Performativity of actions: possible mappings with Jennifer Hornsby's views on acting, actions, activity and agency

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Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

Performativity of actions: possible mappings with Jennifer Hornsby's views on acting, actions, activity and agency

Anna Laktionova

Doctor of science (Philosophy)

associate professor

Abstract

The article is devoted to outlining crucial aspects of defended approach to actions and agency in comparative with primarily J. Hornsby's views. The proposed approach is continuation of developed in the defended by the author candidate (PhD) and doctoral dissertations ideas. J. Hornsby is an outstanding classical philosopher of nowadays, her legacy is connected primarily with analytic tradition; and within it with philosophy of action and agency, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology. Particularities of and relations between such important, but remaining to be vague notions as actions, events, facts, norms, values, evaluations were clarified (using the method of tables). These tasks disclosed ontological (metaphysical) modes actual for both philosophy of action and agency from one side and ontology (metaphysics) - from another. Ontology of action involves metaphysical processing (performing of action) and metaphysical results (achievements by action). The mentioned seem in accordance with J. Hornsby's views. Standard treatments of actions and agency were critically mentioned. The critics against them is due to missing or rather losing in and by them the need of the notion of an agent; because it is intention that causes an action. In the defended approach, as well as in J. Hornsby's theory, the role of an agent has priority. But the most interesting notion from her findings is proved to be trying or attempt to act. It was diversely described, used and shown promising. When successful trying to action coincides with this action. Trying to action is a reason for action. Trying to action does not represent, but present an action. Thus, justification of an action is directly within the action; because action performatively shows itself. Actions performatively validate correspondent events, facts, norms, values, evaluations.

Keywords: Hornsby, Acting, Actions, Activity, Agency, Events, Facts, Norms, Values, Evaluations.

Анна Лактіонова, д-р філос. наук, доц.

Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка, Київ, Україна

Перформаційність дій: можливі відповідності з поглядами Дженіфер Горнсбі про процес дії, дії, активність, здатність до дій

Анотація

ontological philosophy action hornsby

Стаття присвячена висвітленню наріжних аспектів підходу до дій і активності, який захищає авторка, в порівнянні з, в першу чергу, поглядами Дж. Горнсбі. Запропонований підхід є продовженням розвинутих авторкою в кандидатській і докторській дисертаціях ідей. Дж. Горнсбі є провідним класичним філософом сьогодення, її доробок пов'язаний в першу чергу з аналітичною традицією, а в її межах з філософією дії і активності, філософією мови, філософією свідомості, метафізикою, епістемологією. Окремішності і стосунки між такими важливими, проте неясними поняттями як дії, події, факти, норми, цінності, оцінки були прояснені (з використанням методу таблиць). Такі завдання відкрили онтологічні (метафізичні) модуси, актуальні як для філософії дії і активності, з одного боку, так і для онтології (метафізики) - з іншого. Онтологія дії залучає метафізичну процесуальність (перформаційність дії) і метафізичні результати (досягнення завдяки діям). Зазначене виявляється відповідним поглядам Дж. Горнсбі. Стандартні витлумачення дій і активності критично згадуються. Критика проти них пов'язана з відсутністю чи втратою в них потреби в понятті дієвець; адже намір спричиняє дію. У підході, що пропонується, а також в теорії Дж. Горнсбі, роль дієвця пріоритетна. Але найбільш цікавим в її розробках було виявлено поняттям "спроба до дії'. Воно було різноманітно описане, використане і показане плідним. Якщо успішна, спроба до дії збігається з дією. Спроба до дії є підставою дії. Спроба до дії не репрезентує, а презентує дію. Отже, обґрунтування дії є безпосередньо всередині цієї дії, адже дія перформаційно показує себе. Дії перформаційно валідують відповідні події, факти, норми, цінності і оцінки.

Ключові слова: Горнсбі, процес дії, дії, активність, здатність до дій, події, факти, норми, цінності, оцінки.

Introduction

Every action is performative. By performativity I mean realization, accomplishment of what is being performed by action. Every action is self-demonstrating and self-justifying by being performative. Nevertheless, that realization, accomplishment of an action demonstrates and automatically justifies of what is being performed, there remain place for its interpretation. Interpretation of actions can involve juxtaposition with such concepts as appropriate events, facts, values, evaluations, norms. Constitution of action can be treated in terms of attempt or trying to act, to perform an action. Attempt to action is different from intention to action. Intention to action is standardly seen as entailed from beliefs and desires of the agent; intention in standard approaches is a reason or even cause of action.

