The prehistory of post-soviet philosophies

Stalin's chapter laid out the required structure for the teaching of historical and dialectical materialism and the writing of philosophy textbooks. Academic philosophical research was also required to orient to this text. Andrei Ogurcov has described the features of this orientation well:

The fetishization of the clash of cultures and ideological movements, among other factors, led to the assertion of the idea that the class struggle intensified during the construction of socialism and served the ideological justification for repression... the destruction of entire scientific schools and the murder of individual scholars. (Ogurcov 1989: 356)

Philosophy was specifically identified as a central field of struggle: here, the proletarian revolution was to cope with bourgeois ideologies by means of philosophical contemplation and practice. The official surface of Soviet philosophy was transformed into the “camp” of Marxists-Leninists-Stalinists who were obliged to contribute to the struggle for the emancipation of man, to reflect upon the class nature of philosophical teachings, and to participate in the global liberation of humanity from self-alienation.

Party control over philosophical thought, as well as over all the sciences, had been systematically reducing the space for unofficial levels of philosophy. It was during this period that works of non-Marxist and dissident Marxist philosophers were censored, moved to library shelves with highly restricted access, or destroyed (together with their authors). Non-Leninist foreign thought-which makes up the bulk of 20^th-century philosophy-was mainly out of reach for philosophers and the public. The repression of active philosophers empowered Stalinist philosophers (e.g., Mitin, Judin, Mikhail Kammari (1889 - 1965)) to lead the purges of their opponents. Thus, Kareev, Ivan Luppol (1896 - 1943), Semion Semkovskij (1883 - 1937), Sten, Spet, Pavel Florenskij (1882 - 1937), and hundreds of other philosophers were repressed, or killed, or died in prisons, or were deprived of work in philosophical institutions.

If the content and ideological control network of the official Soviet philosophy were created in 1936-39, the original philosophers and lasting institutes that worked within the established framework arrived after World War II, in the late 1940s to early 1950s. World War II, with its extermination of multiethnic populations and cultural rhizomes throughout Eastern Europe, the existential trauma of the survivors of two waves of total war, and the collective experience of participation and victory in the war, changed Soviet society ontologically. If communist rule prior to World War II was, at least partially, seen as the regime that took over because of the civil war, after 1945 it became a legitimate government that had saved the population from physical extermination by the Nazi Germans and their allies.

These experiences and this legitimacy propelled the Marxist impulse for the development of philosophical thought, not only on in officialdom, but also at other levels and centers around the Soviet republics (Dubrovskij 2022; Korsakov 2022). Furthermore, many philosophers and humanities scholars, having moved to Siberian and Central Asian cities during the war, stayed on, giving a boost to philosophical schools there. Finally, the gigantic reconstruction program of the western regions of the USSR that had experienced massive destruction during the war also supported an ambiguous process of return for Soviet philosophy. Philosophical centers (university faculties, departments in institutes, and / or academic research institutes) were established or reopened in Chisinau, Kyiv, Leningrad, Minsk, Moscow, Riga, Vilnius, and many other cities. At the same time, these centers were to promote Soviet Marxism and support ideological control over the populations that had been under Nazi occupation. These populations were now permanently suspected of collaboration or disloyalty, and ideological control over them was part of internal security policy.

By 1950, the network consisting of the central and republican Academies of Sciences, universities with philosophy faculties, and post-graduate and doctoral schools were fully established or restored. As of 1946, there were 4,836 educators in the Soviet system of science and education, of whom 44 were doctors of philosophical sciences (habilitated doctors), while 75 percent had no academic degree.

The philosophical educational institutions, despite ideological control, were disseminating knowledge of philosophy (albeit with a Soviet Marxist twist). A special role in maintaining intellectual life was played by the history of philosophy, which opened up space for encounters with classical thought. Contemporary foreign philosophical literature was rarely translated, and access to it was limited to special sections of libraries. Still, the educational system started producing large multilingual works on the history of philosophy. Despite the partisan and class-based approach and the reinvigorated ideological frenzy of 1946 - 52, through these philosophical works, the system fostered general educated interest in rational thought, logic, dialectic, the methodology of scientific cognition, and the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. The first semi-official student clubs were organized, providing humble platforms for debates on dialectic and the logic of scientific discovery, which were later continued at much deeper levels. On these groups in the Late Stalinist period, see Lektorskij & Bykova 2019; Korsakov 2022; Tishbeisky 2022.

