Theological and Epistemological Principles of Ancient Natural Science

Í.Ï. Êîïöåâà, Ê.Â. Ðåçíèêîâà

Ñèáèðñêèé ôåäåðàëüíûé óíèâåðñèòåò Ðîññèéñêàÿ Ôåäåðàöèÿ, Êðàñíîÿðñê

Àííîòàöèÿ.  ñòàòüå ðàññìàòðèâàåòñÿ ïðîáëåìà ìåòîäîëîãèè àíòè÷íîãî åñòåñòâîçíàíèÿ íà ìàòåðèàëå àíàëèçà ôðàãìåíòà 29cd «Òèìåÿ» Ïëàòîíà, Êîììåíòàðèåâ ê äàííîìó ôðàãìåíòó, êîòîðûå áûëè íàïèñàíû Ïðîêëîì Äèàäîõîì. Îñîáîå âíèìàíèå óäåëÿåòñÿ ïîíèìàíèþ íàóêè â ôèëîñîôèè Ïëàòîíà êàê «ïðàâäîïîäîáíîãî ìèôà», «âåðîÿòíîñòíîãî çíàíèÿ», º³êîòà p'á0ov.  ñâÿçè ñ ýòèì ðàññìàòðèâàåòñÿ ïîíÿòèå «á³òþ³à», «äèàíîéòè÷åñêèå äîáðîäåòåëè» â «Íèêîìàõîâîé ýòèêå» Àðèñòîòåëÿ è Êîììåíòàðèè Àêâèíàòà ê ôðàãìåíòàì «Íèêîìàõîâîé ýòèêè», ãäå ãîâîðèòñÿ î äèàíîéòè÷åñêèõ äîáðîäåòåëÿõ. Òðóäû âåëèêîãî àíòè÷íîãî âðà÷à Êëàâäèÿ Ãàëåíà îïðåäåëÿþòñÿ êàê óíèâåðñàëüíûé ýòàëîí íàó÷íîãî ïîçíàíèÿ. Áîëåå ïîäðîáíî àíàëèçèðóåòñÿ âòîðàÿ ãëàâà òðàêòàòà Ãàëåíà «Ïåð³ òþv ²ëëîêðàòîó^ êà¿ ÏXàòþvo^ 5îóöàòþ^, ðàññìàòðèâàþòñÿ îñíîâíûå ýëåìåíòû íàó÷íîãî ìåòîäà Ãàëåíà. platon aristotle galen timaeus

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: Ïëàòîí, Àðèñòîòåëü, Àêâèíàò, Ïðîêë Äèàäîõ, Êëàâäèé Ãàëåí, «Òèìåé», «Ãîñóäàðñòâî», «Íèêîìàõîâà ýòèêà», àíòè÷íîå åñòåñòâîçíàíèå, íàó÷íûé ìåòîä Ãàëåíà, êîììåíòàðèè ê «Òèìåþ», «Îá ó÷åíèÿõ Ãèïïîêðàòà è Ïëàòîíà».

Theological and gnoseological origin of ancient natural science

The development of ancient natural science is closely connected with the development of ancient philosophy, with the study of the possibilities of human cognition, with the search for tools for a correct, accurate understanding of the Cosmos and Nature. Ancient Greece is considered the ancestor of modern natural science. This succession is probably rooted in certain cultural and religious customs of ancient Greeks, which distinguished them from neighbouring nations. For instance, the religious thinking of ancient Greeks includes an understanding (along with the concepts of gods, demons, heroes, a variety of animated elements and other religious objects) that there is a universal law, which even gods are subject to. Moreover, these are the gods who establish this universal law for people and monitor how they obey it. Most often it is obviously a moral law. In poem “Works and Days” Hesiod writes: “You kings! Guard against these things and make straight your words, you devourers of gifts! And put crooked dikai out of your mind completely”¹.

¹ ^ 5s is nap0svo; sail Afcq, Aid; SKysyama,

Ku5p^ t' ai5ovn ts 0s©v, oi "Olupnov s%ouaiv. êa^ p' otcot' av tv; piv planTfl aKoli©; ovoTaZ©v, afraKa nap Ail naTpl Ka0sZopsvn Kpovtovi 260ynpusT' av0p©n©v aSiKov voov, o^p' anoTafl 5^po; aTaa0aIia; paaiIs©v, oi luypa vosuvrs; allfl napKMv©ai 5tea; aKoli©; svsnovTs;.

TauTa ^ulaaaopsvoi, paai!^;, l0uvsTs |5tea;

Swpo^ayoi, aKoIis©v 5s 5iks©v sni nay^u Ia0sa0s.

265oi y' afrT© KaKa Tsn%si avpp all© KaKa tso%©v,

^ 5s KaK^ poul^ t© pou^snaavTi KaKarn. navTa i5©v Aid; o90aIpd; Kal navTa vo^aa; êa^ vu Ta5', ai k' s0sl^a', SniSspKSTai, ofr5s s I^0si, oinv 5^ Kal xpv5s 5fcnv noli; svrd; sspYsi.

Then there is the virgin Dike, born of Zeus.

She has great esteem and aidos among the gods who abide in Olympus.

Whenever someone does her harm, using crooked words, right away she takes her place at the side of Zeus son of Kronos,

[260] and she proclaims the noos of men that is without dike,

with the result that the people have to pay retribution

for the deeds of recklessness committed by their kings. These

kings, having baneful thoughts in their noos,

pronounce dikai in a crooked way, making them veer and go astray.

Hesiod cites the universal law of dike - truth. This law is recognized by Zeus and the other gods. All men follow the universal law. This is not the law of violence, but the law of Truth. An ancient Greek poet and lyricist Theognis of Megara appeals to Zeus himself and asks him why this universal law of Truth is not observed among the people that Zeus rules:

373 Dear Zeus! I marvel at Thee. Thou art lord of all, alone having honour and great power; well knowest Thou the heart and mind of every man alive; and Thy might,

O King, is above all things. How then is it, Son of Cronus, that Thy mind can bear to hold the wicked and the righteous in the same esteem, whether a man's mind be turned to temperateness, or, unrighteous works persuading, to wanton outrage?

