The animal-machine concept in Descartes and Berkeley. The attempt at comparison

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Nicolaus Copernicus University

The animal-machine concept in Descartes and Berkeley. The attempt at comparison

Torun, Poland

Abstract

The article reconstructs and compares two philosophical concepts of animal developed by Renй Descartes and George Berkeley. The analysis of the process of animal perception carried out by Descartes makes it possible to find an analogy between the two abovementioned concepts. According to the interpretation presented in the article, the Berkeleyan immaterialist metaphysics can be reconciled with attributing certain degree of rationality to brutes. However, the reconstruction reveals the complexity of Berkeley's attitude towards Descartes and multidimensionality of his conception the epistemological parts of which can be reconciled with his metaphysics but can also be evaluated in separation from it.

Keywords: Descartes, Berkeley, animal, perception, immaterialism.

А. Гжеліньский, М. Лагош

КОНЦЕПЦІЯ ТВАРИНИ-МАШИНИ У ДЕКАРТА І БЕРКЛІ. СПРОБА ПОРІВНЯННЯ

Мета і завдання дослідження. Метою статті є реконструкція і порівняння двох філософських концепцій - Рене Декарта і Джорджа Берклі. Методологія дослідження. Стаття побудована на аналізі вибраних текстів згаданих філософів та філософської літератури з цієї теми. Обговорення. Наведена у статті інтерпретація протиставляється поширеному розумінню концепції тварини-машини і представляє поглиблений аналіз позиції Р. Декарта, згідно з якою сприйняття тільки в своїй останній фазі вимагає свідомості. Результати дослідження. Це дозволяє зберегти субстанціональну відмінність між твариною, що належить до res coginans, і мисленням. Визнання за тваринами обмеженої здатності сприйняття дозволяє Декарту відмовитись від припущення про існування субстанціональної тваринної души, що виступало би як непотрібне звертання до аристотелізму. Підкреслення складності процесу сприйняття дозволяє, незважаючи на різницю в підходах (дуалізм та імматеріалізм), побачити аналогію між позиціями Р. Декарта і Д. Берклі. Це приводить до декількох висновків. Висновки. По-перше, дозволяє вказати на велику подібність, а, може бути, навіть зв'язок між концепціями французького та ірландського філософів. У випадку другого з них це припущення знаходить своє підтвердження у ранніх записках в Philosophical Commentaries. По-друге, Д. Берклі в своїй праці An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, заперечуючи картезіанське геометричне пояснення сприйняття більшості предметів, в цілому все ж таки погоджується з картезіанськім психологічним поясненням, проте його доповнює і розширює. Це приводить до третього висновку, а власне, до підкреслення багатогранності творчості обох мислителів. Поза відмінностями метафізичних підходів треба звернути увагу на подібність психологічних та епістемологічних рішень. Особливо в випадку Д. Берклі маємо справу з уявною незалежністю фізіологічного, психологічного аналізу відносно метафізики. Проблема складності сприйняття і з'ясування можливості сприйняття у тварин в цілому узгоджується з імматеріалізмом, але може розглядатися і в відриві від нього.

Ключові слова: Декарт, Берклі, тварина, сприйняття, імматеріалізм.