To sum up, the Soviet philosophical condition in this period acquired the status of an officially central discipline. Because of this special status, strict-in fact, totalitariancontrol was established over philosophical thinking and debate. Philosophers had either to accept the “magistral Line” doctrines, or hide underground to survive, or die. The ideological monopoly peaked in this period, casting both philosophical contemplation and practice into the chasm of existential impossibility. As the “main scientific discipline,” philosophy was forced to combine ideological tasks with proper philosophical aims and with the role of supervising the sciences' participation in what the Soviet bureaucracy's lingo called “the practice of socialist reconstruction.” In this period, the surface of official philosophy was institutionalized and integrated with the party and security bodies, while non-official philosophy was forced to a minimal existence.

2.3 Ideological confusion and incipient return of philosophical pluralism, 1956 - 64

The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent fight over succession began a process of slow de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union. The second half of the 1950s turned out to be a period of philosophical reanimation (Lektorskij & Bykova 2019; Dubrovskij 2022). Some lacunae in the public space emerged for non-official philosophy (as well as for other intellectual practices, from poetry to mysticism) with the Khrushchev Thaw, when the “cult of [Stalin-Djugashvili's] personality” was denied at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. For the Soviet philosophical condition, this meant a return to communication between the different levels and circles of philosophy and the opening of interdisciplinary debates. The thaw, however, did not end the supremacy of MarxismLeninism on the official level. The Soviet system still needed some changes to reshape power relations and reinvigorate the truth regime in the Soviet Union. As Adam Ulam well expressed it, the Soviet power system required periods of both increase and decrease in the degree of terror to be effective (Ulam, 1963: 399). In consequence, the Soviet philosophical condition remained structurally unchanged, although the life of thought at the lower levels and in marginal centers was much more active in this period.

In this period, philosophy was given a certain space for its own reorganization. If in the previous post-war period philosophical institutions grew in number, after 1956 it was evident that these institutions began to experience qualitative change, especially in terms of the people taking the lead in them. In the Soviet republics, new heads of institutes of philosophy were appointed, and new deans of philosophy faculties were elected. Moreover, post-war philosophers started publishing articles with views and ideas departing from the “magistral line.” These publications promoted reassessment of the “ideological frenzy” period and philosophy's role in it. Especially in works by A. Solzhenitsyn, B. Djakonov, and others. In this new stage, publications in “samizdat” form took on the main role in disseminating information about local dissident and Western philosophical thought (Komaromi 2012; Gordeeva 2020). Thanks to samizdat, a forgotten culture of free-thinking philosophizing began to revive in certain levels and circles. However, neither the distribution of these texts nor the speed of discussion could satisfy the need for normal philosophical communication. Also, these unofficial publications were mainly focused on issues raised in Russian philosophical or theological centers, while Belarussian, Georgian, Lithuanian, or Ukrainian thinkers were published only sporadically in samizdat (Bungs 1988; Zisserman-Brodsky 2003; Anders 2020; Melnykova 2018).

These conditions of ideological confusion also created a chance for official philosophical institutions to bloom. The resonance of philosophical development through most of the levels and centers gave researchers like Florovskij and Epstein grounds to call it a philosophical awakening (Florovskij 1998: 17; Epstein 2019: 6). Mikhail Epstein, who studied works by philosophers of this period extensively, offered a summary of eight philosophical directions that were defined in the late 1950s - 60s and developed into the 1980s, with some impact on philosophies after the caesura of 1989 - 91 (Epstein 2019: 10-13). My own research supports Epstein's findings, although I studied philosophical work not only in the Russian centers of the USSR, but also in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Ukraine.

