Home language and language home: the experience to apply L. Wittgenstein's methodology of "philosophical investigations" to the theory of borders

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Murmansk Arctic State University

The Volgograd Physical Education Academy

Home language and language home: the experience to apply L. Wittgenstein's methodology of “philosophical investigations” to the theory of borders

Kapitana Jegorova Str. 15, Murmansk, Russia, 183038

Abstract

This article shows the relationship of primitive language with corporal life, which (i.e. life), includes solid bodies' manipulation in the house construction. At the same time, the subjects of speech make certain projections, that is, they propagate those attitudes of consciousness that they had possessed while performing those corporal operations and which are expressed in speech forms, on the rest of the reality that had emerged from a stable state. We prove the inapplicability of these projections to the modern nonlinear processes comprehension in the context of the global crisis. L. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language analysis is transformed into J. Habermas's philosophy of communicative mind through the understanding of the problem of individuality in order to preserve the subject of the modern era from disintegration. As a result the ways to overcoming non-genuine contemporary globalization are found out through the interpenetration of the senses in the perception and comprehension of being in different cultures and peoples.

Key words: primitive language, corporal life, house construction, projection, new European entity, the philosophy of communicative mind, individualization through generalization, home as a language and language as a house, a new form of globalization

ЯЗЫК ДОМА И ДОМ ЯЗЫКА: ОПЫТ ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ МЕТОДОЛОГИИ «ФИЛОСОФСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ» Л. ВИТГЕНШТЕЙНА К ГРАНИЦЕВЕДЕНИЮ

Шачин Святослав Вячеславович -- кандидат философских наук, доцент, доцент кафедры философии, социальных наук и права социального обеспечения

Комлева Людмила Александровна -- кандидат филологических наук, доцент, доцент кафедры социально-гуманитарных дисциплин и иностранных языков

¹Мурманский Арктический государственный университет ул. Капитана Егорова, д. 15, Мурманск, Россия, 183038

²Волгоградская Академия физической культуры Проспект Ленина, д. 78, Волгоград, Россия, 400005

В предлагаемой статье показана связь примитивного языка с телесной жизнью, которая (т.е. жизнь) заключается в манипулировании твердыми телами при строительстве дома. При этом субъекты речи совершают определенные проекции, то есть распространяют те установки сознания, которыми они обладали при совершении данных телесных операций и которые выражаются в речевых формах, на остальную реальность, вышедшую из стабильного состояния. Доказывается неприменимость этих проекций к осмыслению современных нелинейных процессов в контексте всемирного кризиса. Через осмысление проблемы индивидуальности с целью сохранения субъекта эпохи модерна от дезинтеграции философия языкового анализа Л. Витгенштейна трансформируется в философию коммуникативного разума Ю. Хабермаса. В результате выясняются пути преодоления неподлинной современной глобализации через взаимопроникновение смыслов при восприятии и постижении бытия разными культурами и народами.

Ключевые слова: примитивный язык, телесная жизнь, строительство дома, проекции, новоевропейский субъект, философия коммуникативного разума, индивидуализация через обобществление, дом как язык и язык как дом, новая форма глобализации

Introduction

“The new immensity” -- these words, which stand in the title of one of the Jьrgen Habermas books [see: 4], are again applicable to the modern world. On the one hand, globalization has generated processes similar to the great migration of peoples, which makes it possible to draw analogies with the situations of the late Roman Empire and is a symptom of the gradual extinction of civilization. This is the topic that has been present in the conservative thought since the famous O. Spengler's book, “The Decline of Europe” [see: 17; 10. S. 197, 328, 637]. On the other hand, the retrograde motion has appeared. It consists of regionalization, which leads to the fact that the world is once again split into relatively autonomous economic and socio-cultural formations, seeking to self-sufficiency and weakly interacting with each other -- sanctions against Russia, retaliatory barriers to mutual free trade and economic cooperation with the West in general and the growth of anti-Western sentiment in Russia in recent years, all these facts are merely a general trend's manifestation. As a result, public consciousness enters a state of confusion and loss of stable landmarks, and loss of confidence in the fact that the mass consumption society will continue to exist. However, there is a danger that the reasonable form of the world understanding will be fully destroyed together with the non-genuine form of interpretation of being and the subjectivity of the modern era will be finally disintegrated into isolated fragments.