<. .> he endureth much shame and yieldeth to Want who teacheth all evil, both lies and deceits and baleful contentions, even to him that will not and to whom no ill is fitting; for hard is the perplexity that cometh of herYou kings! Guard against these things and make straight your words,

you devourers of gifts! And put crooked dikai out of your mind completely.

[265] The man who plans misfortune for another man is plan-ning misfortune for himself.

A bad plan is the worst plan for the one who planned it.

The Eye of Zeus sees all and takes note of all in his noos.

If he so wishes, he will watch over the present situation. It does not escape his notice

what kind of dike this present dike is that the polis holds within itself.

(Hesiod, “Works and Days” 2019) 373 Zsu ^Is, 0aupaZ© as- an Yap navrsaaiv avaaasi;

Tip^v anTd; s%©v Kal psYa^nv 5nvapiv

375 av0p©n©v 5' so oia0a voov Kal 0updv sKaaTou-

adv 5s KpaTo; navT©v sa0' bnaTov, paailsu.

n©; 5^ asu, Kpov^5n, Tolpai voo; av5pa; aliTpon;

sv Taoxfi po^pfl tov ts 5teaiov s%siv,

^v t' snl aw^poaovpv Tps^0fl voo; ^v ts npd; bppiv 380 av0p©n©v a5teoia' spYpaai nsi0opsv©v; ofr5s Ti KsKpipsvov npd; 5a^pov6; saTi ppoToiaiv, ofr5' o5dv ^vriv' i©v a0avaToiaiv a5oi.(Theognis of Megara)

The desire to know the exact organization of the Cosmos with the aim to understand the universal law governing this Cosmos and human fates creates a need for cognition. This religious and moral need gives birth to philosophy and natural science. Ancient natural science cannot be considered separately from mysterial practices and/or philosophy. Natural science can be seen as an intellectual practice and as a craft, as the activity of people who direct the process of the world cognition based on the inner structure of the world itself. It is hardly possible to grasp a specific method of the scientists of the ancient world without taking into account integrity, logical reasoning and consistency of the ancient world understanding.

The origins of natural sciences in the ancient world lie in the mysterial religion. The ultimate goal of cognition is the achievement of immortality, the transformation of a mortal man into an immortal deity. The goal for both natural science and religion is the same, i.e. Qemaig. There are different ways to succeed in that:

5 I've broken free from an ill-fated, painful circle,

Like a quick-legged runner, I've reached the longed-for crown.

6 I plunged into the bosom of the Lady, of the Underground Queen.

“Blessed and happy, you will be God instead of a mortal!

(Orphic tablet)

The striving to transform a mortal man into an immortal deity and the search for effective ways to bring a man to Qemaig beget the whole Hellenic system of cognition, including religious-mystical, philosophical and natural-scientific types of learning. The distinctive features of the natural-scientific cognition of Antiquity are these:

1) rationalism, the study of human abilities in their effort to understand the true structure of the Cosmos;

2) desire to single the signs of the Sacred Unity within the sensual Cosmos, to confirm that even in the untrue and fragmented reality the theologian and philosopher is able to find an incremental way to the Unity;

3) making Good on the anthropological level of being, multiplying the benefits, exchange of good deeds by people, practical orientation of cognition.

Skepticism is evidently important for natural science, it is typical of ancient scientists and their works are steeped in it. Thus, the famous Treatise “nepi ieprjq vooou” (“On the Sacred Disease”) from Hippocratic Corpus begins with a very emotional assessment of those who do not distinguish between “sacred' and “charlatanism”: “With regard to the disease called sacred I may say it seems to me neither more divine, no more sacred than others, but rather it has the same nature of origin as other diseases. Its nature and cause are called by some a divine case because of their inexperience and wonder, because it is not at all similar to other diseases” nepi (.isv x^q iep^q vooaou Kaleo^ svnq oS's%er ouSsv xi ^oi SoKsei x©v aUov 0eioxspn eivai vooa©v ouSs iep©xspn, aHa ^uaiv ^sv eje ^v Kai xa loma vouo^axa, o0ev yivexai. Ouaiv Ss auxfl Kai npo^aaiv oi av0p©noi svo^iaav 0eiov xi np^Y^a eivai uno aneipinq Kai 0ao^aaioxnxoq, oxi ouSsv soi- Kev sxspflai vouaoiaiv Kai Kaxa ^sv x^v anopinv auxoiai xou ^ Yiv©aKeiv xo 0eiov auxfl Siaa©Zetai, Kaxa Ss x^v eunopinv xou xponou x^q i^aioq © iovxai, arcoMuxai, oxi Ka0ap^oiai xe i©vxai Kai snaoiSflaiv (Hippocrates, 1936). Although Galen believed that this work belongs not to Hippocrates himself, but any of his followers, nevertheless he highly valued this text (Hippocrates, 1936: 494).

Theology, philosophy and practical utility were the ancestors of ancient natural science. Theology sets goals for natural science, it gives meaning to its intellectual and other practices, philosophy implies methodological support, and practical activity allows natural science to reproduce the good at the anthropological level of existence. There is a firm belief that the origin of natural science is in magic. A detailed study on this issue was made by G.E.R. Lloyd (1979). Natural science emerges as a kind of magic with the perfected method of obtaining knowledge and with the result that can be reproduced many times (ideally, ad infinitum) in similar starting conditions. This initial connection of theology, philosophy and natural science was destroyed in the New Age science, when metaphysical questions were not regarded within scientific experiments and judgments. However, this does not mean that this connection has disappeared. Even today no one questions paradigmality of scientific knowledge.

In the Foreword to the work “Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science” Alexei Fyodorovich Losev writes about the commensuration of ancient science and modern science:

“Has science ever experienced such an acute crisis and change of physical worldview, as the one we observe now? And has there ever been a debate in science about such fundamental concepts? It is no wonder that many of the physical theories of antiquity emerge, but only in the shell of precise knowledge” (Losev, 1993: 63).