The first direction is what can be called late Soviet Marxism, which diverged into nationalist and humanist strands. The union of Marxism with nationalism was instigated by Stalin-Jugashvili's article “Marxism and Problems of Linguistics” (2008 [1950]). Epstein is right in suggesting that in this text, the Marxist concept of class gave way to the “national unity” embodied in the “national language” and supported the proletarian case around the world (Epstein 2019: 10). However, it is important to note that there were different traditions of the Marxism-nationalism merger in many Soviet republics well before Stalin-Jugashvili's text; the article, however, legitimized such merger in the Soviet philosophical condition. This merger has later influenced political philosophy in Russia in the 1980s, but even before this, it had influenced philosophers in Georgia, Lithuania, and Ukraine to raise the issue of the legitimacy of national cultures in the world proletarian revolution and in the Soviet Union's development in the 1970s (Dziuba 1974; Gamsakhurdia 1976; on this, see also Vaitiekunas 1965; Parming 1977; Duik & Karatnycky 1990; Johnston 1993).

This tendency was also connected with the non-Marxist philosophy of national spirit, oriented toward Slavophilism, different ethnonationalisms, and the neotraditionalism of thinkers like Rene Guenon and Giulio Evola (Julius Evola) (Epstein 2019: 12). I would also include here the Heideggerian influence that was interpreted by some philosophical groups as the ontology of (ethno)national spirit, which is still an influential tendency in Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine (De George 1965; Sverdiolas & Kacerauskas 2009; Karpenko 2014; Kavaliauskas 2018; Sharpe 2020).

The second Epstein's direction was the Marxist humanist tendency also had its roots in the 1950s, but it was connected with the Russian translation of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844). This tendency was critical for the de-Stalinization of Soviet Marxism-Leninism and offered the possibility of “socialism with a human face.” This line came under pressure after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and returned in Perestroika times after 1986 (Epstein 2919: 10). Its characteristic ideas can also be found in the leftist dissident thought of the 1970s.

Another direction in Soviet philosophy of that period was connected with neorationalism, structuralism, and general methodology. In this area, philosophical study was entering the fields of the natural sciences and humanities on the issues of research methods and the methodology of scientific cognition as such. Here, philosophers were allowed to work with a lesser degree of ideological control, which resulted in interdisciplinary studies in formalism, semiotics, general systems theory, cultural studies, social organizations, and cybernetics (Epstein 2019: 10-11; see also Waldstein 2008 and Tishbeisky 2022). It is worth mentioning that this Line starts even before 1956. As the study of Ilya Tishbeisky shows, the Moscow Logical Circle was active since 1952 / 3, and it was a space that gave Life to Georgij Scedrovickij- Led metodologija movement, a specific Soviet philosophical movement distant to Marxism and supported by some party and government bodies (Tishbeisky 2022: 88). However, I do not agree with Tishbeisky's conclusion that 1960s - 1980s were the years of the Soviet Marxism's retreat (Tishbeisky 2022: 88-90). Yes, the Soviet Marxism was losing its “philosophical quality” due to increasing cynicism and aversion of new generation of philosopher to other questions where Marxism had a lesser significance; but it was also reinstated its hegemony under Mikhail Suslov, and it was far more proliferated in the educational system than under Stalin. This direction of theoretical studies and research was widely practiced in post-Soviet academies of the 1990s.

The direction that Epstein called personalism and liberalism was a Soviet philosophical and literary reception of post-war European existentialism (mainly represented by the ideas of Sartre and Camus) along with reinterpretations of Dostoevsky's, Berdiaev's, and Lev Shestov's ideas. It gave an impetus to many philosophical works at both official and underground levels and equally inspired leftist and liberal dissidents supporting human rights as a foundation for social progress (Epstein 2019: 11; see also Shlapentokh 1990: 22ff).

Soviet philosophy and theory of culture, or culturology, was an attempt to legitimize the idea of cultural dialogue in the field defined by Soviet Marxism and the doctrine of class struggle. There were Soviet philosophers who, in a way, continued the theoretical work of Spengler, Florenskij, and Bakhtin with the key concepts of dialogue, otherness, polyphony, and carnival (Epstein 2019: 11; see also Dragadze 1978; Bibler 2009; Soboleva 2016).

There was also a growing influence of Christian thought on Soviet philosophers. In Russia, this return of Christian thought related to the impact of literary works by Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn, while in the Soviet republics it was influenced by other sources, including Ukrainian Greek Catholic, Lithuanian Catholic, and Georgian Orthodox theologians (Gobar 1978; Vardys 1982; Senyk 2002). In 1988, when the Soviet leadership allowed celebrations of the 1,000^th anniversary of Rus' baptism, the religious renaissance began using the foundations laid by these underground religious-philosophical streams.