To counter this trend, we need to see how the language preserves the memory of the true being and true human existence in the world. This idea was introduced into philosophy by Martin Heidegger (in this sense, language is “the house of ... being” (1)). But first it is necessary to let the spirit of the language express itself freely, the condition of which is to liberate it from the shackles and distortion. This is where L. Wittgenstein's “Philosophical Investigations” methodology can help us. We consider it on the basis of its perception in the modern Frankfurt School, namely, in the works of Habermas and

H.-J. Schneider (who compares the ideas of Jьrgen Habermas and the great American analytical philosopher R. Brandom and traces their origins in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language).

First, we consider how the language points to the connection with bodily actions preceding speech practice. Also we consider the so-called projections (H. Schneider), that is, such initial attitudes of human consciousness toward the world around, transferred from the usual everyday practice, which can distort reality when faced with very complex processes in a crisis (that is, L. Wittgenstein's ideas will be applied to the current global crisis) (1). Then, on the basis of J. Habermas's approach, as it was set out in the book “To the logic of the social sciences” (1971) and “Post-metaphysical thinking” (1988), we consider the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein's individuality based on our interest in the modernist subjectivity preservation through its transformation into intersubjectivity (2). Finally, the rethinking of these erroneous projections and the dialectical solution of the problem of individuality, connected with each other, will allow us to suggest some principles for constructing a language that will be adequate to the current situation of the growth of chaos and the formation of a new world order out of chaos (3).

1. How the language points to the connection with bodily actions

At the very beginning of “The Philosophical Investigations” Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses the problem of “primitive language” (reminiscent of the language of young children), which goes back to St. Augustine, and therefore directly addresses to the construction of the house:

"The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and his assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that is in the order in which A needs them. For these purposes they use a language consisting of the words "block”, "pillar”, "slab” and "beam”. A call them out; -- B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call”. [18. § 2. p. 3]

For Wittgenstein this example is important because he tries to understand how the speaker and the listener are related to the objective world when they jointly perform certain corporal actions in it. At the same time, the corporal actions level precedes the language game. Wittgenstein's desire was to see how the most complex structures that arise spontaneously in language games always presuppose this activity of a person as a corporeal being with objects having weight, shape, strength, etc., and this corporal practice level neglecting leads to huge distortions when we try to understand linguistic structures as something independent. The classic example of such operations with bodies for Wittgenstein was the construction of a house. The sequence of these actions involves two stages. First, a choice of the desired object from many ones that were in the heap is made, and the first stage is completed when the given object is taken in hand. During the second stage, the chosen object is connected to the other objects in accordance with certain rules. After that the initial selection is performed and integration begins on the new level in accordance with the principle that is found. In connection with this fact, you can make a consideration based on the scientific principle of systems theory, according to which any system makes order absorption from the environment by choosing one material substrate, which it needs, and then the internal structure of this material system itself is being built up on a new level in accordance with the principle of its organization. (The work of the digestive system of the body arises in connection with it.)

Developing Wittgenstein's thoughts, H.J. Schneider offers a slightly different model of bodily actions that precede complex language games: the ash heap distribution to find lenses in it, then the pieces of ash are deposited into one vessel, and the lenses into another. According to Schneider:

"The bodily actions previous to language which are at our disposal (that is, the actions "to take something in hand” and "put in a jar”), could form the initial point for Ch. Peirce "pragmatic maxim ”, according to which the meaning of the word is the way by which one's statement could encourage us to actions. Thus, the step of determining (Prddizieren) on the lowest level can be attributed to the actions of a type "to put in a container A” and the generalization operation (Referieren) can be attributed to the actions such as "to take a lens or a piece of ash during a sorting”. Language activities are directly necessary non-linguistic actions extensions” [14. S. 155] (Translated from German into English by authors of this article). wittgenstein philosophy linguistic

The question arises here: is it not too long for us to discuss these lenses, pieces of ash, rocks, gullies and other “medium-hard things”, rather than to answer the question of the subject which is the most important for the logic and methodology and the question of identity which is the most important one for our self-understanding? And what about the events and processes: they are not given like material things, aren't they? Where is subject and object structure taken in our minds from in general, whether is it the result of feedback the objective reality on us, which consists of separate “solid” things, incomprehensible things-in-themselves (Dinge an sich) in I. Kant's sense, etc. of thinkable or unthinkable existence?