In the article I explicate the relations between actions, events, facts, values, evaluations, norms. I will compare the defended interpretations with the views of J. Hornsby. She is working largely with the notion of trying or attempt to act, to action. I use selected by me advantages of her findings to support proposed by me exegetics.

In general the presented here findings have rather descriptive then problematizing style; they are within continuation of the developing of theory and concept of action as well as of theory and concept of agency (these are four different (not entailed by each other, but reciprocally consistent) issues) started by me in the postdoctoral research (the result of which was defense in 2016 of the doctoral thesis under the title "Philosophy of Action and Agency: New Perspective of Theoretical and Practical Philosophical Disciplines" and further publications).

Literature review

In this paper I mostly refer to several classical works of J. Hornsby on philosophy of action and agency where she puzzles out of actions and trying (attempts) to actions. She became to be known from the seventies years of twentieth century. She contributed a lot into philosophy of language, philosophy of action and agency, correspondingly into metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind. She is an outstanding example of female being highly successful in philosophy. Her general acknowledgement as a classical contemporary figure in philosophy promotes positive attitudes to female or even feministic sentiments in today's philosophical discourses.

Referring to J. Hornsby's papers I do not claim to exhaustively outline her ideas. I rather pick up some of them; and I try to show, to use, to interpret them (hopefully without distorting) to be in accordance with what I insist to be important in the context of the proposed by me research.

Literature on philosophy of action and agency grows every year. Interest to these philosophical fields became to be intensive from the second part of twentieth century and is still increasing. It's going up started within philosophy of language. In particular, legacies of L. Wittgenstein, J. Austing stimulated its increasement. But the most actual today basic source for sprouting literature on philosophy of action and agency (the interest to agency from very beginning was not as wide as it recently appears during the lasts decades) is so called standard approach to action and agency proposed by D. Davidson and E. Anscombe. They did not invent it together, but contributions of both of them are evidently associated with the beginning of contemporary philosophy of action and agency in analytic tradition of philosophy in general.

Methods

In general, the methodology of the current research is within Analytic philosophy, Practical philosophy, Philosophy of Actions and Agency. Among the investigative methods employed here the following could be mentioned: analysis, comparison, historical and conceptual reconstructions, contextualization, constructivism and modeling, method of tables.

Findings

Relying on the principle of performativity, ascribing to actions performative nature opens interesting ways to understand and justify them (actions) and to line out relations between them and other touchstone philosophical concepts, such as events, facts, norms, values, evaluations.

Comparing actions and events, different metaphysical modes appear relevant. Action needs an agent, event - does not. Both, events and actions, involve processing of something. Actions can be treated in terms of results (and sometimes result is crucial for action as such). Both actions and events can be a subject of reflection, evaluation and valuing. One and the same issue, plot often can be described differently, alternatively in terms of actions and events. Actions are not to be defined or even described in terms of events (this appears divergent with the standard approaches to actions).

Another opposite to events metaphysical pole involves facts. Facts, opposite to events, are not processes, they can be metaphorically called "cut out from events pieces" in epistemological context of being known and acknowledged 'states of the world'. Fact cannot be unknown - then it is not a fact; fact needs to be established (involves the points of discovering and inventing simultaneously), accepted and widespread. Thus, fact is also a subject of reflection (recognizing of it "before our faces"), evaluation (in terms of truth, no fact can be false, but evaluation in terms of truth can be mistaken) and valuing (at least acknowledging as important, as such). Facts are about the world, we rely as if they were in the world, but they are basically about how we (human beings, agents) can (appeared successful to) establish about the pieces of the world.

At the same time, nevertheless that facts involve values (at least matter for us in proper sense of being taken as a fact), on the opposite formal pole from them are norms. Facts are about "what there is", norms are about "what ought to be". Norms are very problematic as such. My PhD research (under the title "Normativity in Constituting Linguistic Units: a Philosophical Analysis", defended in 2005) was devoted to normativity of speech acts. Norms function simultaneously constitutively and regulatory, are external and internal, can be implicit and take form of explicit rules. This, mentioned above actual for norms, mode of "ought" is relevant for actions. Thus we "close the circle": starting and finishing with actions and evaluative mode of acknowledging.

As the table illustrates, action involves all the mentioned modes. At the same time, evaluative mode appears relevant to all the compared items. Analyzing differently, evaluation and value can be adjusted and be compared with the notions in the upper horizontal row of the table.