He also points out that ancient science is to be deduced of mystical mythology. By defining Greek philosophy as a logical construction of myth (Losev, 1993: 76), A.F. Losev also introduces the ancient science into this logical construction, into the dialectics of myth. The origin of the conceptual construction of the myth is “Infinity”, 'Iepo^ Xoyo^, “Sacred Word”. A.F. Losev gives the shortest formula for dialectics (both ancient and modern): “The dialectical method consists in consistently distinguishing `one' and `another', `definite' and `infinite” (Losev, 1993: 104). This restriction is implemented through a number, dpi0p,6^.

A.F. Losev states that ancient science is the dialectics of Cosmos, which has 4 origins, 4 sources: 1) “Ether”, Monada, Nus; 2) Dyad, primordial matter, apeyron and matter together; 3) Time, Xpovo^, Soul (according to Plotinus); 4) Inevincibility (ASpaoieia), Necessity (AvyKn), Revenge (Aten), World Law (No^o^) (Losev, 1993: 77-79). Thus, it is possible to evince the wholeness of the ancient knowledge and to understand the ancient natural science as a necessary constituent of the eternal mystery, the dialectics of the limit and the limitless (infinite) which unfolds in the Cosmos itself and in the man who comprehends Cosmos's eidos and merges with it.

Theory and practice were merged in ancient natural science, which is clearly seen in the example of medicine. For the first time the high status of a doctor was described by Homer in “Iliad”:

“A wise physician skill'd our wounds to heal, Is more than armies to the public weal” inxpoq yap dv^p noXXov dvia^ioq aUov ouq t' SKia^veiv snl t' ^nia ^ap^aKa naaaeiv. (Iliad, 11, 514-515).

It is a different matter that Plato esteemed the development of courts and hospitals not an exuberance, but rather a decline of the state, as this development shows that neither soul nor body of the state citizens are healthy thanks to proper education and upbringing; that citizens need external coercion and treatment.

“It is not the body that is treated by the body, otherwise it would be impossible that doctors themselves could have a bad bodily condition, no, the body is treated by the soul, but it cannot be treated well in such a way. If the doctor's soul is bad or has become such” (Plato, State, 408e).

Cicero, who believed that he should become a Roman Plato, used the image of a doctor along with the image of a helmsman three times in his dialogue “De re publica” (“On the State”); it was done in order to show the meaning of the ruler (Emperor) in the State. For instance, one of the participants in the dialogue, Scipio, while arguing that the state should be ruled by the few best people, tells his interlocutor:

“Just as a fair voyage is the intention of the helmsman, the ship is to be entrusted to one helmsman, health of the sick is to be entrusted to one physician (if they both are masters in what they do), it is more rightful than to entrust these things to many” (Cicero, 1994: 77).

Comparison with the helmsman and the physician is repeated by St. John Chrysostom, though it is not the governor he compares with the helmsman and the physician, but the God:

“Those travelling by the ship do not give stern orders to the helmsman how to hold the helm in a known way and to direct the ship, but, sitting on the deck, they trust his mastery not only when the sea is calm and the ship sails safely, but also when there is a threatening situation; but only in God alone, who cares for us, they are not eager to trust; they can be likened to a sick man, who asks a doctor to give him /her not what stops the disease, but what nourishes the matter which is the mother of the disease” (Chrysostom, 12, 576 (The Word of Diseases and Doctors)).

Either St. John Chrysostom knew Cicero's works well, or the comparison with the doctor and the helmsman may have spread everywhere and was at the time understood by every reader. Therefore, in different epochs this comparison was used either for describing the Emperor (Cicero), or God (St. John Chrysostom), signalling the transformation of the Roman state in the Christian one.

Medical research is a kind of the core of ancient natural science. It brings together the natural, human and divine, here the courageous spirit can find its room in a healthy body:

“.. .your prayer must be that you may have a sound mind in a sound body.

Pray for a bold spirit, free from all dread of death;

that reckons the closing scene of life among Nature's

kindly boons; that can endure labor, whatever it be.” Orandum (e)st ut sft mens san(a) in corpore sano. Fortem posc(e) animum, mortis terrore carentem, Qui spatium vit(ae) extrem(um) inter munera ponat Naturae, qui ferre queat quos cumque labores (Juvenal, 2010: 356-359).

Hippocrates believed that medicine had already evolved both in terms of method and content. Having its own methods and content, it provided room for further improvement.

“From olden times medicine has had every means available, it has found both the origin and the method, thanks to which in this long period of time, much wonderful has been discovered and the rest will be found, if someone, being thoroughly prepared and knowing the already found, will strive for the research based on the knowledge got” (Hippocrates, 1936, 147, “On Ancient Medicine”).

There are all the major characteristics of science: method, specific content, openness to further development. Is it good or bad for medicine to be treated as a science? After all, the same Hippocrates calls it art and says that it has its own artists.

The most important question remains unclear, what was the status of natural sciences in Antiquity? The status of science was to be perceived as “a plausible myth” and “nothing more”. Hence the dialogue “Timaeus” outlines the result of application of human cognitive abilities and the sum of knowledge received with their help, i.e. elKoxa pn0ov, a plausible myth (a fairy tale, a fable). Is it possible to surmise that during more than a thousand years of history of Ancient Greece, Hellenism, Ancient Rome, Late Antiquity, the status of natural science remained unchanged? The time may not have come to answer the second question yet, nevertheless, the first question is actively discussed in the academic environment.