And just here the novelty of Wittgenstein was that he refused to answer the questions of this kind due to the fact that they are not properly set. According to Wittgenstein, the language game development is due to the continuously occurring projection, during which one and the same paradigm of an actor and activity is used to different semantic contents. The given paradigm is the basis of the subject and object structure which gives us the form to express our thoughts via language. That is the broad applicability of the logical forms such as those known to mathematical logics, is caused not with the world structure which is independent from us or a priori structures contained in our thoughts, but is generated by ourselves: we ourselves treat different cases, life offers us, in a similar way, that is, according to those two schemes that have just been described. That we believe is lying in the nature of things, in fact, according to Wittgenstein, is incorporated into the rate of presentation (Darstellung) of reality in language. However, the difficulties appear here constantly. They consist in the fact that language can describe reality not adequately, and there will be disagreements between our experience and its linguistic expression. This is due to an unjustified proliferation of the activity projection beyond its validity; as a result our language seems to become too rude, physical and subjective [see: 14. S. 167--168].

This is especially true of the process of the reality understanding, when the complex events manifest a certain, easy to understand ill will. These complex events are the result of a plurality of relatively autonomous operating reasons coupling and also spontaneous deviations from causal chains due to the entry into force of uncertainty factors (for example, due to the presence of free will in the Kantian sense in human actions). Meanwhile, language “conversion into physical state” prevents us from finding of guidance in a world that is not always subservient to the original physical scheme of a house building or lenses retrieving in a pile of ashes. The fact is that both a bunch of ash and a house belong to a well manageable things that are available to our understanding, as a result of that we can accomplish these things by manipulating certain efforts. Projections are failed when reality goes beyond our logic when we cannot draw a meaning of things, not because of the fact that our concepts are weak, but because of the fact that these things do not belong to the circle of our concepts (as Kouzma Proutkov told in the famous aphorism) (2). So, simple schemes of this kind deprive us of an adequate orientation and therefore they have to be transformed into structures built according to a different logic. And we have to start with the fact to comprehend the functioning of our projections and failures in them owing to unjustified extensions of projecting schemes beyond their applicability. The discrepancy of the language with the reality will not be eliminated but understood and thereby philosophy will fulfill a therapeutic function which was promoted by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

2. The philosophy of individuality by Ludwig Wittgenstein

As an example of such therapeutic function realization we shall consider the problem of individuality, namely, the way of expressing the experience of our ego in the language on the basis of the Wittgenstein's language game paradigm. As it is noted by Habermas one of the reasons of “linguistic turn” for Wittgenstein was to solve the problem of identity. The Descartes' position that individuality finds his/her basis in selfconsciousness, in the act performed by the subject of certification of one's existence by means of thought was not sufficient for him. Wittgenstein also sought to find in the reflexive relation of the cognizing subject to his consciousness a moment breaking through the subjective framework. A coherent system of objective and social world formation in the mind of every member of a society in the linguistic philosophy is explained not by the transcendental genesis of meaning but by the joint usage of language, which rules define the ways of the world understanding by the individuals [see: 5. S. 52--54].

Having carried out the strict demarcation of the sentences with logical relationships from the facts with empirical relationships, Wittgenstein raised problem to show how the relationships between the symbols implicate the relationships between social activities, how social norms can be “read” in the grammatical structure of the language. According to L. Wittgenstein's point of view expressed in the “Philosophical Investigations”, grammar simultaneously defines the limits of the reality interpretation, so the rules of the language also contain the practical point of establishing a framework of meaning. To interpret reality in a language in different ways is not just to give different interpretations (the choice of which is arbitrary) of one and the same system of the described facts, but also create various linking systems of the facts themselves -- this is the “language games” [see: 3].

Thus, the most important problem of mediation between the different “language games” and finding a universal moment in each of them is set. To do this, we need to address the problem of language understanding. According to Wittgenstein, understanding is based on the domination over “language game” rules, that is, over the ways of establishing of mutual relations between language symbols, states of consciousness of the subject and his actions, as well as a reality to which language refers the subject. Human ability to dominate over the language game rules is acquired through his/her participation in the communication within the certain “life forms”. The grammatical rules of speech are also virtual socialization process rules. This conclusion was made by L. Wittgenstein.

Jьrgen Habermas went further and showed the possibility of mutual transformations of meanings between various “language games”: the interpreter mediates various types of socialization processes, based on the reflexivity of the process of socialization through which he passed himself. For this purpose the idea of “language games” restraint and their pluralism must be overcome: the reflective component can be found in the rules of “language games”. In this context Habermas adds Wittgenstein's ideas about the “language games”: speech understanding should be viewed not only as a virtual repetition, fast “scrolling” of the language rules learning process by a subject in his/her consciousness, but also as a result of the interpretation put force in case of the given rules violation [see: 3. S. 244--254].

