The patterns of conceptual representation and the symbolic exchange: Marx’s construal of systemic effects in new contexts

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Volgograd State University

The patterns of conceptual representation and the symbolic exchange: Marx's construal of systemic effects in new contexts

Alexander I. Pigalev

Abstract

Key words: Karl Marx, systemic effect, transformed form, symbolic exchange, representation, abstraction.

СТРУКТУРЫ ПОНЯТИЙНОЙ РЕПРЕЗЕНТАЦИИ И СИМВОЛИЧЕСКИЙ ОБМЕН: НОВЫЕ КОНТЕКСТЫ ИСТОЛКОВАНИЯ МАРКСОМ СИСТЕМНЫХ ЭФФЕКТОВ

Александр Иванович Пигалев

Волгоградский государственный университет

Ключевые слова: Карл Маркс, системный эффект, превращенная форма, символический обмен, репрезентация, абстракция.

Introduction

Karl Marx did not develop the original idea of representation as an explicit and complete theory, but he introduced the elaborate design of the analysis of the so-called systemic effects, after all. The term “systemic effects” in this case implies a peculiar mode of action of a complex system that cannot be explained by referring to the theoretical model of the linear cause-effect relationships between the elements and should be interpreted exactly as the consequence of a certain degree of complexity. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that in complex systems the relationships between elements can form ramifications, loops, knots, traceries, entanglement, and, in addition, interlacing links between different levels, and all that imparts to the system properties which one should consider as emergent. Such structure enables the complex system to act not as an ill-formed arithmetic sum of elements, but as a whole, whereas within the system it gives rise to the processes and phenomena which cannot be created by deliberate intent of a man.

One should acknowledge, however, that the word combination “systemic effect” is the designation of the relevant phenomenon which Marx did not use, preferring to describe it, in this case as if incidentally, through rather uncertain term “transformed form” which in his works comes on only few pages, though [Marx 1981, passim] (especially pp. 139, 263, 380, 440). Marx himself seems to make little account of its specificity and definition, so that its meaning remained contextual and discernible mainly by intuition. Meanwhile, it is safe to say that the results of the detailed analysis of the concept of transformed form were for the first time shaped into an article for the philosophical encyclopedia by the Soviet philosopher Merab Mamardashvili that was published in 1970 (see the enlarged version of that article [Mamardashvili 2011]).

When the meaning of the term was made more or less explicit and definite, it became clear that it had many areas of contact at the same time with Marx's concepts of money, commodity fetishism, and ideology which are also based on the conjecture of systemic determination and systemic effects [Marx 1982, 163-177; Apter, Pietz 1996; Torrance 1995; Nelson 1999]. Indeed, the intimate essence of problem firstly fell into place when it turned out that peculiar effects of the transformed form occurred and could be immediately observed in a certain type of systems which in “Capital” was analyzed in connection with the consideration of commodity-money relations in political economy. In general, the main unthematized premise of Marx's concept of the system effects is tantamount to the tacit assumption that the system of economic exchange has a peculiar structure which should be without fail taken into account in the analysis.

As it turned out later, “economy” was indeed the widespread structural model of complex hierarchical system which generates entangled and nonlinear links between its elements and is notable for the ability to trigger the synchronized operation of many groups of elements and various levels as well. As a result, the cause-effect relationships in the system in question would be not only non-linear, but also retroactive. Just entanglement and nonlinearity enable the appearance of the variety of systemic actions, i.e., the simultaneous resultant triggering of elements and levels of the system in various combinations including also the phenomena of feedback, that can be called the systemic effects. In the issue, exactly the heuristics of Marx's stance became essential, albeit, perhaps, not constitutive, for the consideration of the forms of abstractive thinking, the formation of concepts as conceptual representations, and the representational models both in general and in respect to some problems of the philosophy of science [Wartofsky 1979; Damerow 1996].

Contextualizing representation

On the genesis of abstractions as conceptual representations

The preliminary plan of the investigations on the basis of Marx's approach was outlined in 1931 by Soviet philosopher and sociologist Boris Hessen who endeavored to consider the social roots of Isaac Newton's mechanics in the light of Marxist historiography of scientific cognition including the problem of concept formation. Hessen's approach required not only the conceptualization of science in social and historical context, but also taking into account the system of social production and the interpretation of science as a kind of labor which could exist and thus had to be analyzed only in connection with that system [Hessen 2009]. Accordingly, it is safe to say that just Hessen was the first to make use of Marx's idea about the social and the historical determinacy of human activity and to apply it specifically to the analysis of scientific cognition.