Suffice it to say that P.P. Gaidenko believes that Plato's reasoning about the “plausible myth” in the dialogue “Timaeus” is a reasoning about natural science, about physics, which cannot claim to be called science to the full extent (Gaidenko). The word “plausibility” is frequent in this dialogue when the astronomer and mathematician Timaeus narrates a story of the Universe from the idea of demiurge and its incarnation in a living being of the Universe to the appearance of people in the Universe. The direct modelling of the Universe in the dialogue “Timaeus” is preceded by the insistent reminder that this modelling is nothing more than elKoxa pn0ov - a probable, believable story:

“On the contrary, we should rejoice if our reasoning turns out to be no less plausible than any other, and at the same time remember that both I, the reasoner, and you, my judges, are only people, and therefore in such circumstances we have to be content with a plausible myth, not demanding more” ^ Gau^dofl^ alV sav apa ^n^svoq ^xxov napsx©^s0a siKoxaq, ayanav %p^, jis^vn^svouq ©q o Isy©v sy© [29d] is oi Kpuai ^UGiv av0p©TCivnv s%o^sv, ©gxs nspi xoux©v xov siKoxa ^u0ov anoSsxo^svouq npsnsi xodxou ^n^sv sxi nspa Zn^siv..

The English translation (by R.D. Archer-Hind) for rendering the expression pn0ov pn0ov uses the term “likelihood”, i.e. probability, Thomas Taylor in his translation writes “probable narration”; the German translation (made by Franz Susemihl) contains the term “Wahrscheinlichkeit”, i.e. probability, likelihood, plausibility, in the translation by S. S. Averintsev we see “a probable myth” (Averintsev, S.S. Timaeus, 29d). Thus, Plato defines science as “probabilistic” knowledge, as “plausible story”, etKoxa pn0ov.

S.V. Mesiats first drew attention to the importance of this definition of science as “a plausible myth”, pn0ov pn0ov, in her article “Modern Science and Plato's Myth”. She asserts that Plato “has guessed all the main features of New European science” (Mesiats, 2007). It is possible that M. Heidegger also thought about science in ancient understanding as an imperfect form of knowledge; he called philosophy after Plato a mistake, which, however, could not have been avoided and which had led European nations to the technical dimension of being” (Heidegger, 1993).

It is known that the dialogue “Timaeus” has been abundantly commented by the Neo- platonians of Antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance, as well as by Arab thinkers. The contemporary of Heidegger, the great German physicist Werner Heisenberg, addressed the dialogue in his article “The Meaning of Beauty in Exact Sciences”. Heisenberg, as the creator of quantum mechanics, testifies that in the historical debate about the primary elements the winner is Plato with his mathematical ideal forms, and not Democritus, who understood the mainstay of the world as a substance (Heisenberg, 1987: 267-282). That being said Plato for modern science is not so much the author of a successful hypothesis about the primary elements, but the creator of scientific meta-theory, philosophy, where the place of scientific natural science is defined in a sufficiently accurate way.

To understand the essence of the theological and philosophical methodology of ancient natural science there shall be analysed the commentary of Proclus Dyadochus on a fragment of the dialogue “Timaeus 29cd”, where Plato depicts scientific knowledge as a “plausible myth”, probabilistic knowledge, elxoxa pn0ov.

Comments on the Dialogue “Timaeus” by Proclus Dyadochus, fragment 29cd. A plausible myth

A.F. Losev refers to Marinus's remark in Proclus's biography that Proclus was 27 years old when he wrote his commentary on Plato's Dialogue “Timaeus”, and that this was probably the first work by Proclus:

“13 By an intense and unresting labor by day and night, he succeeded in recording in writing, along with his own critical remarks, the doctrine which he heard discussed, and of which he finally made a synoptic outline, making such progress that at the age of twenty-eight years, he had composed many treatises, among others a Commentary on the Timaeus, written with utmost elegance and science. Through these prolonged and inspiring studies, to science he added virtue, increasing the moral beauty of his nature” (Marinus of Samaria, 1925).

But A.F. Losev, having indicated that Proclus's commentary contains references to almost all the ancient commentators of this dialogue, supposes that this comprehensive and thorough work, in terms of its coverage of commentators, was hardly written by Proclus in some definite period of his life: “Such a unique work in the history of philosophy, of course, cannot fit into any chronological framework” (Losev, 1988: 37).

Losev highlights that the Proclus's judgment that the dialogue “Timaeus” is a direct continuation of the dialogue “State”, and this is very important in the context of the study of platonism as a gnoseological basis of ancient natural science (Losev, 1988: 53).

The commentary by Proclus's Dyadochus on Plato's “Timaeus” was highly appreciated by Thomas Taylor, an outstanding British researcher and the first translator of Proclus's Dyadochus into English. In the preface to the publication of this commentary T. Taylor posits:

“Of that golden chain of philosophers, who, having themselves happily penetrated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato, Proclus is indisputably the largest and most refulgent link” (http://meuser.awardspace.com/Neo- Platonics/33700322-Proclus-Commentary- on-the-Timaeus-of-Plato-all-five-books. pdf).

Studies of Proclus Diadochus's comments on Plato's “Timaeus” were carried out by the following Western researchers: K.E.A. Schmidt (De Timaeo Platonis ex Procli commentariis restituendo. Stettin. By Gedruckt bie H.G. Offenbart, 1842. 45 p.), Giorgio De Santillana (The origins of scientific thought (from Anaximander to Proclus, 600 D.C. to 300 A.D.). New York. Published by New American Library of World Literature, 1961, 320 p.), Thomas Whittaker (The Neo Platonists a Study in the History of Hellenism. Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger Pub., 2005, 485 p.), Alain Lernould (Physique et theologie. Lecture du Timee de Platon par Proclus. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitairesdu Septentrion, c2001. 405 p.), John Phillips (John Phillips Order from Disoder. Proclus Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition. Series editors: Robert M. Berchman (Dowling College, Bard College), and John F. Finamore (University of Iowa), 280 p., Published July 20, 2007 by Brill Academic Publishers), Marije Martijn (Proclus on nature (philosophy of nature and its methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timae- us). Leiden; Boston: Brill, c2010. IX, 360 p.)

Fragments of the commentary have been translated into Russian by A.V Petrov (http:// centant.spbu.ru/plat/proklos/works/tim_1/000. htm) and in 2012 line by line “Commentary on “Timaeus” (translated from Greek) was published in Russian (Mesiats, 2012). However, the fragment 29cd which is interesting to us has not been published in Russian yet.