This philosophical awakening was also connected with the returning influence of cosmism and mysticism. The Thaw allowed various gnostic, occult, and theosophical doctrines back into discussions in philosophical circles, where they were synthesized with modern scientific theories. In this context, the legacy of Konstantin Ciolkovskij, Nikolai Roerich, Vladimir Vernadskij, and other thinkers was reinvented and turned into influential doctrines confessed in groups around the USSR (Epstein 2019: 13; see also Menzel 2013; Siddiqi 2016; Terbish 2020).

The eight years of “ideological confusion” provided short-lived liberation to official philosophical centers not only in Moscow and Leningrad but also in other cities like Almaty, Kazan', Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Vilnius. For example, contemporary Ukrainian philosophy is rooted in the processes of this period. With the arrival of Pavel Kopnin in Kyiv as director of the Institute of Philosophy (of the Ukrainian Academy of Science), a long process of institutionalization and capacity-building in the philosophical practice of the Ukrainian SSR began. Kopnin dared to link seminars (in historical and dialectical materialism, as well as in philosophy of science) in the institute with the philosophy faculty of Kyiv State University, which resulted in the creation of an entire generation of Ukrainian philosophers. The University itself underwent reorganization when the history and philosophy faculty were “merged” and new departments were established: the Department of the History and Theory of Atheism, which served as the center of antireligious propaganda in the enlarged USSR; the Department of Modern Philosophy; and the Laboratory of Social Research, which became the first center of sociology in the Ukrainian SSR.

As in Moscow, official philosophy partially began communicating with non-loyal and dissident thinkers. Vasyl Lisovyj, a witness to these processes, described this communicative situation in the following way:

There were no sharp borders between the broad intellectual and cultural movement of the 1960s ... and professional (academic) philosophy-not only in terms of ideas, but also in terms of personalities. (Lisovyj 2007: 64)

As an example, Lisovyj refers to the fact that dissidents Ivan Dzyuba (1931 - 2022), Vasyl Stus (1938 - 1985), Jevhen Sverstyuk (1928 - 2014), and attended universities or institutes, while Mykhailo Braichevs'kyj (1924 - 2001), Mykhailyna Kotsjubyns'ka (1931 - 2011), Ivan Svitlichnyj (1929 - 1992), and others officially worked in academic centers. This situation had a positive effect on both groups of thinkers. Ukrainian non-official philosophy was a source of non-communist ideas, which took both liberal democratic and national conservative forms. The former was directed at the democratization of the USSR and the establishment of a liberal regime in all republics of the Union. Meanwhile, the national conservatives gravitated toward ethnocultural values and promoted a nationalist program. For its part, academic philosophy increasingly focused on the study of logic, dialectic, and scientific methodology, thereby developing the rationalist virtues of Soviet Ukrainian philosophy. At this time, the history of philosophy was the disciplinary space where non-Marxist philosophical research was possible.

This thaw was short-lived, but the ideological disorientation of the authorities gave philosophers an opportunity to deal with the totalitarian trauma, restore some elements of doctrinal pluralism, and advance several long-term directions that were partially connected with foreign philosophical centers and continued to grow until after the second caesura.

2.4 The professionalization of philosophy and the proliferation of ideological cynicism, 1965 - 85

The 1964 Brezhnev coup was followed by the establishment of Mikhail Suslov's neo-Stalinist ideological policy, which tried to control the results of the Thaw, including those in philosophy. At the time, Soviet philosophy was being further institutionalized at the official and semi-official levels, while communication with foreign philosophers was more open for those Soviet scholars who were regarded as loyal. Moreover, philosophical education, while remaining essentially dogmatic, was somewhat improving.

According to A. Ogurtsov, in 1975 there were 4,370 students studying philosophy with the philosophy faculties of seven universities, namely the universities at Kazakh (in Almaty), Kyiv, Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov, Tbilisi, and Ural (in Sverdlovsk). In the 1970s, these faculties prepared about 800 specialists in philosophy annually. As of 1976, 13,745 philosophy professors were teaching Marxist-Leninist philosophy throughout the higher educational institutions of the USSR. At that time, there were 351 habilitated doctors and 6,554 candidates of philosophical sciences among them. The highest qualification in philosophical studies was provided by post-graduate programs at the universities, the academic institutes, the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee and republican party organizations, and the Higher Party Schools (Ogurtsov 1989: 7ff). The Soviet philosophical condition involved ever more professionals in philosophy- educated intellectuals whose ideas mattered and who were permanently in the situation of facing the impossible choice stemming from the practice-contemplation double alienation.