Here action and evaluation appear relevant in all the modes. But the modes (metaphysical and epistemological) remained in the second table are rather theoretical (according to the classical philosophical division between theoretical and practical philosophical disciplines and correspondent reasonings). Shall we add practical modes into analysis, let's stay with ethical (mode of "ought" as opposite to "is") and social (at least as commonly unproblematically shared with others "world" of habitual understanding).

In the last table one more mode - the socially commonly habitual mode appears to be relevant to all the notions in the horizontal row of the table. Modes of "ought" and "is" meet on the habitual communality within the notions of action and evaluation. Events are relevant only within the metaphysical processing and habituality; facts - within epistemology, metaphysical results and habituality; norms are formally out of any metaphysics; values - are formally out of metaphysical processing.

The mentioned, important for the maintained here approach points can meet relevant ones from Hornsby's theory. There is a widespread temptation to identify (or at least to refer to synonymously) such relative to action "components" as trying and intending. In the article "Trying to act" J. Hornsby (Hornsby, 2010) critically investigates about it. Trying is taken to be treated as "mental" ingredient of physical actions. A person is producing her actions, she can even be acknowledged as mentally causing of what she physically does in the world. J. Hornsby insists that such a weight of trying might be exaggerated, but critically analyzing it, in comparative with other prominent views of philosophy of actions, clarifies its advantages and disadvantages.

Coming back to the J. Hornsby's paper "Acting and T rying to Act" (Hornsby, 1980) let's stop on physical actions. She claims that they are caused by trying or attempts. Every accomplished action can be seen in the light of attempting to it; and a lot of attempts to act remain to be unaccomplished. There is no action without agent's attempt to it, but there are attempts to actions without proper actions. The last becomes a reason to identify actions with attempts (or trying) to them (actions). Every agent's action can be reduced to her/his trying of it. This claim is independent of any knowing any p, p's being true, and any relying or doubting on the two just mentioned. But trying to action can involve and influence external physical world. Trying to act evidences about available (which can mean possible or imaginable but not existent) between an agent and the world relation; nevertheless, that the description of this relation can be missed or misconceived.

Action goes beyond someone's doing (automatically) something. According to the standard theory of action and agency, intention plays such crucial for an action role as causing it. According to J. Hornsby's approach - attempt to act plays it; and it is independent from whether the action and trying of it coincide. Trying to act is not the same with intention. Intention is not within the action, the first (intention) is always external to the second (action). Trying to act, if successful (accomplished or realized) is always within the action, not just (at least) internal to it, but performatively coincides with the action. Nevertheless, that the agents are not usually considering what they do in terms of attempts unless there is a doubt, difficulty, possibility of fail to succeed in acting, all the actions can easily be described, reflected upon in terms of attempts. There is no unavoidable need to relate intentions and attempts, but every intention to act can be treated in terms of attempt, but not vice versa: attempts can be treated independently from intentions. Attempts to actions are within the common world (habitual world of shared with others social and natural environments), intuitively intersubjectively obvious and reliable. Using the notion of attempt or trying is directly unproblematic in mental, physical and both mental and physical senses.

According to J. Hornsby (Hornsby, 1980), trying to act could be ubiquitous. Her approach is not against volition- ism, can be applied to improve it, but does not entail or coincide with it. She also does not deny standard approaches, in particular - Davidsonian, but does not fully accept it. Claiming on touchstone for an action importance of agent (who performs, produces it) commit to acknowledge his/her personality (even in terms of personal identity, which can also be effectively provided by performativity of agent's actions; actions witness personal identity of an agent) and to assign to him/her freedom (without recognizing freedom (even if it remains to be very vague contradictive notion) of person there is no way to see him/her as agent).

An agent's action causes the result. Action is produced by an agent; thus, an agent causes the result. The agent can be not just an individual person, but a group of people (sum of persons) or community (not reducible to the collection of the participating persons). The mentioned entail correspondent rationality and reasoning: individual, collective, common (the topic of rationality is left out from this paper as it is very specific and wide, it remains to be a fruitful interesting perspective for further applications of the offered approach); unavoidable ontologically responsibility (which is also difficult and "big" theme not for this paper).

Let's appeal to the J. Hornsby's paper "Agency and Actions" (Hornsby, 2004). There she critically analyses standard approaches to agency and actions, possible (mostly event-based) supplementations of such approaches and keeps being attentive to the involving "causation" into analyzing of actions and agency. Standardly, actions are explained in terms of intentions causing them; behind intentions beliefs and desires are recognized. Concepts of agency and causation remain to be dubious. Sometimes avoiding, omitting from an action can be still taken as action or at least as realization of agency (as capacity to perform actions).

