German question in the foreign policy strategy of the USA in the second half of the 1940s-1980s

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State Institution “Institute of World History of NAS of Ukraine”

GERMAN QUESTION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF THE USA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1940S - 1980S

Dmytro Lakishyk

Ph.D. (History), Senior Research Fellow

Kyiv

Abstract

german question relations war

The article examines US policy towards West Germany after World War II, covering a historical span from the second half of the 1940s to the 1980s. It was US policy in Europe, and in West Germany in particular, that determined the dynamics and nature of US-German relations that arose on a long-term basis after the formation of Germany in September 1949.

One of the peculiarities of US-German relations was the fact that both partners found themselves embroiled in a rapidly escalating international situation after 1945. The Cold War, which broke out after the seemingly inviolable Potsdam Accords, forced the United States and Germany to be on one side of the conflict. Despite the fact that both states were yesterday's opponents and came out of the war with completely different, at that time, incomparable, statuses.

A characteristic feature of US policy on the German question in the postwar years was its controversial evolution. The American leadership had neither a conceptual plan for development, nor a clear idea of Germany's place in the world, nor an idea of how to plan the country's future. However, the deterioration of relations between the USA and the USSR and the birth of the two blocs forced the US government to resort to economic revival (the Marshall Plan) and militarypolitical consolidation of Western Europe and Germany (NATO creation).

US policy toward Germany has been at the heart of its wider European policy. The United States favored a strong and united Western Europe over American hegemony, trying to prevent the spread of Soviet influence.

Joint participation in the suppression of communism, however, could not prevent the periodic exacerbation of relations between the United States and Germany, and at the same time did not lead to an unconditional follow-up of the West Germans in the fairway of American foreign policy.

Keywords: USA, USSR, FRG, German question, Berlin crisis, cold war.

Анотація

Дмитро Лакішик, кандидат історичних наук, старший науковий співробітник ДУ «Інститут всесвітньої історіїНАН України» Київ, Україна

НІМЕЦЬКЕ ПИТАННЯ У ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНІЙ СТРАТЕГІЇ США У ДРУГІЙ ПОЛОВИНІ 1940-х - 1980-х рр.

У статті аналізується американська політика щодо Західної Німеччини після Другої світової війни, охоплюючи історичний проміжок з другої половини 1940-х до 1980-х років. Саме німецька політика США в Європі, і в Західній Німеччині зокрема, визначала динаміку і характер американсько-німецьких, що виникли на довгостроковій основі після утворення ФРНу вересні 1949 р.

Одна з особливостей американсько-німецьких відносин була обумовлена тією обставиною, що обидва партнери виявилися втягнутими в конфліктну міжнародну ситуацію, що швидко розвивалася після 1945 р Холодна війна, що спалахнула після здавалося непорушних Потсдамських угод, змусила опинитися США і ФРН по одну сторону конфлікту. Незважаючи на те, що обидві держави були ще вчорашніми противниками і вийшли з війни з абсолютно різними, на той момент незрівняними, статусами.

Характерною ознакою американської політики щодо німецького питання в повоєнні роки стала її суперечлива еволюція. Американське керівництво не мало ні концептуального плану розвитку, ні чіткого уявлення про місце Німеччини в світі, а ні ідеї про те, як планувати майбутнє країни. Однак погіршення відносин між США і СРСР і народження двох блоків змусило американський уряд вдатися до економічного відродження («план Маршалла») і військово-політичної консолідації Західної Європи і Німеччини (створення НАТО).

Політика США стосовно Німеччини була осердям її більш широкої європейської політики. США віддавали перевагу сильній і єдиній Західній Європі за американської гегемонії, намагаючись не допустити поширення радянського впливу.

Спільна участь у стримуванні комунізму, однак, не могла запобігти періодичним загостренням відносин між США і ФРН, і, водночас, не призвела до беззастережного слідування західних німців у фарватері американської зовнішньої політики, щоправда, солідарність, базована на протидії спільному ворогові, виявлялася загалом досить міцною.

Ключові слова: США, СРСР, ФРН, німецьке питання, Берлінська криза, холодна війна.