Soviet philosophy dwelt in university faculties that grew in terms of people involved and new departments established. These departments focused on the allowed philosophical areas and themes. For example, the philosophy faculty of Kyiv State University, after it was restored as a separate part of the university in 1965, consisted of departments focused on the following thematic areas: history of philosophy; philosophy of the humanities; philosophy of the natural sciences; ethics; aesthetics; logic; psychology and pedagogy; history and theory of atheism; and scientific communism. At Moscow University and Leningrad University, the areas were approximately the same, while at other universities the number of departments was somewhat smaller, usually from three to five.

Philosophy curricula throughout the Soviet Union grew at the expense of general cultural courses and included the following: dialectical materialism; historical materialism; history of foreign philosophy; history of philosophy of the Soviet peoples; history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy; modern bourgeois philosophy and ideology; aesthetics; ethics; history of religion and atheism; the world history module (from the history of the ancient world to contemporary history); the field of socio-economic disciplines (scientific communism, political economy of socialism and capitalism, history of CPSU); psychological and pedagogical sciences; and, finally, the division of natural and exact sciences (basics of modern mathematics, general and theoretical physics, and basics of biology). Such training was expected to provide Soviet “philosophy specialists” with a thorough materialist education integrated with the social and natural sciences. At the same time, general education in the humanities Lagged far behind, owing to a lack of fundamental courses in the classical Languages, history of art, etc. The worst situation was that of knowledge of languages, critical thinking, academic writing, public speaking, and theological studies. The general framework of the curriculum was set up to reproduce a materialist and Marxist historicist worldview among those receiving the Soviet philosophical education.

The training of teachers of Marxism and other philosophical disciplines was put on a Ford-style assembly line after 1966, when a compulsory course on “scientific communism” was introduced in all the USSR's educational institutions. For this course, a specialist in philosophy had to be prepared not only to deliver the doctrine to vast audiences but also to skillfully answer questions from “immature” youth. A special difficulty arose when that youth wanted to discuss the difference between the principles proclaimed by the authorities and real everyday life in the USSR. The philosophical faculties issued so-called “methodological recommendations” that could help specialists find correct answers to problematic questions. These correct answers, in a way, demonstrate that the course and its methodology aimed at convincing audiences rather than developing their thinking abilities-a perverse strategy opposing and subverting the Socratic maieutic. A summary of such “wise advice” can be found in Tadevosyan et al. 1987. On transgressive Socratic cynicism, please see Mocalova 2020.

Despite these conditions, the Soviet philosophical awakening continued in the above-mentioned philosophical directions. However, there were valuable additions. First of all, in the 1970s - 80s, Soviet philosophy and other intellectual and artistic practices were developing their own conceptualism and postmodernism (Epstein 2019: 13). Conceptualist and early postmodernist ironic optics focused on Soviet Marxist conceptslike collectivism, equality, and the people-and undermined their ideological meaning. The centers of this wave were visible in Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Lviv, and Novosibirsk, but these ideas also found wider audiences around the Soviet Union.

This ironic trend in philosophical circles was merging with another tendency of this stage: cynicism. Whereas during the rule of Stalin-Jugashvili and Khrushchev, the ideological guidelines of Marxism-Leninism were largely unquestionable for those working in official philosophical institutions, in the 1970s to early 1980s intellectuals could reduce the introjection of the Marxist creed through cynical compartmentalization. In the introductory parts of their works, Soviet philosophers were to mention Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but they did so only as an empty ritual, a defensive gesture. Although Marxist language remained in texts, thinkers tried to maintain personal distance from the doctrine. This practice allowed the preservation of their inner freedom of contemplation, but at the price of the self-humiliating refusal to engage in public discussion or action. For more on this late Soviet cynicism, see Yudin 1993 and Jermolenko 2003.

