Soviet Russian: translation losses as a weapon of information warfare against Ukraine (2013-2020)

It should be noted that the export version of Soviet Russian, implanted in the European media discourse, was different from the one used for the occupied territory and the aggressor country. For European media and political elites, `eternal Patriotic War' was presented as `Russia's eternal war against Nazism' [65, p. 215-227]. The verbal construction of this version was devoid of (or almost devoid of) the equation sign between `fascists' and `NATO soldiers' (`America', `Gayrope', etc.). Instead, Russia was portrayed as the savior of Europe from `Nazism', whose mission in the 21st century was to fight off neo-Nazism that allegedly reared its head in Ukraine and the Baltic states.

According to Tatiana Zhurzhenko, this is a strong message not only for Europe but also for the USA and Israel, whose task -- through accusing Europeans of tacitly supporting the so-called neo-Nazism -- is to present Ukraine and the Baltic countries as a failed experiment in nation-building and to call upon the nations of old Europe to review the order that was established after the end of the Cold War [66]. Unlike the vocabulary for `internal' use, this construction relies on the words that are correct in terms of the European way of thinking and speaking of World War II: the place of `fascists' is occupied by `Nazis' and `neo-Nazis', in place of `atrocities of banderites' -- `genocide' etc.

The second difference is that the export version of the Kremlin's propaganda about the war that Russian Federation started in Ukraine subordinates (and even downplays) the myth of the Great Patriotic War in favour of message about the `civil war' that is waged between Ukrainian citizens. The `civil war' discourse, however, is also disseminated for domestic use on occupied terri- tories and consumers of information in the Russian Federation. But for these audiences, the hierarchy remains unchanged: here the myth of `eternal Great Patriotic War' absorbs all other mythological and ideological constructions, using almost all the verbal constructs of the Soviet chronotope.

However, for an imaginary external audience, the Russian war against Ukraine is provided with a vocabulary of a civil war (civil conflict), understandable for this community. This vocabulary that is rooted in the Soviet description of the wars against Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. The place of the `workers' (who in the Soviet `eternal war' needed support and protection from the oppressors-capitalists, bourgeois elements, NATO countries, etc.) is occupied in the dictionary by `Russian-speaking' people who supposedly suffer from `nationalists'. Therefore, the vocabulary not only names, but also partly creates new conditional communities, such as `separatists' (this word has no pronounced negative connotation in Europe), `pro-Russian' and `pro-Ukrainian' citizens, `republics', `militia' and more. In translations into European languages, quotation marks are not used with the words rebels, separatists, pro-Russian people, and the title “so called” often is not used with the names of the occupation administrations.

Asian, American, European journalists and experts working in the occupied territories are not sensitive to the contexts and subtexts typical of Soviet Russian, nor do they pay attention to the loss of informational subjectivity of the occupied people, whose statements are not free and do not always reflect their real thoughts. Hence, sociological surveys, interviews, notes from the occupied territories are more a tool of hidden Russian propaganda rather than a description and analysis of reality.

A significant achievement of Soviet Russian in the space of foreign media is the fact that a considerable number of geographical names are translated not from Ukrainian, but from Soviet Russian. First of all, it refers to the term `Donbas' (Донбасс in Russian) We should note that this product of Soviet propaganda is often used in Ukrainian mass media as well., commonly translated with the double "s" even by authors who seem to be rooting for Ukraine and understand the nature of war. For example, Sergei Loznitsa's film is positioned in foreign media through a double "s" [67]. It is possible, of course, that this was the author's intention: to demonstrate in the title of the work the nature of the `Russian world' that came to the Ukrainian territory. However, in other, more categorical news and analytical programs the occupied territory was also designated as Donbass Unfortunately, even experts who clearly understand that Ukraine is suffering from Russian aggression use this mistranslation. For instance: “It has savored war and presented the military intrusion in Ukraine's Donbass region as a sequel to Russia's fight with Nazis during World War II” // Mikhail Fishman. Russia is killing what little independent press it has // November 27, 2017. -- CNN. -- Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/27/opinions/ russia-independent-press-opinion-fishman/index.html.. Although American and European media gradually started correcting this translation error, the use of the term -- a Soviet neologism, aimed at creating a showcase region of Soviet industrialism -- gave rise to an imaginary symbolic space in which the entire territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions was defined as territory of war (or even as occupied territory). In addition, this `Donbas' symbolic space canceled out the differences within the regions (between rural and urban populations, between different ethnic groups, between large cities and mono-cities, etc.) and promoted the creation of symbolic community that the Kremlin positioned as the `people of the Donbass' It should be noted that the Kremlin proposed the same symbolic construction to describe the events in Crimea, imposing the concept of `Crimean people', which blinds us to the existence of the Crimean Tatars as an indigenous population of Crimea. This construction was successfully tested in Soviet Russian when creating an imaginary community of `all Soviet people'..