The main text

One of the most prominent features of the Cold War is the German question. It is no accident that its completion is associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall (on the night of November 9 to November 10, 1989), an event that paved the way for German unification. The settlement of the German question in the postwar period became a kind of indicator of relations between the Western powers (USA, Great Britain and France) and the USSR. The relevance of the study of the origins of the German question and its place in post-war international relations is also conditioned by the need to objectively study the historical experience of crisis management in the conditions of the existence of the Cold War bipolar system of the world.

The Second World War set the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain exclusively in size and importance tasks for the post-war world order. The large-scale aggression carried out by Nazi Germany prompted the ruling circles of the anti -Hitler coalition to seek a model of international relations in which Germany would not be able to carry out new aggression. At the same time, this goal was compounded by the fact that serious differences emerged during the planning of the postwar future of Germany, in the Allied camp, during the Second World War, which gave rise to the so-called “German problem”. This, in turn, led to the emergence of post-war international conflicts, which developed into powerful regional crises. One of them was the Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949, the basis for which emerged during the discussion by the Allies the plans of Germany's post-war system.

This topic and other related problems in historical science are relevant and are systematically researched by Western and national experts. American historiography is represented by a considerable amount of research on the problems of international relations, in particular the European policy of the USA. American literature is constantly updated and has long become one of the leading sections of US historiography.

Analysis of the works of such American and European researchers as W. Hanrieder, J. Heideking, D. Marsh, W. Miscamble, F. Ninkovich, T. Schwartz, F. Stern, G. Treverton argues that after World War II, West Germany first became the object of influence of various foreign political forces, and then gradually became an important subject of international life. In both cases, its importance and then its role in world affairs and especially in European affairs were very important.

In Ukrainian historiography, European policy of the United States, in particular American-German relations and related issues have attracted the attention of many researchers (E. Kaminsky, I. Koval, S. Kondratyuk, R. Kryvonos, A. Kudryachenko, A. Martynov, I. Pogorska, O. Potekhin, M. Ryzhkov, S. Tolstov). The work of these researchers analyzes the European direction of the United States, including American policy toward Germany.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the US foreign policy in the German issue in the context of the bipolar split of the European continent in the second half of the twentieth century.

During the war, the three leading powers - the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain, which fought against Germany - began to look after its post-Nazi future. The question of Germany consisted of three interrelated problems: occupation, reparation and division of Germany. For the first time, the destiny of Germany was discussed by the leaders of the three countries during a conference in Tehran (November 1943). US President Franklin Roosevelt, in the working hypothesis, favored the division of Germany. He put forward a proposal to form five autonomous states in Germany: Prussia; Hannover and the northwestern regions of Germany;

Saxony and the district of Leipzig; Hessen province, Darmstadt, Kassel and districts are located south of the Rhine, as well as the old cities of Westphalia; Bavaria, Baden, Wьrttemberg [14, p. 94].

However, the prospect of future Soviet Union hegemony in Eastern Europe, which increasingly concerned American politicians, helped to forge closer relations with the Germans. But among the US foreign policy establishment there were supporters of “punitive peace”. For example, US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau regarded Germany as an aggressive country by nature and believed that Versailles did nothing to overcome the German threat. H. Morgenthau called for the destruction of heavy industry in Germany, the flooding of coal mines and its transformation into an agricultural country. “If Ruhr, he argued, would be deprived of his machinery, the mines would be flooded, blown up and destroyed - It would make the Germans unable to wage future wars” [19, p. 581].

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, France, as the fourth controlling country, was included in the Big Three, giving it its own occupation zone. The leaders of the three countries agreed to liquidate the independent state existence of Germany, but refused to dismember the Reich territory [14, p. 186-187]. The United States and the United Kingdom also spoke in favor of maintaining viable Germany under a tough occupation regime. However, this was not caused by the desire for reparations, but by the fact that since the fall of 1944 F. Roosevelt had been striving for a stable Central Europe within the framework of the global equilibrium system. Germany's economic stability was essential to th is plan, i.e. the Morgenthau Plan was finally rejected [21, p. 111-133].