А. Гжелинский, М. Лагош

КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ЖИВОТНОЕ-МАШИНА У ДЕКАРТА И БЕРКЛИ. ПОПЫТКА СРАВНЕНИЯ

Целью статьи является реконструкция и сравнение двух философских концепций - Рене Декарта и Джорджа Беркли. Статья построена на анализе выбранных текстов упомянутых философов и философской литературы по данной теме. Приведенная в статье интерпретация противопоставляется распространенному пониманию концепции животное-машина и представляет углубленный анализ позиции Р. Декарта, согласно которой восприятие только в своей последней фазе требует сознания. Данный концепт позволяет сохранить субстанциональное различие между животным, что относится к res coginans, и мышлением. Признание за животными ограниченной способности восприятия позволяет Декарту отказаться от предположения о существовании субстанциональной животной души, что выступало бы как ненужное обращение к аристотелизму. Акцентирование на сложности процесса восприятия позволяет, несмотря на разницу в подходах (дуализм и имматериализм), увидеть аналогию между позициями Р. Декарта и Д. Беркли. Это приводит к нескольким выводам: во-первых, позволяет указать на большое сходство, а может быть, даже связь между концепциями французского и ирландского философов. В случае второго из них это предположение находит свое подтверждение в ранних записках в Philosophical Commentaries. Во-вторых, Д. Беркли в своей работе An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, отрицая картезианское геометрическое объяснение восприятия большинства предметов, в целом соглашается с картезианских психологическим объяснением, вместе с тем дополняя его и расширяя. Это приводит к третьему выводу, а собственно, к подчеркиванию многогранности творчества обоих мыслителей. Вне различий метафизических подходов необходимо обратить внимание на сходство психологических и эпистемологических решений. Особенно в случае с Д. Беркли, где мы имеем дело с мнимой независимостью физиологического, психологического анализа относительно метафизики. Проблема сложности восприятия и выяснения возможности восприятия у животных в целом согласуется с имматериализмом, но может рассматриваться и в отрыве от него.

Ключевые слова: Декарт, Беркли, животное, восприятие, имматериализм.

Introduction

The origins of the animal-machine concept attributed to Renй Descartes are sought in two dimensions. In the critical dimension it was associated with overcoming Aristotelianism with its teleological vision of nature and the tripartite division of the soul into vegetative, sensual and rational; in the positive dimension, the animal-machine concept is treated as the result of Cartesian metaphysical dualism. In fact, both elements are intertwined: the Cartesian

philosophy of nature is a part of the seventeenth- century efforts to present a new concept of nature, including various versions of materialism and corpuscularianism (Th. Hobbes, P. Gassendi, R. Boyle) or the descriptive program of the accumulation of natural history (F. Bacon, J. Locke), gradually found their culmination in Newtonian physics (Anstey, 2011: 9). From R. Descartes' new, mechanistic understanding of nature, which is res extensa, a new concept of animal deprived of its soul emerged, whose life functions should be described as the result of the work of a mechanism (automaton) - the soul, and therefore consciousness, was reserved only for man. It seems, however, that such an interpretation of Cartesianism is inappropriate and leads to simplification. In fact, R. Descartes attributed the ability to perceive, albeit without conscious thinking to animals. This simplification can be explained by an excessive emphasis on the role of metaphysics in the cognition of nature; at the same time, it is worth adding that for R. Descartes, natural research, including physiological research, was an extensive and relatively independent subject of research.

From this perspective, it is also interesting to what extent modern British philosophy, developing in the Cartesian paradigm, was aware of the shortcomings of such an interpretation. The metaphysical opposition between man and brute (reduced only to a mechanism within res extensa) was soon challenged both by John Locke (for whom the history of human reason extends from the simplest acts of perception, also characteristic of brutes) and David Hume (for whom neither rationality and nor passions, but morality and history only determined the uniqueness of man). The reconstruction of George Berkeley's position, in which, like in Descartes', metaphysics is considered to be of great importance, is also particularly interesting. In this case we are dealing with a reshaping of the Cartesian stance which emphasizes the juxtaposition no longer of thinking and extension, but of active spiritual substance identified with the will and passive ideas whose existence is reduced to being perceived.

The aim and tasks

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the Cartesian position and compare it with the concept of animal present by G. Berkeley, on which Cartesianism had a significant, often ignored, effect (Szafek, 2016: 48 ff). In particular, we endeavor to demonstrate that the relationship between these two concepts only seemingly boils down to the rephrasing of the metaphysical position, as this would lead G. Berkeley to uphold the animal-machine concept, and only mechanicism would be understood in a different way. Although this may come as a surprise, the similarity concerns precisely the attribution of perceptual abilities to animals. This leads to several conclusions regarding a) the status of the animal given by R. Descartes and G. Berkeley, b) the philosophers' understanding of thinking, c) the relationship between metaphysics and natural sciences they recognize. This text consists of three parts. The first part juxtaposes the traditional metaphysical reading of the Cartesian concept with those interpretations in which animals are treated as sentient beings (though unconscious); the second part reconstructs Berkeley's position in which animals are endowed with the ability to perceive. Finally, in the third part we formulate conclusions on the mutual relation of both concepts and differences in the understanding of the role of cognition of nature and metaphysics.