Loss of meaning in translation happened also because of the usage of the article `the' in the name of Ukraine, which was a continuation of the Soviet tradition of perception of Ukraine as the Ukrainian SSR and part of the USSR or simply a geographical name [68; 69]. The article created a situation of deprivation of the political subjectivity of Ukraine, and therefore was one of the directions of propaganda work of the Kremlin Internet agents, who persistently promoted the correctness / reasonability / possibility of its use [70].

Because of the insensitivity to the Soviet way of constructing, naming and describing reality, a considerable number of pseudo-political, artificially organized and oftentimes falsified events (such as the so-called referendum that took place on May 11, 2014, the fake elections of November 2014 and 2018, pseudo-parties and movements such as the `Donetsk Republic') [71] were described in the foreign press as being connected to reality.

Translation from Soviet Russian, including from Soviet Russian language of diplomacy, which for several decades had offered the internal consumer the image of the hostile capitalist world, opposed by the solid `peaceful initiatives of the USSR', and for the external consumer -- the image of a state, respecting the international law and not interfering in the affairs of other states, while actively `helping workers around the world', has led the foreign mass media to firmly define Russian aggression as a `civil conflict' and a `Ukrainian crisis'. Therefore, the ideas for the future settlement offered by Western experts are not focused on understanding the dangers of the `eternal Patriotic war' concept, but on the experience of settling civil conflicts. They are marked by the words `reconciliation', `reintegration', `reunion', which in translation into Ukrainian -- `примирення', `реінтеграція', `возз'єднання' -- create a symbolic picture in which Ukraine seems to be disintegrated for internal reasons. Translated into Soviet Russian -- `примирение', `реинтеграция', `воссоединение' -- these words either do not mean anything at all, since the concept of `eternal Great Patriotic War' does not imply zero-sum games, or correlate with the historical experience of the Russian Empire, where `reunification' applied to the whole territory of Ukraine and meant its long colonial dependence.

The inability and understandable incapacity of foreign experts to perform complex hypertextual translation of the language of the occupier and the language of the occupied leads to the fact that the distorted picture of the war in Ukraine automatically distorts attempts to construct a peace agenda, since the semantic field of this agenda neither relates to reality or to constructed expectations of the occupied people, nor to the strategic interests of the Ukrainian state.

Soviet Russian for Ukrainian society in times of war

It was noted above that Soviet Russian in the form of `cultural imponderables' or `hidden curriculum' continued to exist in independent Ukraine. Its speakers were people in power, sometimes also intellectuals, as well as ordinary people. At the time of the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine, Soviet Russian (including in translation into Ukrainian) occupied a prominent place in the vocabulary of describing and attempting to understand war. To a certain extent, it can be stated that period of spring-fall of 2014 was marked by a `verbal shower' in which Soviet Russian language constructs were combined with new word forms coined in the Kremlin (`ukry', `ukrop', `country 404', `people's republics', etc. )11 and with the verbalization of the events carried out by the Ukrainians themselves (these were influenced or not influenced by the first two components of the `storm'), and the authoritative order of thinking that was being dictated by the approved documents on the launch of the anti-terrorist operation, change of its format for the operation of the united forces, Minsk treaties, PACE resolutions adopted during the war, etc [72].

It is important to note that the Soviet Russian, embodied in the myth of `eternal Great Patriotic War', was one of the most powerful components of the Ukrainian way of thinking and describing war, at least in 2014-2015. Researcher Elisaveta Gaufman, analyzing the statements of social network It should be noted that some constructions used for description of the events of the war in the spring of 2014 were also taken from the Russian liberal discourse (`Colorado potato beetle', `Putinjugend', etc.). This was noticed by Elisaveta Gaufman in her article «`Victory will be ours': securitization and collective memory in Russian media during the Euromaidan». users in the spring and fall of 2014, noted that in the Ukrainian segment words like `Putler' (Putin as Hitler) and `Russia-ism' were often used to «emphasize the aggressive intentions of the Russian Federation and to claim anti-fascist discourse and redirect it against Russia» [73]. I agree with Gaufman's opinion and would like to add that these and other words (`Gauleiter Zakharchenko'

, «DNR's» concentration camps' [75], `occupiers' helpers' [76]), which were used in Ukrainian society in 2015-2018, were the result both of the idea of reclaiming Russian rhetoric of the `Great Patriotic War' and of the long and invincible existence of this particular Soviet way of thinking about any war that seemed to some part of the community to be the only possible construction for describing Russian aggression and resisting it Unfortunately, I also belonged to this community. Having witnessed the arrival of Russian invaders in Donetsk on July 5, 2014, I wrote in my diary: «They entered my city as fascists»..