In 1934 Franz Borkenau published the results of his pioneering Marxist consideration of the transition from the feudal to the bourgeois world picture [Borkenau 1971/1934] and that consideration appreciably extended the sphere of influence of Marxist methodology when applied just to the development of science. Note should be taken that Borkenau's investigation focused already not only on the general problems of social and historical context of science, but also on the analysis of dependence of the specific conceptual tools of scientific cognition on the system of social production. First of all, the abstract notions which should be considered to be the prerequisites for the emergence of the mechanistic concept of the world are meant. Such understanding in all probability points to the increased interest in the theoretical reconstruction of the origin of abstractive thinking as the token of new science and its mechanistic world picture as well (see on the mathematization and mechanization of the world picture [Dijksterhuis 1961; Funkenstein 1986; Crosby 2009]).

In 1946 Henryk Grossmann completed the manuscript of the book on Descartes and the mechanistic concept of the world including the problem of the universality of science [Grossmann 2009]. In his book Grossman in tune with Marxist approach continued with that type of the analysis of science that was initiated by Hessen, but the issue of the influence is disputable, though. The mechanism as the distinctive feature of the new world picture was considered by Grossmann to be responsible for the development of a new mathematics and creating favorable conditions for the historical evolution in the line of the increasing generality of the abstractive thinking.

That line of development culminated in the detailed and persuasive philosophical theory of the emergence and rise of abstractive thinking by Alfred Sohn-Rethel which relied on the analysis of the division of labor. The theory was conceived already in twenties of the last century, but for the first time it was published as a whole only in seventies [Sohn-Rethel 1978]. The starting point of Sohn-Rethel's historical and philosophical reconstruction of the genesis of abstract thinking is the analysis of the identification of nonidentical entities as the initial form of exchange. In effect, Sohn-Rethel was the first to reject general statements and to show in detail that the formation of abstract notions depends on the development of exchange. Moreover, he noticed attention to the fact that the consciousness was completely blind to the identification of nonidentical entities in exchange as the result of society's operation, that takes place just “behind the back” of every individual. It ultimately gives rise to the so-called “real abstraction” which does not reside in the human mind, being characterized precisely by the lack of awareness.

The nexus of that unconscious society manifests itself as something imposed on every individual, and the plausible, but, in effect, barely seeming independence of such unconscious social cohesion should be apprehended as a “second nature” [Sohn-Rethel 1978, 60-61]. In this connection Sohn-Rethel points out to the fact that the first philosophical concepts as abstractions that were introduced by classical Greek philosophy were not created deliberately and, so to speak, from scratch, i.e., by abstracting from the manifold of perception and elevating the resulted notion to the top level of generality. What is equally important, none of the first Greek philosophers tried to legitimate the concepts by presenting the way they were formed, for they were found by them already ready-made and needed only in slight modification [Sohn-Rethel 1978, 65-66].

Symbolic exchange, abstraction, and self-reference

The end result of the identification of nonidentical entities is the emergence of general equivalent which somehow organizes the aggregation of the exchangeable entities and turns it into the “centered” one. The general equivalent becomes the representation that indicates the totality of entities together with the machinery of identification of nonidentical entities behind. It is easy to see that the emergence of the general equivalent in the general case is analogous to the evolution of the form of value in Marx's “Capital”. That analogy was used fruitfully by Jean-Joseph Goux [Goux 1990].

According to Goux, the complication of the relations of exchange at all levels accomplishes only when the general equivalent emerges at every level. It occurs in exactly the same way as the circulation of various kind of money becomes arranged after the acceptance of gold in the capacity of just general equivalent that replaces all local equivalents and crowns the system of commodities. The identification of nonidentical entities is therefore the graded process, and every grade correlates with the level of development of general equivalent that was for the first time exemplified by Marx just in his analysis of the forms of value [Marx 1982, 138163]. Goux interprets the genesis of the money form of value as the accession to power of the representative and the institutionalization of its role [Goux 1990, 12].

The starting point of the identification of nonidentical entities is in tune with Marx the equating of one commodity to another, so that they are declared to be two different forms of the same value in spite of the nude fact that they are not equal to each other at all. In the process of equating one commodity is considered to be the equivalent and cannot express its value, whereas another commodity expresses its value in the body of another. This is the first, elementary, or accidental form of value which is characterized by the arbitrariness of the equivalent, because every commodity can be the equivalent and there are no privileged commodities. The following analysis is in line with Marx's consideration of the evolution of the form of value that develops from the first stage to the final, forth form that is called the money form which at the same time corresponds to the emergence of the general equivalent.

Thus, the evolution of the form of value, having passed through a series of metamorphoses, which are obviously the typical systemic effects, at the second stage of development gives birth to endless number of tantamount equivalents, so that the values reciprocally and unrestrictedly mirror one another (the second, total or extended form of value). Then emerges the unique general equivalent (the third, generalized form of value), and the development come to a close only when the money form as the ultimate metamorphose of value arises and the world of commodities becomes “centered” at length. It should be emphasized that the fourth form of value is characterized not only by the “centering” of the world of commodities, but also by the expelling of the general equivalent apart from the aggregation of other commodities. Its privileged position or, in effect, its transcendence is provided by it exclusion from the immanent world of tangible things through its fetishization or idealization, although a certain connection of the general equivalent with the system of exchange still remains.