After the liberation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Joseph Stalin began to carry out a massive “Sovietization” of this region, with its further transformation into a buffer zone. The consequence of such a policy of the Soviet Union was the aggravation of contradictions between the Allies at the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945). Instead of a harmonious European peace, Potsdam has fixed a new dividing line between future adversaries. “It seemed that the Potsdam Conference intended to keep Germany united, but in fact laid the groundwork for its division... In Potsdam, the seeming unity among the Big Three was destroyed by the so-called responsibility principle, which was incorporated at American insistence” [35, p. 22, 23].

Political instability, economic chaos, and even mass famine in Germany have required the US government to take effective action to prevent a possible catastrophe. US officials have recognized that their national interests require the economic revival of Germany in a European context. The problem was that the Allied Control Council © Dmytro Lakishyk, 2020 “did not rule” Germany and did not allow the country to govern itself. That is why the United States sought the “maximum possible” economic union, which will allow Germany to achieve an independent economic revival. For example, Secretary of State James Byrnes, in his speech in Stuttgart in September 1946, announced changes in US policy: “If full unification cannot be achie ved, we must do everything in our power to ensure the maximum possible unification... The US Government believes that the German people in all of Germany, under proper control, must be given some responsibility for their conduct their own affairs” [17, p. 94-96].

Thus, the inability to reach the political unification of the four occupation zones forced the economic unification - the creation of Bizone or Bizonia (since August 1948 - Trizone) as the only western economic region. Economic unity was considered necessary not only to make Germany independent, but also to help to revive Europe, which required a fully-fledged German economy. While Germany remained divided into occupation zones without a single economic policy, the economic revival of other Western European countries was in question. Only the integration of German resources into the European economy could have averted the threat of an economic crisis in Western Europe.

The extremely dire situation of post-war Europe required the US government to provide financial assistance for its economic revival. Important in this sense was the “Marshall Plan”. On June 5, 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall in his Harvard speech offered American assistance to those European countries willing to coordinate their efforts for economic recovery. Former politician Paul Nitze, in his memoirs, stated: “It was his (Marshall. - D.L.) idea that our initiatives would not be directed against any country. Rather, they will be open to all countries of Europe, East and West alike, and aimed at eliminating the major problems of hunger, poverty and disease... Our goal was to revive Europe economically and spiritually, to make it prosperous again” [29, p. 53].

The reaction of the USSR and all communist parties in Eastern Europe to the Marshall plan, which they voluntarily rejected, was extremely negative and harsh. Marshall's plan, in their interpretation, was a manifestation of American imperialism aimed at establishing an economic and political dictate in Europe [3, p. 438].

Following the failure of the Last Chance Conference held in London in November-December 1947 with the participation of four foreign ministers, and the failure to create a common economic zone, it became clear that no agreement with the USSR would be possible in the near future. In January 1948 the issue of convening a conference of three Western powers to consider the German question (the creation of a West German government) was resolved. The conference opened in London on February 23, despite protests from the Soviet Union [8, p. 7].

However, after the London talks, the Soviet government took a number of measures against the policies of the Western powers, which in fact indicated a refusal to jointly solve the German problem. J. Stalin used the introduction of the German mark in the West, during the monetary reform on June 20, 1948, as an excuse for the blockade of West Berlin in order to annex it to the Soviet occupation zone. On the night of June 23-24, 1948, any land connection between the western zones and West Berlin was blocked and lasted for almost a whole year. The TASS statement on the situation in Berlin explained the actions of the USSR as follows: “This circumstance (conducting monetary reform. - D.L.) forced the Soviet command in Germany to take measures to restrict transport links between Berlin and the western occupation zones of Germany in order to protect the interests of the German population and the economy of the Soviet area from its disorganization” [13, p. 50].

US officials believed that the decision to adopt “rules of the game” imposed by the USSR would have negative consequences not only for the city's residents, but also would cast doubt on America's intention to remain in Europe. “If we want to keep Europe from communism, we should not give in to a whit”, emphasized the military governor of the US zone in Germany Lucius Clay. “I am convinced that the future of democracy requires us to remain here until we are displaced” [28, p. 65].