We cannot claim that at the time of writing Ukrainian society has finally coped with this `shower of words'. However, some changes have occurred, and as a result part of the Kremlin-imposed discourse receives now more critical, and sometimes satirical reception. Some of the offensive labels were reappropriated and reconsidered (`ukrop' became the name of the party, «jew- banderite» -- a humorous name for the political identity of Ukrainian Jews, etc.). Google query statistics demonstrates that the `separatists' as a search term has hardly been used in the Ukrainian segment since 2016 (peak searches occurred in the spring-fall of 2014) [77] while the word `occupation' was evenly used throughout the years of the war (except for the peak of March 2014) [78], and the `Russia -- aggressor' search query has been consistently high since summer 2017 [79].

However, Soviet Russian (based both on the myth of `eternal war' and on ways of describing the practices of a totalitarian society) became `perceptible', moving from a `hidden curriculum' to an open and manifested one. These `openness' and manifestations were aptly detected by Yuriy Andrukhovych, who noted that in 2015 restaurants in Ternopil played the translation of the song by Russian musician Oleg Gazmanov «Господа офіцери» / «Офіцери, панове» («Officers, gentlemen»). It was dedicated to the ATO soldiers. The writer indignantly asked why journalists, bloggers, experts, deputies, activists need to compare `cyborgs' with the `defenders of Brest Fortress'? To call Donetsk airport `our Pavlov's house'? The last transport artery connecting Debaltseve to the Ukrainian territories -- the `the road of life'? And what will be written soon (may God have mercy) about Mariupol -- `our blockaded Leningrad'? And where will our `battle of Kursk' happen? [80].

The naming of the events of the Russo-Ukrainian war by Soviet constructions of the `Great Patriotic War' not only reproduced colonial practices of self-description, but also set certain social expectations regarding the behavior of occupied people in Crimea and parts of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. These were the expectations of `guerrilla' or `clandestine' resistance, the organization of "arson of garrison headquarters', `mining of railways' and so on [81]. In addition, Soviet Russian, in describing Russian aggression, produced a number of Stalinist speech stereotypes about the behavior of people in the occupied territories, which were labeled in the texts of the Ukrainian media, bloggers and journalists as `traitors', `bootlickers', `polizei' and, more rarely, 'innocent victims' [82]. Armed by such vocabulary, the way of thinking about war and occupation, which began in 2014, on unreflected level also formed the ways of describing (forecasting) the future, in which the `eternal Great Patriotic War' was continued by the `cold war' and it was considered necessary to separate the occupied lands by the conditional `Berlin Wall', to abandon the territories inhabited by “irreparable people who themselves are guilty of what happened”.

Ukrainian journalist Serhiy Ivanov: «Donbas deserved this war. Because it deliberately let in the separatists, slept through Maidan events. While Donbas was drinking, singing in karaoke and enjoying life -- people were killed on the Maidan. They thought misfortune would not happen to them. Now they are paying for this» [83].

In this way, Soviet Russian in a triumphant manner also dictated the horizons of rituals regarding the postwar system, the system of punishment of the occupied, and so on. Given that the European expert community was producing ideas of an `internal crisis' and drawing the horizon of the future through the concept of `reintegration', in the Ukrainian order of thought discursive strategies of analysis of war were mixed or superimposed. However, discussions about choosing an integral way of thinking about war were often marked by the `symbolic war'. The task of this symbolic war was not the search for commonality, but a `final victory', `sewn' into Soviet strategies of using language as a `space of battle' and style of speaking on behalf of `the vast majority'.

On the other hand, the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is characterised by the phenomenon of `insensitivity' of some people to both Soviet Russian and to the myth of the `eternal Great Patriotic War', which was not expected by the aggressor and was not analyzed by experts. Some of its particularly bright, unexpected, and not fitting in with the idea of Donbas as russified land manifestations happened in the spring of 2014. Then communities of eastern cities and towns (Donetsk, Kramatorsk, Luhansk, etc.) organized large rallies with slogans `Donetsk is Ukraine', `Luhansk is Ukraine', started volunteer activity in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, joined voluntary battalions and regular military units that defended Ukraine.

The clarity of their motivations and self-description was based on a completely different vocabulary where there was no place for `grandfathers who fought in war', `greatness of our Motherland -- USSR' and so on, even when the language of self-description was Russian Ukrainian.

