that: (a) are members or acceding to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); (b) are Group of 20 members; (c) are classified as high-income countries by the World Bank; or (d) account for more than 0.5 % of global merchandise trade. These conditions would exclude more than 30 developing-countries that are members of WTO from eligibility for special and differential treatment.

A group of developing countries, i. e. China, India, South Africa, and Venezuela, has argued that there remains an important gap not only in terms of per capita income and poverty levels, but also in individual trade and development capacities between developed and developing countries. In addition, they argue that an historically important role had been assigned, through special and differential treatment, to the facilitation of their gradual integration into the multilateral trading system and to the contribution of such treatment to the emergence of a consensus in trade negotiations. They called for a more practical, voluntary and cooperative approach to the reform of special and differential treatment. This discussion is important, as strengthening the principle of special and differential treatment to make it more precise, effective and operational is pertinent to SDG 10 on reducing inequality within and among countries. China is competing with the US to be the first economic power and trading country and will soon have the same GDP as

US. Therefore, the rationale for it to use of SDT is no longer commensurate to its level of development. Trade Facilitation Agreement would be a good model to follow.

Transparency and notifications.

Efforts to reform regular work and transparency at WTO are crucial for a well-functioning system. Lack of data and notifications have often prevented the effective monitoring and assessment of the trade policy measures of trading partners. Improved monitoring and transparency are considered key to strong compliance on substantive issues including industrial and agricultural subsidies and SOEs. Proposals from Argentina, Costa Rica, the European Union, Japan and the United States focus on enhancing the incentives to comply with notification requirements and improve their examination, including by instituting administrative sanctions and counter-notifications. This approach is also believed to improve pre-litigation problem-solving and incrementally improve WTO rules. Some developing countries have called for a more cooperative approach, as notification difficulties could also represent capacity constraints for them. The WTO does have capacity building programs for developing countries to help them prepare the notifications. Transparency would contribute to accountability and legitimacy.

The dispute settlement mechanism, especially Appellate Body (AB) functions.

The WTO dispute settlement mechanism -- the “jewel of the crown” -- has been significantly weakened and may soon be paralyzed by the non-appointment of the AB members. The integrity of the multilateral trading system in general is likely to be negatively impacted. 22 cases have been brought to the dispute settlement mechanism on different issues including on national security measures. Tackling these complex and large- scale cases is a significant challenge, as these measures raise complex legal questions of a systemic nature, and their handling will have serious systemic implications. If unilateral tariff measures are justified, either as a result of national security exceptions or the unfair trade argument, certain core WTO disciplines may be weakened. If the measures are not justified, securing compliance may prove difficult, and the US disengagement will deepen. The importance of enhancing multilateral oversight on unilateral measures that are at the source of the current heightened trade tensions has been emphasized given its crucial role in providing security and predictability. There is however need to concretely deal with major socio-economic and security concerns e.g. unemployment, technology theft, deindustrialization etc. which could lead to civil unrest and economic distress.

The central elements of current WTO reform efforts, including those from the EU and China, are undoubtedly those relating to the dispute settlement mechanism with a view to ending the current impasse in the Appellate Body. The appointment of new members to the Appellate Body has been blocked because of US concerns relating to its operation including in relation to lack of respect of time lines for different stages of DS and the AB member. The US has also concerns relating to judicial activism. Four out of seven seats had become vacant by October 2018, leaving three judges, the minimum required to hear an appeal. In December 2019, another two seats will become vacant and the Appellate Body would cease to function.

Various proposals have been made to address these concerns by amending the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes and the rules of procedure to clarify and modify relevant provisions. Significantly, some proposals envisage increasing the number of Appellate Body members from the current seven to nine, making it a full-time job and providing one single longer-term appointment of 6 to 8 years instead of the current term of 4 years, with the possibility of one renewal. The EU and some other members have supported an alternative arbitration mechanism to the AB. The hope is to achieve outcomes for the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in Nur Sultan Kazakhstan in June 2020.

Jean-Marie Paugam

The last concept of WTO reform was launched by the US at the WTO Ministerial in Buenos-Aires and by French President Macron at the OECD ministerial of 2018, and then endorsed by the EU Council. The good news is that some progress has materialized since then: First: the concept of WTO reform has landed within the WTO. It is now regularly mentioned and being discussed within the discussions of its General Council for instance. Second: everybody more or less agrees that the WTO reform is about restoring and improving the three functions of the WTO: negotiating disciplines, implementing agreements, litigating disputes.