The Americans decided to organize an “air bridge”, which in technical terms was a complete success and was able to fully secure the supply of West Berlin. The heroic behavior of the Berliners under these circumstances changed the image of the Germans in the eyes of the Americans, whose determination to resist Soviet actions provoked universal admiration.

During the Berlin crisis, US officials put forward a proposal to resolve the German issue. In the summer of 1948, the director of Policy Planning in the Department State led by George Kennan proposed a last-ditch effort to achieve German unification. G. Kennan, who headed the National Security Council's subcommittee responsible for examining Germany's future relations with its European neighbors, suggested that “four states give up control of Germany, gradually withdraw troops from all over the country and hold nationwide elections. A limited garrison of four states will remain there (in Germany. - D.L.) only to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany” [26, p. 258].

However, US government officials opposed Ken nan's idea. They stressed that it would be extremely dangerous to agree to Germany's reunification under the G. Kennan program until Western Europe becomes stronger economically and militarily. However, a large number of foreign policy representatives, as well as Secretary of State G. Marshall, were interested in Kennan's proposal and insisted on its further elaboration. G. Kennan and his policy planning staff have set up a working group to develop a plan called “Plan A”. In parallel, “Plan B” was developed, which did not provide for the withdrawal of military forces from Germany, but did imply restrictions on unilateral control by each occupying power in its zones [29, p. 71].

Due to strong opposition in the US Department of Defense, Kennan's plan was not implemented, but US leaders continued to implement the London agreements to establish a West German government. On May 8, 1949, the constituent assembly (Parliamentary Council) together with the Commander-in-Chief adopted the constitution - the Basic Law of Germany, and on August 14, elections were held in Germany. On September 12, Theodor Heuss was elected President of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Konrad Adenauer became Chancellor. Thus, in late 1949, West Germany emerged as an independent political force. In this regard, the Soviet researcher Yu. Melnykov noted that “with the creation of Federal Republic of Germany, the existence of Germany as a single state was not terminated in fact, but also legally” [6, p. 114].

Having formed a West German government, the American leaders suggested that they take the next step - to take Germany to Western security organizations, thereby further orienting Germany to the United States. The idea of rearming Germany, at least to counterbalance the strong police regime of the GDR, was extremely unpopular in neighboring France, but it was in the United States that it received approval.

The Korean War was an impetus for the US government to formally appeal to the Atlantic Council for rearmament of Germany, citing a “military vacuum” in Europe. At the same time, the Korean War forced Western statesmen to acknowledge their military vulnerability. That is why proposals have been put forward among American politicians not only to exploit Germany's enormous human and industria l potential, but also to rearm it. “Without the German contribution, it would be difficult to imagine that NATO would ever be able to create effective defense”, remembers P. Nitze [29, p. 121-122].

Unable to counter the rearmament of Germany, France proposed a so-called “Pleven plan”. On October 24, 1950, the Prime Minister of France, Renй Pleven, proposed a plan to create a European Defense Community (EDC) with a single command and a European army made up of mixed contingents, which would include German forces. The Pleven plan envisaged re-equipping the Germans without rearming Germany, thus satisfying the American demand and opposition from the

French National Assembly. The proposal of the French was welcomed by the Americans. For example, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in conversation with President Harry Truman, agreed that “rearming Germany was impossible without the creation of a European Defense Force” [16, p. 42].

Konrad Adenauer was very supportive of this idea and characterized the EDC as a step towards the unification of the whole of Europe, which would serve as a tool not only for the reunification of Germany but also for the creation of European unity. As early as 1949, he proposed at the party congress of the CDU that human resources of West Germany should be included in the European strike forces against the USSR. In 1950, K. Adenauer “began to press on the Allies to create hundreds of thousands of police at the level that already existed in the GDR” But at the time of specific negotiations, he realized that “rearmament belongs to the sphere of fantasies” [18, p. 269].