Research methods

From the methodological point of view, the article is based on the analysis of source works and subject literature. In the case of Descartes, the analyses are based on works in the field of metaphysics and epistemology: Meditations on the First Philosophy, The Principles of Philosophy and A Discourse on the Method, and Passions of the Soul. Berkeley's position is reconstructed on the basis of Treatise of the Principles of Human Knowledge, An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, and Philosophical Commentaries - i.e. early works of the philosopher, including his notebooks which are important for tracing the formation process of his philosophy. The source analyses are complemented by a review of existing interpretations in the literature on the subject.

Research results

Slightly more than a machine - Descartes on animal

The contraposition of the extended and thinking substance, as well as the introduction of the category of mechanical causality into the description of nature was connected with the effort of overcoming the traditional image of nature which modern philosophy inherited from antiquity. First of all, it was found that the traditional Aristotelian view that nature is purposefully organized and that particular species are the purpose of development of their inner form can be known in advance as soon as their essential attributes are defined was no longer valid in modern times. Such a vision of the world was opposed both by new attempts to mathematize the nature (G. Galilei) and of previously unknown phenomena, which were reported from the journeys around the New World (the program of descriptive and historical knowledge by F. Bacon). Descartes's position eradicated the purposefulness of nature, leaving it only in the sphere of human thinking and conscious and deliberate management of will. The mechanistic description of phenomena fully presented by him in The Principles of Philosophy soon proved to be erroneous: R. Descartes' calculations of the amount of the whirling motion of three types of matter were quite quickly negated by Newton. However, the requirement of clarity and transparency of knowledge, certainty based on mathematical cognition, and thus the essential aspects of the Cartesian epistemological program, proved to be much more durable. Also the dualistic metaphysics with the juxtaposition of deliberate and spontaneous thinking and the extension subject to the laws of mechanics became a challenge for subsequent philosophers - even if the principles of this mechanics required corrections with respect to details.

A particular challenge for philosophers and naturalists was the description of animals whose purpose of life Cartesianism reduced to mechanism. In his works, Descartes refers to the Aristotelian concept of three souls - vegetative, sensual and rational. The distinction between their kinds is invoked by the Aristotelians in order to emphasize the qualitative differences that are visible in the chain of existence, in the transition from inanimate matter through plant and animal to human life. Thanks to this distinction, it is possible to include the characteristics specific to human beings into it.

R. Descartes certainly believes that typically human abilities in a particular way demand postulation of a separate soul, however the postulate of a hierarchy of souls, and more precisely the postulate of the sensual soul, in order to emphasize the animal's ability to feel, is a separate issue. First of all, it is unnecessary since, according to R. Descartes, the abilities of plants and animals can be explained by the properties of matter. Secondly, the postulate of the hierarchy of souls does not in principle explain anything but merely labels the stages in which further differences emerge, while giving the impression that the causes of these differences have been identified. Thirdly, the hierarchy of souls obscures the important distinction between the soul and the body, suggesting that the difference between them may only be a matter of degree. R. Descartes combines mechanistic interpretation with the principle of economics of thought and on this ground seeks to demonstrate that animals have neither a vegetative nor a sensual soul. Ockham's razor in this case means a law deductible from the simplicity of God's actions, according to which God did not multiply the “principles” beyond necessity. Therefore, in order to illustrate that the behaviour of animals should be explained by mechanical rules, he indicates that there is no need to seek any other “principle of movement and life” other than the simplest one that can be formulated in mathematical terms. Thus, Descartes's position should be considered on three levels: religious (indicating the distinctiveness of thinking, and consequently of the human soul, not subject to decomposition like the body), metaphysical (emphasizing the distinctiveness of two substances) and natural (presenting both: a physiological description of animal bodies, and behavioural, which shows the difference between the instinctive behaviour of animals and the rational behaviour of man). The religious dimension of the dispute over the nature of the animal is slightly less accentuated by R. Descartes, yet it must not be ignored. There were fears of mechanistic reductionism, of “reducing the spiritual to the physiological and the physiological to the physical” (Drozdowicz, 2014: 126), it was feared that Descartes' concept would lead to erroneous conclusions. The evidence for this is a letter to R. Descartes from Froidmont dated September 13, 1637; we read there that replacing the sensual soul with purely mechanical processes introduces the risk that the human soul will also be reduced to them. The opponent addresses R. Descartes with the following words: “If one suppresses the vegatative and sensual soul in the brutes, one opens the door for the atheists, who will attribute the operations of the rational soul to a cause of the same kind and will give us a material soul to replace our spiritual soul” (Spink, 1974: 237). The author of the Meditations takes a position that is clearly opposed to such accusations. He points out that animals are treated by him on an equal footing with machines and refers to the Scripture in order to prove that there is no need for any kind of differentiation between the rational, sensual and vegetative soul. At the same time, he speaks against materialism, reiterating that res cogitans is also, besides res extensa, an elementary component of reality.