This means that in any language, in addition to the specific life form's project the unlimited communicative community is anticipated as an unbroken form of intersubjectivity [see: 8. S. 226--227]. The problem of individuality in its relationship with the world and with other thinking subjects using speech to understand the world, in which they live, can be solved in a new way by means of linguistic philosophy. And the formal pragmatics developed by D. Austin, J. Searle and creatively developed by Jьrgen Habermas gives us the key to this problem [see: 1], [15], [16], [6. S. 144--149].

It should be noted that L. Wittgenstein himself came very close to the idea that the utterance is also a linguistic action, having discovered that the statements carry not only a neutral information, but also express the attitude of the speaker to it: “One will point to places and things -- but in this case the pointing occurs in the use of the words too and not merely in learning the use” [18. § 9. p. 6]. Therefore, the following J. Habermas analysis is the creative continuation of L. Wittgenstein's ideas on the basis of tradition in the language philosophy.

According to J. Habermas ideas, under the terms of the formal pragmatics in the analysis of the process of linguistic communication of individuals we need to examine not only the theme of a dialogue and the agreement maintenance but the mutual understanding prerequisite in the language, on the basis of which any dialogue leads to consensus. First of all, it is necessary to comprehend certain structure, forming a common dialogue context, and then this structure can be filled with certain content, and can be transformed as a result of their internal modifications depending on the content of the dialogue. This structure is assumed by three speaker's claims on the importance of his statements, which he raises before the listener, making a statement: to the verity (in relation to the external world), to the accuracy (in relation to social world) and to the truthfulness (in relation to his/her own inner world). These claims to the importance are expressed in the so-called performative element of the language act. The presence of performativity protects the language from becoming a closed system in which meaning is automatically generated on the basis of following the rules of the language game, so that the participants of communication themselves are not important (they can be replaced by some technical means of communication). However, if the statements themselves are actions, acts, then the use of speech involves three basic communicative roles: the speaker, the listener and the neutral observer. These roles should be performed by specific participants in verbal communication, so that a certain result can be achieved that is mutual understanding between them. The speaker addresses the statement to the listener, and if the listener agrees with the claim to the significance of the speaker's statement, accepts his motivation for the joint action, then the speaker returns to himself, having established the reciprocal relationship with the listener. It turns out that the speaker finds himself as “alter ego of the other ego” [see: 2. S. 15--16], [9. Bd. 1. S. 144--148].

It remains for us to consider how this happens on a concrete example. During the occupation of the performative position (it is expressed in phrases such as “I warn you that...”) the speaker must assume the “perspective” of the listener, that is, take into account possible expectations of the behavior of the speaker existed in a listener in the situation that describes the propositional element of the language act (“...it's cold outside” -- the listener in these circumstances, for example, dresses warmer). On the other hand, the listener also assumes “the prospect” of the speaker, being exposed to the linguistic act, expressed in the utterance performative element (in this example, a warning is in its meaning anticipation of certain actions, which resulted in the fact that a listener will be able to avoid the negative consequences of a particular state in the world and the speaker is just waiting the given actions from the listener), and the speaker finally meets his own subjectivity as a “alter ego of alter ego”. Finally, both the listener and the speaker can take the perspective of a neutral observer (e.g. the listener can interpret that the speaker's warning is not important for him, because he is more experienced than it could be imagined by the speaker). This leads to the dialogue semantic field a change, brings communication to a new level, with the result that, if the speaker and the listener are willing to continue the process of communication consistently, the agreement content will include several “horizons” of meaning comprehension at the same time (in our example, the listener will clarify the speaker how he feels cold weather and why he does not feel uncomfortable in it).

On the other hand, “the exchange of perspectives” between the participants of the dialogue does not eliminate the distance between them completely. Each of the participants in the communication, having integrated all three dialogical roles (a speaker, a listener and a neutral observer) in their verbal behavior, spontaneously treats them separately, when a person takes on one of these roles in the process of communication, and differently makes mutual transitions between them. (For example, the speaker can become a listener, perceiving experience of self-awareness of the speaker who is the “former” listener with interest in the cold weather of the North, but the person will become a neutral observer, as soon as he realizes that he cannot follow the speaker in his subjective outlook, but he may wish to share his own perceptions of the middle latitudes warm weather which is more familiar to this individual). As a result of the dialogue participants' intentions the communicators always deviate from the standard content of any linguistic expression, and the universalization of the persons who are the members of communication comes back to individualization dialectically. (Analyzing the problem of individuality in linguistic philosophy of Wittgenstein's followers the authors used the material of the work of Habermas' “Post-metaphysical thinking” [see: 5. S. 31--32, 58--59].)