This cynicism, however, was an alternative to Orwellian doublethink: a cynical position provided some painful integrity to the late Soviet personality that was paradoxically genuine in official and intimate controversies. For more on this non-binary Sovietness, please see Yurchak 2013: 12ff. In terms of the Soviet philosophical condition, this cynicism was a result of acceptance of the chasm as an existential platform: it provided physical safety, a stable income, and the ability to philosophize-even if the results of this philosophizing were not for public use. It is worth mentioning that this cynicism was relatively non-productive: philosophical texts that were considered highly valid in the 1970s and 1980s are not in demand in today's philosophical world-we have enough dogmatists and cynics of our own.

Another strong trend was the nationalization of philosophical processes in all the Soviet republics, including Russia. Alongside the slow decline of Soviet Marxism as a philosophical position, some local patriotic and nationalist tendencies were growing in Moscow, Kyiv, Tbilisi, and elsewhere. In philosophy, this was reflected in the opening of departments for the study of the national philosophical heritage. For example, despite the stern control of the republican Central Committees over the non-proliferation of “bourgeois nationalism,” researchers were looking at Georgian religious teachings, the links between Islam and philosophy in Kazan, or the Mohylian philosophical heritage in Ukraine.

This tendency started in the late 1960s, and in the 1970s it was always on the margins of the official philosophical surface, needing constant administrative defense from ideological censorship. For example, the Mohylian research was possible due to constant political cover by Pavel Kopnin, initially director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Kyiv) and later director of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Moscow). Later, the ideological and methodological foundations of these pre-discursive nationalist conventions manifested in the second caesura and in the early 1990s, when nationalism-in its different forms- became the major source of legitimacy for the new truth regimes and social orders in independent Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine.

The chiefs of the philosophical centers (heads of academic institutes and university faculties, ideological workers of the Central Committee, and their entourages) were able to create working conditions for a generation of philosophers who were born from the spirit of the Thaw and its associated philosophical awakening. This allowed Genrikh Batishchev (1932 - 1990), Vladimir Bibler (1918 - 2000), Evald Ilyenkov (1924 - 1979), Vadim Ivanov (1933 - 1991), Mikhail Lifshyts (1905 - 1983), Jurij Lotman (1922 - 1993), Merab Mamardashvili (1930 - 1990), Nelli Motrosllova (1934 - 2021), Svetlana Neretina (b. 1941), Mikhail Petrov (1923 - 1987), Myroslav Popovych (1930 - 2018), Georgij Scedrovickij (1929 - 1994), Alexander Zinoviev (1922 - 2006), and many others to work in a relatively comfortable environment. On this cohort of philosophers, please see Kantor 2009; Motrosllova 2009; Tolstyh 2009; Lektorskij 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2014; Arslanov 2010; Popovych 2010. However, there were very specific parameters, including institutionalized censorship and ideological monopoly, waves of repression of dissidents, and pressures to move from philosophical centers into other, less ideologically important academic institutes. Yet there were also some limited possibilities for publications, seminars, and communication with foreign colleagues. As Motrosllova described it from her own experience, this was a philosophical situation based on an antinomy: there were censors and controllers from Stalin-era

Marxist centers-but there were also “creative communities,” spaces of free philosophical creativity and communication, despite all disciplinary and political borders (Motrosllova 2013: 6, 14-15; Motrosllova & Tatarenko 2018: 343-45).

The late Soviet post-totalitarian power and truth regime were still strong. Even in 1983, at the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Stalinist solutions were offered in response to increasing social dissatisfaction with the standards of living:

The political vigilance of the Soviet people, their irreconcilability with hostile views, their ability to resist the ideological diversions of the class enemy... should be increased and strengthened. [to fight] the opportunistic raids on the real socialism. (Materialy 1983: 70-71)

Andropov's attempted reforms and increased ideological censorship demonstrated that the authorities' zeal to reinstate totalitarian rule and ideocracy lacked both human and institutional resources.

Indeed, despite the control and ideological monopoly, the development of philosophical research in the areas of the history of philosophy and “critique of bourgeois doctrines” provided access to contemporary non-Marxist philosophical thought (Dewey, Husserl, Heidegger, Ricreur, Habermas, etc.). Official philosophical publications, including some in the languages of the national republics, were growing in numbers and spread ideas not limited to Marxism. Studies of Kant and Hegel-due to their role as predecessors of Marx-were recognized as having the right not only to exist but also to develop actively, creating late Soviet “Kantians” and “Hegelians.” All this served as a basis for the philosophical leap to the Perestroika stage of the Soviet philosophical condition.