At the London meeting in February 1952, progress was made in the creation of the EDC, but major decisions were made shortly at the NATO meeting in Lisbon. As the success of the London and Lisbon negotiations was the way to the immediate creation of the EDC and, therefore, the re-equipping of Germany, the Soviet Union began to accuse the Allies of violating the decisions of the Potsdam Conference on the demilitarization of Germany. In order to solve the problem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on March 10, 1952 proposed an important political initiative in the so-called “Stalin's note”. The project included a commitment that the future German state would not join coalitions and military alliances against any state that participated in the war against fascism. The territory of Germany was determined by the borders established by the Potsdam Conference. No restrictions were imposed on the development of the world economy, trade, shipping, or access to world markets. In addition, the state could have the necessary national defense forces for defense [34, p. 1-2].

In proposing unification on the basis of free elections, J. Stalin seemed to suggest that he was willing to sacrifice the East German communist regime. Even if the Communists won the East German election that the Americans feared, the German population would be far more likely to secure a decisive victory for the proWestern democratic parties. “The essence of Stalin's diplomatic offensive was at least to find out what the Soviet Union would be able to gain if it threw the East German communist regime overboard”, said former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. “Stalin never perceived this regime as a fully-fledged sovereign state and gave it a status different from that of all other Eastern European satellites, precisely in order to keep East Germany in stock in case of an agreement when German unification would be seriously discussed” [4, p. 450].

However, K. Adenauer was adamant. His distrust of Moscow was so deep that he did not want to make any compromises because of the vague promises of a possible unification of the country at the cost of its neutrality. Contrary to K. Adenauer's position, the Social Democrats, led by Kurt Schumacher, actively advocated the unification of Germany, despite the country's future neutrality. For example, the adviser to US President John McCloy in Acheson's telegram of March 12, 1952 emphasized: “Fortunately, for us, most Germans h ave little illusions about Russia and Bolshevism. Most Germans who have considered the Soviet proposals treat them with skepticism... The Soviet conditions (“Stalin's note”. - D.L.) are generally very exaggerated to be plausible' [34, p. 125].

However, Stalin's note failed to halt the process of German rearmament within the EDC. The coming to power of the Democratic administration of Eisenhower gave a new impetus to the EDC. The Edgar Faure government, and subsequently the Antoine Pinay government in France, together with European allies, accelerated the preparation of the EDC treaty. After long negotiations, the treaty was signed on May 27, 1952 in Paris [2, p. 205-262]. The day before, in Bonn, representatives of the three Western occupying powers signed a treaty that gave Germany equal rights with other countries. But its implementation depended on the entry into force of the Paris Treaty. The question of ratification of the treaty in Paris has therefore become a major issue in German and American policy.

However, the French did not want to see Germany fully rearmed and did not want to sacrifice their national defense capabilities for the sake of an integrated West defense system that included Germany. Because it would entrust the defense of their country to those who had ravaged France decades ago and thereby restricted its ability to wage colonial wars. That is why plans for the creation of the EDC were raised against France's resistance. “The EDC, in fact, the original French idea, quickly became the object of growing anti-American sentiment in France”, states T. Schwartz [33, p. 233]. At the meeting of the National Assembly on August 30, 1952, virtually without prior discussion, the EDC ratification was rejected by a procedural majority - 319 against 264.

The defeat of the EDC was a blow to US European policy. The vacuum that arose from the US-French stalemate, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden suggested filling the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Germany. At the London Conference in late September 1954, it was agreed that Germany should join NATO and the Brussels Covenant, which became the Western European Union (WEU). In May 1955, West Germany became a full member of NATO.

The hopes of American politicians have come true, and Germany's political success has been closely linked to Western European prosperity. The failure of the EDC was a barrier to military integration, but served as an impetus for economic unity, the basis of which was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), proposed by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman (“Schuman Plan”) in May 1950. Consequently, favorable conditions have emerged for a “new European uplift”. In March 1957, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the six countries of the ECSC signed the so-called Treaties of Rome establishing the Common Market and The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). These proposals were met with enthusiasm in the US and sharply criticized in the USSR. For example, K. Adenauer and D. Eisenhower, in a joint statement on May 28, 1957 in Washington, emphasized: “... the treaties establishing the Euratom and the European Common Market are a further step of historical significance in the progress towards European unity. Their realization will be useful not only to the peoples of Europe, but to the whole world” [24, p. 26].