However, metaphysical duality does not mean that we are dealing with blind mechanisms in the case of animals, because they are endowed with senses. R. Descartes attempts to determine which elements of the cognitive process should be attributed to the mind and which - to the body. Since in daily life cognition - including sense cognition - is somehow available in a final form, in which both these elements accompany each other, and only a philosophical analysis may point to their respective functions (Morris, 2000: 405). According to R. Descartes, sensations relating to functions previously assigned to sensual soul (e.g. feeling pain, seeing light, etc.) were unclearly intertwined with those dependent on the body (e.g. eye stimulation by light) and with the properties of the mind (e.g. thinking that my own eyes are being stimulated by light). The first two types of sensations belong also to animals, while the latter are specific only to people. In

The Passions of the Soul R. Descartes explains for instance that: “Our perceptions are also of two sorts, and the one have the soul as a cause and the other the body. Those which have the soul as a cause are the perceptions of our desires, and of all the imaginations or other thoughts which depend on them” (Descartes, 1986: 79). Whereas in A Discourse on the Method he writes: For, in investigating the functions that could as a consequence be in this body, I found precisely all those which can be in us without our thinking of them, and to which our soul, that is to say, that part of us distinct from the body whose sole nature, as has been said above, is to think, contributes nothing; these functions are the same as those in which irrational animals may be said to resemble us. But I was unable to find in this body any of those functions which, being dependent on thought, are the only ones that belong to us as human beings. (Descartes, 2006: 39)

Failure to observe this strategy of disambiguation is a source of an incorrect interpretation of the animal- machine concept. Commentators of Descartes' thoughts note, for example, that he claims that animals do not have feelings or passions “like us” or “like ours”. They also recognize that R. Descartes did not deny that brutes have sensations as long as they depend solely on the structure and distribution of organs. However, it is routinely claimed that “the lack of feelings like ours” means the lack of feelings in general, and the statement that “they have sensations as long as they depend on the body” signifies a lack of sensations. Thus, in standard interpretations of the animal-machine concept, we are dealing with further mixing of what R. Descartes tried to separate (Morris, 2000: 406). Using the example of visual cognition we may point to differences between a) a simple reaction to a visual stimulus, in which parts of an animal machine simply react in an appropriate way; b) visual consciousness, in which the perceiving subject possesses a mental representation of the object or state of things that previously provoked a reaction on the level of a visual stimulus; and c) the perception judgement, or the ability to reflect and make a judgement, for example, about the validity of the representation concerned. R. Descartes attributes the last ability only to human beings, stating that it requires the possession of a mind - the rational soul. The other two powers are also applicable to animals. Within Descartes' concept, the questions of how the organs of the senses work and why they work in this way are two separate issues (Gaukroger, 2000: 396). God, being the only ultimate cause, has given machines the organs of the senses, through which they are able to experience. However, if the body is not considered as an animal body or a human machine but as part of what Descartes calls the union of soul and body, the question of the purpose of sensual experience becomes legitimate - this however refers us to human thinking, as only within its scope can this question be legitimately posed. philosophical descartes berkeley metaphysics