2.5 Decline of ideological monopoly and fuller return of philosophical pluralism, 1986 - 91

By the early 1980s, the Soviet Union faced the existential problems generated not only by political, security, and economic situations but also by its very success in education. An inflexible ideological frame, cynical professors, and a huge educational and party bureaucracy simply could not react to the demands of social development and globalization. The watershed in Soviet domestic politics was the XXVII Congress of the CPSU (February 27 - March 6, 1986), at which the need for urgent measures in the spheres of economic and social development was acknowledged. Furthermore, the success of the needed executive measures depended on deep economic and administrative reforms, democratization of the decision-making process, and liberties for those involved in the analysis and interpretation of the causes and consequences of catastrophic socioeconomic processes. For that reason, one of the main decisions of the congress was articulated in a document called “The Main Trends of Perestroika of Higher and Secondary Education,” which demanded a “new quality” of personnel training for industry and administration to restore socioeconomic progress. This new education and training system had to maintain equilibrium between “ideological and political maturity” and professionalism (Sickarenko 2013: 163).

Gorbachev's educational reforms coincided with those in Britain and Japan. In the 1980s, Britain and Japan also faced the issue of educational systems unable to meet the needs of the globalizing economy. However, their reforms were not targeting an educational system that had been tasked with social engineering. In the Soviet Union, the Perestroika reforms started with the idea that the “new Soviet man” had never been formed in the USSR, in spite of all the revolutionary victims and efforts of the previous fifty years. This meant the education system had to give up on social engineering and be reoriented from the quest for Soviet Man to the needs of the economy and effective management. Gorbachev's reforms aimed at changing the ideological “cement” of the USSR's political regime and social order.

Quite predictably, the role of philosophical education in this context was seen as highly important. Characteristically, the Soviet mind assumed that the policy of glasnost had to be morally and ideologically grounded to be effective. Philosophy had to provide Soviet society with discursive conventions that would allow it to accept pluralism of opinion and the necessity of public discussion while limiting the negative results of public discord. The Soviet philosophical condition, however, had not prepared philosophers to act publicly, think critically, or to link contemplation, practice, and experience. In consequence, the party's tasks were never implemented by philosophers, at least not in the ways party leaders wanted.

Instead, Soviet philosophy was actively participating in, if not leading, the process of `de-platforming' the ideological monopoly and all the historical myths and identity posits of the Soviet lifeworld. The normative and rational force of philosophy, as well as of many other intellectual practices, was applied to launching the process of critical review of what had been laid down in the foundations of the Soviet society and regime- the process that Anatolij Tykholaz called “unmasking” (Tykholaz 1998: 60). Many heretofore suppressed facts about the crimes of the Soviet authorities and many official myths about heretofore-worshiped idols and demonized opponents of Soviet power were quickly brought into the center of public attention.

The Memorial movement, banned in Russia last year, stemmed from this process. Intellectuals focused on unmasking the past to such an extent that collective memory became the field of struggle, in which liberals from the Memorial movement fought with neo-Sovietist conservatives from the Pamiat' (Memory) movement and with many nationalist intellectuals promoting an ethnonational revival of the past. Historical studies of the Soviet past by figures like Roy Medvedev or Alexander Solzhenitsin were at the center of public debate (Solzhenitsin 1989; Medvedev 2010). In addition, non-Marxist sociological studies of the late Soviet society commanded considerable interest (Zukov 2003: 15ff).

Philosophy, however, did not assume the role of a Weberian science, which to rationalize the lifeworld had to focus on the present and the future. Official philosophers were ignored as they tried to use disrespected Marxist language or demonstrate their cynical approach. Unofficial, dissident philosophers quickly became engaged in the political struggles of liberals, social democrats, national patriots, etc., whose voices were too contradictory to be heard. With rare exceptions, as in the Mamardashvili case, philosophers could not offer a nonpartisan opinion-yet if they did, they were not listened to since the opinions they expressed were too unpopular and thus provocative. Soon before the caesura of 1989 - 91, philosophy relinquished its central position in the Soviet lifeworld to the historians, who soon came in addition to inspire legal studies, literary fiction, and aesthetic theory.