Proclus Dyadochus in his commentary on “Timeaeus”, 29d, gives a detailed interpretation of this important for understanding ancient natural science thesis of Plato about human science as a probabilistic knowledge, a plausible myth and nothing more. First and foremost, Proclus Dyadochus reveals the gnoseological obstacles associated with the materially incarnate Cosmos. The physical, material Cosmos has been fragmented into many things, the essence of which is just being formed and is not realised within this Cosmos in a holistic and indivisible way. Being an object of cognition, the material Cosmos is not in its true state, but rather in the state of alleged fragmentation, the dissociation of individual things:

“107A Timaeus reminds us in a twofold respect of the privation of stability and accuracy in physical discussions; first, from the essence of the things. For from immaterial natures becoming material, from impar- tibly partible, from separate natures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming individual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific and irreprehensible, which is adapted to immaterial and impartible forms” 107 A. Ai%o&sv o T^aioq to ^ apapoq ^nS' aKpipsq x©v nspi T^q ^oaswq Ioy©v ons^vnasv, sk ts x^q am;©v t©v npay^arav oomaq -and yap aul©v svula ysvo^sva Kai and dö£p^aò©v ^spiaTa Kai ano %©piaT©v sv aXXoTpiia s5pa Kai ano Ka0oIiK©v aTo^a Kai ^spiKa tov sniaxnvoviKov Kai avsIsyKTov ooK sniSsxsTai loyov, oq Toiq KaOoIoo Kai Toiq aoIoiq s^ap^oZsi Kai Toiq dö£p^aòolq siSsai (translated by T. Taylor).

The second gnoseological obstacle is related to the cognitive abilities of man, which consist of both sensual sensations and the mind reasoning. Inconsistency, the difference between the form of knowledge and the form of things is the second explanation for the lack of scientific knowledge, according to Proclus Dy- adochus:

“But in the second respect, from the imbecility of that by which physical objects are surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any thing concerning them, it is also requisite to embrace a knowledge coordinate to them” êà³ Åê õä; xffiv EnioKonougEvrav àáîòà^à³ó º³ yap Å5º³ ò³ yvffivai ïºð³ aijxffiv, Å5º³ xgv ouoxoixov àîõîö axpipatxiv yvffioiv(translated by T. Taylor).

Direct human knowledge is sensual knowledge, says Proclus Dyadochus: ahxn 5E aio&noi; (28).

Proclus Dyadochus provides rationale for that human nature alone cannot produce intelligent, pure, holistic knowledge that constitutes unity with things learned. Anthropological forms of knowledge are always distorted by the material substrate through which the cognitive process takes place. It is conceivable that in the material Cosmos there are divine levels of Being, where knowledge and object coincide, nonetheless it is not an anthropological space of Cosmos, but divine one:

“And if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived; but here dwelling in the last part of the universe, and being most remote from them, we employ sense in a gross and erroneous manner. For we are allotted the human nature. But the human nature brings with it a life which is material and darkened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge. The Gods, however, know that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote from generation, that B which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent, necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they intellectually perceive them after the abovementioned manner. For we must not fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known” att' Å꺿 gEv ovrai; ¿îþ; f|xxov av äïàõä&ä- ^v, Evxau&a (translated by T. Taylor).

Proclus Dyadochus brings to a logical conclusion his idea of the impossibility of cognition in anthropological status. He maintains that the very thirst for knowledge, the desire to know something is but testifying to the initial and inexpugnable inability of man to know the essence. In true quality, the cognizable and the cognizant are inseparable. Their separation is a distortion per se. In this separation, no cognition can be genuine. Even at the level of gods, cognition is not absolutely genuine, because every god has his own character, his own personality, which distorts the essence, as soon as this essence appears external to the cognizant:

“Hence, our discourses may be very properly said to resemble fables. For our language, which the word “mythos” a fable [used here by Plato] indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to pardon human nature”5' ev õô âîõàõô òîé (30) rxavxo^ êàõôêþðåòî¿ êà³ ïîððþõàõþ^ovtoi; Åêºï'îò ïà^Åþ; êà³ fgapxggEvra; õä à³î&ä õðþðº9à. êà³ fgºï; gEv îîõþ^ ô^îè» yap av&praravgv ÅÀö^º^ f 5å av&prarnvg ôéîö ñòuvºiGôEpºi xgv Evutov Z®gv xgv Eninpoo&oogEvgv îïî òîé oragaxo;, xgv gºpiGxgv,(5) xgv 5ºogEvr|v êà³ xffiv atoyrav yvécºþv. àéõî³ 5å oi Îºî³ êà³ õî yºvgx6v àóº^õþ; êa³ õî 5iaoxaxov à5³àîõàõþ; Åóóéêàî³ êà³ õî gºplñòò6v agºp^oxþ; êà³ õî Eyxpovov 5³àþòø; êa³ õî Ev5ºx6gºvov avayrato; àéõô yap õô voºïv navxa óº\™îïó (translated by T. Taylor).

What is particularly significant here is the “circular” form of commentary on 29d. Proclus Dyadochus, upholding the intermediate conclusion of his interpretation of “the divine Plato”, returns to Plato's characterization of scientific cognition as ^uOo^ ev5riKv0xai and lays down that this is a kind of human destiny, and it is necessary to forgive people for that we are able to create only more or less plausible myth, a fictitious story about the Cosmos and its things, as this is human nature.