In "Actions and Activity" (Hornsby, 2012) J. Hornsby is concerned with the ontological (in general ontological context) issues over human actions and activities (thus ontology of actions and activities is not outside, but is within general ontological prospect) insisting on special importance of agent and inherit by him activities for performing or producing actions. Speaking about actions unavoidably involves speaking about reasons for actions. Reasons need not be, but sometimes appear to be causes. Activity is explicated as type of what agent's action might appear to be. Activity is analogous to stuff, as J. Hornsby insists: both are out of particular notifiable place and are out of processing. Actions are particulars of activities as types. The other way round: samples of actions are generalized into formal types. Description of typical actions can include their connections or oppositions with norms (how to act), values (why action matters), evaluations (how to evaluate actions), facts (what there is independently or dependently to action), events (what is going on - as alternative to what has been proceeded and done by action).

J. Hornsby agrees that actions can be seen in terms of activities and performances; performances - in terms of accomplishments and achievements (Hornsby, 2012: p. 6). These divisions look very appropriate. Actions as activities are types. As for the types of actions there ought to be formal, but habitual norms, values and evaluative procedures which provide examples of acceptable actions. This provision supplies formal justification, thus reasons for widely acknowledged in common world versions of how to act appropriately (in corresponding contexts).

Actions as performances are particular performatively done accomplishments which inherit achievements. Achievements bring attention to results of actions. But an action is not to be reduced just to its result. Similarly, action is not to be reduced to its reasons. Action is within itself. What precede and what proceed the action does not exhaust its constitution, realization and regulation. Each action is performative, but can be reflected upon as being particularity of typical activity. Each performance involves understanding in terms of accomplishments and achievements. Accomplishment shifts attention to processing action.

Discussion and conclusions

So far, the concepts of action, event, fact, norm, value, evaluation were juxtaposed under crucial for the maintained approach to actions and agency principle of performativity. I remain out from giving definitions, but try to explicate performatively the usages, importance and (not just formal) weight of these notions by comparing their reciprocal appropriate applications. The proposed findings were shown to be in accordance with some points from J. Hornsby's approach.

The main sympathy is with her treating actions in terms of attempts (trying to act). Such treating supplies for internal implicit to a performed action directly available constitutive reason for action. Such a reason justifies an action and can be a subject for reflexive externalizing and explicating. Emphasizing on internal implicit performative character of justification of acting does not exclude external explicit analysis of it. The last occur formal and regulative. Action directly presents itself and does not need external representation to be justified. Speaking of attempt to action is within speaking of action: attempt to act is within the act. That is why such a step is always valid. "Speaking" itself is left out from this paper, but it is activity and particular examples of it - speech acts - could be fruitfully used to show the main ideas I tried to look after in this paper.

The provided deliberation turned out to have ontological significance (I have been relying on synonymy between "metaphysics" and "ontology" and derivative terms in this article). At the same time J. Hornsby's considerations are also ontological quite often. Considering actions, their processing and results could matter. Such different metaphysical points of regard open alternative curing of reciprocal attitudes between the related concepts (action, event, fact, norm, value, evaluation). Special care was attached to clarifying activity as action-type, performances of actions correspond to appropriate types. Types provide sample of actions. But performing an action is always unique and actualizes adequate events, facts, norms (in their regulative and constitutive functions), values and evaluations.

Further, in the upheld here elaborations "agent" plays important role. J. Hornsby also saves crucial role for agents in her theory. This specific attention to the role of agent can be viewed as critics against standard interpretations; where it is rather intention that "produces" an action, but not an agent as such.

Thus, the field of philosophy of action and agency is still promising and perspective. Comparisons between different authors, alternative interpretations of terms and approaches are inexhaustible within it.

References

1. Companion to the Philosophy of Action (2010), T. O'Connor and C. Sandis (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell.

2. Hornsby, J. (1980), "Acting and Trying to Act," in Actions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), pp. 33-45.

3. Hornsby, J. (2012) Actions and Activity. Philosophical Issues 22 (1), pp. 233-245.

4. Hornsby, J. (2004), "Agency and Actions," in J. Hyman and H. Steward (eds.), Agency and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-23.

5. Hornsby, J. (2010), "Trying to Act," in T. O'Connor and C. Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 18-25.

6. Philosophy of Actions. An Anthology (2015), J. Dancy and C. Sandis (eds.), Wiley Blackwell.

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