The Cartesian understanding of animals in Berkeley's philosophy

In contrast to the conception developed by R. Descartes, G. Berkeley's notion of an animal has been but rarely analysed by scholars (Charles, 2010: 189 ff; Hight, 2011: 207 ff), which is hardly surprising since the Irish philosopher did not focus much of his attention on the subject. On the face of it, it seems that G. Berkeley follows the Cartesian path and opposes human freedom and conscience to animal mechanisms acting merely instinctively (even if the mechanism is conceived not as a modification of extended substance but rather as a set of ideas the esse of which is no more than percipi). For the scarcity of place we will not investigate into the differences between the two metaphysical presuppositions underlying both conceptions. The issue can be summarised as follows: for G. Berkeley all the content of human thinking (i.e. ideas) immediately depends on God's activity as he writes in the Principles § 29 (Berkeley, 1749 (a): 53). However, it is noteworthy that Berkeley's philosophy - and his conception of animals - was motivated by his religious beliefs. Berkeley, a member of Anglican clergy, makes a reservation that understanding and will are the qualities of spirits (or souls) of human beings: “A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being - writes G. Berkeley in § 27 of the Principles - as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will” (Berkeley, 1949 (a): 52). In opposition to the ideas of imagination which are “excited at random” ideas of sense “have... a steadiness, order, and coherence, are... excited. in a regular train or series, the admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author” (Berkeley, 1949 (a): 53). Thus, both factors shaping Berkeley's thought: his metaphysical stance (immaterialism) and his religious commitment (the perspective of immortality of human souls) should make us think that brutes are mere soulless automats.

However, though postulating the uniqueness of spirits and separating them from all natural phenomena, G. Berkeley attributes the ability to perceive to animals. The respective remarks can be found in his early Philosophical Commentaries as well as in his major works such as the Principles and the Three Dialogues: “For this end the visive sense seems to have been bestowed on animals, to wit, that by the perception of visible ideas (which themselves are not capable of affecting or any wise altering the frame of their bodies) they may be able to forsee (from the experience they have had of what tangible ideas are connected with such and such visible ideas) the damage or benefit which is like to ensue, upon the application of their own bodies to this or that body which is at a distance”. (Berkeley, 1948a: 193)

The problem of the reconciliation of the spirits-ideas dualism and the proposition that animals can perceive drew the attention of researchers. According to Sebastien Charles the contradiction can be removed by observing that G. Berkeley adopts a non-Cartesian definition of soul the lower part of which can be attributed to brutes (Charles, 210: 197). Charles sticks to the traditional reading of the Cartesian conception of an animal as a mere mechanism and claims G. Berkeley abandons the Cartesian position in this aspect. However, it seems plausible that both stances can be reconciled and within the framework of

Berkeley's theory the dualism of sprits and ideas can be maintained, and animals can be endowed with the ability to perceive. In order to do this one should refer to Berkeley's psychological explanation of perceiving.

The analysis of sense perception process carried out in An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision describes the shaping of the ideas of distance, greatness, and position of objects by the reference to the data of the senses of sight and touch. Visible extension is different from tangible and both senses must be correlated to form the idea of “objective” extension of objects. Speaking more generally: ideas of sight “suggest” ideas of touch (or, generally speaking, ideas caused by the awareness of our bodies) and within the process of “suggesting” the idea of objective extension can be formed in our imagination. The process of associating the ideas of both senses being habitual and unconscious needs a philosophical investigation pointing at the roles senses and imagination play in it (Berkeley, 1948 (b): 193). In an analogous manner sounds (e.g. words) can be associated with objects they signify. In both cases ideas of senses and ideas of imagination are combined which should be understood as a counterpart of two first stages of the process of perceiving specified by R. Descartes: a reaction to a sense stimulus and a mental representation of an object or of a state of things. G. Berkeley attributes this ability to brutes similarly to R. Descartes. A specifically human disposition is reflection (an awareness of one's own mental states and the ability to distinguish them from an immediate sense experience) and volitional activity thanks to which one's imagined and desired state of things can be an aim of one's deeds and allow human beings to desire immortality which goes beyond any imagination.