There were not enough of sociological interviews, focus group studies and oral histories at the time of writing to qualitatively describe and explain this phenomenon of decolonization of consciousness while preserving thought processes in the language of the metropole. Experts assumed that among probable reasons for this phenomenon were preserved Ukrainian traditions in Russian-speaking families, higher than average education, higher than average income, age differences, etc [84]. Hiroaki Kuromiya emphasized that the «Ukrainian tradition of freedom and democracy» has always been closer to Donbas than the «Russian tradition of autocracy» [85]. Tatiana Zhurzhenko noted that Russian-speaking Ukrainians of the East consolidated not so much around the issues of identity but around the issues of peace, stability, security, and «this plan was de facto pro-Ukrainian» [86].

The analysis of the body of texts of the expert and journalistic environment of Russian-speaking Ukrainians I mean here pages in social networks and texts of a large number of IDP experts, journalists and bloggers such as Denis Kazansky, Tatiana Khudyakova, Anna Khripunkova, Serhiy Stukanov, Tetiana Zarovna, Stanislav Fedorchuk, Anton Shvets and others. from the East shows two important trends. The first is the persistent and consistent resistance to the Soviet language of describing war with an accentuated ability to capture and criticize the `Soviet' roots of any discourse. The second is the gradual transition to Ukrainian language, however, this tendency is not absolutely stable. The phenomenon of Russian-speaking Ukrainians who have shown insensitivity to Soviet Russian and its translation into Ukrainian requires a separate investigation. Resistance factors of this very varied in terms of age, professional background, gender, and education community may be useful for shaping state practices of de-Sovietisation of language space. However, this problem also remains in the blind zone or, possibly, in a consciously postponed state. The Soviet way of discussing (winning at all costs) makes the `language topic' too hot, manipulative, and therefore ineffective. In addition, the careless handling of this problem may add arguments to the aggressor country in its attempts to legitimize the subsequent operations claiming to `defend Russian speakers'. However, the phenomenon itself, and its effects (both positive and negative), and the prediction of language policies of this community remains worthy of investigation by experts.



Conclusions

Soviet Russian and its carbon copy in Soviet Ukrainian continued to be an essential part of discursive practices in independent Ukraine. Latency, elusiveness, and unreflected existence of Soviet Russian as a language that gave orders to rituals, collective practices, ways of organizing life, mechanisms of self-knowledge, transformed Soviet Russian (and its Ukrainian `doublenewspeak' (Oksana Zabuzhko) into both a `hidden curriculum' and into the dangerous space of the Kremlin's informational invasion.The Soviet language remained a field of symbolic exchange, supporting, among other things, the symbolic and pragmatic practices of those in power, officials, ordinary people. These practices were supporting the hierarchies and interactions of the Soviet type. The Soviet newspeak continued to shape not only the domestic, cultural, political, but also the legal field, and therefore influenced the hidden transmission of Soviet political order into the practices of independent Ukraine. By strengthening the Soviet discourses with nostalgic, `anti-fascist', `Soviet-patriotic' projects, the Kremlin relied on the established constructs of the description of the world and strengthened those patterns of speech and thinking that contributed to legitimization of aggression.

The myth of the `Great Patriotic War' turned out to be the strongest one among such patterns. When attempting to restore Russian imperial grandeur in its Soviet and post-Soviet variants, this myth acquired the characteristics of `eternal Great Patriotic War'. Reconfigured to become `eternal', this myth became an element of the Kremlin's policy towards the war against Ukraine. Its broad verbal content, where the `fascists' merged with `American imperialists', creating an overall picture of the `hostile world', acted as a mechanism of `affective management' (Serguei Oushakine), a powerful trigger motivator for engaging in ritual actions, including `reconstruction of the eternal Great Patriotic War' in Ukraine.

Consuming Soviet Russian, occupied people automatically fell into the trap of ritualization, where the meaning of the words, and thus the order of thinking about the veracity or falsehood of the statements did not matter. Instead, the ritual itself mattered -- the utterance of words. For some native speakers and consumers of the Soviet language of `eternal Patriotic war' the meaning of the words used to describe events remained not quite clear and understandable, but their correctness did not cause any doubt. The sense of correctness, coupled with the lack of an accurate understanding (knowledge) of the content of the words used, made it possible for Russian propaganda to easily manipulate people's minds by offering them practices and reactions `spelled out' in the myth of `eternal Great Patriotic War'.