Proclus believes that Plato's physics in the dialogue “Timaeus” is superior to Aristotle's. He sees Aristotle's physics as the work of a diligent student who copies the master's work and tries to surpass it:

“It also appears to me that the daemoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as possible the

à 5E óº-vvffiaiv, Åê xffiv agºpffiv ãà³ aitovtov (10) êà³ aut®v ºi5ffiv yºvvéaiv* þàõº êà³ voouaiv auxa xouxov x6v xponov. gr yap oin&ffigºv, oxi xai; xffiv yvwaxffiv ôèàºà^ ai óóéàºö %apaê^np^Zovòal, gg5' oxi õî gr apap6; îéê apap6; Eaxi napa &ºî¿;

¹⁰ þàõº º³êîõþ; êà³ gu&oi; Åî³êîõà; Åpoégºv toyov; nottg; yap õä; naxuxgxo; êà³ õä; atoy^a;, gv î öé9î^ £Óᣲêó0òà³, î fgExºpo; toyo; Eaxrv ava^ntgagEvo;, êà³ 5º¿ õä av$p®mvg ôèຳ àèóó^éàêº^

doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole

of his discussion concerning nature” (1, 2,

F 21-24) Äîêðà 5s öî³ êà¿ Sai^ovioq Apiaxoxs^n^ xnv xou n^axovoq 5¿5ààêàÌàó êàòà 5uva^iv Ñ,Ë^®°à^ oux® 5ia0swai xnv o,nv ïsp^ ôèàðþ^ npay^axsiav òà ^sv ãî¿ø navxwv x®v ôèàÁ³ auvsax®x®v ^5ov (translated by T. Taylor)

Naturally Proclus believed that Aristotle's physics is grandiose in its conception and execution, but the physics set forth by Plato in the dialogue “Timaeus” has no analogues even in Aristotle's creations (Helmig, Steel, 2012).

The nature science-specific cognition is accomplished by means of certain cognitive abilities, which were analyzed by Plato in the VI book of the dialogue “State” (509d-511e). Plato calls these cognitive abilities Siavoia, in English this term is translated as “thought”, in Russian as “reason” (“ras- sudok”) (A.N. Egunov), in German as “Verstandeserkenntnis”.

In the dialogue “State” Plato documents cognitive ability, which produces scientific knowledge. Traditionally, Siavoia has been considered a cognitive ability, which is realized through the use of mathematical tools. Plato places it on the second stage after “mind” (voo^). This cognitive ability indeed occupies an intermediate position between sensual cognition, where sensual images are created, and mental comprehension, where eidoses get to the mind. On the basis of sensual images, Siavoia does not descend to the lower things, but since it is “burthened” by the sensual images, Siavoia does not rise into the sphere of “pure”, devoid of images cognition. Aiavoia is knowledge based on the sensual image of a fathomable idea. This knowledge which feeds on impulses, assumptions, hypotheses and does not cross their borders, also does not sever itself from these impulses, etc., and from hypothetical sensual images of fathomable eido- ses. Plato notices that this is the knowledge of “geometricians” (State, 511d). The intellectually comprehensible knowledge is closest to the Infinity, it does not merge with it, but departs from it in order to formulate logical laws of dialectics and pure abstract concepts for the manifestation of the Infinity.

Thus, the gnoseological principles of the ancient natural science were postulated by Plato in his theological and philosophical physics, which he articulated in the dialogue “Timaeus” (it is not without reason that on the fresco “The School of Athens” Rafael painted Plato next to Aristotle, who is holding his book “Metaphysics”).

Ancient science is not only a way to document the regularities of the outer world, but also a guidelines of moral behaviour of people, an activity in which the unity of Knowledge and Good is manifested. That is why 5iavorn gets moral dimension in “Nicomachean Ethics” of Aristotle.

Aiavoia and “Nicomachean Ethics” by Aristotle

While 5iavoia in Plato's dialogue “State” means a certain (“average”) educational ability of a human being, in the “Nicomachean Ethics” by Aristotle it presents a generic concept for a certain category of virtues:

“Virtue is divided according to this difference, for we call some virtues intellectual, others moral. Wisdom, understanding and prudence are said to be intellectual virtues, while liberality and sobriety are called moral. When speaking of man's good morals we do not describe him as wise or intelligent but as mild-tempered or sober. We do praise a person for acquiring the habit of wisdom since praiseworthy habits are called vir- tues” Äþð³ôø³ 5s êà¿ ë apsxn mxa x^v 5¿àôîð^ xaux^v Isyo^sv yap àøñ^ xaq (5) ^sv 5làvonxlêaq xaq 5s ë0³êà^, aoô^àv ^sv êà¿ auvsaiv êà¿ ôðîóïà^ 5làvonxlêdq, S,su0spþxnxà 5s êà¿ a^poawnv ë0³êà^. Isyovxsqyapnsplxou ^0ouqouIsyo^svoxiòîôî^ ë ouvsxoqa,,' oxinpaoqË àþôðþó snmvou^sv 5sêà¿ xov àoô6vrnxax^vs^ivx®vs^s®v 5sxaqsnrnvsxaqapsxaq (10) Isyo^sv. (Nichomachean ethics, 1(À), XIII 1103a 5-10).

Dianoetic virtues are associated with purely human mental activity, with those processes where a person constructs his / her own judgment. Aristotle distinguishes between the mental activities in which 1) virtue can show by order, encouragement and/or punishment; 2) virtue can arise as a result of a person's own efforts and is therefore purposeful. Moral qualities of the second kind stem from cognitive ability - Stavota and are emanation of Stavota.

In his Commentaries on “Nicomachean Ethics”, Thomas Aquinas emphasises Aristotle's division of the soul into two parts: rational and irrational:

“243. Then [C], at “Virtue is divided,” he divides virtue according to this difference in the parts of the soul. He says that virtue is designated or divided according to the above-mentioned difference in the parts of the soul. Since human virtue perfects the work of man which is done according to reason, human virtue must consist in something reasonable. Since the reasonable is of two kinds, by nature and by participation, it follows that there are two kinds of human virtue. One of these is placed in what is rational by nature and is called intellectual.

The other is placed in what is rational by participation that is, in the appetitive part of the soul, and is called moral. Therefore, he says, we call some of the virtues intellectual and some moral. Wisdom, understanding and prudence are said to be intellectual virtues, while liberality and sobriety are called moral.