Goux considers such evolution as sociohistorical structuring of the system of exchange which is expressed also in the logic of the symbolization process [Goux 1990, 24], and one can discover the homology of the structures at various levels of symbolic exchange (language, writing, law, etc.). Moreover, such approach to the symbolic exchange, taking into account the structural and historical metamorphoses of the modes of symbolization, enables us also to explain the evolution of the modes of representation at the level of thinking. The thinking, inevitably following at its level the unified logic of “centering”, eventually acquires a skill to form more and more abstract notions as the patterns of conceptual representation in both philosophy and science [Goux 1990, 88-111].

The homology of the levels of symbolic exchange enables us to expose its structure even if it is difficult of access, and the sought-for structure can be “read off” in outline directly from the structure of commodity and money exchange or, to be more precise, from the fabric of salient features that authenticate the degree of its complexity in the road to the general equivalent in the making. It might be supposed that the motion along such conceptual path somehow or other influenced on the making of the theoretical models of representation that benefit from the analysis of money and commodity-money exchange as the excellent indicator of hidden processes occurring in specific complex systems. However that may be, the parallelism between the modes of substitution at the levels of money and signs in view of the changes of the mode of representation that are produced by the “decentering” of the “centered” systems, is undoubtedly of great interest, because the destruction of the previous regime of signs maintained by the system takes place.

It is already a commonplace to argue that this destruction manifests itself in the decoupling of the signified and signifier that in certain contexts was described as the “death of God” or nihilism the origin of which should be examined elsewhere, though. Notwithstanding, one cannot but admit that the decoupling of the signified and signifier was scrutinized relative to the signified that eventually turned out to be absurd without the signifier. It is also true that the mode of existence of the signifier which has been let loose from the signified and thus has become autonomous and self-referential, but did not disappear in this capacity at all as one could have supposed, did not notice special attention for a long time, albeit such signified was certainly conceptualized as “simulacrum”, i.e., just self-referential sign. Meanwhile, the phenomenon of self-reference in the self-contained complex systems has a significant analogue at the level of money that brings to light its nature as a systemic effect.

At the level of money self-reference is marked by the emergence of imaginary paper money that has no link with the gold standard. Accordingly, it can signify only itself, and therefore generally paper money would be impossible without a kind of a promise as an attempt to find a point of reference at first in space (gold), but thereafter in time as the last resort. The promise, being the endeavor to abandon selfreference, requires establishing relationships of paper money that is not based on gold with some future states of itself. Thus, the monetization of time by means of futures and options occurs, so that money, failing to refer to another guarantee than the future, in a way goes bail to itself and creates itself out of the future [Rotman 1993, 9297]. In exactly the same way the very spirit of the traditional epistemological models and the patterns of conceptual representation have undergone the radical change [Rotman 1993, 97107; Derrida 1997]. Moreover, the very paradigm of representationalism in the philosophy of modernity has been subjected to severe criticism as the underlying condition of the conviction in the existence of some extremely accurate privileged representations which one ought to consider as the foundation of knowledge [Rorty 1980].

Concluding remarks

Marx's is not only the founder of the elaborated theory of value in economics that is based on the efficient construal of systemic effects. He made also the substantial contribution to the analysis of the concept of representation in general and devised the methods which are suitable for the scrutiny of systemic effects in knowing as contrasted to the name concept of representation. In addition, Marx argued that the representation of every kind and particularly the patterns of conceptual representation in the field of human cognitive practice, being, in effect, a variety of mediation, should be treated likewise the science as a whole, i.e., as historical and thus changeable. One of the first things Marxism did for the formation of genetic epistemology was the specific contextual construal of the concept of representation that enabled to understand cognition and science as social and historical kinds of human activity.

Regardless of the fact that Marx never showed keen interest in the concept of representation as a special epistemological problem, he not only paved the way for the inquiry of mediation in complex systems with nonlinear links between elements, but also proved the value of his approach by way of convincing example of the analysis of economic exchange. It seems withal that the interest for the retracing and analysis of the correlation between exchange and the forms of thinking does not go off the boil even when it is provoked not only by Marxist construal of that connection (see, e.g., the works that are based on different methodological principles [Muller 1981; Hadden 1994; Kaye 2004; Seaford 2004]).

The phenomenon of simulacrum as the unforeseen product of symbolic exchange makes every representation relative and blurs the discrepancy between truth and delusion, so that the truth can be deliberately created without hindrance, and thereby no conceptual representation can claim to objectivity. This is the serious threat to science that seems to be impossible without the conceptual representation claiming to truth. In this connection the best way to render homage to Marx in his bicentenary jubilee is to remind that in spite of different assessments of his philosophical legacy his basic ideas still curiously remain the issue even outside the limits of their initially stipulated applicability.

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