The ritual nature of Soviet Russian provided for a specific general temporality and conception of historical and political space. Divided into two `hostile camps', the world emerged as a space of endless war, which gave the idea of a `proper' life program that could only happen if another enemy is overcome -- Ukraine, NATO, `Americans' and `Gayropa'. In addition, the program determined by Russian Soviet created such chronological order in which the time of occupied people, determined by language, progressed in a non-linear fashion, returning them to the 1920s -- 1930s (with slogans of nationalization, expropriation, national property, searching for enemies of the people, denunciations, etc.), then bringing into the discourses of `post-war recovery' and the rise of the `new Donbass', then pulling the occupied people to compulsorily consent to the description of reality by a vocabulary of the late Soviet bureaucratic language.

Occupied speakers in different situations and different circumstances of social interaction used Soviet Russian with different motives and guidelines. However, the reproduction of the form with the ignorance and misunderstanding of the content formed the tendency of the internal crisis of the structure of the occupying power. The tendency was manifested not through direct opposition to the system, but through participation in its reproduction, coupled with a simultaneous reconstruction of the meaning of Soviet Russian and the myth of `eternal Great Patriotic War'. Understanding and analyzing this tendency -- through the ordinary practices of (re)incarnation of Soviet Russian in the occupied territories can become a fruitful methodology of deoccupation.

Soviet Russian also had an export variant, implanted in European and world media discourse. It differed in two essential parameters. First, for foreign media and politicians, `eternal Patriotic War' was presented as `Russia's eternal war against Nazism'. Secondly, the war against Ukraine was referred to as a `civil conflict', started by the `Nazis'. Therefore it required the support of Russia, the eternal savior of the world from Nazism. The imagined external audience was provided with a clear vocabulary of civil war (civil conflict). This dictionary not only named, but also partly created `imaginary communities' of `rebels', `inhabitants of republics', `militias', etc. The export version left hidden the Soviet rituality, and the chronotopes and horizons of the future of occupied people that it provided. The inability and understandable incapacity of foreign experts to perform complex hypertextual translation of the occupier's language and the language of the occupied, led to the fact that the distorted picture of the war in Ukraine automatically distorted attempts to construct a peace agenda, since the semantic field of this agenda did not relate either to the reality or constructed expectations of the occupied people or strategic interests of the Ukrainian state.

We should also bear in mind that the Soviet Russian, embodied in the myth of `eternal Great Patriotic War', was one of the most powerful components of the Ukrainian way of thinking and describing war, at least in 2014-2015. Naming of the events of the Russo-Ukrainian war by the Soviet constructs of the `Great Patriotic War' not only reproduced colonial self-description practices, but also created certain social expectations about the behavior of occupied people in Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and also conditioned the order of reflections about postwar regulations. The ways of thinking about the Russian war against Ukraine within the semantic constructs of Soviet Russian remained a great danger in the context of defending Ukrainian independence. Each of the lines of thought identified in the text requires in-depth analytical and practical work. Creation of the dictionary of difficult contextual translations from Soviet Russian into Ukrainian and European languages can be a part of this task.

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Фуко М. Археология знания / М. Фуко. -- Пер. с фр., общ. ред. Бр. Левченко. -- К.: Ника-Центр, 1996.

Бурдье П. Университетская докса и творчество: против схоластических делений / П. Бурдьє. -- М.: Socio-Logos, 1996. -- С. 8-31.

Tumarkin N. The living and the dead: ^e rise and fall of the cult of World War II in Russia / N. Tumarkin. -- N.Y., 1994.

Вахтин Н.Б. Языковое манипулирование и воздействие на сознание на примере языка советской епохи [Електронний ресурс] / Николай Вахтин // Элитариум. -- Режим доступу: http://www.elitarium.ru/jazykovoe_manipulirovanie_sovetskojj_jepokhi/.

Кульчицький С. Червоний виклик. Історія комунізму в Україні від його народження до загибелі / Станіслав Кульчицький. -- Кн. 3. -- К.: Темпора, 2013.

Dickinson P. History as a Weapon in Russia's War on Ukraine. -- October, 3, -- Режим доступу: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/history-as-a- weapon-in-russia-s-war-on-ukraine.

Дубин Б. «Кровавая» война и «великая» победа / Борис Дубин // Отечественные записки. -- 2004. -- Т. 19. -- № 5.

Великая Отечественная война 1941-1945. Словарь-справочник / Ред. М. Кирьян. -- М.: Издательство политической литературы, 1988.

Журженко Т. «Чужа війна» чи «спільна Перемога»? Націоналізація пам'яті про Другу світову війну на україно-російському прикордонні / Т. Журженко // Україна модерна. -- 2011. -- № 18. -- С. 103.