The second half of the 1950s was marked by a significant deterioration of relations between the US and the USSR, which was explained by a number of reasons, one of which was the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961. West Berlin was a capitalist center in the heart of the GDR, which resulted in a constant demonstration of the contrast between the high standard of living of free economies and poverty in communist countries. “The loss of labor through Berlin has t hreatened the survival of the GDR as such. If no urgent measures are taken, East German Communists claimed, the state would die in a few years. It would be a crushing blow to the Soviet sphere of influence, which Khrushchev sought to unite”, stated H. Kissinger [4, p. 515].

On November 10, 1958, during his visit to Poland, Nikita Khrushchev emphasized that “it was time for the signatories to the Potsdam Treaty to abandon the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin and thereby to create a normal atmosphere in the GDR capital. The Soviet Union, for its part, will hand over those functions in Berlin that are still held by the Soviet authorities to the sovereign German Democratic Republic” [12]. Since then, the US, UK and France should negotiate directly with the GDR. But the Western powers did not recognize the GDR. If, however, the Allies refuse to enter into negotiations with representatives of East Germany and forcefully enter Berlin, “we will regard this as a statement against the Soviet Union, against all the countries that are part of the Warsaw Pact” [12]. The Soviet note of November 27 specified Moscow's new position. “The Soviet government will, at the appropriate time, begin negotiations with the GDR government on the transfer to the German Democratic Republic of functions that were temporarily performed by the Soviet authorities”. In conclusion, the note warned - and this circumstance gave the crisis a threatening character - “if the term (six months. - D.L.) is not used to reach an agreement, then the Soviet Union will implement the planned measures with the GDR” [9].

The Western powers, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, France and West Germany, have taken this crisis very seriously. But the approaches to solving the crisis in these countries have been divided into two diametrically opposite strategies of behavior. The Government of the United Kingdom considered it possible to make a number of small concessions that would have softened Khrushchev's ultimatum. Gen. Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, on the contrary, believed that any compromise on West Berlin should be abandoned. The United States, whose role was crucial, ranged between a soft British approach and a tough Franco-German. D. Eisenhower argued that the United States “should not look upon it (the Soviet ultimatum. - D.L.) as a Berlin crisis, but as part of a long war of nerves that will last for decades. We are ready to live with several parts of Berlin for the next forty years” [20, p. 351].

Since the United States was facing the threat of nuclear war, this problem also arose before the USSR. If the United States remains in its steadfast positions, then is the USSR ready to go to war to achieve the ultimatum requirements. Fortunately, the limited political views of N. Khrushchev, the erroneous assessment of his military might, and perhaps the split among the Soviet leadership together gave the Soviet plan a surprising incompleteness. Khrushchev's inability to defend his demands saved NATO from the existential crisis.

Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 contributed to a significant improvement in the political atmosphere and the emergence of the so- called “Camp David spirit”. N. Khrushchev and D. Eisenhower agreed to organize the conference in 1960, but the incident with the downed US reconnaissance aircraft U-2 disrupted it. “It is possible that the history of the U-2 was just a convenient occasion. Believing at a meeting in Camp David that the Americans would make some concessions, Khrushchev later realized that nothing like this would happen. In such circumstances, the conference in his eyes lost any meaning”, said F. Ninkovich [28, p. 127].

During a summit in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961, N. Khrushchev informed the new US President, John Kennedy, of his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR [10, p. 136]. On August 13, 1961, the US government, despite various hints by the secret services, was captured by the unexpected construction of the Berlin Wall, initiated by the GDR government, “to block the path of subversive activity in West Berlin against the GDR and other socialist countries...” [7, p. 284].

With the “solution” to the Berlin crisis, the Kennedy administration, despite a famous speech in June 1963 near the wall in which the president declared that “Ich bin ein Berliner”, acknowledged that the issue of unification should be removed from diplomatic order daytime. In November 1961, J. Kennedy publicly stated: “We recognize that today the Soviet Union does not intend to allow unification and how long the USSR will pursue such a policy as long as Germany is not united” [23, p. 802].

