Making global justice as a valuable functionalism in action

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Kyiv National University. Shevchenko

Making global justice as a valuable functionalism in action

Boychenko M. I.,

Ph.D., Professor

This article is about global justice as same result of cooperation of the several particular values systems of different social communities and about different influences of global justice as same value. The answers to the classic question of social justice become concrete because of their universal consideration -- the global context is crucially included in the formulations and solution of all the issues of social justice. Modern society sees the global justice as the most consistent and guaranteed among all other kinds of justice. The valuables functionalism appears as a strategy of achieving the working interaction between social sciences and humanities, it offers a methodology and philosophy which enable new institutional perspective to solve the issues of global justice.

Keywords: global justice, methodology, valuables functionalism, values, social functions, communicative communities, universal/particular, social philosophy.

Global justice needs its own methodology - not one for all cases and times but universal for everybody involved in one case and one event. Such methodology should have functional power and value justification. That is why we propose to consider valuable functionalism as such universal methodology, that can takes different implementations for different sciences and theories, but remains its principles and basic demands. So we should discuss the justice in action, not the idea of justice - we need concrete values to understand all kinds of justice, including global justice. These concrete values serve as means to achieve wished social results, so they could be considered as some social functions. The same value could give different results and different values could lead to the same result. In our case we would talk about global justice as same result of several values systems of different communities and about different influences of global justice as same value.

Universal justice issues in a global context acquire concrete and practical features - whereas from their conceptualization to their real effects it takes less time and already one generation can live along several such conceptualizations. Thus, the answers to the classic question of social justice become concrete not in spite of their universal consideration, namely because of it - the global context is crucially included in the formulations and solution of all the issues of social justice, when equity is increasingly becoming impossible without global support (as contemporary issues of Ukrainian statehood). Thus, from the global context of solving problems of social justice modern society transits to global justice as the most consistent and guaranteed among all other kinds of justice. On the one hand, particular issues as independent from the universal issues disappears or fades into the background to some extent - on the other hand, some things that one used to call the particular, now reinvented as a source and base (and most significant) for the universalism, particularly in cases of the making of a universal position as a result of decisions about private positions generalization. Motivation for such decisions can be very specific and particular, but this does not preclude their overall result could be highly generalized - such as the decisions of the UN or the OSCE.

Analysis of the such social phenomena value characteristics as «the universal / the particular» needs, above all, involving works of modern classics of the institutional approach, ranging from Shmoel Eisenstadt's [7] and Barrington Moore's (author of «injustice» [15]) researches to the scientific projects of Robert Putnam Douglas North's and Niklas Luhmann [12]. Finally, the classical formulation of the question of controversy «universalism - particularism» was proposed by Talcott Parsons in his analysis of pattern variables that characterize the value orientation of action. Although Parsons used to be seen primarily as the author of the theory of social systems, he also developed important prospects of the institutional analysis of society. Appeal to ideas of these researchers allows create methodological basis to more accurately tracking the ties of the important normative characteristics of global justice with functional characteristics of real social institutions and institutional structures - including the global.

Valuables functionalism is cognitive position and strategy of action, which asserts the values as normative phenomena with help of their functional interpretation and implementation in certain behavior. Obviously, in such role valuables functionalism concerns humanities and social sciences, rather than natural or even technical sciences. Accordingly, a social philosophy should in most proper way substantiate valuables functionalism. However, in order to assess the theoretical premises of valuables functionalism and its importance for philosophical knowledge in general we should pay attention to the historical dynamics of philosophical thought, which can be seen in the paradigm shift in philosophy.

The main idea of valuables functionalism in the social philosophy we had quite deployed analyzed in a special monograph devoted to systematic approach in social cognition [1]. Previously we have also drawn attention to the problem of defining paradigms in social cognition, and distinguished substantial, functionalist and axiological paradigms as being historically succeeding one another [2].

It should be noted that social theories emerged as a theories of social action that we have also been analyzed before [4]. So in this perspective a couple of categories «value - function» should be analyzed mainly on the basis of a conceptual scheme «purpose - means» that convincingly demonstrated in Niklas Luhmann's doctor paper [14]. However, in the same paper he outlines the transition to the next paradigm of socio- philosophical knowledge - systemic. The pair of categories of «purpose - means», which has clearly an anthropological nature, is replaced by a new pair of categories of «society as a system of social systems - separate social system». We should closer explore its values basis, since there is no doubt in saturation of social systems theory by social functional problems, because this theory in social cognition occurs primarily on the basis of the methodology of structural functionalism.

Indeed, every social system, according to Luhmann, is the most orderly and rational, also transparent to the human mind - in the sense of Weber's formal rationality and Max Horkheimer's instrumental reason [10]. There is clearly dominant functional principle that first captured Luhmann too much, and later begun to bother him and he looks deeper basis for such functionalism - first in theory of autopoiesis, and then addressing to the theme of self-observing special thanks to the inclusion of communication participants' consciousness. The latter, in our opinion, creates the very basis for understanding the values foundations of society as the construction of social systems. However, as Luhmann could not even suggest the possibility of the presence of some common values for the whole society, he appeals to the values of the scientist who researches these systems - in fact his self-observing is the most consistent expression of society self-observing. However, Luhmann tries to save communicative basis of any observations as any action within social systems. But, in our opinion, this communicative basis looks here more as an open possibility, which still needs its theoretical explication. In our view, communicative communities research opens the explicative possibility for this. After all, the very scientist that observes society as a system of systems does that not as self-sufficient individual, but as a representative of the communicative community of scientists.