Term coined by Serguei Oushakine. Serguei Oushakine. Remembering in public: On the affective management of history // Ab Imperio. -- 2013. -- № 1. -- С. 269-302.

Немецкий режиссер решил снять фильм о «фашистском Львове». -- 13.07.2011 [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://ukranews.com/news/98552-nemeckyy- rezhysser-reshyl-snyat-fylm-o-fashystskom-lvove.

Flynn Bryan. Anarchy in Ukraine: 'Nazi' militia train yobs to fight our fans/ April, 27, 2012. -- The Sun // https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/568540/anarchy-in-the-ukraine/

Стадионы ненависти [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://podrobnosti.ua/839715-stadiony-nenavisti-k-evro-2012.html.

Регионалы собрали на митинг антифашистов в Луганске 15 тысяч человек -- 15.05.2013. [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://delo.ua/econonomyand politicsinukraine/regionaly-sobrali-na-miting-antifashistov-v-luganske-15-tysjach-204649/.

В Крыму также прошли антифашистские митинги, сожгли чучело Фарион [Електронний ресурс]. -- 16.05.2013. -- Режим доступу: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/ news/2013/05/16/6990043/.

В Сумах на «антифашистский мітинг» согнали школьников и бюджетников [Електронний ресурс]. -- 16.05.2013. -- Режим доступу: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/05/16/6989982/.

На антифашистский митинг в Житомире студентов приводили группами, заполнили всю площадь Королева [Електронний ресурс]. -- 15.05.2013. -- Режим доступу: https://www.zhitomir.info/nhtmlews_122445.

В Донецке состоялся Антифашистский марш и митинг «Донбасс -- против неофашизма!» [Електронний ресурс]. -- 17.05.2013. -- Режим доступу: http://www. donbass-info.com/content/view/4683/4693/.

Забужко О. Мова і влада / Оксана Забужко // Хроніки від Фортінбраса (вибрана есеїстка 90-х) -- К.: Факт, 1999.

Масенко Л.Т. Мова і політика [Електронний ресурс] / Лариса Масенко. -- К., 2001. -- Режим доступу: http://varnak.psend.com/mova.html.

Калиновська О.В. Вербальний ритуал в українському політичному дискурсі 70-х років ХХ століття / О.В. Калиновська // Наукові записки: Філологічні науки. -- 2004. -- Т. 34.

Вахтин Н. Разговор на деревянном языке [Електронний ресурс] / Н. Вахтин. -- Режим доступу: http://www.cogita.ru/analitka/otkrytye-diskussi/razgovor-na-derevyannom-yazyke.

Вахтин Н. Дискурс убеждения в тоталитарном языке и постсоветские коммуникативные неудачи / Н. Вахтин // «Синдром публичной немоты»: история и современные практики публичных дебатов в России / Отв. ред. Н.Б. Вахтин, Б.М. Фирсов. -- М.: Новое литературное обозрение, 2017.

Масенко Л. Мова радянського тоталітаризму // Лариса Масенко. -- К.: Кліо, 2018.

Anonymous person А. Respondent is a man, a pensioner, with finished secondary education. From town of Snizhne in Donetsk region. The conversation was recorded by Anna Novychenko in November 2014. The conversation lasted for 30 minutes.

«В ближайшее время появятся инструкции, как незаметно выявлять террористов и сообщать о них в органы». Обзор сепаратистских СМИ [Електронний ресурс]. -- 26.09.2015 // Остров. -- Режим доступу: //http://www.ostro.org/general/politics/articles/533449/.

Крутова Л.Б., Пенькова О.Б. Современные подходы к изучению истории Донбасса / Л.Б. Крутова, О.Б. Пенькова // Журнал исторических, политологических и международных исследований. -- 2015. -- № 1 (55).

Галицкая Соломия. Славным воинам Новороссии. Ноябрь 2014 // Донецкий край, в стихах воспетый: сборник лучших стихотворений участников открытого конкурса поэтического творчества «Донецкий край, в стихах воспетый» [Текст] / М-во культуры Донецкой Народной Республики, ГУК «Донец. респ. универс. науч. б-ка им. Н.К. Крупской»; сост. И. А. Пилипенко; ред. О. А. Пинзон; отв. за вып. И. А. Горбатов. -- Донецк, 2017.

More details: http://antifashist.com/item/marmazov-bratcy-budte-bditelny-v-doneck-uzhe-pronikaet-i-pronikla-vsevozmozhnaya-ukropnya.html#ixzz5O8sZH1Vx

Астаф'єв А.О. Вплив російської імперської ментальності на соціокультурне відчуження в Україні: шляхи подолання. Аналітична записка [Електронний ресурс] / А.О. Астаф'єв / Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень. -- Режим доступу: http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/1821/.