But the conception of animal perception can be reconciled with immaterialism and the view that all the souls we know are human. It is not a coincidence that G. Berkeley uses another term and speaks of animal “nature”, not of animal “soul” (Berkeley, 1955: 216). While considering animal behaviour the rationality can be attributed to brutes only by analogy with human beings. All the experience informing us of the animal behaviour or of their brain activity belongs to natural sciences and can be reduced to various ideas and their correspondence. Similarly, pain or pleasure can also be attributed to brutes but the ability of creating reflective, conscious preposition “I am suffering” cannot. Similarly, volitional activity is restricted only to spirits. Only finite human souls and the infinite spirit, God, can be really and efficiently active. Animal instinct can be understood as a purely natural phenomenon: we can speak of animal activity only in a vulgar sense as when we say of stone “hitting” the ground. For G. Berkeley the notion of spirit or soul has a religious meaning and spirituality is reserved only to the unique relation between God and man.

Discussion

According to the interpretation presented here, there is no necessity to presuppose that G. Berkeley endows brutes with souls in his early works, the Principles and in the Three Dialogues; also, the fact that the brutes do perceive is not tantamount with breaking with the immaterialist thesis and its distinction between active spiritual substances and passive ideas. On the psychological plane (referring to ideas and heir relations) Berkeley's stance is similar to that of R. Descartes. His metaphysical principles, however, restrict the activity to spirits (human and divine). By distinguishing the real (i.e. metaphysical) and apparent (i.e. physical) causality G. Berkeley claims that the real cause of the instinctive behaviour of brutes is the Author of Nature even if in common sense of language one can speak of animals as agents. Though animals can perceive and experience pleasure and pain, which leads them to behave according to the needs of the self-preservation instinct, they are not real agents as they are not endowed with souls - even if from the human perspective the behaviour seems rational.

Conclusions

This, however, leads to several consequences. The first of them concerns human subjectivity. The thesis that only spirits are substances does not mean that the attributes such as understanding and will can be ascribed to it. Such a substance deprived of its attributes would be meaningless. In its principal meaning, the spiritual substance is nothing but the will, as can be read in the Philosophical Commentaries 828: “substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble that may be made on the word it), to act, cause, will, operate” (Berkeley, 1948 (a): 99; Daniel, 2018: 99). Substance is understood as activity and creativity, and in his understanding of the term G. Berkeley differs from R. Descartes who uses the categories of substance and attributes. Astonishing as it might seem, brutes can be but at the same time they are not substances for G. Berkeley.

Secondly, the convergence of Descartes' and Berkeley's positions regarding the description of the multi-stage character of perception suggest a strong affinity of both conceptions. Though G. Berkeley opposed the Cartesian explanation of the process of perceiving extension the fundamental reason for his criticism was the geometrical, i.e. technical and derivative, character of the explanation provided by R. Descartes together with some difficulties in explaining particular phenomena. G. Berkeley supplemented it with a psychological analysis of the mental process, primary in relation to the geometrical one. Thus the relation between both thinkers does not boil down to a simple acceptance-refusal opposition; rather, it should be examined separately in particular fields of philosophical discourse: the metaphysical, the physical, and the psychological one.

The last observation leads to the third ascertainment: as Bertil Belfrage once observed (Belfrage, 2006: 202 ff), within the framework of Berkeley's philosophy the particular fields of discourse are relatively independent and can be treated separately. The explanation of phenomena as subjected to the laws of nature can be conceived without making references to metaphysical presuppositions. This feature of Berkeley's thought seems to have its source in the influence of Newton. As it is well known, G. Berkeley followed the general principles of Newtonian physics with its separation from metaphysical claims; the evidence of the fact can be found in his correspondence with Samuel Johnson where he finds the new physics “not in the least inconsistent with the principles he lays down” (Berkeley, 1949 (c): 279). Thus, the analysis of animal perception, though compatible with Berkeleyan metaphysics does not require the reference to it.

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8. Berkeley G. "Philosophical Correspondence between Berkeley and Samuel Johnson 1729-30" in: the Works. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949 (c). Vol. 2. P. 265-294.

9. Berkeley G. "Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous" in: the Works. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949 (b). Vol. 2. P. 147-263.

10. Daniel S. Substance and Person. Ruch Filozoficzny LXXIV. 2018. No. 4. P. 7-20.

11. Descartes R. Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies / transl. by J. Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 120 p.

12. Descartes R. A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences / transl. by Ian Maclean. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 84 p.