244. He proves this point from human praises. When we wish to praise someone for good morals, we do not describe him as wise and intelligent, but as sober and mild-tempered. We do not praise a man for good morals alone but also for the habit of wisdom. Praiseworthy habits are called virtues. Therefore, besides the moral virtues, there are also intellectual virtues like wisdom, understanding, and some others of this kind. Thus ends the first book. (243) Deinde cum dicit determinatur autem virtus etc., di- vidit virtutem secundum praedictam differentiam potentiarum^{animae. Et dicit quod virtus determinatur, idest dividitur, se-cundum praedictam differentiam partium animae. Cum enim virtus humana sit per quam bene perficitur opus hominis quod est secundum rationem, necesse est quod virtus humana sit in aliquo rationali; unde, cum rationale sit duplex, scilicet per es- sentiam et per participationem, consequens est quod sit duplex humana virtus. Quarum quaedam sit in eo quod est rationale per seipsum, quae vocatur intellectualis; quaedam vero est in} (Commentary on the “Nicomachean Ethics” by Thomas Aquinas, translated by C.I. Litzinger, O.P. Chicago, Henry Regn- ery Company, 1964, in 2 vols, Book 1, Lecture 20).

In fact, Thomas Aquinas simply translates Aristotle into Latin in this comment. But what Aquinas calls “two kinds of reasonable” is crucial here. These two kinds are revealed through analysis of the motives for action of this or that person. A person can act rationally (intellectually) and morally, but because of coercion or habit. And also a person can act rationally and morally in accordance with one's own judgment. We see that Aristotle himself also gives great prominence to this distinction.

In such a way Aristotle and Aquinas introduce into European moral philosophy the distinction between two motives for rational (intellectual) and moral behaviour. In the future, this distinction will be fully elaborated by Immanuel Kant in his theory of hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

The other problems studied by Aristotle and Aquinas are related to the emphasis on the unity of reasonable and moral action, which today sounds like a problem of the moral foundations of science and ontological foundations of truth.

Atavota is “the thinking part of the soul” and it is the only one that defines the “self” of a human being, says Aristotle. He makes this judgment with reference to who the actions of the “good” person are directed at. They are directed at these people themselves, deems Aristotle. Dianoetic qualities of a person make

eo quod est rationale per participationem, idest in appetitiva animae parte, et haec vocatur moralis. Et ideo dicit quod vir- tutum quasdam dicimus esse intellectuales, quasdam vero morales. Sapientia enim et intellectus et prudentia dicuntur esse intellectuales virtutes, sed liberalitas et sobrietas morales. (244) Et hoc probat per laudes humanas: quia cum volumus aliquem de moribus suis laudare, non dicimus quod sit sapiens et intelligens, sed quod sit sobrius et mitis. Nec solum laudamus aliquem de moribus, sed etiam laudamus aliquem propter habitum sapientiae. Habitus autem laudabiles dicuntur virtutes. Praeter ergo virtutes morales, sunt aliquae intellec- tuales, sicut sapientia et intellectus et aliquae huiusmodi. Et sic terminatur primus liber. Available at: http://dhspriory.org/ thomas/Ethics1.htm#20 them understand the need for good deeds, which they do for themselves:

“For he is consistent with himself, always desiring the same things with his whole soul; he wishes for himself both genuine and apparent goods, and produces them. Indeed it is the mark of a good man to take pains to achieve the good, and he does this for himself, i.e., for the sake of the intellectual part which seems to be a man's real self.

Likewise, he desires his own life and preservation and especially that of his thinking faculty. For existence is a good to a virtuous man and everyone wishes what is good for him. No one would choose to have everything which exists at the price of becoming someone else. (God even now possesses the good, but he always is what he is at any time.) And it seems that the thinking part of man is the man himself or at least the most important part”¹⁴ (Aristotle, Book 9,

IV (1166a, 15-19)).

In Aristotle's ethics, dianoetic cognitive abilities predetermine the reasonableness of moral choices, i.e. these very cognitive abilities that make moral behaviour possible as free and responsible in itself. It is worth mentioning that this fragment also reveals a similarity with the Kantian thesis that theoretical reason does not lead to truth (cognitive abilities do not reveal a thing-in-itself), but practical reason directed at itself is capable of acting according to a categorical imperative that turns moral judgment not to the outside but to the inside of a person. The Socratic principle of the unity of mind and morality, knowledge and good is unfolding in the integration of Plato's philosophy of cognition and Aristotle's ethics:

“1804. Next [1, c], at “For he is consistent,” he clarifies his principal proposition. First

¹⁴ oijtoi; yap ogoyvragovei eauxffi, Kai xffiv aijxffiv opeyexai Kaxa naoav xr|v yuxgv Kai poiifexai (15) Sr| eauxffi xaya0a Kai xa (paivogeva Kai npaxxei (xov yap aya0ox> xaya0ov Sianoveiv) Kai eauxov eveKa (xov yap Siavor|xiKox> xapiv, îïåðEKaoxoi; eivai SoKet) Kai Zgv Se poijfexai eauxov Kai oôZeo0al, Kai gafioxa

[c, i] he shows that the virtuous man himself suitably has what is proper to beneficence; second [c, ii], what is proper to goodwill, at “Likewise, he desires etc.”; third [c, iii], what is proper to concord, at “Such a man etc.” He says first that the virtuous man desires for himself both genuine and apparent goods, for these latter are identical with genuine goods for him; the reason is that he wishes the goods of virtue, the real good of man. Nor is this desire ineffective in him, but he produces these goods for himself because it is a mark of a good man to labor for the achievement of good.

1805. We said in the second book that virtue makes its possessor good and his work good (222, 307, 309) And the virtuous person wants this and acts for himself, i.e., for the sake of the intellectual element which is foremost in man. Indeed everything seems to be especially what is foremost in it. But the virtuous man strives always to do what is reasonable. It is evident then that he always wishes for himself the absolute good 1804. Deinde cum dicit: iste enim etc., manifestat princi-pale propositum. Et primo ostendit, quod virtuoso convenit respectu suiipsius id quod pertinet ad beneficientiam. Secundo id quod pertinet ad benevolentiam, ibi: et vivere autem vult etc.; tertio id quod pertinet ad concordiam, sed et convivere et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod virtuosus maxime vult sibiipsi bona et vera et apparentia. Eadem enim sunt apud ipsum vera et apparentia bona. Vult enim sibi bona virtutis, quae sunt vera hominis bona; nec huiusmodi voluntas in eo est vana, sed hui- usmodi bona etiam operatur ad seipsum, quia boni hominis est ut laboret ad perficiendum bonum.