The Berlin crisis was the beginning of the deterioration of Bonn-Washington relations. Establishing closer Franco-German relations was a sign that US-German relations had entered a new era. Germany's temporary departure from the United States was offset by the `summer of French friendship”. By signing the Elysйe Treaty in January 1963, K. Adenauer and C. de Gaulle gave special importance to German- French friendship. Washington's reaction was ambiguous: there were speculations about Bonn's intentions to negotiate with Moscow to settle the German issue. “In response to US pressure, the Bundestag has “softened” the preamble agreement, which emphasized the need for Atlantic co-operation,” said J. Heideking. “Kennedy's visit to Germany in June 1963, first and foremost, aimed to deny the German population the “wrong direction” of the German-French alliance against the United States” [15, p. 472]. Kennedy's calculation turned out to be correct. The memory of the Germans in shock after the construction of the wall remained an updated guarantee of protection for West Berlin.

Relations between the two countries were in a transitional stage in the 1960s. The coming to power in 1963 of new leaders - in the United States Lyndon Johnson and in Germany Ludwig Erhard - did not contribute to improving relations. The policy of “double deterrence” proclaimed in the 1950s testified that the German question and the confrontation with the USSR were interrelated and, therefore, should be addressed at the same time. “Although in the 1960s, the US government pursued a policy of discharge against the USSR without mentioning the German problem, restoration of German-American harmony and further progress in the German issue required that the policy of “double restraint” be replaced by a policy of “double discharge””, said the American researcher S. Szabo [35, p. 7]. It is obvious that the Germans still adhered to the old stereotypes and did not adapt to the new realities of life.

This was partly due to the fact that the domestic policy in the Federal Republic was in a transitional stage. Trends in international change began to be felt in the fall of 1966, after the so-called “Grand Coalition” of two major parties came to power: the Christian Democratic Union with Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor and Social Democrat leader Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister [5, p. 9-18].

The Government of the Grand Coalition has adopted a more flexible policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe. Not formally abandoning the “Hallstein Doctrine”, which meant breaking diplomatic relations with any state recognized by the GDR government, K. Kiesinger built his policy on the harsh realities of bipolar confrontation in Central Europe and around the world. The establishment of German trade missions in Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Prague was considered a promising start. Thus, K. Kiesinger, during his visit to Washington in August 1967, emphasized: “With respect to Eastern Europe, I reached out to these countries for reconciliation, and we began to move towards mutual understanding. We have established diplomatic relations with Romania, concluded a trade agreement with Czechoslovakia, and we seek friendly and good-neighborly relations with Poland and the USSR” [28, p. 83].

In part, these shifts in relations between West Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe were explained by changes in the relationship between the US and the USSR. In 1966, L. Johnson made it clear to K. Kiesinger that the problem of German unity was not on the agenda for the United States. “If you want to live in peace with Europe, you have to look for an alternative”, the president stated [32, p. 416]. Thus, it became clear that Germany's unity cannot be a means of expression for the East - West discharge, but can only come as a result of a long-lasting process of peaceful social change.

The German elections in October 1969 initiated a radical change in Germany's foreign policy. Although the CDU/CSU bloc defeated the SPD in the election, W. Brandt was able to form a governing coalition with the Free Democrats, largely on the basis of their shared desire for a new direction in Eastern politics. “We in Germany know that the painful partition of our country can be stopped if the split of Europe is resolved”, W. Brandt emphasized. “We must proceed from the existing situation, that is, from reality, to reach more normal relations with our eastern neighbors” [31, p. 92-93].

The German government's renewed desire to improve relations with the communist bloc has coincided with a parallel process in the United States. In 1969, Republican President Richard Nixon came to power with the intention of launching a “negotiation era” that would ease the tensions in the Cold War. Thus, W. Brandt wrote in his memoirs: “During our conversation on April 10, 1970 (in Washington. - D.L.), Richard Nixon stated that he trusted our policies and knew that we were not going to put our map to the test for years friendship. However, we must bear in mind that some uncertainty may arise in France and England, and in some places in the United States... It is important that we agree to maintain close contact on all issues relating to East-West relations” [1, p. 55-56].