One of the reasons that history-and historical fiction-became the leading intellectual practice was that Soviet philosophical institutes and faculties did not immediately accept Perestroika's call for pluralism. The official surface was still influenced by ideological inertia, continued party control, and a sort of disciplinary snobbism that restrained philosophers from timely reaction to the public's demands. Philosophers from other layers and centers were fast becoming involved in many new opportunities in journalism, politics, religion, and business (especially publishing). In 1988 - 91, tens of philosophical books by previously forbidden authors-just to name a few, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, and Pavel Florenskij-were re-published, and many new translations of core 20^th-century philosophical works were undertaken. In 1989-91, the number of translations of philosophical, historical, and sociological works doubled annually (Khapaeva 2005: 10-11). At all levels, the Soviet philosophical condition was falling into ruin from blows struck by the philosophers themselves.

Furthermore, philosophical education was dropping off in the structures of the Soviet condition. In Moscow, the democratization of philosophical education began around 1988. That year, the election of the dean of the philosophy faculty of Moscow State University drew considerable publicity when Professor Alexander Panin defeated the candidate promoted by the authorities. Panin immediately instituted reforms, bringing many new intellectuals onto the faculty in newly established departments and launching the project of a new philosophy textbook. For the centralized Soviet educational system, this new textbook offered the start of decommunization. A group of philosophers and sociologists headed by Professor Ivan Frolov developed a new Perestroika-style two-volume textbook (Frolov et al. 1989).

The Introduction to Philosophy became an extremely popular product used by most humanities and social sciences centers in the Soviet educational system to displace the Marxist didactic texts. By the end of 1989, Perestroika's influence had already spread to the philosophical centers in Almaty, Kyiv, Minsk, Tbilisi, and elsewhere. But everywhere- with the exception of the Baltic countries-philosophical institutions remained closely tied to the authorities and had a very narrow space for influencing the style and content of late Soviet politics.

The pluralism of philosophical ideas and communication platforms led to the destruction of the Soviet philosophical condition. This pluralism provided philosophers with more opportunities to revise their own positions, study more widely, and take time for contemplation and practice. By the time of the second caesura, the chaos of intellectual and social processes was opening new horizons for the life of philosophy in new cultural and political conditions.

Conclusions

The life of philosophy since the dissolution of the USSR has put an end to the alternative status of the Soviet philosophical condition. Its structures, limitations, and incentives have ceased to exist, and the philosophical processes in the societies of Eastern Europe and Northern Eurasia no longer constitute an alternative This non-alternative status still means a long philosophical silence (or lack of new ideas) in the East. apart from other contemporary philosophies. Philosophers from these societies have adapted to the new conditions of theoretical work, including a great decrease in both authoritarian control and public interest, as well as the hegemony of philosophical ideas from outside the region.

As I have argued, the Soviet philosophical condition was a product of the caesura of 1917 - 22, which moved philosophy from its place as one of many intellectual practices into the center of the struggle for the power and truth regime. This caesura constituted not only a rupture in cultural continuity but also an ontological event that critically changed the life of philosophy.

Before the Soviet philosophical condition came to an end with the caesura of 1989 - 91, it developed in five different stages through which at least three generations of philosophers lived and worked. Arguably, their philosophical institutions, directions, and practices survived the changes of 1989 - 91 and may still be found, though on a different scale, in the contemporary intellectual landscape of Eastern Europe and Northern Eurasia.

My study is an attempt to reconsider Soviet philosophy as a condition and to offer a periodization of its development. A clear portrait of the evolving characteristics of this condition provides researchers on Soviet philosophical thought with an opportunity to better understand the logic of its development, its sociopolitical context, the motivations of individual philosophers, and the elements that may still be found in contemporary philosophical processes. The periodization offered is a result of looking at the development of Soviet philosophy in terms of a balance among political, wider intellectual, and narrower philosophical factors. In combination, these lenses may help better understand how philosophy can live within, be subordinate to, yet ultimately undermine the power regimes creating ontological obstacles to philosophical contemplation and practice.

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