1805. Dictum est enim in secundo, quod virtus facit habentem bonum, et opus eius etiam reddit bonum. Et hoc etiam vult et operatur gratia suiipsius, idest gratia intellectivae partis quae est principalis in homine. Unumquodque autem videtur id maxime esse, quod est principale in eo, virtuosus autem sem-per ad hoc tendit ut operetur id quod est conveniens rationi. Et sic patet, quod semper vult sibi bonum secundum seipsum. (Ibid. Book IX. Properties of friendship, Lecture 1. Proportionate Properties in Friendship).

In his Commentary on these fragments of the “Nicomachean Ethics” Aquinas uses Aristotle's reasoning to justify the “naturalness” of man's desire for absolute good. This is the naturalness of the mind, the intellectual aspect of our soul. Aquinas especially accentuates Aristotle's desire to remove the “burden” of virtue from a person. This is not a heavy cross, but personal self-determination, as dianoetic virtue is directed by the mind and it is directed to the mind back. A person who cultivates such a dianoetic virtue as rationality multiplies his/ her beneficence by becoming a rational, reasonable person who minimizes errors in one's own actions.

In this regard, there is an analogy with the current discussion about the status of the university. Certain participants in this discussion have daresaid that a medieval university as a monastery of intellectuals should be replaced by a profitable university-corporation. From the point of view of both Aristotle and Aquinas, the value in itself is the existence of people whose minds predetermine their moral choice in favour of virtue. When such people enter any community this community immanently changes and its overall moral status grows. If such consequences have no monetary equivalent, it does not mean that the university in its original “medieval” sense has no place in modern times.

Plato's thesis that scientific knowledge is an intermediate form of knowledge, “plausible myth”, “probabilistic knowledge”, siKoxa ^fiOov, which will (or will not) be transformed into higher forms in the future cognition by means of philosophy and theology, along with Aristotelian principle of transformation of rational knowledge into practical virtue were taken in by Claudius Galen, the greatest scientist of Antiquity and Middle Ages. Galen's widely known statement that a true doctor/physician is a philosopher without any doubt goes back to Plato, whom Galen revered as a prophet giving the seekers of the Truth all the necessary guidelines. That is why in the treatise “nepi xrov InnoKpaxoy^ Kai n^axrovo^ Soy^axrov” (“On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato”, “De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis”) Galen integrates Plato's theology and philosophy with Hippocratic medical science to prove his own position that mental activity is inherent not only in human, but also in animals, and that the physiology of the higher nervous activity of man is connected not with the heart, but with the brain. Galen's opponent was stoic Chrysip- pus of Soli, author of the treatise “About the Soul”, which is known only from Galen's quotation.

The Treatise “De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis” has not been adequatrly studied in both Russian and foreign science. K.J. Elliott refers in passing to the influence of Plato on Galen, saying that it was huge and requires a separate study. According to L. Edelstein, Plato and Hippocrates were like gods for Galen, who likewise worshipped Aristotle. L.T. Pearcy reckons that for Galen Hippocrates and Plato were the founders of real philosophical and medical knowledge. This is also theorized by

F. de Lasi, who doubted that Galen's thinking should be attributed exclusively to Platonism. W.D. Smith examines the influence of Hippocrates on Galen, too. IV. Prolygina only mentions this treatise, noting its more philosophical nature in comparison with other, more practical medical works of Galen. L.T. Pearcy, B.S. Eastwood, N. Arikha, TJ. Tracy, E.A. Puchkova,

G. C. McDonald. D.A. Balalykin, A.P. Shche- glov, N.P. Shock study to the very Treatise “nepi xrov InnoKpaxoy^ Kai n^axrovo^ Soy^axrov” and figure that Galen is the last element in one of the two main methodological and gnoseological lines of the development of ancient natural science: Plato - Hippocrates - Aristotle - Galen (the other line: Leucippus - Democritus - Epicurus - Asclepiades); they presume that the study of Galen in Russian academic environment is complicated by the small number of treatises of the Roman philosopher translated into Russian. In particular, they say that there are only translations of the work on the usefulness of the parts of the body.

Preliminary analysis of Galen's Treatise “nepi xrov InnoKpaxoy^ Kai n^axrovo^ Soy^axrov” has evinced that this is a brilliant example of ancient natural science knowledge, a universal standard of presentation of scientific ideas and their proofs. The greatest advantage of this treatise is the integration of philosophical methodology and empirical evidence, which Galen obtained with the help of his huge anatomic practice. Even main ideas of this treatise cannot be presented in this small article, so only Book 2 was chosen for the further analysis of Galen's scientific method.

Galen's “Ïåð³ òþó ²ÿÿîêðèòîó^ êೠϳàòþóî^ áîóöàòþó”, Book 2

In Book Two, Galen begins with the natural science method. He cites his treatise “On Evidence” and says that each statement must be based on reliable sources and strict method. Galen enters in polemics with Chrysippus, who, in order to “verify” that the human soul (i.e. mental activity) has the source in heart, resorts to “strange” arguments - quotes from poets, etymology of words, as well as the physical movements that accompany pronunciation of the words “I”, “ego”. According to Chrysippus, these movements of a mouth and jaws point downwards, to the chest, where the heart is. In spite of Galen's rejection of this method of proof, he avers that it is possible to refute Chrysippus himself with such reasoning. For example, when people want to express their consent, they nod their head. Why, Galen quirks, should one pay attention to the direction of that nod down and not up? And why should we pay heed to the movements that make up this nod and not to the fact that it is the head that moves, not another part of the body? So, by rebutting Chrissippus's arguments in their essence, Galen nevertheless tries to “speak the language of the interlocutor” and deflates it in the way that his opponent applies.