Although the new style of American politics was favorable to the pursuit of a new eastern policy, this did not mean that there were no opponents to it in the US government. Thus, Nixon's national security adviser, H. Kissinger, was initially quite skeptical of Brandt's intentions. He feared that “Brandt's new Oriental policy, which for many seemed to be a progressive search policy, could in less conscientious hands be transformed into a new form of classical German nationalism” [27, p. 408-409]. H. Kissinger fundamentally disagreed with W. Brandt on the possible outcome of Eastern policy, believing that it would rather consolidate the division of Germany than lead to its liquidation.

The late 1970's - early 1980's was marked by a significant deterioration in relations between the US and the USSR. During this period, the Soviet Union began deploying medium-range SS-20 ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe. In response, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt contributed to NATO's decision to deploy US ballistic missile Pershing II to the West German territory. But internal controversy over this decision contributed to the start of the anti-nuclear movement in Germany. Mass anti-missile movement against the deployment of nuclear forces created a real threat to the “neutrality” of Germany, which is constantly opposed by Americans. Former politician P. Nitze wrote in his memoirs: “The decision to deploy missiles has had an ambiguous impact on European public opinion, especially in West Germany. Any decision threatened to destroy the fragile consensus on defense that the development and preservation of which West German political parties had fought for two or more decades” [29, p. 368].

The center-right coalition, led by Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, came to power with a clear focus on the US and NATO. The fact that the leader of the Free Democrats, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, remained the foreign minister in the new coalition, testified that the previous course in Bonn's foreign policy aimed at expanding contacts between the two Germans had continued. The tactically active Eastern policy has helped to weaken internal critics who have opposed the deployment of short-range US nuclear forces.

The Republican administration, led by Ronald Reagan, has departed from the political course of its predecessors. Thus, in November 1981, R. Reagan proposed the so-called “zero count”. “I decided to come up with a double -zero proposal... I told the Russians if they liquidated their SS-20 and SS-5 missiles aimed at Western Europe, then we would abandon the Pershing II deployment plan and cruise missiles”, the president recalls in his memoirs [11, p. 297]. The Soviet leadership would agree to some reduction, but not a zero option. The leadership of the USSR was not interested in continuing the negotiations, as it believed that the incited European public would not allow missiles to be deployed. But Soviet tactics did not work, and in 1983 deployment began. R. Reagan decided to place the first missiles in Germany. Despite mass protests by the Movement for Peace Proponents, part of the SDP and the Greens, in November 1983 the German Bundestag approved a decision to deploy medium-range missiles. Back in November 1982, in a joint statement, R. Reagan and H. Kohl stated that “the decision to deploy systems in Europe is based on the unanimous belief of the members of the Atlantic Alliance that the deployment of SS-20 missiles threatens the security of Western Europe as well as the entire Alliance” [25, p. 174].

The proclamation of “perestroika” and “glasnost”, that is, the new political course of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, elected Secretary General of the CPSU in March 1985, helped resume arms control talks and revitalize East-West relations. After years of top-level negotiations, first in Geneva, then in Reykjavik and Washington, R. Reagan and M. Gorbachev signed the Medium-Range Nuclear Weapons Treaty in 1987. Finally, despite the constant skepticism about what the consent of the two superpowers might mean for Europe, the reduction in arms has taken a real shape. “It was the first ever case in which countries agreed not only to cease production of nuclear missiles but also to destroy them”, states R. Reagan [11, p. 708].

The improvement of the geopolitical situation in Europe was intrinsically linked to the internal and external transformations of M. Gorbachev. The liberalization of Soviet Union relations with members of the Economic Assistance Council and the Warsaw Pact led to the beginning of democratic reforms and the further fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.

Soviet “perestroika” and “glasnost” also contributed to the improvement of the international situation and overcoming the split of Europe, one of the visible manifestations of which was Germany and Berlin in particular. In August 1986, President R. Reagan declared: “The Berlin Wall is a tragic recognition of the failure of totalitarian governments. This is the most sincere evidence of the artificial division of Germany and Europe - the division that painfully divides the East and West. This cannot be. One day, she, and everything like her, will disappear. The division of Berlin, like the division of Europe, cannot be permanent” [30, p. 296]. Reagan's predictions soon came true.