13. Descartes R. Namiзtnosci duszy / transl. by L. Chmaj. Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986. 219 p.

14. Descartes R. Cztowiek. Opis ciata ludzkiego / transl. by A. Bednarczyk. Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989. 203 p.

15. Drozdowicz Z. Kartezjanski racjonalizm. Zrozumiec Kartezjusza. Poznan: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora, 2014. 154 p.

16. Gaukroger S. "The Resources of a Mechanistic Physiology and the Problem of Goal-Directed Process", in: Descartes' Natural Philosophy / ed. by S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster, J. Sutton. London ; New York: Routledge, 2000. P. 383-400.

17. Hight M. "Berkeley on the Difference between Brutes and Men" in: Berkeley's Lasting legacy - 300 Years Later / ed. by T. Airaksinen, B. Belfrage. Newcatle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011. P. 207-222.

18. Morris K. "Bкte-machines" in: Descartes' Natural Philosophy. London ; New York: Routledge, 2000. P. 401-419.

19. Rossi P. Filozofowie i maszyny / transl. A. Kreisberg. Warszawa: PWN, 1978. 231 p.

20. Spink J. S. Libertynizm francuski od Gassendiego do Voltaire'a / przet. A. Neuman. Warszawa: Ksi^zka i Wiedza, 1974. 434 p.

21. Szatek P. K. Istnienie i umyst. Studium podstaw Filozofii George'a Berkeleya. Krakow: Universitas, 2016. 309 p.

References

1. Anstey, P. (2011). John Locke and Natural Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

2. Bednarczyk, A. (l989). "Wstзp" to: Renй Descartes. Cztowiek. Opis ciata ludzkiego. Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

3. Belfrage, B. (2006). "The Scientific Background of George Berkeley's Idealism" in: Eriugena, Berkeley, and the Idealist Tradition. S. Gersh, & D. Moran (Ed). Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

4. Berkeley, G. (1949(a). "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge" in: the Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. (Vols. 2). A.A. Luce, & T.E. Jessop (Ed.). London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

5. Berkeley, G. (1948(b). "An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision" in: the Works. (Vols. 1). London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

6. Berkeley, G. (1955). "Happiness" in: the Works. (Vols. 7). London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

7. Berkeley, G. (1948(a). "Philosophical Commentaries" in: the Works. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

8. Berkeley, G. (1949(c). "Philosophical Correspondence between Berkeley and Samuel Johnson 1729-30" in: the Works. (Vols. 2). London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

9. Berkeley, G. (1949(b). "Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous" in: the Works. (Vols. 2). London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

10. Daniel, S. (2018). Substance and Person. Ruch Filozoficzny LXXIV, 4, 7-20.

11. Descartes, R. (1996). Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies. J. Cottingham (Trans). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

12. Descartes, R. (2006). A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences. Ian Maclean (Trans). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

13. Descartes, R. (1986). Namiзtnosci duszy. L. Chmaj (Trans). Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

14. Descartes, R. (1989). Cztowiek. Opis ciata ludzkiego. A. Bednarczyk (Trans). Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

15. Drozdowicz, Z. (2014). Kartezjanski racjonalizm. Zrozumiec Kartezjusza. Poznan: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora.

16. Gaukroger, S. (2000). "The Resources of a Mechanistic Physiology and the Problem of Goal-Directed Process", in: Descartes' Natural Philosophy. S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster, & J. Sutton (Ed.). London; New York: Routledge.

17. Hight, M. (2011). "Berkeley on the Difference between Brutes and Men" in: Berkeley's Lasting legacy - 300 Years Later. T. Airaksinen, & B. Belfrage (Ed.). Newcatle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

18. Morris, K. (2000). "Bкte-machines" in: Descartes' Natural Philosophy. London; New York: Routledge.

19. Rossi, P. (1978). Filozofowie i maszyny. A. Kreisberg (Trans). Warszawa: PwN.

20. Spink, J.S. (1974). Libertynizm francuski od Gassendiego do Voltaire'a. A. Neuman (Ed.). Warszawa: Ksi^zka i Wiedza.

21. Szatek, P.K. (2016). Istnienie i umyst. Studium podstaw Filozofii George'a Berkeleya. Krakow: Universitas

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