Ушакин С. В поисках места между Сталиным и Гитлером: о постколониальных историях социализма / С. Ушакин // Ab imperio. -- 2011. -- № 1.

Vitalina Yershova. 17 August 2018. https://twitter.com/rjpthjuz/status/.

Anonymous person B., man, pensioner, Torez city. -- Recording made in October 2017.

From communication in social network VKontakte. -- 13 July 2016.

Roman Manekin // https://www.facebook.com/rmanekin/posts/141895473383626.

Я попал в альтернативную реальность [Електронний ресурс] // ЖЖ Федора Березина. -- 6 July 2014. -- Режим доступу: https://hrapypris31.livejournal.com/ 147801.html.

Quote from Яковенко І. Фантастический ру^кий фашизм. -- День -- 11 July 2014 [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://day.kyiv.ua/ru/article/media/ fantasticheskiy-russkiy-fashizm.

Гутин М. Войну в Украине придумали писатели-фантасты? [Електронний ресурс]. -- 8 August 2014. -- Голос Америки. -- Режим доступу: // https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/ukraine-war--writer-fantasist-mg/2406591.html.

Fedor Berezin. Speech [Електронний ресурс]. -- 8 June 2014. -- Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOt93dMVSwE.

Игорь Гиркин. Нет уже ополчения на Донбассе. Это контрактники... [Електронний ресурс]. -- 13 March 2017. -- Режим доступу: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/ news/2017/03/13/7137952.

От Мариуполя до Лондона: в сети собрали самые громкие угрозы главаря ДНР [Електронний ресурс] // Апостроф. -- 13 May 2017 -- Режим доступу: https://apostrophe.ua/news/society/2017-05-13/ot-mariupolya-do-londona-v-seti-sobrali-samye-gromkie-ugrozy-glavarya-dnr/95813.

В гостях у Захара Прилепина Александр Захарченко [Електронний ресурс] // Царьград-ТВ. -- 5 December 2016. -- Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= NHTeTZiqVRw (begin watching at 21st minute).

Родионов Дмитрий. Киев жаждет войны и крови на Донбассе. Милитаристские качели Украины снова на подъеме [Електронний ресурс] // Свободная пресса. -- 16 June 2017. -- Режим доступу: http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/174748/.

One of the examples of such construction is examined in the article: Lassila J. Witnessing War, Globalizing Victory: Representations of the Second World War on the Website Russia Today [Електронний ресурс] // In Memory, Confict and New Media: Web Wars in Post-Socialist States. -- Ed. E. Rutten and J. Fedor. -- Abingdon: Routledge, 2013. -- Р. 215-227. -- Режим доступу: Witnessing_war_globalizing_victory_Representations_of_the_Second_World_War_on_the_website_Russia_Today_Memory_Conflict_and_New_Media_Web_wars_in_post.

Zhurzhenko Т. Russia's Never-ending War against `Fascism [Електронний ресурс] // Eurozine. -- 2015. -- 8 May. -- Режим доступу: http://www.eurozine.com/ articles/2015-05- 08-zhurzhenko-en.html.

Bradshow Peter. Donbass review -- freakish fake-news kaleidoscope of Ukrainian civil war [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://www.theguardian.com/film/ 2018/may/10/donbass-review-cannes-2018-sergei-loznitsa.

Adam Taylor. Why Ukraine Isn't 'The Ukraine,' And Why That Matters Now [Електронний ресурс] // Business Insider. -- December, 2013. -- Режим доступу: https://www.businessinsider.com/why-ukraine-isnt-the-ukraine-and-why-that-matters-now-2013-12.

Steinmet Katy. Ukraine, Not the Ukraine: The Significance of Three Little Letters [Елнктронний ресурс] // Time. -- March 5, 2014. -- Режим доступу: http://time.com/ 12597/the-ukraine-or-ukraine/.

See, for example, one such discussion that took place in March-April 2014: What is the difference between Ukraine and the Ukraine? [Електронний ресурс] // English language and usage. -- Режим доступу: https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/155823/what-is- the-difference-between-ukraine-and-the-ukraine.

For instance: Ukraine: pro-Russia separatists set for victory in eastern region referendum [Електронний ресурс] // The Guardian. -- May, 2014. -- Режим доступу: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/eastern-ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk.