Thus, the meaning in speech is arisen from the fact that the participants in the dialogue follow not only the rules of the correct usage of words in the language game, but also the rules governing the procedure of the dialogue, which are related to the communicative roles of the speaker, listener and the neutral observer. And if Ludwig Wittgenstein recognized “language games” and “life forms” pluralism yet, then in the course of further development of linguistic philosophy the universal prerequisites of understanding have been discovered in the language that allow to come to the “unity of communicative reason in diversity of its voices (positions)” according to the precise aphorism of J. Habermas [see: 7. S. 153--157].

3. Principles for constructing a language that will be adequate to the current situation

We conclude by gathering all the methodological ideas of the article. To convert from the house building language to the language as a means of modern subject integrity preservation through the development of its reasonable capacity, we need to overcome unnecessarily corporal projections' model, which was discussed in part (1) of the given article. This model is based on the experience the limited world, consisting of items available to our technical manipulation. In this case we are not talking about the destruc¬tion of such a model, but the comprehending of impossibility of its unjustified transfer to non-linear processes, that are developing at high speed and open to new unintended effects processes. Language analysis in the style of Wittgenstein should perform a therapeutic function, showing irregularities in the normal functioning of our projections due to their unjustified dissemination. And if Wittgenstein himself stopped at this fact, the subsequent formal pragmatics developed in the writings of D. Austin, J. Searle and

J. Habermas, has opened the way for us to build a philosophy of a dialogue on the basis of the philosophy of language. In this case the language turned out to be a medium, i.e. the medium of communicative reason, in which socialization occurs through individualization (Indivieduierung durch Vergesellschaftung) according to J. Habermas. The member of the dialogue, in obedience to the call of the language, first provisionally stands at the point of view of another, who brings a different perception of life with his voice (for which there are even no concepts in our language as Kouzma Proutkov wrote about it). But then, one and the same language encourages such an operation of self-reflection in the other, with the result that he begins to express the experience of being opened to him in terms of the first participant in the dialogue. In this case exchange of perspectives takes place, vocabulary of both languages expands, the languages begin to serve as a means of the world discovery in its universality, and the original concepts are transformed. Only after successful completion of the dialogue projections connecting our speech with the life practice corporal level can be resumed again, but now these projections will be altered. (Relatively speaking, people will start to build homes differently, from different materials as they did before or to understand that home, like ships, are filled with air that is why they are free to change their form by taking into account this point, inaccessible to rough corporal actions. For example, nowadays it is proved by the means of the art of sliding walls in Japan and Feng Shui in China.) As a result, the artificial borders preventing the speaker and the listener to understand each other will be removed and a mobile media of communicative mutual understanding will be formed. Then the narrowly corporal “home language” will be able to start turning into “the language home”, and the modern spurious globalization will be able to turn into a more harmonious and perfect globalization through the detection of currently hidden abilities in the subject. And while “neither I nor you will have an opportunity to live in this beautiful time” (as in N.A. Nekrasov's poem), however, philosophy can offer a project which is then, will begin, to grow up in reality like a seed, from which a cultivated tree can grow. For all the apparent chaos there is a movement to a new order, which realizes positive opportunities that were hidden in the past stability states, but then they could not fully express their potential...

Notes

1) “Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of being”. Ref. to: [11. P. 243]. Also refer to: [12].

2) Kouzma Petrovich Proutkov is a literary mask, under which the poets Alexei Tolstoy and the Zhemchuzhnikov brothers (Alexei, Vladimir and Alexander Mikhailovich) performed in the Russians magazines “Sovremennik”, “Iskra” and others in the 1850s and 1860s. In the Russian culture, the aphorisms of this collective author (published in the collection “Benefits of Meditation” (1854)) were valued as an example of subtle intellectual humor. This is the aphorism number 66: “Many things are not clear to us, not because our concepts are weak; But because these things are not included in the range of our concepts”. See: [13].

3) “I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the `language-game'” [see: 18. § 7. P. 5]. Also: “Here the term `language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life” [see: 18. § 23. P. 11].

4) In detail L. Wittgenstein considers the intertwining of the processes of socialization and learning the correct use of words in the language in: [18. § 6. P. 4--5]. Hence follows the famous proposition from Wittgenstein: “What is supposed to show what they (i.e. the words in the language -- Authors' note) signify, if not the kind of use they have?” [18. § 10. P. 6]. Also see, but in the affirmatives in Wittgenstein: “And how he `takes' the definition is seen in the use that he makes of the word defined” [18. § 27. P. 13--14].

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