It should be paid a particular attention to the ratio of value and functional characteristics in a pair of «values-functions» as a landmark for the modern social theories. For a long time these properties were investigated not only from the objective position, but also at a certain evaluation point of view, which is especially clearly manifested in attempts to carry out systematic philosophical analysis of society. In applying of the systemic approach is not always considered as valuable so functional aspects of this application: a long time certain «technocratic» tendencies were apparent in contradiction with the liberal-humanist tendencies. These first gave sufficient reasons for accusations in excessive functionalism with little consideration of values issues, and the second - for an utopian complaints, insufficient scientific character, Romanticism, nearly myth-making. Criticism of «technocracy» primarily was carried out by Frankfurt School for Social Researches (Max Horkheimer's critique of instrumental reason, Theodor Adorno's and Jurgen Habermas' critique of repressive rationality etc.), existentialist philosophy and was close to humanistic psychology, while criticism of pseudo-humanism was launched by Martin Heidegger and developed by the so- called conservative trend in social studies, post-positivists (Karl Popper) representatives of social systems theory (Niklas Luhmann) and the theory of elites. Somewhat arbitrarily and incorrectly humanistic trend began to appeal mainly to the interpretive methods of study and technocratic - mainly to explanatory: in fact, most superficial researchers on this basis tend to oppose same methodology of humanities and social sciences. At first glance, it seems paradoxical, but every trend both in positive and in a critical part of their research was largely one that reflects real social processes, and therefore had a valid claim to truth. Another thing is that each of these theoretical tendencies did focus on its own vision of the future without taking into account different perspective, and sought to enhance the differences, not common origins and common opportunities for development.

For the analysis of our problem this means partial, and therefore not philosophical, but rather a party, a political approach to the subject - as values so functional. As one so an another was developed as a result not only incomplete, but in fact inadequate, ie not disclosed the true nature of values or functions. Our position is that analyzing the development of society one should take values with their functional influences, and take in account that the most socially significant functions acquire such significance not only because of their indispensability and inevitability, but rather because of a certain understanding of the indispensability and inevitability from certain value positions.

The question is whether we are talking here about classical Stoic epistemology of relation between freedom and necessity, which Seneca vividly described by offering an analogy with a dog tied to a cart - freedom, they say, is only in order to run along a cart, and lack of freedom expects only those stubborn that try to ignore the cart path, i.e. fate. In such a case, the real social study would be natural cognition, and social sciences and humanities were engaged in a sort of meditation and psycho- pedagogical consultations, the essence of which would have differed little from the philosophy of Camus: if the world does not obey our whims, so it were absurd and deserves only on resistance - albeit resistance is doomed to failure [6]. In our view, such a position as other variation of epistemological nihilism in socio-humanitarian knowledge does not have its logical justification. If humanity just followed around the natural need, then it would have evolved not far away from the rest of social beings in the nature. Another thing is that in its development the humanity occasionally suffers periods of slowing its evolution, caused by the decline of certain cultures and even civilizations. These periods can be catastrophic for these civilizations mentioned, but for humanity as a whole is only a short-lived state of decadence, of a partial disruption as a symptom of new social and organizational forms. Decadence has its aesthetic justification and even magic, but it does not indicate any prospects of social development. However, if we consider the natural laws only as external framework conditions of social development, which are not relevant to its essence [5], then following these laws loses semantic connection with the problem of freedom, as with any other social values. Feedback is possible - ie social values may grant conditional, additional meaning to laws of nature, without specifying their nature, but specifying the range of their perceptions in society. However, this addition to the natural laws does not add anything to their nature, and especially not change it.

True freedom that really motivates social development and is a powerful motivator of human behavior has its own social and personal determination that is possible to understand on the ways in which one can explore social values, including the value of freedom. How the latter depends mutually from the other values - defined for each society, each community and each person, even in a special way, although there are certain internal determinations to society and to the individual. Such own social and personal determinations, in our opinion, are possible to track by identifying their specific social and functional manifestations - in the functioning of social systems, social institutions, social organizations. This is the essence of valuables functionalism.

Obviously, this approach is still not dominant in social cognition, although in social and philosophical knowledge one can meet it more and more often. In the social sciences is still dominated technocratism with its emphasis on the study of functional relationships as self-sufficient without explained appeal to social values, but vice versa - with explanation of its value as an epiphenomenon. In humanities values do not take proper consideration: here one could meet almost miraculously combined technical functionalism when considering some empirical problems with the overall romanticism as value background for such consideration - in determining of substantive and methodological principles of research, devoid of any functional specificity. Thus, the valuables functionalism appears as a strategy of achieving the working interaction between social sciences and humanities, and thus becomes paradigmatic value: in addition to developing its own epistemological perspective it offers a methodology and philosophy which enable new institutional perspective to develop a new type of single socio-humanitarian knowledge.