Thus, the words `terrorists', `fighters', `hostages' were derived from the state discourse of the anti-terrorist operation: Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of April 13, 2014 `On urgent measures for overcoming the terrorist threat and maintaining the territorial integrity of Ukraine' dated April 14, 2014. [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/405/2014; Law of Ukraine “On Temporary Measures for the Period of Anti-Terrorist Operation” // Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР), 2014, № 44, ст. 2040. -- Режим доступу: http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1669-18.

Гауфман Е. «Победа будет за нами»: секьюритизация и коллективная память в российских медиа во время Евромайдана [Електронний ресурс] / Е. Гауфман // Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры. -- Русское издание № 1, № 2 за -- Режим доступу: http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss29.html.

Гауляйтер Захарченко утверждает, что переловил всех подельников террориста Гиви [Електронний ресурс] // Кримінальна Україна. -- 11.02.2018. -- Режим доступу: http://crime-ua.com/node/22813.

Асєєв перебуває у концтаборі «ДНР», неправдиві свідчення з нього вибили тортурами, Геращенко [Електронний ресурс] // Еспресо ТВ. -- 30.08.2018. -- Режим доступу: https://espreso.tv/news/2018/08/30/asyeyev_perebuvaye_u_konctabori_quotdnrquot_ nepravdyvi_svidchennya_z_nogo_vybyly_torturamy_geraschenko.

«Посіпаки окупантів!». У мережі розгорівся скандал через «сепаратистський» інцидент у маршрутці [Електронний ресурс] // Обозреватель -- 2 August 2017. -- Режим доступу: https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/crime/60421-posibniki-okupantiv-u-merezhi-rozgorivsya-skandal-cherez-separatistskogo-intsidentu-v-marshruttsi.htm.

Google Trends. Analysis. -- Search query `separatists'. Region `Ukraine'. In last 5 years [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://trends.google.com.ua/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&geo=UA&q=%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80% D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8.

Google Trends. Analysis. -- Search query `occupation' [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://trends.google.com.ua/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&geo=UA&q=%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%86%D1%96%D1%8.

Google Trends. Analysis. -- Search query `Russia -- aggressor' [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: https://trends.google.com.ua/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&geo=UA&q=%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%96%D1%8F%20%D0%B0%D0%B3%D 1%80%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%80.

Андрухович Ю. Велике Вітчизняне гівно / Юрій Андрухович [Електронний ресурс] // Збруч. -- 2 February 2015 -- Режим доступу: https://zbruc.eu/node/33251.

These expectations are reflected, for example, in the content of not always true, but `useful' from the point of view of discourse of `Great Patriotic War', news: Донецкие партизаны взорвали железнодорожные пути в Ясиноватой [Електронний ресурс]. -- 12 November 2018. -- Сайт города Донецка 62.ua. -- Режим доступу: https://www.62.ua/ news/2213335/doneckie-partizany-vzorvali-zeleznodoroznye-puti-v-asinovatoj?fbclid=IwAR0GMVawuTNg6lcRb5txBpq--cI0kNjWBM4wjDbPD3XzWLj4aJw_4jt4LqU.

The ways of thinking about the occupied people in a strange way coincided with the text of the NKVD circular, sent on February 18, 1942, which indicated the groups of people who were to be subjected to repression for `cooperation with the enemy'. For more on this `personalized enemy directory' see Вронська Т.В. Феномен «пособництва»: до проблеми кваліфікації співпраці цивільного населення з окупантами у перший період Великої Вітчизняної війни // Сторінки воєнної історії України: Зб. наук. статей / НАН України. Ін-т історії України. -- Вип. 11. -- К., 2008. -- С. 90-91.

Сергій Іванов: Донбас заслужив цю війну. Бо свідомо впустив сепаратистів, проспав Майдан [Електронний ресурс]. -- 22.11.2014 // Інтерв'ю з України -- Режим доступу: https://rozmova.wordpress.com/2014/11/21/serhij-ivanov/comment-page-1/.

Консолідація українського суспільства: шляхи, виклики, перспективи. Інформаційно-аналітичні матеріали до Фахової дискусії 16 грудня 2016 р. -- К.: 2016. [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/upload/Identi- 2016.pdf.

Hiroaki Kuromiya's arguments are spelled out in more details in his book: Куромія Х. Зрозуміти Донбас. -- К.: Дух і Літера, 2015. -- 142 с.

Журженко Т. Розділена нація? Переосмислення ролі політики ідентичності в українській кризі [Електронний ресурс]. -- Режим доступу: http://www.historians. in.ua/index.php/en/doslidzhennya/1529-tetiana-zhurzhenko-rozdilena-natsiia-pereosmyslennia- roli-polityky-identychnosti-v-ukrainskii-kryzi.



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