This perspective means among other things also reconciliation of the theory of social action and the theory of social communication (for example, creating a new version of the theory of social systems [3]) - through their mutual limitations. Social action takes values from the perspective of social communication and social communication becomes functionally justified if the definition of framework conditions for realization of social action moves to determine the functional feasibility of specific types of behavior. In our studies, we tried to identify the perspective of the mutual understanding of the institutional balance of social action and social communication. This perspective opens due to the coordination between functions and values in institutional behavior, namely coordination between the values of sustainable communicative communities and communication functions defined by the social systems. This option of the valuables functionalism obviously can and must be supplemented by others, including those that will better clarified the relationship between the problems of value identity and self-organization system of the individual, between institutional structure of societies and their symbolic systems, between social structure as a whole and a plurality of communicative communities that are always partly coincide with it, between the so-called social culture and cultural identity. One can continue the list of subjects that should be developed as a special for social philosophy and social sciences - certainly seems to us only need to take into account the experience of the combination of value and functional aspects of a systematic approach in social cognition, which was proposed by us as a philosophical reflection of paradigmatic shift processes in modern social- humanitarian knowledge.

Another couple of categories of modern social philosophy, which enables the analysis of global processes in general and themes of international communication and global justice in particular, there is a couple of «social integration / system integration». The term «social integration» becomes it classic sounding in tandem with the term «system integration», although the first time even Herbert Spencer begins to develop the concept of social integration. Failure of differentiation or vague theoretical distinction in non-philosophical studies of these two types of integration in society often leads to confusion with issues of social integration with system integration issues - when first are appointed the functions of the last or vice versa. Such approach eventually leads to some misunderstandings in theory or individual cases of social dysfunction in practice. The classic distinction between social and system integration was offered by David Lockwood in his special article [11], devoted to criticism of Talcott Parsons' theory of social systems. From this position later Jurgen Habermas develops in his theory of communicative action an opposition of social systems to the life world as the embodiment of social integration [8].

Based on the theory of communicative action, one can specify the procedure for reaching a consensus as a result of argumentative discourse due to broader consideration of the means to achieve such a consensus. Thus, it seems justified that Habermas opposes the consensus through compromise as less stable to the consensus by creating of the new values shared by both parties of conflict [8]. Compromises, even mutual, mean concessions of parties that retreat from their initial fundamental principles. That always will leave the reasons for revenge and departure from the consensus. While the creation of new values in the discourse opens a whole new level of communication between the parties when the old position were covered or «overlap» with new one that better take into account the new realities of communication. Moreover being achieved together, they begin a new common history of constructive, not conflict interaction.

However, the claim to universalism, that Habermas makes when considering the problems of social communication in general and normative issues in rational discourse in particular, needs adjustments.

It should be also specify clearly when compliance to supposedly «universal» necessary conditions and principles of rational discourse is not sufficient to resolve the conflict - for example, in cases of low (not sufficient) level of competence (or awareness) of the members of this discourse, or in situations where a positive result in a discourse that is at the level of communicative rationality does not lead to the corresponding positive pragmatic result in social instrumental interaction. For example, the framework decision on global justice could be adopted by parties of the conflict at a theoretical level, but in practice they are guided by the same particular interests that go beyond the «permitted» global justice. Thus the different actors of the political, economic activities, etc. believe that they do not actually violate global justice, but implemented it more accurately and in more proper way, than their opponents that is there is a conflict of interpretations, not abuse of justice. global justice community

The concept of global justice can be understood not as a purely law phenomenon, but also as a phenomenon of moral, political, economic, social-structural, cultural and other kinds. Such a broad interpretation of global justice in theory of communicative action gives as its inevitable consequence not only clear advantages compared with its narrow interpretation (e.g., purely moral, purely legal, purely political, purely economic, purely social-stratification, purely cultural), but not immediately visible risks and irreversible loss. First of all, it is about the risk of substitution of one type of justice with another - economic, political, social stratification, legal, moral, cultural and others. This is true not only for global justice, but justice itself or any other kind of justice - but we express it according to the concept of global justice, which has the regulative function for all other modern humanities and social sciences researches. In addition, the inevitable loss of such wide approach becomes the content, values ambiguity of the broad interpretation of justice - it is more meets the criteria of formal rationality and less value, material rationality. Fundamentally danger of this trend was outlined by Georg Simmel and Max Weber - the first in the phenomenon of prostitution of the public relations, the second in effect of the paradox of rationalization. The real question lies in the fact that the global justice is a nobody justice. This is its strength, but this is its weakness too, by itself such nobody justice is motivational weaker than stronger in its purity, its «correctness».

If according to Habermas we consider unlimited communicative community as a subject of global justice, then we should be aware that the value of this community seems to be too abstract and very formally identified, in order to justify meaningful answer to the question of global justice. Rather unlimited communicative community is that a universal model, which any real local communicative community should take on, if it enters the discourse on justice issues, including global justice.

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